What would it take to ensure the US doesn’t join the Entente in the First World War? Obviously it would probably be no declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare from the Germans and no Zimmerman telegram, but what could have prevented those from happening? And how does the war progress with direct American involvement?
And most of the likely alternatives to Wilson*were* more isolationist than he was. Champ Clark and WJ Bryan certainly were, and his comments about the Lusitania suggest that Vice-President Marshall thought likewise.
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
1. Japan refusing to back down from any of its 21 Demands, and the US breaking diplomatic relations and sanctioning Japan and doing naval-military posturing about it. Leading to US-Japanese war, when Japan preempts a feared US strike by seizing the American Philippines, Guam and Wake Island.
Since the Japanese were an Allied power, this greatly complicates American relations with the Allies. That's even with the Allies condemning Japanese policies toward China and America as rogue. The Japanese war in the Pacific and China soaks up US attention, taking America's attention off the Germany ball.
2. japan-takes-manchuria-1916.524862 - with a similar escalated Sino-Japanese conflict and then Japanese American conflict, leading to the outcomes described in 1 above.
Mexico, being on the border and fairly large, can soak up a great deal of attention. Does anybody there have the capacity to stimulate an involvement several times the size and duration of the Villa Expedition?
I personally doubt anyone in Central America has the raw power, or anybody in South America has the raw power projectable against US interests, to command exclusive American foreign attention during WWI.
Since the Japanese were an Allied power, this greatly complicates American relations with the Allies. That's even with the Allies condemning Japanese policies toward China and America as rogue. The Japanese war in the Pacific and China soaks up US attention, taking America's attention off the Germany ball.
2. japan-takes-manchuria-1916.524862 - with a similar escalated Sino-Japanese conflict and then Japanese American conflict, leading to the outcomes described in 1 above.
What would any of the actors down in Mexico, Central or South America have to be doing or trying to do to soak up that degree of undividable American attention?
Mexico, being on the border and fairly large, can soak up a great deal of attention. Does anybody there have the capacity to stimulate an involvement several times the size and duration of the Villa Expedition?
I personally doubt anyone in Central America has the raw power, or anybody in South America has the raw power projectable against US interests, to command exclusive American foreign attention during WWI.
Riain
Banned
There were 2 things happening in the American military sphere prior to the WW1 DoW; a bunch of interventions in Central America and the growing pains of expanding the US into something other than a military pygmy.
I believe the latter was a prerequisite before the US involved itself in WW1, The US went through a general consolidation of earlier reforms with National Guard units forming into larger units with HQs etc, went through the Preparedness controversy throughout 1915-16 culminating in the 1916 Defense Act which authorised the major expansion of the Army and the Naval Act for the expansion and balancing of the Navy. Then the US mobilsed the entire Army and National Guard in support of the Pancho Vila expedition, giving US Army generals experience handling divisions for the first time in a decade and a half for a period of more than half a year, creating a cadre of 170,000 troops with mobilisation experience. The DoW did not occur until after the Pancho intervention was winding down and the National Guard were being demobilised.
However while all this was happening the US involved itself in Mexico twice, Cuba, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic and Haiti with other interventions just outside the WW1 timeframe. Most of these interventions were tiny, however the likes of Cuba is a pretty big country and the others were able to be handled with tiny forces. However my thought is if any or better yet all of these interventions required full sized Army Brigades and Marine Battalions the steady consolidation and growth wold have been affected and most importantly the mobilisation for Pancho Vila would have been adversely affected and the US might have had to call for volunteers and equip and train them up which will push back the DoW even further back than April 1917.
Everyone seems to forgot the BIGGEST reason why USA joined WW1 is because they lent the Allies so much money that if the Allies lose, they won't pay the USA back it's loans and it will trigger a recession. Also they exported so much to Britain, France and Italy that America was earning a hefty profit so the Allies losing the war is not economically beneficial to America
So if we remove all that, that will have prevented the USA from joining ww1.
So if we remove all that, that will have prevented the USA from joining ww1.
David Flin
Gone Fishin'
The Entente winning by Christmas 1914. Which there was a fleeting opportunity for at the start of the Race to the Sea.
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Except that
a) All loans made as of April 1917 were secured ones. Unsecured ones started only *after* US entry into the war.
b) Even a victorious Entente would have huge bills to pay and might well default - as happened OTL. Entente victory was no guarantee of repayment.
c) Hardly anyone *expected* the entente to lose- not even the Germans, hence their gamble on USW and the ZT. As far as Americans knew in Apr 1917, they were joining the winning side.
Except that
a) All loans made as of April 1917 were secured ones. Unsecured ones started only *after* US entry into the war.
b) Even a victorious Entente would have huge bills to pay and might well default - as happened OTL. Entente victory was no guarantee of repayment.
c) Hardly anyone *expected* the entente to lose- not even the Germans, hence their gamble on USW and the ZT. As far as Americans knew in Apr 1917, they were joining the winning side.
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A competent German diplomatic corp in the United States
They could have done a better job at showing the German point of view and delayed American decision on action until after the war was over
They could have done a better job at showing the German point of view and delayed American decision on action until after the war was over
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ahmedali
Banned
Several things, if they happen, may prevent entry to America
Mexico (Revolution and Civil War temporarily occupy Americans)
The von Essen accident
(He withdraws all moral sails from the Entente when Sweden is exposed to what happened to Belgium)
An isolationist American president
And most importantly, no loans to the British and the French
Mexico (Revolution and Civil War temporarily occupy Americans)
The von Essen accident
(He withdraws all moral sails from the Entente when Sweden is exposed to what happened to Belgium)
An isolationist American president
And most importantly, no loans to the British and the French
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Honest math in German naval estimations.
Or mathematical literacy by the Army General Staff or Reich Civilian government when the Navy briefed the unrestricted submarine warfare plan.
Look, it was nice of the Navy to propose in USW a solution to Germany's increasingly desperate and gloomy wartime situation, so it made sense for the civilian and military supremos to hear them out. But the audience was too quick to press the "I believe" button before thinking and checking whether the numbers presented really added up.
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Without control of strategic and military policy back home, what the German diplomatic corps in the US can do is basically talk.
What can the German diplomats, using talk, do as an antidote to the fact that the German assault on the west, especially Belgium, started the war?
What can the German diplomats, using talk, say as an antidote to the argument that submarine sinkings are worse than blockade because they cost lives and not just money?
About all German diplomats could do differently is on the margins, throwing more shade on the Entente powers, denying the provenance of the Zimmerman Telegram, and that's pretty much it.
I thought they only started because the British were arming merchant vessels so surfacing for inspection became a trap.
Did they have other reasons?
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Yeah, that's why they recommended it as a tactic. But I was talking about their advocacy of it not as a tactical solution in at sea encounters - but as a war-winning strategy. The promise of USW as a strategy as it was briefed before being launched at the beginning of 1917 was that if this tactic was launched against all ships [even neutral ones, which was unprecedented] it would bring more strategic benefits than costs in terms of losses to enemy shipping. That it was worth the known risk, of important neutral countries like the US entering the war. That's where the Navy's math was wrong.
A difference between USW as the Germans expanded it in 1917 and earlier 'sharpened' U-Boat campaigns is that it wasn't just using unrestricted tactics against enemy merchant ships, but all merchant ships, including neutrals - and the Germans knew that was political dynamite making war with the neutral USA probable.
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Forced or not, USW was still a German error. The Germans hit the 'I believe' button and removed a known and knowable variable when they considered the case for it.
The Germans saw the negative trends of the war and blockade. They weighed the Navy's solution, USW against shipping, judging universal application of the tactic would sink enough Allied cargo tonnage Britain and/or its armies or factories would starve, thus ending Germany's war & blockade problems at the source.
Great. Go for it. The Germans had the decency/rigor to weigh the counter-argument against it - a decent probability the US would declare war. Their counter was two-fold, that the U-Boats would sink all the troopships (which didn't happen) and, much more reasonable, that America's small army and military potential would in any case take so long to apply to European battlefields that the issue of the war could be decided by then.
But Germany's treatment of the counter-argument was cursory and very incomplete.
It left out a couple of important variables: a) Central Powers shipping interned in US ports - upon American declaration of war, this interned, inactive pool of shipping instantly becomes available for Allied cargo purposes, and needs to be subtracted from any sunken tonnage totals. b ) the most combat capable branch of American armed might - the US navy and its numerous destroyers - unlike the US Army, are available to participate in combat immediately, including directly against submarines and in support of blockade operations.
I've never seen a thing indicating the Germans considered the self-negating effect of USW sinking Allied tonnage, but 're-floating' former CP interned tonnage as Allied tonnage in the event of US entry.