What did Japan plan to do if it won?

It related. Very long careers and huge lags in decision-making have naturally alienated Japanese senior elites from the youths, resulted in a lot of insubordination. The problem was grasped in full after shameful defeat at Khalhin Gol (Nomonhan) though, and wave of "nuts tightening" in IJA has reduced the scale of of problems, although underlying issue of promotion system defect is not solved even today. In 1945, Americans just beheaded senile elite, resulting in one-generation long growth burst, instead of actually fixing the defect.

You'll excuse me if I find the idea that senility, a phenomenon that overwhelmingly tends to manifest after age 65, was common among a leadership body who mostly (not entirely, but mostly) was in their 50s more then a little ludicrous. I also have to express skepticism that a Japan which is victorious in the Pacific would leave just let it's colonies go peacefully at the first sign of anti-imperial movements, given the brutality with which it conquered and ran them as a matter-of-course and particularly given the continuing indoctrination of the next generation of Japanese leadership in the Japanese-style of Racialized Imperialism that was in-vogue during the 30s and early 40s. Far less powerful and prideful countries then our hypothetical Imperial Japan who has triumphed in a Pacific War have tried to hold onto colonial possessions with more stubbornness and brutality then you are supposing.
 
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trurle

Banned
You'll excuse me if I find the idea that senility, a phenomenon that overwhelmingly tends to manifest after age 65, was common among a leadership body who mostly (not entirely, but mostly) was in their 50s more then a little ludicrous. I also have to express skepticism that a Japan which is victorious in the Pacific would leave just let it's colonies go peacefully at the first sign of anti-imperial movements, particularly given the continuing indoctrination of the next generation of Japanese leadership in the Japanese-style of Racialized Imperialism that was in-vogue during the 30s and early 40s. Far less powerful and prideful countries then our hypothetical Imperial Japan who has triumphed in a Pacific War have tried to hold onto colonial possessions with more stubbornness and brutality then you are supposing.
You put too much weight on senility as opposed to early-onset age related conservatism.


My underlying calculation:
~1920-1925: Start of problems of colonial system (lowering productivity and profit margin, resistance to external rulers)
~1933: US, as fastest-loop state of epoch, starts acting on issue (Good Neighbour Policy, planning of Philippine independence)
~1946: Medium-senility states (British) realize the problem too
~1955: Even senile Japan realize the colonies are hindrance rather than any benefit
 
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The Japanese had no planning process like the Nazis had for Lebensraum, Generalplan Ost, etc. Some (undefined) territory was to be Japanese like Korea or Formosa, the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was to be a region of Japanese economic dominance, with compliant locals. Getting rid of the colonial powers was a necessity. Obviously anywhere in the sphere, including conquered Pacific Islands, only the Japanese military would be there, some local forces but small and second line equipment at best. True independence whether for "colonies" like Formosa or Korea or Manchukuo was not in the cards, and any areas that had local governments for day to day administration would be under Japanese "advisors".

Resistance to Japanese control, whether direct, economic, or indirect influence would not end well for those resisting.
 
The Japanese had no planning process like the Nazis had for Lebensraum, Generalplan Ost, etc. Some (undefined) territory was to be Japanese like Korea or Formosa, the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was to be a region of Japanese economic dominance, with compliant locals. Getting rid of the colonial powers was a necessity. Obviously anywhere in the sphere, including conquered Pacific Islands, only the Japanese military would be there, some local forces but small and second line equipment at best. True independence whether for "colonies" like Formosa or Korea or Manchukuo was not in the cards, and any areas that had local governments for day to day administration would be under Japanese "advisors".

Resistance to Japanese control, whether direct, economic, or indirect influence would not end well for those resisting.
Basically it seems the mentality of the top brass and related bureaucrats was, to the extent cogerent planning existed, was "let's treat East Asia as one big Africa."
 
@MatthewB : A more precise description is that that Japanese marched in to a corner, painted much of the floor around them, and finally handed the USA the paint and brush and dared the USA to finish the job. Japan embarked on a war of aggression in China, unsatisfied with the reality that they had acquired "Manchukuo" and the rest of the world accepted this, if reluctantly. As usually happens in war, as the Japanese got more and more stuck in the Chinese tar baby, of their own making, their demands and conditions for war termination got bigger and bigger. The USA, a sort of ally of China (prior to PH) applied increasing pressure to get the Japanese to end the war and this was not a demand for status quo antebellum or giving back Manchukuo. This pressure was economic and was significantly ramped up with the complete embargo after Japan had occupied French Indochina following the Fall of France. At that point Japan had reduced options to the binary choice of come to a conclusion of the war in China or go to war with the USA and the European colonial powers in SEA to seize the resources needed to continue the war it had and fight the other war it was going to start.

The "political" problem in Japan was that the IJA had acquired veto power over what the ostensibly civilian government did, and elements within the IJA pushed the IJA in to even more aggressive actions.

The USA had been reduced to basically a binary choice. Continuing the economic sanctions and limitations including freezing assets, no credit, and raw materials restrictions or pretty much undoing all of that and giving Japan a free hand in China. Doing the former resulted in war, as the Japanese government (AKA the most far out segments of the IJA) was not going to end the war in China without "victory" whatever that was. The latter, putting economics and trade back on the normal footing, would enable the Japanese to continue the war until they decided they had achieved "victory".

So yes, US economic pressure did provoke the war, but only because Japan was unwilling to end a war of choice/aggressive war they had started in China short of "victory".
 
"Same thing we do every night Pinky." The Brain.

Every previous success spurred young up and comers to invade someone else, so it is easy to imagine a Japan that gets everything it wants, pause for a minute, then roll the dice again.
Well they are still bogged down in China, so that might be a renewed focus/quagmire.
 
There was no grand plan. Which is the reason why Japan was so inconsistent in their strategy.

When the Japanese military in 1940, at last, realized that the war would not end in favor of Japan unless Chongqing is captured, which in turn was hopelessly out of reach for the Japanese, 6 divisions were quickly pulled out of China and disbanded, huge number as the IJA had no more than 45 army divisions at the end of 1939. To pre-WW2 Japan it was one of the few moments where the saner heads prevailed.

Then, the French surrendered to the Nazis. Soon the British seemed to be on the verge of collapse. Adapting to an ascending New World Order, Japan backpedaled their exit-China strategy and instead occupied French Indochina, which in turn intensified American anxiety, and after that...
 
You put too much weight on senility as opposed to early-onset age related conservatism.

Then why did you use the term senility instead of "conservatism"? And why does that conservatism mirror the attitudes among the junior leadership of the time as well?

My underlying calculation:
~1920-1925: Start of problems of colonial system (lowering productivity and profit margin, resistance to external rulers)
~1933: US, as fastest-loop state of epoch, starts acting on issue (Good Neighbour Policy, planning of Philippine independence)
~1946: Medium-senility states (British) realize the problem too
~1955: Even senile Japan realize the colonies are hindrance rather than any benefit

And where does France, whose attempts to hold onto it's colonies almost led to a civil war in the 60's, fall under that?

They were backed into a corner. The US demands on Japan were impossible to meet without the collapse of Japanese politically.

FDR was determined to force Japan into a war. https://mises.org/library/how-us-economic-warfare-provoked-japans-attack-pearl-harbor

And the Japanese ensured he would not only get his war, but also sustain it for the long haul. Even if we assume that the Japanese were wedded to war and accepting American terms and giving up on the hemorrhaging ulcer that was China was not the truly smart thing to do, the way the Japanese went about in getting their war was blatantly suicidal and eliminated even the smallest chance of success. Above all: Yamamomoto's obsession over hitting Pearl Harbor, which was both operationally unnecessary and strategically disastrous yet so popular with the IJN that he managed to bully his Admiral Nagano into accepting it. Nagano's own plan is generally accepted to have been far superior... which is unsurprising since he, and not Yamamoto, was supposed to be in charge of strategic planning! If the US did intervene against the strike south, the USN would have been forced to fight a war on the other side of the Pacific at the end of very extended supply lines, using a base (the Philippines) that in 1941 was totally inadequate to support a large fleet. This would draw poorly supplied American forces into Japan's back yard in a war of choice while the Japanese would be close to their own logistics hubs, with shorter internal lines of communication, and a more compact and easily defensible perimeter.

If, on the other hand, the USN stuck to what it's warplans called for and sat back in the East Pacific for two years while building up it's logistical strength, then the inaction could sap at American political will which lacks the same sort of stamina that the rallying cry of "Remember Pearl Harbor!" provided.

Under either such circumstances, Japan had the chance of winning some early victories, which in turn at least held out the hope of leading to a negotiated settlement to what in America might be an unpopular war. The odds were still long and something like the Bataan Death March could still occur which would have driven US outrage to similar heights in Pearl Harbour's place, but there was at least there was a small chance of success. In comparison, Pearl Harbor was nothing more than a suicide pact.
 
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There was no grand plan. Which is the reason why Japan was so inconsistent in their strategy.

When the Japanese military in 1940, at last, realized that the war would not end in favor of Japan unless Chongqing is captured, which in turn was hopelessly out of reach for the Japanese, 6 divisions were quickly pulled out of China and disbanded, huge number as the IJA had no more than 45 army divisions at the end of 1939. To pre-WW2 Japan it was one of the few moments where the saner heads prevailed.

Then, the French surrendered to the Nazis. Soon the British seemed to be on the verge of collapse. Adapting to an ascending New World Order, Japan backpedaled their exit-China strategy and instead occupied French Indochina, which in turn intensified American anxiety, and after that...

The Japanese military/government saw a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity after France fell. French Indochina was there for the taking. France was defeated, the British were in bad shape, the Dutch were a worse place than France. Going back on the offensive in China was a mistake though.
 

trurle

Banned
And where does France, whose attempts to hold onto it's colonies almost led to a civil war in the 60's, fall under that?
France did agreed to remove forces from Vietnam in 1954, marking the start of decolonization, therefore placing it into "late" decolonization cohort. Decision timer may be partially reset by foreign occupation during WWII though. The process of decolonization, as with other large and diverse empires, is never expected to be complete, as i mentioned before on example of New Caledonia.
 
France did agreed to remove forces from Vietnam in 1954

This is blatantly ignored that France only "agreed" to remove it's forces from Vietnam in the same sense as Germany "agreed" to peace with the Allies in May of 1945. In practice, it's eviction from Vietnam was a consequence of military defeat and the inability of the French state to recover from said defeat.
 
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