What could deter Japan from attacking Pearl Harbor

In simple terms just the loss of cargo shipping & access to foreign banking were enough to destroy Japans economy for 5-10 years. Oil could have been left off the embargo list & it would have hardly mattered.

Then immediate issue that worried Japanese planners was the oil, even a wait of a few months in Japan's plan to attack the US would see dramatic changes in the military situation in the USSR probably enough to cause a reassessment.
 

Paul Large

Banned
The entire reason the Pacific Fleet was stationed at Pearl was to tempt the Japanese into an attack. It was all part of the steps to war. Cut off the oil. Cut off the money held in USA. Shame them. Put the Pacific fleet within attack range. How to start a war.
 
If they realize the U.S. can't declare on them first since the Congress is isolationist, then simply reducing the attack plan down to UK/Dutch possessions is a winner for Japan.
Would they even be able to take UK or Dutch possession or even want with the Philippines sitting in the middle of their planned conquest and supply lines ?
 

thaddeus

Donor
The US State Department was putting together a plan to offer New Guinea in return for a pull out of China and a new naval limitation treaty. Neither the Dutch or the Australians were consulted about this plan.

As Australia was part of the Commonwealth, and the Dutch government sat in London as a economically important British ally. Trying to implement such a plan has some really big implications. Beyond that I can't see the Zaibatsu thinking New Guinea populated by a few cannibals, no industry, no infrastructure, as a alternative to Chinas potential economic benefit to Japan. Just controlling the banking of China for the next few decades could propel Japan to financial equality with the US or Britain. What would New Guinea have to offer the Zaibatsu financially?

cannot find reference to this but is it possible "pull out of China" does not include Manchuria? but rather to pre-1937 borders?
 

nbcman

Donor
The entire reason the Pacific Fleet was stationed at Pearl was to tempt the Japanese into an attack. It was all part of the steps to war. Cut off the oil. Cut off the money held in USA. Shame them. Put the Pacific fleet within attack range. How to start a war.
Um, no. The US fleet was moved up as a deterrence to Japan, not as bait. The US and almost all Japanese naval planners thought that Pearl Harbor was out of reach. All the embargos and freezing of assets against Japan were attempts to stop a war from spreading; they were not part of a great conspiracy to get the US into one.
 
Would they even be able to take UK or Dutch possession or even want with the Philippines sitting in the middle of their planned conquest and supply lines ?
The Philippines aren't a problem until the U.S. is formally in the war. Of course, plans for what to do if that does happen would need to be made. But I doubt the American entry into WW2 happens as soon as the DEI/Malaya are invaded. It would take many months to push through a DOW for someone else's benefit.
 
The entire reason the Pacific Fleet was stationed at Pearl was to tempt the Japanese into an attack. It was all part of the steps to war. Cut off the oil. Cut off the money held in USA. Shame them. Put the Pacific fleet within attack range. How to start a war.

Did They Expect that sort of Damage Throught ?
 
My understanding is that at cabinet level, it was decided to put pressure on Japan by limiting oil shipments. At this meeting it was acknowledged that cutting oil would cause war. Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson creatively interpreted the instructions to cut the oil shipments. When it was realised that supplies to Japan had been cut it was felt that opening them up again would send the wrong message as a back down. Now on the conveyor belt to war, when the Japanese invasion fleets were on their way south, Roosevelt was going to ask Congress to declare Armed Neutrality from Monday Dec 8th, similar to what was active in the Atlantic. That Japan was about to attack was obvious but the US leadership expected attacks on US ships in China, not as far away as Hawaii. Planning in Hawaii was on how to bait the IJN to come to the central Pacific so the USN could fight it, not wholly crap we are the first hit! None of the various Rainbow plans envisaged the fall of Singapore or the Malay/NEI barrier. Japanese success on this scale was not anticipated. Not even the Japanese anticipated it.

On the issue of the US confronting Japan:

From "The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations Throughout History" by Walter LaFeber p184-185
When non interventionists demanded that the President acknowledge a war existed [1937] and that US goods not fuel the conflict, FDR weathered the storm. Nevertheless, his first public response to the 1937 conflict was merely a pious statement by Hull that condemned the use of force an neglected to mention Japan. The administration was divided. One faction, led by Hornbeck and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morganthau wanted to protect US interests in China through a military and economic build up that, they assumed, would force Japan to back down. Hornbeck and Morgenthau did not believe that the Japanese had the wherewithal, or the nerve, to confront the United States. Opposed were Hull and Ambassador Grew in Tokyo who warned that sanctions could lead to war and at the least, undercut relative moderates such as Konoe and Saionji who were trying to rein in the militarists.

Hull, with his ear to the ground on Capitol Hill, also feared that any aggressive action could unloose the fury of congressional 'isolationists' who would further tie his and Roosevelt's hands.

In August and September 1937, Japanese planes badly wounded the British ambassador to China and bombed civilians in Nanking. Such killing of civilians still aroused condemnation in the West. The British approached FDR with the idea of jointly imposing economic sanctions, an idea U.S officials quickly mistrusted because of its source (were the British again trying to push the United States into protecting their colonies while they appeased both Japan and Hitler?) The President instead decided to speak out on October 5, in a Chicago speech given in the shadow of the Chicago Tribune Building, where the nation's most powerful 'isolationist' newspaper was published. Condemning the 'international lawlessness' in China, he urged that the '90 percent who want to live in peace under law" use "positive endeavours to preserve peace." He suggested that an attempt be made to 'quarantine the patients' against the 'disease' of aggression. A stunned Hull who had not known about the words, feared that the anti-interventionists' outrage would paralyse US policy. Some loud opposition to the United States joining any such quarantine was indeed heard in the Senate, but the general response was more favourable than Roosevelt had expected. In any event, the President might well have decided he no longer needed the 'isolationists' votes for domestic programs so he could defy them in foreign policy.

If so, Roosevelt's bluff was quickly called. The League of Nations had been waiting since 1932 for the United States to take such a lead. Now the League asked the Americans to meet with other powers in Brussels during November 1937 to explore the President's suggestion of a 'quarantine'. The Soviets arrived ready to accept any help from the West. They had been involved in repeated clashes with Japanese troops along the Manchurian border. Japan, however, refused to attend, And the Western powers, especially the Americans, refused to take China seriously; they even lectured the Chinese delegation to correct the conditions (that is, aggressive nationalism) that had led to the war. The Brussels Conference taught a number of lessons. The other powers and the United States could not cooperate to stop Japan, the Americans did not yet see the Chinese as so important as to be worth a war.
 
cannot find reference to this but is it possible "pull out of China" does not include Manchuria? but rather to pre-1937 borders?

Possibly. But, the New Guinea proposal sounds like one of those ideas raised in a meeting, then after some reflection dropped. Maybe someone spends a few days or weeks studying it, maybe there are some memos, or a few pages of analysis, but thats the extent of it. If each of us had a penny for every dead end idea raised in a planning meeting we've attended we'd have money for a banquet size lunch, and a afternoon of drinking after.
 
Would they even be able to take UK or Dutch possession or even want with the Philippines sitting in the middle of their planned conquest and supply lines ?

Japans leaders knew the PI were to be independent in 1946. Had they used logic and patience they'd been able to seduce the Philippines into favorable treaties with Japan. Eventually the US would be wondering why it was paying so much for a useless little isolated naval base on Luzon.
 

thaddeus

Donor
cannot find reference to this but is it possible "pull out of China" does not include Manchuria? but rather to pre-1937 borders?

Possibly. But, the New Guinea proposal sounds like one of those ideas raised in a meeting, then after some reflection dropped. Maybe someone spends a few days or weeks studying it, maybe there are some memos, or a few pages of analysis, but thats the extent of it. If each of us had a penny for every dead end idea raised in a planning meeting we've attended we'd have money for a banquet size lunch, and a afternoon of drinking after.

LOL! yes I would be a rich man!

but you understand my point that Manchuria was talked about as a discrete entity whereas now we refer to whole of China. New Guinea does not seem plausible as even a swap for the occupied areas outside of Manchuria, but certainly for the whole of Japanese territories on the mainland it would be an insult?
 
I have an idea. The British are stronger than OTL

The British do OP Judgement with bells on using a multiple carrier strike - using scores of AC rather than just 21 aircraft - sinking all of the Italian BBs and CCs at Taranto along with some of the CLs and DDs - shifting Naval power firmly into the RNs court and this is followed up with a far better increased build up in Malta than OTL

This allows for a better North/East Africa Campaign due to greater interdiction of Axis logistics

Following on from this the Australian and New Zealand commanders query the plans for the Greek adventure with their governments (OTL they did not) and this delays their deployment to Greece as part of W force to the point where W force is not sent before the German invasion of Greece and instead the Troop ships and RN assets are used to recover Greek troops and use them to garrison Crete.

With worse than OTL logi and improved Commonwealth forces in North Africa Rommel is not strong enough to attack Wavells forces in Cyrenaica and instead he is forced to go on the defensive.

With the Japanese occupation of the rest of FIC in July 1941 the Australian Government, fearing that the Japanese seek to seize the Dutch East Indies which would include attacking Malaya, and the Philippines and subsequently threaten Australia, requests that the 2nd AIF's divisions in Africa are returned to the Far East and in Sept and Oct both the Veteran 6th and 7th Divisions are sent to Malaya to form with the 8th Division the Core of the Imperial forces there (with 2 Divisions from the UK sent to relieve them in Africa). In addition the RN having not suffered as many losses in the Med as OTL is able to send a more powerful fleet to Singapore centered on Illustrious and Ark Royal and 5 battleships/1 Battle Cruiser.

Seeing that the Imperial forces in Malaya are now far stronger than hoped with 2 'proper' Commonwealth Infantry Divisions and increased naval assets the Japanese leadership gives pause and delays plans regarding the region and this includes not attacking the US fleet at Pearl Harbour as well as invading the Philippines.

As 1941 ends and the USA gets drawn into the European war during early 1942 - the Japanese realise that the moment has passed and that the USA has become too powerful with its war industry now in full swing and they estimate that the USA will produce 200 infantry divisions worth of troops far in excess of their own forces.

By 1943 Japan now scraping the barrel with regards to POL, asks to negotiate with the USA regarding the sanctions and by 1944 the moment has truly passed.
 
Kill Yamamoto, so he can’t strongarm Nagumo and the rest of IJN command into his “declare war on the entire Pacific” plan, which means they leave the US alone while kicking the shit out of whatever the Brits can scrape up in the Far East.
That effectively destroys IJN, as IJA gets the lion's share of the budget. What IJN CO will go along with that?
 
If Japan discoveres the Daqing Oil Field some time after occupying Manchuria, that might make the Oil Embargo toothless.
 
The entire reason the Pacific Fleet was stationed at Pearl was to tempt the Japanese into an attack. It was all part of the steps to war. Cut off the oil. Cut off the money held in USA. Shame them. Put the Pacific fleet within attack range. How to start a war.
That was exactly how Japan saw it. To bad nobody in DC did.
cannot find reference to this but is it possible "pull out of China" does not include Manchuria? but rather to pre-1937 borders?
I couldn't give you the source offhand, but I've read that was exactly what the U.S. meant: leave metropolitan China; letting Japan keep Manchuria (which Japan very much wanted) was okay with FDR.
 
The Japanese embassy staff reading up on newspapers and media reports on US politics. If they realize the U.S. can't declare on them first since the Congress is isolationist, then simply reducing the attack plan down to UK/Dutch possessions is a winner for Japan.
The UK and Dutch colonies were Japan's true objectives. They only attacked the Pacific Fleet because they were afraid the U.S. would intervene to protect European colonies. (Given Roosevelt's response to the occupation of Vietnam, this was a logical fear. And moving the Battle Force to Pearl Harbor from San Diego also didn't help matters.) If the Japanese don't think the U.S. is going to intervene, they probably won't attack the Pacific Fleet.
 
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Before Yamamoto pushed his PH plan to approval the intent had been to hit the US Asiatic fleet and the Cavite naval base much harder. Including carriers vs just a land based strike. Part of the IJN admirals opposition to the high risk PH strike was it took the carriers away from other operations thought essential. IIRC a IJN carrier group was to strike Luzon from the South China Sea, then take a short step south to support the operations in northern Maylasia. This implies the Brit surface TF being attacked by carrier launched strike as well as the Annam based bombers.
 
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