What caused the fall of the (Western) Roman Empire?

My only point was that usurping generals used to be a much less problem in the early Principate, particularly with the Julio Claudian dynasty when Italy was still considered the master nation. Once this was lost, regionalism became a big problem. Generals were able to find support of troops recruited from particular regions, rather than from Italy, and these troops held no loyalty to Italy, as opposed to the whole cosmopolitan empire which they were a part of. This would be unthinkable in the early Principate, or even in the 2nd century when the idea of provincials fighting for the mantle of empire was done only in emergencies, not as a regular matter of imperial power plays.

As for provincial emperors, this was the first step towards the idea that anyone from the provinces could thus become emperor, making regional usurpations more likely in the future, even if the early provincial emperors had stable successions. It was a gradual fragmenting process of legitimacy.



One question, was post-Severus more political stable or pre-Severus? Pre-Severus, senators held most of the power other than the emperor. Post-Severus the power balance shifted to the equestrians. Soon you had equestrians trying to become emperor directly. Clearly giving equestrians military/provincial power did not bode well for the empire in the long run, even if it did help the emperor in the short run by marginalizing his enemies in the Senate and giving power to equestrians he could trust.

Politically, the empire was as unstable in the first century as it was in the third, whenever under a weak ruler. If the emperor proved incompetent, or unpopular, the Senate would simply kill him, potentially causing unrest in the meanwhile. If that’s stability to you, to each his own.
Replacing senators with equestrians also allowed the empire to avoid massive disasters like the battle of Abritus, fought by Decius, a former usurper of senatorial rank. Equestrians were generally the better generals, and all the emperors that allowed the empire to recover, from Claudius II to Diocletian, were all equestrians, or soldiers who scaled the ranks.
 
I'm of the opinion soldiers and armies make generals far more than the other way around. Simply put, place Gallienus during the time of Caesar with Caesar's legions he would have done better. Place Caesar in Gallienus' time with his troops, he would have had far more trouble. Thus qualitatively, the Romans held a much decreased edge over their enemy for a variety of reasons by the late 3rd century onwards, after 50 year crisis.



I maintain qualitatively, their armies were superior in the early Principate, but this edge gradually began to decline until the late 3rd century, when Roman and barbarian armies were much more comparable. After this point, Romans were more likely to win when they had superior resources, wealth, equipment, numbers, compared to the time earlier. The fact that the Romans could lose to these enemies used to be considered shocking, by the late 3rd century onwards it no longer was as much.

Romans and barbarians were positively shocked by Adrianople, a completely avoidable clusterfuck of unprecedented scale.
 
You’re way underestimating how actually hard it is to properly lead an army, especially in ancient times were you had to rely on scouts and informers for intelligence, and were highly subjected to climate changes. If Caesar had been born in the third century, he’d use tactics typical of the third century. Conquering Gaul was an incredible feat, to credit it solely on the army would be greatly unfair to Caesar, who was the one giving the orders to the soldiers.

As even Caesar's Gallic Wars attest, it was his armies that saved his ass not the other way around. His legions were tough and they held under impossible odds. He could not have conquered Gaul with mediocre soldiers. Also command is a skill that is learned through experience, and then luck is the major factor. One general might be slightly better than another, but not overwhelmingly better. People are essentially equal, and when we talk about genius in military command, we are talking about slight superiority only. Alexander was insanely lucky and had the best troops in the world due to his father. Caesar was better than his republican counterparts, not overwhelmingly, but only because he had the most experienced/loyal troops. The romantic myth of the general who can overcome all odds, is just that, a myth mostly.

It was always about money and resources that people fought, why do you think soldiers attached themselves to their general’s fortunes in the late Republic? They wanted him to grant them the retirement lands that the Senate very probably wouldn’t have provided them. Augustus fixed this by granting soldiers an annual salary, plus a pension after retirement.

Exactly. It used to be the case that soldiers followed generals who could pay them, and they fought out of loyalty to the state + war spoils. They enlisted for specific campaigns. If they lost, they got nothing. Afterwards, soldiers wanted professional careers and be paid, that was all.

Course not, he spent a quarter of his reign fighting the civil war, fought all by senators. After that, he very wisely pruned the Senate of all his enemies, and stationed a legion of his supporters in Rome.

Severus never faced the Huns, Sassanids, Goths.

Well, the civil wars in the late Republic, coupled all together, lasted about, what, slightly more than twenty years? Civil wars in the empire, however, counting all usurpers, would make for about a fourth of its five hundred years’ existence. Doubt losses in the Late Republic can rival that.

Compare the manpower pool of the Late Republic (almost all recruits from Italy) vs that of the late empire and come back to me. The Roman Republic in the last 50 years of its history experienced constant civil war, with a much smaller population base to generate recruits for their army, with horrendous losses for its citizen population, while the empire in the first two centuries experienced only two bouts of real civil war, resulting in far fewer losses, with a much larger (provincial) manpower base, yet in the aftermath of the second one, they were already struggling to secure the frontiers. Whereas the Romans after 50 continuous years of civil instability, reunified, and immediately set about expanding their empire under Augustus, conquering immense tracts of territory. (And even during the midst of civil instability, they were simultaneously fighting external enemies effectively as well as themselves) Why the difference? One still had an intense military culture and tribal loyalty. The other did not.
 
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Romans and barbarians were positively shocked by Adrianople, a completely avoidable clusterfuck of unprecedented scale.

Yes, you had Roman advantage in numbers, resources, and they still lost a set piece battle. It used to be the case if the Romans lost, they were ambushed, had inferior numbers, lack of preparation ect. Then in the late 3rd century onwards, it was they were expected to prevail if they have the numbers, resources, favourable conditions. By the late 4th century, they can have all these things yet still lose. That's the shock. But the shock used to be that the Romans could lose under ANY circumstance WAY back.
 
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In a nutshell why the Romans fell in the most general of terms.

Rome started off with an intense military culture but no power/resources, a city state. Using that intense military culture/tribal loyalty, they expanded, gradually acquiring power/resources/manpower. At the height of their power they both had an intense military culture + power/manpower/resources. Then with the advent of empire, that tribal loyalty and military culture instrumental to their original conquest began to fade away. Eventually they were left with only manpower/wealth/resources as an advantage over their enemies, the legacy of their successful past conquests. However civil instability + increased foreign threats sapped this away gradually, while the empire couldn't hold together regionally speaking. Thus eventually even this advantage was increasingly lost, (Western) Rome couldn't pay for the upkeep of numerous quality troops, and so they relied on foreign mercenaries. When those mercenaries turned on Rome to renegotiate terms, ect, the empire buckled and Rome fell.
 
The main problem, I believe, is the breakdown of trade networks and the multi-year splintering of the empire in the 3rd century crisis. Inept leadership by the post-Antonine Emperors, the loss of legitimacy of the Imperial title as a result, the ensuing increasing reliance of ambitious generals-turned-emperors on bribing the army for loyalty--all of that contributed to a general breakdown of social order, the temporary splintering of the empire, a slow decline of military discipline, and the loss of the lucrative internal trade networks, initiating the transition throughout the late-antique period in Europe and the Med from the antique society of largely open, trade-focused cities and well-maintained trade networks to the medieval society of fortified cities, powerful rural estates centered around fortified citadels, and increased localization of production. This reduced the ability of the Roman Empire to maintain a unified state identity, and the decline in military culture contributed to severe military defeats against re-organized and increasingly powerful Germanic peoples, who when brought into the Empire in lieu of having them run amok further contributed to the destabilization due to having limited at best loyalty to the Imperial state.

The Eastern Roman Empire, not coincidentally, suffered its most serious losses of outlying territory in the post-Justinian period (when tenuous conquests were undone by a combination of plague, a brutal and pointless war that drastically depleted manpower, and the new Arab threat), before actually making something of a comeback after the establishment of professional military units in the 8th century. When those professional units got trashed and eventually dropped in quality in the 11th century, that's when things really started to go down the tubes for the Byzantines.
 
As even Caesar's Gallic Wars attest, it was his armies that saved his ass not the other way around. His legions were tough and they held under impossible odds. He could not have conquered Gaul with mediocre soldiers. Also command is a skill that is learned through experience, and then luck is the major factor. One general might be slightly better than another, but not overwhelmingly better. People are essentially equal, and when we talk about genius in military command, we are talking about slight superiority only. Alexander was insanely lucky and had the best troops in the world due to his father. Caesar was better than his republican counterparts, not overwhelmingly, but only because he had the most experienced/loyal troops. The romantic myth of the general who can overcome all odds, is just that, a myth mostly.

Soldiers don’t act on their own, they receive orders, one wrong order, and all could be lost. By your reasoning, Scipio should have lost the war in Spain, since most of his troops were green, and Quintus Coepio should have won at Arausio, since his troops had been in Gaul for years. Soldiers being well trained is an important element to every army, but it’s naive to think that all commanders are equal save for the quality of their troops.



Exactly. It used to be the case that soldiers followed generals who could pay them, and they fought out of loyalty to the state + war spoils. They enlisted for specific campaigns. If they lost, they got nothing. Afterwards, soldiers wanted professional careers and be paid, that was all.

Doubt the Fimbrians under Lucullus gave two shits about the state. They just wanted to get paid, and I bet a lot of other soldiers just fought to get paid. We can’t go assuming that every single soldier was patriotic, but we can very well assume that money was a good incentive, back then as now.


Severus never faced the Huns, Sassanids, Goths.

So? Doubt he’d have behaved differently in the late second century.



Compare the manpower pool of the Late Republic (almost all recruits from Italy) vs that of the late empire and come back to me. The Roman Republic in the last 50 years of its history experienced constant civil war, with a much smaller population base to generate recruits for their army, with horrendous losses for its citizen population, while the empire in the first two centuries experienced only two bouts of real civil war, resulting in far fewer losses, with a much larger (provincial) manpower base, yet in the aftermath of the second one, they were already struggling to secure the frontiers. Whereas the Romans after 50 continuous years of civil instability, reunified, and immediately set about expanding their empire under Augustus, conquering immense tracts of territory. (And even during the midst of civil instability, they were simultaneously fighting external enemies effectively as well as themselves) Why the difference? One still had an intense military culture and tribal loyalty. The other did not.

The first civil war was fought in 87, then 83-82, and ended with the sertorian war from 80 to 72. Then There was constant civil war from 49 to 45, then there were several bursts of civil war that go from 43-42, then 41-40, 38-36 and 32-30. All that for a grand total of 23 years of civil war. Consider that in some of these armies, rather tahndestroyed, were incorporated by the enemy. Losses were significant, but not that significant.

Of course after it’s civil wars, the empire struggled to keep its borders, they were significantly larger than the Republic’s, and there were no more client kingdoms to secure them.
 
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Politically, the empire was as unstable in the first century as it was in the third, whenever under a weak ruler.

Total bollocks. It took FOUR years for Caligula to die, not usurped, but by his own Praetorian Guard. Nero lasted 14 years. Claudius was a "weak" emperor since he had no military accomplishments + disabled, with no prior political career. Nerva was able to diffuse the situation by adopting Trajan, without a civil war, something that would be unthinkable in the mid late 3rd century. Hadrian, Pius, Aurelius were weak nobodies militarily speaking.

If the emperor proved incompetent, or unpopular, the Senate would simply kill him, potentially causing unrest in the meanwhile.

The Senate as a whole body has never killed an emperor, individual senators would plot against the emperor but with much less success than mid/late 3rd century equestrians. The Senate as a whole body had a duty to uphold the emperor, who in return had to treat them like peers. That is not the same as the relationship between equestrians and the emperor in the later period (Dominate).

Replacing senators with equestrians also allowed the empire to avoid massive disasters like the battle of Abritus, fought by Decius, a former usurper of senatorial rank. Equestrians were generally the better generals, and all the emperors that allowed the empire to recover, from Claudius II to Diocletian, were all equestrians, or soldiers who scaled the ranks.

False. Rather certain equestrians were good generals just like certain senators were good generals. The trick is to elevate the best equestrians to senatorial rank before giving them major military command of legions/provinces. This practice coincided with the greatest stability Rome has known, Trajan to Aurelius.

The reason all the good generals/emperors were equestrians by that period was that the Senate had already been marginalized from all military posts in that period. Thus it was impossible for a senator to be a "good general". You have the causation around backward. In early years for example, the Senate produced the best commanders because the Senate held all the military posts, ect.

The problem with too much meritocracy in determining emperors, is of course the problem of future usurpers. Even if you got a quality emperor now, you have to deal with future instability which could not be avoided.
 
Yes, you had Roman advantage in numbers, resources, and they still lost a set piece battle. It used to be the case if the Romans lost, they were ambushed, had inferior numbers, lack of preparation ect. Then in the late 3rd century onwards, it was they were expected to prevail if they have the numbers, resources, favourable conditions. By the late 4th century, they can have all these things yet still lose. That's the shock. But the shock used to be that the Romans could lose under ANY circumstance WAY back.

As I said before, name one battle under competent leadership that the empire lost against barbarians.
 
As I said before, name one battle under competent leadership that the empire lost against barbarians.

I already said leadership is itself a product of a successful army in itself, plus the various factors that allow one to produce that leadership. So you can blame quality of troops. You can blame the imperial system of rotating commanders. You can cite the Republic's more ambitious generals who use military success to further military careers. You can talk about military culture. You can't cite abstract command quality, as if there was a massive difference between most Republican commanders and later Empire commanders. There wasn't. Rome had its share of good/bad commanders in both Republic and Late Empire and early Empire periods. It's irrelevant to analysis of the quality of the Roman army. We have to cite results, not who was in command of those results.
 
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Soldiers don’t act on their own, they receive orders, one wrong order, and all could be lost. By your reasoning, Scipio should have lost the war in Spain, since most of his troops were green, and Quintus Coepio should have won at Arausio, since his troops had been in Gaul for years. Soldiers being well trained is an important element to every army, but it’s naive to think that all commanders are equal save for the quality of their troops.

I never said they were equal, only that the difference between them is not as large as you suppose. I also said luck plays a massive role, a bigger role than command quality. As for Scipio's green troops, I would say that Republican ethos was a motivating factor in convincing Romans to fight for their homeland. Thus Scipio being a great commander had great troops to command.
 
Total bollocks. It took FOUR years for Caligula to die, not usurped, but by his own Praetorian Guard. Nero lasted 14 years. Claudius was a "weak" emperor since he had no military accomplishments + disabled, with no prior political career. Nerva was able to diffuse the situation by adopting Trajan, without a civil war, something that would be unthinkable in the mid late 3rd century. Hadrian, Pius, Aurelius were weak nobodies militarily speaking.

The senators were privy to Caligula’s murder, and they feebly attempted to restore the Republic, had not Claudius been at hand, it could have turned into a mess.
Claudius had Britain conquered, that’s one heck of a military accomplishment, and he was no weakling.
Except senators actively conspired against Nero, and at last they managed to topple him.
Nerva was part of a larger conspiracy that involved a good chunk of senators and Trajan himself, otherwise why adopt Trajan and not someone closer? And why didn’t Trajan even bother to go to Rome once Nerva died? It was all under control from the beginning. There were no civil wars because the senators could still dispose of emperors and replace them with someone else. It doesn’t make the empire any more politically stable than it was later.



The Senate as a whole body has never killed an emperor, individual senators would plot against the emperor but with much less success than mid/late 3rd century equestrians.

The emperors in the third century were rarely killed by conspiracy from equestrians, the soldiers often took care of that. Only Caracalla, Gallienus and possibly Tacitus and Carus were killed in a conspiracy. In the first century, Caligula, Nero (who had conveniently broken down and committed suicide) and Domitian were killed by a conspiracy of senators. The tally is rather close.



False. Rather certain equestrians were good generals just like certain senators were good generals. The trick is to elevate the best equestrians to senatorial rank before giving them major military command of legions/provinces. This practice coincided with the greatest stability Rome has known, Trajan to Aurelius.

The reason all the good generals/emperors were equestrians by that period was that the Senate had already been marginalized from all military posts in that period. Thus it was impossible for a senator to be a "good general". You have the causation around backward. In early years for example, the Senate produced the best commanders because the Senate held all the military posts, ect.

The problem with too much meritocracy in determining emperors, is of course the problem of future usurpers. Even if you got a quality emperor now, you have to deal with future instability which could not be avoided.

Exactly, take some equestrians and make them senators. At the end of the day, they still started out as equestrians. When senators began losing and getting annoyed, Gallienus had them replaced with his own men, with good results.
I’m not saying senators couldn’t be good generals, but the equestrians were overall better than the senators, because the equestrians needed to stay in the army for a prolonged time to further their careers.
 
I already said leadership is itself a product of a successful army in itself, plus the various factors that allow one to produce that leadership. So you can blame quality of troops. You can blame the imperial system of rotating commanders. You can cite the Republic's more ambitious generals who use military success to further military careers. You can talk about military culture. You can't cite abstract command quality, as if there was a massive difference between most Republican commanders and later Empire commanders. There wasn't. Rome had its share of good/bad commanders in both Republic and Late Empire and early Empire periods. It's irrelevant to analysis of the quality of the Roman army. We have to cite results, not who was in command of those results.

The commanders also trained their soldiers, since there was no thing as a military academy. If the commanders were good, the soldiers would be well trained, if not, go look at Roman armies in Spain in the middle of the second century.

Plus, alright, let’s cite results, name one significant Roman loss from 382 CE onwards suffered by Romans against barbarians.
 
I never said they were equal, only that the difference between them is not as large as you suppose. I also said luck plays a massive role, a bigger role than command quality. As for Scipio's green troops, I would say that Republican ethos was a motivating factor in convincing Romans to fight for their homeland. Thus Scipio being a great commander had great troops to command.

Patriotism is nice and all, but in the thick of action, it accounts to nothing. Scipio’s troops were remnants from his relatives’ armies in Spain and a good deal of conscripts. No matter what, no soldier is great in his first battle. His troops were great cause he made them great.
 
I'll grant you most of these, but I have a single criticism. I fail to see how Rome "failed to recover" from the 3rd century. The period from 285-385 CE was a century of prosperity and military supremacy where the central government was strong. For example there were only two successful usurpations in that entire period - Constantine and Julian - many fewer than either the third or fifth centuries, and only one major military defeat. Even the prosperous period from 96-196 CE saw more usurpations (those of Nerva, Pertinax, Didianus, Severus, and arguably even Hadrian). Central power only began to break down with the court infighting during the regency of Stilicho and the invasions from 406-410, and became irreversible with the seizure of Africa by the Vandals and Spain by the Goths.
I specified fully for a reason. The recovery under Diocletian and Constantine was indeed extensive, and I wrote a post on another threat arguing that the transition to the Dominate gave Rome the resilience to soldier on.

However it was not a full recovery. Demographically Rome was in a weaker position both in terms of total population and urbanization, the Roman authorities were never able to get banditry back down to pre-crisis levels, devalued currency continued to be a problem even after Constantine's reforms, and of course the fact that all freemen were automatically citizens lowered military enlistment rates (though that problem slightly predates the Crisis of the Third Century). None of these were necessarily fatal, but they certainly didn't help.
 
The senators were privy to Caligula’s murder, and they feebly attempted to restore the Republic, had not Claudius been at hand, it could have turned into a mess.

The senators tried to restore the republic because they didn't know what to do. It was the Praetorian Guard who killed him, the vast majority of senators were not involved and passively resisted Caligula for 4 years as he humiliated them in the most grotesque fashion. The most serious plots against him came from close family members. I wonder how an emperor would fare if he tried this against his equestrians in the late 3rd century?

Claudius had Britain conquered, that’s one heck of a military accomplishment, and he was no weakling.
Claudius conquered Britain after he became emperor because he had no other accomplishments before then! And he did not personally take command of anything. He would not have survived in the mid-late 3rd century scenario.

The emperors in the third century were rarely killed by conspiracy from equestrians, the soldiers often took care of that. Only Caracalla, Gallienus and possibly Tacitus and Carus were killed in a conspiracy. In the first century, Caligula, Nero (who had conveniently broken down and committed suicide) and Domitian were killed by a conspiracy of senators. The tally is rather close.

You think soldiers were acting independently of equestrians and higher officials are you insane? Every emperor described as killed by soldiers was the result of equestrians abandoning their loyalty. I'll note that with the exception of Nero, none of the senatorial conspiracies resulted in civil war. I'll also note that Nero was usurped by regional generals (senators) only because he committed suicide needlessly, as sources attest.

Nerva was part of a larger conspiracy that involved a good chunk of senators and Trajan himself, otherwise why adopt Trajan and not someone closer? And why didn’t Trajan even bother to go to Rome once Nerva died? It was all under control from the beginning. There were no civil wars because the senators could still dispose of emperors and replace them with someone else. It doesn’t make the empire any more politically stable than it was later.
It was more stable because the Senate managed to resolve matters between themselves WITHOUT a civil war.

Exactly, take some equestrians and make them senators. At the end of the day, they still started out as equestrians. When senators began losing and getting annoyed, Gallienus had them replaced with his own men, with good results.

Severus began replacing the senators with equestrians to consolidate his own power. By the time of Gallienus, the majority of legions and provinces were under the command of equestrians. No wonder the Senators had no calibre. The classic Principate took the best equestrian commanders and made them senators. The Dominate let the equestrians get out of hand and essentially abolished the Senate. I'll leave history to judge which is more successful.

I’m not saying senators couldn’t be good generals, but the equestrians were overall better than the senators, because the equestrians needed to stay in the army for a prolonged time to further their careers.

If equestrians were structurally better commanders, why all the successful senatorial generals of the early Principate all the way up to Severus? Because 1) the best equestrians were promoted. 2) military experience is generated by actually fighting in wars, not merely serving in command posts during peacetime.
 
Patriotism is nice and all, but in the thick of action, it accounts to nothing. Scipio’s troops were remnants from his relatives’ armies in Spain and a good deal of conscripts. No matter what, no soldier is great in his first battle. His troops were great cause he made them great.

Or rather they had latent potential to be great because of their patriotism. Otherwise they wouldn't grow past the early battles. Motivation and morale is everything in the thick of action.
 
The commanders also trained their soldiers, since there was no thing as a military academy. If the commanders were good, the soldiers would be well trained, if not, go look at Roman armies in Spain in the middle of the second century.

No evidence that training was better in the empire than in the Republic. Quite the opposite, discipline declined during the empire compared to republican legions.
 
The senators tried to restore the republic because they didn't know what to do. It was the Praetorian Guard who killed him, the vast majority of senators were not involved and passively resisted Caligula for 4 years as he humiliated them in the most grotesque fashion. The most serious plots against him came from close family members. I wonder how an emperor would fare if he tried this against his equestrians in the late 3rd century?

Cassius Chaerea was clearly involved with the senators, or else he wouldn’t have been killed right away by Claudius, who paid some of the other pretoriane handsomely for their services in his favor. Some senators knew what was gonna happen, and arranged accordingly, but they were preempted by Claudius.

Caligula could have stood a chance had he been one of the Severii, Caracalla did for 6 years after all.


Claudius conquered Britain after he became emperor because he had no other accomplishments before then! And he did not personally take command of anything. He would not have survived in the mid-late 3rd century scenario.

Someone like Claudius wouldn’t have gone for the purple in the first place in the third century.



You think soldiers were acting independently of equestrians and higher officials are you insane? Every emperor described as killed by soldiers was the result of equestrians abandoning their loyalty. I'll note that with the exception of Nero, none of the senatorial conspiracies resulted in civil war. I'll also note that Nero was usurped by regional generals (senators) only because he committed suicide needlessly, as sources attest.

Emperors wouldn’t be the first military commanders to be killed in a mutiny. Very often, soldiers in the third century had no intention of fighting for an emperor who would clearly lose against his contender, so they just dispatched him to save themselves. Maximinus was killed by his soldiers when his siege of Aquileia failed, Philip was killed either in battle or by his troops when facing Decius, Trebonianus was killed by his troops when facing Aemilianus, Aemilianus was killed by his troops when facing Valerian.


It was more stable because the Senate managed to resolve matters between themselves WITHOUT a civil war.

The army made the empire stable, not the senators. As long as the army was well paid, well provided for and didn’t have to move too much from one corner of Europe to the other, the empire stayed stable.



Severus began replacing the senators with equestrians to consolidate his own power. By the time of Gallienus, the majority of legions and provinces were under the command of equestrians. No wonder the Senators had no calibre. The classic Principate took the best equestrian commanders and made them senators. The Dominate let the equestrians get out of hand and essentially abolished the Senate. I'll leave history to judge which is more successful.

Considering the empire began recovering after Gallienus, and managed to survive another two centuries, I’d say history is on Gallienus’ side. You can’t also expect things to stay the same over the centuries, it’d be like pretending that 19th century Europe was the same as 20th century Europe.



If equestrians were structurally better commanders, why all the successful senatorial generals of the early Principate all the way up to Severus? Because 1) the best equestrians were promoted. 2) military experience is generated by actually fighting in wars, not merely serving in command posts during peacetime.

I said generally equestrians were better. There were good generals who were senators, they were the ones who bothered with staying in the army as tribune for more than a year. Few did that.
 
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Or rather they had latent potential to be great because of their patriotism. Otherwise they wouldn't grow past the early battles. Motivation and morale is everything in the thick of action.

Training and discipline is everything in the thick of action. Those are what make a veteran different from a newbie. Motivation and morale are only worth if the soldiers are well led, lots of motivated and galvanized Romans died at Cannae.
 
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