What could have been done to make SeaLion work?

Could SeaLion be successful if they had hindsight?

  • Yes

    Votes: 9 6.6%
  • No

    Votes: 107 78.1%
  • Maybe

    Votes: 21 15.3%

  • Total voters
    137
Damn, looks like it won't happen unless Germany can strike a deal with another country to produce the material. Italy could partially do it, considering their industry is not the best and Spain is out of the picture since they're still recovering from the civil war.
 
According to Churchill’s History of WW2, on July 10, Fighter Command had a total of 54 front-line squadrons operational, with 656 aircraft available. He doesn’t give figures of squadrons for earlier, but did say that at all time, 450 front-line fighters had been kept in Britain during the Battle for France, with their pilots having been kept from the Battle of France.

Egbert Keiser, Operation Sealion, states that at the Fall of France, 11 Group had 196 aircraft operational, but doesn’t specify how many operational fighters were in the other 3 Groups. Typically, 11 Group had around 50% of operational fighters, so a rough rule of thumb would suggest around 400 operational fighters in Britain at the Fall of France.

Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, states that at the start of July, there were 400-500 front-line fighters in the south of England.

The discrepancies seems to be that Churchill’s figures include all fighters, while Liddell Hart is only counting Hurricanes and Spitfires. Keiser’s figures, because he focuses on the German side of things, is based on Luftwaffe estimates.

According to the RAF website, at the start of July 1940, the RAF had a total of 1259 trained pilots. Irritatingly, it doesn’t specify what proportion were fighter pilots, but an assumption of 40% gives us just over 500 pilots, which is not out of line with the numbers of available aircraft.

According to Christos Turner, on 2 July, the RAF had an available strength of 525 Spitfires and Hurricanes.
Firstly I don't dispute any of the figures you're giving, only the original statement that 11 Group of fighter Command had 24 squadrons at it's disposal immediately after the Battle of France. James Holland states that there were roughly 330 single seat fighters available at the beginning of June but this rose to just under 600 by the beginning of July. In general Churchill's writings are a little unreliable, the figure of 450 fighters kept out of the Battle of France is not strictly true. In total 43 Fighter Command squadrons lost aircraft in the skies above France and the Low Countries, that's something in excess of 80% of all squadrons available. With respect to the number of aircraft possessed by Fighter Command you have to look at it in context. The established strength of a squadron as envisaged by Hugh Dowding was supposed to be 20 aircraft with 2 ready reserves. Typically at the height of the Battle of Britain a front line squadron strength was 12-16 aircraft. If you take Egbert Keiser's figures for 11 Group after the fall of France and say that there were 24 squadrons available that would mean that each squadron was at just over a third of its established strength and about 60% of normal operational strength. Liddell Hart is possibly looking at the South of England as a whole, ie 11 Group aircraft plus those in 10 Group and possibly those in 12 Group that were close enough to assist, who knows?!?

OTL this never happened - squadrons were rotated through 11 group as losses and pilot fatigue dictated.

Had it happened - how long would it take for fighter command to recover?

And had Sealion been in the offing having maintained FC as a viable force how long to restage fighters to 11 group?

Its interesting to note that the LW had virtually no rotation and the only way in which a pilot or crew could get 2 weeks rest was to have his tonsils removed - by the time the battle ended very few of the surviving veterans had tonsils!.
The rotation system of squadrons only worked whilst Fighter Command had experienced squadrons and ended within the first week of September when Hugh Dowding recognised that the quality of replacement squadrons was on a rapid decline. After this Fighter Command adopted a system similar to that used by the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe would conduct basic flying training, then go to type specific training (the rough equivalent of the Operational Training Units in the RAf), then they would be posted to a replenishment unit where they would continue practicing and individual pilots/crews would be fed through to the front line units as and when required. In early September Dowding decided to categorise squadrons as A, B or C. A Squadrons were front line units, B squadrons were ready replacements (there were only four B squadrons) and C squadrons were used for training pilots that could be fed through to the front line units as and when required. A squadrons retained their experienced pilots and grabbed the majority of experienced pilots from the C squadrons with the exception of a tiny core that were used to train the inexperienced pilots fresh from the OTUs.
 
Firstly I don't dispute any of the figures you're giving, only the original statement that 11 Group of fighter Command had 24 squadrons at it's disposal immediately after the Battle of France. James Holland states that there were roughly 330 single seat fighters available at the beginning of June but this rose to just under 600 by the beginning of July. In general Churchill's writings are a little unreliable, the figure of 450 fighters kept out of the Battle of France is not strictly true. In total 43 Fighter Command squadrons lost aircraft in the skies above France and the Low Countries, that's something in excess of 80% of all squadrons available. With respect to the number of aircraft possessed by Fighter Command you have to look at it in context. The established strength of a squadron as envisaged by Hugh Dowding was supposed to be 20 aircraft with 2 ready reserves. Typically at the height of the Battle of Britain a front line squadron strength was 12-16 aircraft. If you take Egbert Keiser's figures for 11 Group after the fall of France and say that there were 24 squadrons available that would mean that each squadron was at just over a third of its established strength and about 60% of normal operational strength. Liddell Hart is possibly looking at the South of England as a whole, ie 11 Group aircraft plus those in 10 Group and possibly those in 12 Group that were close enough to assist, who knows?!?

Apologies for the delay in tracking down the 24 squadrons reference. Source was Deighton and Hastings, Battle of Britain. They report Churchill claiming to the Cabinet that on 15 May Dowding had told him that 25 squadrons were needed for defence of southern England, and that therefore more squadrons could be sent to France and still leave sufficient protection. This was, to put it at it's mildest, not exactly reporting Dowding's position accurately (Churchill utter a terminological inexactitude? Why, next people might start saying that he was fond of the occasional drink). On 16 May, Dowding corrected the misunderstanding, and he was allowed to retain 26 fighter squadrons. Later that day at the full Cabinet meeting, Churchill persuaded the Cabinet to agree to sending a further four squadrons to France, reducing to 22 the number of squadrons retained.

The RAF Order of Battle for 11 Group for 1 July gives 29 squadrons, of which 26 were Spitfires or Hurricanes. with 348 combat ready aircraft.

Since the Fall of France was completed on 25 June, figures for 1 July seem more appropriate than figure for 1 June.
 
Damn, looks like it won't happen unless Germany can strike a deal with another country to produce the material. Italy could partially do it, considering their industry is not the best and Spain is out of the picture since they're still recovering from the civil war.

Siebel ferries were built out of what was lying around, not new from factory. Recently conquered France had about 2.25 million automobiles, (54 vehicles per 1,000 population in 1939), and each had an engine. This does not include aircraft engines. Diesel was better than gas, but gas could be used if the point was to pump out Siebel ferries in massive quantity.
 
Siebel ferries were built out of what was lying around, not new from factory. Recently conquered France had about 2.25 million automobiles, (54 vehicles per 1,000 population in 1939), and each had an engine. This does not include aircraft engines. Diesel was better than gas, but gas could be used if the point was to pump out Siebel ferries in massive quantity.
And how many weren't owned at the time? And come to think of it, exactly how mane engines of <50 hp do you need to power one Siebel Ferry? And do you have the right sort of propellers to match those car engines?
 
my speculation is always around MFP/AFP design for expanded use, not the Siebel ferries.

maybe they could have R-boats in smaller numbers and used some of the MAN diesels employed on those? (would have doubled hp)
 
The Germans would need around 10 years of hindsight, first the Luftwaffe would need a dedicated air superiority fighter to replace the Bf-109.Second they'd need a crap load of landing craft and support vessels. And the third a real Navy.
 
The rotation system of squadrons only worked whilst Fighter Command had experienced squadrons and ended within the first week of September when Hugh Dowding recognised that the quality of replacement squadrons was on a rapid decline. After this Fighter Command adopted a system similar to that used by the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe would conduct basic flying training, then go to type specific training (the rough equivalent of the Operational Training Units in the RAf), then they would be posted to a replenishment unit where they would continue practicing and individual pilots/crews would be fed through to the front line units as and when required. In early September Dowding decided to categorise squadrons as A, B or C. A Squadrons were front line units, B squadrons were ready replacements (there were only four B squadrons) and C squadrons were used for training pilots that could be fed through to the front line units as and when required. A squadrons retained their experienced pilots and grabbed the majority of experienced pilots from the C squadrons with the exception of a tiny core that were used to train the inexperienced pilots fresh from the OTUs.

The Critical period of the Battle for the RAF where fighter command started experiencing shortages i.e. where losses in both planes and trained pilots outstripped Britains ability to replace both was the period of the last week in Aug and the 1st week in Sept.

From the 7th Sept 1940 till VJ day - that did not re-occur - namely because the RAF had effectively won and had forced the LW to abandon their plan to attrite the RAF and instead they started attacking Civilian and Industrial targets in what we call the Blitz.

So by the time Dowding might have been changing things in Sept - it was irrelevant as Parks tactics had prevailed.
 
The Critical period of the Battle for the RAF where fighter command started experiencing shortages i.e. where losses in both planes and trained pilots outstripped Britains ability to replace both was the period of the last week in Aug and the 1st week in Sept.

From the 7th Sept 1940 till VJ day - that did not re-occur - namely because the RAF had effectively won and had forced the LW to abandon their plan to attrite the RAF and instead they started attacking Civilian and Industrial targets in what we call the Blitz.

So by the time Dowding might have been changing things in Sept - it was irrelevant as Parks tactics had prevailed.
It didn't help either that the LW had themselves been attrited something terrible.
 
And how many weren't owned at the time? And come to think of it, exactly how mane engines of <50 hp do you need to power one Siebel Ferry? And do you have the right sort of propellers to match those car engines?

With 2.25 million engines, should be at least 10% truck engines, so perhaps 225,000+ engines of 50+ HP. Not including aviation. Four per ferry would be about my guess. Ownership of engines would be irrelevant to taking possession. Propellers for nuclear attack submarines I understand can be quite the trick to make, but 8kt Siebel ferries I doubt have quite the exacting engineering standards. Armament of ferries would have to be from German army stocks or again capture French material.
 
With 2.25 million engines, should be at least 10% truck engines, so perhaps 225,000+ engines of 50+ HP. Not including aviation. Four per ferry would be about my guess.
Actually, the OTL Siebel ferries used 4 x 300hp aero engines.

Ownership of engines would be irrelevant to taking possession.
Except it would actually be rather important, because you really don't want to remove a load of fire engines from the road, that would just be stupid. Nor do you want to scrap a whole load of construction trucks.

Propellers for nuclear attack submarines I understand can be quite the trick to make, but 8kt Siebel ferries I doubt have quite the exacting engineering standards.
No, but you still want the engines to power the vessels fairly efficiently.

Armament of ferries would have to be from German army stocks or again capture French material.
None of which is configured to work at sea.
 
Well, again with the resources, for the repurposing of the Luftwaffe, they could have never started on the Seydlitz and the Luetzow at all to provide resources for the anti-shipping role for the Luftwaffe. They don't lose much to affect France at all. So that can do for the coastal navy.

The only way to not get the British to react would be if Chamberlain commits to a political purge and replaces officers who mostly agree with him on Germany not being a threat. Germany could hide some landing craft, but not all of them, considering British intelligence is way superior.

I certainly do take in the reactions to the opposing side for one side changes their pre-war tactics. But like I said, it requires a pacifist RN and Germany being able to conceal some part of their amphibious invasion force and faulty British intelligence downplaying them in order for the British to underestimate their power for it to happen.
That's not a PoD that's called stacking the decks.

If you want to write a timeline like this, that's your prerogative but you might as well go full Stirling and unleash a Stone Dogs virus on the West as it is about as believable,
 
The Critical period of the Battle for the RAF where fighter command started experiencing shortages i.e. where losses in both planes and trained pilots outstripped Britains ability to replace both was the period of the last week in Aug and the 1st week in Sept.

From the 7th Sept 1940 till VJ day - that did not re-occur - namely because the RAF had effectively won and had forced the LW to abandon their plan to attrite the RAF and instead they started attacking Civilian and Industrial targets in what we call the Blitz.

So by the time Dowding might have been changing things in Sept - it was irrelevant as Parks tactics had prevailed.
Dowding's changes occurred prior to the Luftwaffe's priority change and was as a direct result of losses in men and aircraft. Yes it made no difference to the outcome but it happened and it was the right thing to do just as rotation was the right thing to do, up to a point, during the first half of the battle.
 
Apologies for the delay in tracking down the 24 squadrons reference. Source was Deighton and Hastings, Battle of Britain. They report Churchill claiming to the Cabinet that on 15 May Dowding had told him that 25 squadrons were needed for defence of southern England, and that therefore more squadrons could be sent to France and still leave sufficient protection. This was, to put it at it's mildest, not exactly reporting Dowding's position accurately (Churchill utter a terminological inexactitude? Why, next people might start saying that he was fond of the occasional drink). On 16 May, Dowding corrected the misunderstanding, and he was allowed to retain 26 fighter squadrons. Later that day at the full Cabinet meeting, Churchill persuaded the Cabinet to agree to sending a further four squadrons to France, reducing to 22 the number of squadrons retained.

The RAF Order of Battle for 11 Group for 1 July gives 29 squadrons, of which 26 were Spitfires or Hurricanes. with 348 combat ready aircraft.

Since the Fall of France was completed on 25 June, figures for 1 July seem more appropriate than figure for 1 June.
Yes you are right. I tend to forget that prior to the 8th July 11 Group was geographically much larger than the 11 Group of the Battle of Britain so would contain more squadrons. Effectively at the start of July we're talking about 10 and 11 Groups combined. My initial point still stands, it doesn't matter how weakened the RAF is the Luftwaffe is equally as weak and would remain so until the end of July, therefore an early invasion was not really a possibility unless the Germans were prepared to do it without substantial air support.
 

Archibald

Banned
Bundesarchiv_N_1603_Bild-054%2C_Schwarzes_Meer%2C_Siebelf%C3%A4hre_mit_8%2C8cm_Flak_ArM.jpg


Now that's a Siebel ferry ? reminds me of Gericault "Raft of the Medusa" painting :p

Seriously, I naively believed Sibel ferry = car ferries in the Channel, that is, big, slow ships.
 
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The Germans would need around 10 years of hindsight, first the Luftwaffe would need a dedicated air superiority fighter to replace the Bf-109.Second they'd need a crap load of landing craft and support vessels. And the third a real Navy.
At least. And there'd be a British reaction to factor in. The only plausible (non ASB) idea I remember was Dudley's.
 
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