What chance did Kerensky have?

RousseauX

Donor
Yes, you just need someone with more than mediocre amount of political nuance.

You needed someone ruthless and politically astute like Frederich Ebert in Germany who is willing to keep the loyalty of the military, make peace, and ruthlessly execute left-wing (and probably right-wing) revolutionaries to keep the provisional government in power.
 
Yes, you just need someone with more than mediocre amount of political nuance.

You needed someone ruthless and politically astute like Frederich Ebert in Germany who is willing to keep the loyalty of the military, make peace, and ruthlessly execute left-wing (and probably right-wing) revolutionaries to keep the provisional government in power.

Except unfortunately, Ebert in a way created more long term problems, because of utilizing Freikorps... well, that set a bad precedent.

Additionally, its worth noting that Kerensky had to use the radical left, in the form of the Bolsheviks, to crush the radical right, in the form of a military coup. Ebert essentially did the reverse. Its telling what would happen to both states from the precedents these actions set.

Really, what Kerensky needed to do was get out of WW1 and focus on domestic problems to truly quell extremists.
 
IF Kerenskey was willing to take Russia out of hte war, and had enough authority in the Provisional Government to do so, he would have taken away Lenin's most popular talking point. So probably no October Revolution

OTL, there was enough (barely) fight left in the Russian army to launch the Brusilov offensive. When that failed, the army pretty much fell apart

I belive OTL he was a strong supporter of the offensive, so he almost has to become has to be someone other than who he was.

I also doubt whether Kerenskey had enough influence in the Provisional Government to make such a huge change. Wouldn't he have been kicked out by his colleagues for trying?
 

RousseauX

Donor
Additionally, its worth noting that Kerensky had to use the radical left, in the form of the Bolsheviks, to crush the radical right, in the form of a military coup. Ebert essentially did the reverse. Its telling what would happen to both states from the precedents these actions set.

That is really insightful, though I'm not sure if I can say that the left "crushed" the right in Russia (they arguably stopped a coup though), but the general idea is certainly there.

The right though, are a lot easier to co-op (at least temporarily)
 
That is really insightful, though I'm not sure if I can say that the left "crushed" the right in Russia (they arguably stopped a coup though), but the general idea is certainly there.

The right though, are a lot easier to co-op (at least temporarily)

With the last, judging by Chile(to explain, apparently Allende may have appointed Pinochet to something in order to calm the military, you know the rest of the story), that isn't even necessarily always the case. It can be, but it isn't anymore assured I'd argue than the left being kept in line, although I admit we don't really have many examples, either way, of the left being used to crush the radical right, so take that as you will.

With the first, thanks! But yeah, my point is, using an extreme to crush another extreme isn't going to end well, as both Germany and Russia sadly demonstrated. Hence, I don't think Ebert's example is a good one, because in his case, he was trading short term stability for long term, and... that's not a good idea. Understandable mind you, but still not a good idea.
 
If Kerensky refrains from any offensive, and crushes the Bolsheviks at some point (perhaps by backing Kornilov instead of sacking him), he'll be OK. At least 50/50 if not better. That will increase if his government also 1) completes the constitutional reforms and holds new elections (as it will discredit the idea that the soviets are really in charge) and 2) supports some immediate land reform. Than chances are probably better than 80/20.
 
If Kerensky refrains from any offensive, and crushes the Bolsheviks at some point (perhaps by backing Kornilov instead of sacking him), he'll be OK. At least 50/50 if not better. That will increase if his government also 1) completes the constitutional reforms and holds new elections (as it will discredit the idea that the soviets are really in charge) and 2) supports some immediate land reform. Than chances are probably better than 80/20.

You forget, there was also the risk of the radical right, as remember, some of the rise of the Bolsheviks came from Kerensky using them to stop a coup.

Hence, its damned if he does, damned if he doesn't. He stops the war, maybe the radical right goes crazy depending on the concessions required. He continues, well... we already seen what happened in OTL.

Look, I'm playing Devil's advocate in this thread, to some extent, because Russia's situation I don't see any easy way out of, or any clear way out of, for that matter. Its, in some ways, similar to Germany's, because essentially, neither country has a way out of its circumstances that's healthy in the long run. (In the case of Germany, using Freikorps set a bad precedent.)

EDIT: To avoid being purely negative, I do agree he needs to end the war, as I think he'd probably would be able to isolate, if you will, the radical right from support a lot easier than the radical left, given the present conditions.
 
Except unfortunately, Ebert in a way created more long term problems, because of utilizing Freikorps... well, that set a bad precedent.

Whatever mistakes the German Republic made, smashing the Spartacists was not among them. If he didn't, there wouldn't be any long term problems because the patient would have been dead.

If you're going to blame anyone else on the triumph of the Nazis in 1933, blame the KPD which de facto allied with the Nazis to destroy the SPD and other democratic parties as per Stalin's orders. KPD simply guessed wrong who would benefit from that stance.

Ebert should have made it known that the army stated it could not continue fighting or defend Germany from the allies. Put the blame on them so that there isn't the nonsense of the "November criminals". Second, avoid the 1923 hyperinflation. That would have generated more support for the democratic center.
 
Whatever mistakes the German Republic made, smashing the Spartacists was not among them. If he didn't, there wouldn't be any long term problems because the patient would have been dead.

That set the precedent though that Paramilitaries were okay. Its not crushing them that was the problem, it was HOW he did that caused the problem.

If you're going to blame anyone else on the triumph of the Nazis in 1933, blame the KPD which de facto allied with the Nazis to destroy the SPD and other democratic parties as per Stalin's orders. KPD simply guessed wrong who would benefit from that stance.

That's overly simplistic. My point was how he established a precedent that would play a part into how the Nazis rose. Of course, the KPD hardly helped here, but the conditions with which it became a problem only got worse because of the precedent involving paramilitaries.

Ebert should have made it known that the army stated it could not continue fighting or defend Germany from the allies. Put the blame on them so that there isn't the nonsense of the "November criminals". Second, avoid the 1923 hyperinflation. That would have generated more support for the democratic center.

The first part is not possible with how he crushed the Sparticists, as he was forced to agree not to do so in order to get their cooperation. That was part of the precedent, which was being unable to blame the military for problems because they were too necessary to prevent social and/or political collapse.

The hyperinflation itself was partially caused by external circumstances, namely France and all. Yes, it should've been avoided, to say the least, but my point here is that the circumstances causing it have to be taken into account.
 
My understanding is that after 1916 the eastern front was mostly static. What if Russia remains on the strategic defensive, detaches a few divisions to crush any uprisings while it enacts reforms/elections/etc. Could they have managed to hold things together for another year or so until the general peace?
 
My understanding is that after 1916 the eastern front was mostly static. What if Russia remains on the strategic defensive, detaches a few divisions to crush any uprisings while it enacts reforms/elections/etc. Could they have managed to hold things together for another year or so until the general peace?

Doubtful. Russia was starving, I'd remind you, during this period, and I don't know if any short term reforms could've fixed that in time.

This isn't even getting into that, assuming 1916 still has the Tsar, the government has all the baggage associated with that still unfortunately.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
...watch out when David Tenner notices this thread and points out all the constraints on Kerensky...

Policy change may be harder for Kerensky to accomplish than simply better tactical performance in countering the Bolesheviks. Kerensky might survive by, the Bolesheviks having an earlier coup that they are unable to sustain, arresting Lenin and/or Trotsky, possibly moving the capital to Moscow in the summer of 1917. Any number of things.

For an altered Kerensky-ite war policy, my favorites are: 1) Avoiding an offensive altogether for 1917 while formally staying in the war and keeping a front-line intact, and 2) Making 1917 the year of waiting and building in Europe, while resuming the offensive against Turkey in Asia and the Black Sea. Make it the year of Yudenich. Forces on that front had higher morale than in Europe, and the Ottomans have much less ability to show the Russians how outclassed Russia is than the Germans did in OTL summer 1917.

This policy could be predicated in part on an appreciation by Kerensky that the war simply won't be won in 1917, and the American factor will make 1918 much better for the Allies that year. Additionally, if the anti-Ottoman option is chosen, the rationale could be that this is an investment in securing Russia's unique national interests safely in advance of any peace settlement through creation of favorable "facts on the ground", the Entente powers and Americans after all may not be 100% trustworthy in carrying out Sykes-Picot-Sazanov partition otherwise. With Germany defeated, the west loses its geopolitical incentive to accept Russian control of the straits.
 
Ok, Kerensky could have retained power and possibly weathered Lenin. What happens afterward is up in the bag, without the Bolsheviks and Germans the common enemy of the whole white movement is gone. You now have a myriad of factions, on top of that you have separatists. Russia will not be in for some good times baring a complete miracle.
 
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