I don't buy this at all. It's not hard to look at a map or figures for steel production.
What did Hitler hope to achieve with the DoW on USA ?
- Thread starter skarosianlifeform
- Start date
I don't buy this at all. It's not hard to look at a map or figures for steel production.
It seems unrealistic and crazy that they didn't realize... but then they did declare war on the USA, and they did plan to fight the three greatest powers of the time (every individually bigger than Germany), so...
Yes, it would probably be more accurate to say that Hitler failed to appreciate the military significance of economic power.
Hammerbolt
Donor
Both Hitler and the japanese leaders lived in a world of their own making; simply "looking at a map" meant nothing. Remember that Hitler thought he could grab the USSR and Japan wanted China; not exactly small dots in a map. It's how they translated this into reality that matter; Hitler was convinced of Arian Racial and Tecnical superiority, Japan saw itself as "divine invencible warriors". And both scoffed at american martial capabilites: not the weapons, etc, but the people themselves. Yes, they read the maps and maybe even the figures, but they saw what they wanted to see.
Well, the "neutrality zone" was half of the Atlantic.
In this time period, any "diversity" celebrated was a diversity of white people.
HITLER/NAZI choice was the original strategic plan which HITLER rejected in 1936 and hastily cobbled together his catastrophic FOUR YEAR PLAN.
gaijin
Banned
That is not correct. The German army relief on speed of manoeuvre as its main weapon. For that it needed to be able to move ad quickly as possible. Russia had two "mud seasons" or to use the Russian word rasputitsa, one in fall one in spring. Barbarossa was launched as soon as the land had dried enough after the spring Rasputitsa to allow fast movement of armoured columns.
Butterfly away the campaign in Yugoslavia and you start Barbarossa at the same time as ITL.
gaijin
Banned
Uhm no. The wehrmacht in general and the officer corps in particular were fully on board in regards to attacking the Soviet Union. Notice the total lack of institutional resistance to the plan. The overwhelming majority of the officer corps agreed with Hitler that the Soviet Union was a threat and this was the time to deal with it.
This ties in with the larger picture that many German officers may have found the Nazi's tacky but they Agreed with the majority of the program. There was overwhelming support for rearmament. Likewise there was no objection among the officer class to aggressive wars of conquest. They pretty much all agreed that Germany had a right to control Central and eastern Europe.
When it comes to the genocidal actions undertaken. Pretty much the same thing. Most officers may have found them "in bad taste", but on the other hand most did not find them bad enough to do as much as protest or resign their positions. Most German officers of the age would take offence if you called them nazis, but that was mainly because they considered the Nazis tacky and upstarts, not because they disagreed with the nazis on the majority of their program.
Postwar of course everyone was blaming only the nazis but we should never forget that the nazis could never have done what they did were it not for the active support of significant sections of the German population. The cooperation of thearmy and officer class especially was am essential ingredient in this.
Spring rasputitsa is march-april thing. Annoyingly, almost all internet encyclopedia refuse to mention any details as if afraid they'd hunt them down and kill their families. Took some digging to find out that rasputitsa of 1941 was particularly long.
Main advantage of no Balkan war is more supplies left for Barbarossa (for example in 1939, Germans spend large fraction of their supplies in Poland, and had to rebuild them over winter), but extra few weeks would be nice.
No, that's exactly the same thing written down differently. And it's nonsense. It's not hard to understand that x million tonnes of steel can lead to y thousands of tanks, or that access to international markets and global resources is better than coal and starvation. And the economic and industrial effects of blockade were hardly a mystery in Germany. Hell, didn't Hitler order the focus on the southern USSR in 1942 for explicitly economic reasons?
These kind of statements are really a failure of people to see things from Germany's strategic point of view. There's a great review on Amazon of Tooze's book... ah here it is:
Once you understand the economic and industrial aspects, and combine them with the international relations of the time, then it's clear just how screwed Germany was in summer 1940, after Britain decided to stay in the fight and America decided that Britain was worth supporting. Germany's subsequent actions all flow naturally and logically from the economic and industrial implications.
This is really hard to pin down as after 'My Struggle' was written Hitler commented very little to writing. A few memos, "Fuher Orders", and minutes from some meet ins or speeach transcripts.
Nothing like the policy papers, or numerous coherent series of papers left by Roosevelt & Churchill. But, it does look like Hitler did understand the industrial capacity of the US, and he understood in 1941 that capacity was being mobilized for war. He did read the reports from the German Embassies in the US and Mexico, he did have reports from spies & the AT-3 transcripts. What he failed to accept was the will of the US population in prosecuting a war. The idea the US could put a army capable of offensive action not Europe was denied by him. There were not enough of good Aryan stock in the US to do this. In his view the mongrelized race mix of the 'white' people in the US lacked the ability and will. Certainly in the nazi/Hitlerian view the Negros, Hispanics, 'Indians', Slavs, and Asian races living in the US were worthless as military material.
"The Happy Times" Hitler intended to slaughter American merchant shipping. Disrupting American aid to the Allies.
The Germans were able to sink a few hundred thousand tons of shipping before Admiral King figured out what was going on.
The Germans were able to sink a few hundred thousand tons of shipping before Admiral King figured out what was going on.
Hammerbolt
Donor
After the Khalkhyn Gol disaster of 1939, and with Japan grinding China and comited in the Pacific, I very much doubt Japan would be able to scrap any decent attack force...
There is a joke Germans told -- carefully, trying to make sure there were no Gestapo agents, Blockleiter, or Pimpfen wishing to make a hit with their HJ leader, in the vicinity:
A man goes to the doctor and sees a map on the wall. “What is that enormous brown country?” he asks.
The doctor says, “That’s the Judeobolshevik Soviet Union.”
“And that great big green country?”
“That’s the judified and negrified United States.”
“And these red places all over?”
“That’s the effete and degenerate British Empire.”
“And this blue country, the not so big one in the middle?”
“Oh, that is Our Greater German Reich.”
The man had thought for a moment. Then, timidly, he had said, “Has the Führer seen this map?”
A man goes to the doctor and sees a map on the wall. “What is that enormous brown country?” he asks.
The doctor says, “That’s the Judeobolshevik Soviet Union.”
“And that great big green country?”
“That’s the judified and negrified United States.”
“And these red places all over?”
“That’s the effete and degenerate British Empire.”
“And this blue country, the not so big one in the middle?”
“Oh, that is Our Greater German Reich.”
The man had thought for a moment. Then, timidly, he had said, “Has the Führer seen this map?”
"Butterfly away the campaign in Yugoslavia and you start Barbarossa at the same time as ITL."
Sort of OT, but Army Group South took awhile to get its various component parts all assembled. Some, basically a panzer army and an infantry army, had been used in the Balkans and needed to refit, and showed up at the party late.
The effect of the Balkan campaign is poorly misunderstood. I think its correct that the date of the attack would not have been affected, as they attacked that year as soon as the weather was favorable and the Spring mud lasted late. But without the Balkan campaign, Army Group South would have made more progress earlier.
Sort of OT, but Army Group South took awhile to get its various component parts all assembled. Some, basically a panzer army and an infantry army, had been used in the Balkans and needed to refit, and showed up at the party late.
The effect of the Balkan campaign is poorly misunderstood. I think its correct that the date of the attack would not have been affected, as they attacked that year as soon as the weather was favorable and the Spring mud lasted late. But without the Balkan campaign, Army Group South would have made more progress earlier.
There was NO PLAN TO ATTACK RUSSIA OR AMERICA UNTIL HITLER TOOK OVER. The entire war plan from the late 1920s early 1930s envisaged at most a pre-emptive strike/invasion of Poland and France. But Groner [1928] stressed this could only occur under certain conditions- like the Wehrmacht was fully mobilized for total war and European/American support for such action in view of Franco-Polish aggression. Follow on to this was a German lead pan European anti Stalinist alliance to defend Europe against Russian attack. This was to be hammered out through a pan European economic alliance to rebuild Europe in the wake of the great depression. Schacht & government pushed for such a 15 year plan but when Nazi took over Hitler was unwilling to wait until the early 1940s for such a plan to congeal. When Hitler found out that some eastern European countries resisted such negotiations and the plan may not be reached until 1950, he baulked at these efforts and imposed his bullshit plans of conquest/coercion and politics instead in the second half of the 1930s.
Don't give a toss about what some officers wanted , they were not the power until they were backed by Hitler.
Craig wrote:
Ya this is STILL not uncommon an issue. A cousin of my wife, (who note is a middle school teacher in Germany) tossed off a question to my wife if she and family could 'drop by' while they were visiting Washington... (DC not state) When my wife enquired further she made sure to post driving and distance maps as she noted that DC was a 'bit' further than a 'day-trip' from Utah...
Being stationed over there was also educating. Describing how I'd had to drive 3 days to get from one US duty station to another when if any of them did that they'd have gone through several NATIONS in doing so
As noted the declaration, by the time it happened, was seen by most in Germany as simply acknowledging the already simmering conflict. I did read an article where it was expanded upon that both Ribbentrop and Hitler specifically "delayed" the decision and announcement even though the Japanese ambassador in Berlin had expressly and immediately demanded a German declaration of support on the 8th of December. The idea was that it would seem that Hitler was hoping for the exact thing that Churchill feared in that the US, having been attacked by Japan directly, would therefore turn their attention on Japan and leave England and Russia to 'hold' in Europe. Supposedly the 9th and 10th was to allow the US to make just such an announcement but lack of such and continued support of Britain and Russia, (and promises of more) made it unlikely by the hour.
The hope that a German declaration would reciprocated with a Japanese declaration of war, (and some support from) against Russia was the main factor that drove the decision but I'm less certain of that argument than the author was as it does not seem anyone in Germany pushed for or was given any assurance of such a move. (And frankly unlikely given the Japanese disposition and goals but I'm not sure the Germans could have understood that even if they'd know the planning)
Randy
Ya this is STILL not uncommon an issue. A cousin of my wife, (who note is a middle school teacher in Germany) tossed off a question to my wife if she and family could 'drop by' while they were visiting Washington... (DC not state) When my wife enquired further she made sure to post driving and distance maps as she noted that DC was a 'bit' further than a 'day-trip' from Utah...
Being stationed over there was also educating. Describing how I'd had to drive 3 days to get from one US duty station to another when if any of them did that they'd have gone through several NATIONS in doing so
As noted the declaration, by the time it happened, was seen by most in Germany as simply acknowledging the already simmering conflict. I did read an article where it was expanded upon that both Ribbentrop and Hitler specifically "delayed" the decision and announcement even though the Japanese ambassador in Berlin had expressly and immediately demanded a German declaration of support on the 8th of December. The idea was that it would seem that Hitler was hoping for the exact thing that Churchill feared in that the US, having been attacked by Japan directly, would therefore turn their attention on Japan and leave England and Russia to 'hold' in Europe. Supposedly the 9th and 10th was to allow the US to make just such an announcement but lack of such and continued support of Britain and Russia, (and promises of more) made it unlikely by the hour.
The hope that a German declaration would reciprocated with a Japanese declaration of war, (and some support from) against Russia was the main factor that drove the decision but I'm less certain of that argument than the author was as it does not seem anyone in Germany pushed for or was given any assurance of such a move. (And frankly unlikely given the Japanese disposition and goals but I'm not sure the Germans could have understood that even if they'd know the planning)
Randy