What caused the fall of the (Western) Roman Empire?

Yes, they were good, but their resources were heavily limited, because at the end of the day the ERE had its own stuff to deal with it. They pulled back reinforcements in 434 CE and 441 CE cause of the Persians and the Huns. Money from the East wasn’t shared with the West, and grain from the East wasn’t shared with the West. The East did help quite a lot, but a United empire would have achieved a lot more.

I don't see how the ERE could've done more for the WRE than it did--or at least tried to do--in 468. So great was its effort it was practically broke afterwards for some time....
Even had the empire been united the eastern part would've "had its own stuff to deal with" to the detriment of its ability to assist the West. A theoretically united empire in the mid third century was just unable to provide help to some areas which had to fend for themselves, and even broke away.
 
I think people are underestimating the impact of bad Emperors. Rome (and the Byzantines too for that matter, although not to the same level) were pretty reliant on the competence of Emperors. If Rome had a good Emperor they were fine. If they had a bad one they were less fine. Post-Theodosius I the Western Roman Empire had a pretty motley collection of Emperors on the whole.
 
He and Pilate represented the empire. Or he represented the army.



Well it's great to hear you're an atheist, welcome to the club. :) But unless you're a prof yourself, you don't have such things as tenure to worry about; too much controversy can be detrimental to one's career. And I'm not blaming christianity just because I don't believe in it. I think christianity played an important role in western civilization; in some ways it had a very positive effect. But I think the evidence for christianity sapping the strength of the empire is quite good.:)

You might want to consider how tenure works before you invoke it as the rationalization for ignoring the vast weight of scholarly evidence. Typically a professor receives tenure within 5-7 years of first becoming an "assistant" professor (at which point he or she becomes an associate professor). The titles are a little different in the UK but the idea is the same. Once a professor has tenure firing him or her becomes exceptionally difficult (and almost never because of a controversial publication). Therefore, if you theory were correct you would expect to see young professors publishing one set of arguments about the fall and older professors saying "well now that I have tenure let me explain that it is really all Christianity"). As a quick google search of Peter Heathers name will reveal he has published the substantial bulk of his work (and the book I'm sure you have) after he received tenure.
 
I don't see how the ERE could've done more for the WRE than it did--or at least tried to do--in 468. So great was its effort it was practically broke afterwards for some time....
Even had the empire been united the eastern part would've "had its own stuff to deal with" to the detriment of its ability to assist the West. A theoretically united empire in the mid third century was just unable to provide help to some areas which had to fend for themselves, and even broke away.

Which is why Diocletian instituted the tetrarchy, the empire was divided in four so that proper support could be lent to all parts by four associated emperors, yet in practice he could employ all the empire’s resources as it were one.
 
If by "foreign troops" you mean men from the Danube area, they were a great asset not a liability.
No mate I mean troops from beyond Rome's borders because the Constitutio Antoniniana eradicated the Roman Army's primary tool for recruitment.

that the Empire bounced back admirably from the many disasters of 250-60
IIRC trade never recovered to pre-Crisis levels, same for urbanization.

Everything went wrong at the time but the (prechristian) Empire still revived.
Bah Gibbon's thesis was stupid even by the standards of the age of conspiracy theories about Jesuits trying to rule the world as a shadowy cabal.

love how there was no reply to this.
 
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He and Pilate represented the empire. Or he represented the army.

To some, sure, to other Christians, he represented himself, and to some others, he was a saint.



Yet again, I didn't say christians were opposed to the empire... Just that most wouldn't fight for it, a problem which became serious when they became the great majority.

So, all that talk about Romans being evil? Anyway, some Christians didn’t fight as some pagans didn’t fight, don’t you believe that at least some of them would not fight simply because they’d have stayed at home rather than get stationed in Britannia? It doesn’t have to be all about faith.



Of course he mentioned church state relations, I commented on that.

You said he preferred to avoid the topic. He didn’t.



Estate owners were obligated to provide recruits and sons of soldiers were supposed to serve. True some estate owners wouldn't provide good men or any. But as I wrote before....for the most part, the problem was unwillingness to serve. Men often cut off their thumbs to avoid service--a problem that Goldsworthy says became worse in the fourth century than previously. (I don't recall if he tried to explain why, but he did note evidence for increasing avoidance of service.) Christian senators may have complained about pagans being employed, but what choice did the state have if not enough christians would fight? There's no doubt the new christian empire by c 400 was heavily dependent on barbarians. The clear implication is that most christians would not fight.
Yet again, barbarians didn't have the historical baggage of Rome nor the admonitions of pacifistic church authorities not to fight.

Poor people can’t run away from conscription, since the middle of the fourth century there were severe laws for those who’d cut their thumbs. The only way they could escape the law was under the protection of rich landowners, who sheltered them from service. Again, there’s a lot of reasons why people don’t want to join the army, then as now, it doesn’t have to be all about faith.



Well it's great to hear you're an atheist, welcome to the club. :) But unless you're a prof yourself, you don't have such things as tenure to worry about; too much controversy can be detrimental to one's career. And I'm not blaming christianity just because I don't believe in it. I think christianity played an important role in western civilization; in some ways it had a very positive effect. But I think the evidence for christianity sapping the strength of the empire is quite good.:)

I’m still an amateur, nonetheless, I wouldn’t support Christianity just because it’s a trend, heck, some historians thrive on controversy.
From your argument, it looks like the whole reason the empire fell was because of Christianity, which, come on, no matter what you believe, it couldn’t have been just that now could it?
 
To answer OP's question I would probably start with Rome's failure to fully recover from the Crisis of the Third Century, and then from there go on to discuss the impact of climate change, the faults of the Roman economy, the rise of the Sassanids as a peer power, the development of Barbarian kingdoms along the Empire's northern frontier, the over extension of the roman army, the failure to fully reign in infighting, the reliance on foreign troops brought about by the expansion of citizenship, the decline of the Roman Navy, ect...

I'll grant you most of these, but I have a single criticism. I fail to see how Rome "failed to recover" from the 3rd century. The period from 285-385 CE was a century of prosperity and military supremacy where the central government was strong. For example there were only two successful usurpations in that entire period - Constantine and Julian - many fewer than either the third or fifth centuries, and only one major military defeat. Even the prosperous period from 96-196 CE saw more usurpations (those of Nerva, Pertinax, Didianus, Severus, and arguably even Hadrian). Central power only began to break down with the court infighting during the regency of Stilicho and the invasions from 406-410, and became irreversible with the seizure of Africa by the Vandals and Spain by the Goths.

1. Tribal loyalty. In early days, Roman citizens felt tribal loyalty to the state and fought despite the uncertain economic benefits in return. Even after Marius reforms they signed up knowing that only victory and the general's purse would pay and supply them. In a multi-ethnic empire however, soldiers expect regular wages and pensions, otherwise motivation drops, conscripts are unreliable. Previously Auxilia fought for citizenship but the perks of citizenship vs peregrini/provincial became less and less as the empire wore on, and by 212 everyone had citizenship. The barbarians on the other hand fought out of tribal loyalty, for "free", with only success determining economic reward. That's a serious structural advantage mitigated only by size and numbers, but once the Migrations began and Persia strengthened that factor was increasingly lost for Rome.

3. In the early days of the empire, the concept of Italy as the master nation kept the provincials in line who didn't try to usurp imperial authority by making a hopeful power play themselves. As emperors increasingly came from the provinces, and Italy lost its central importance, and even the role of the Senate became inferior to equestrians, the psychological authoritative hierarchy broke down, leading to a loss of unity, paradoxically as Rome was becoming a melting pot of ethnicities.

I think this is inferring more than is reasonable. The empire may have been a melting pot of ethnicities, but it was certainly not a melting pot of nationalities. This may seem to be a semantic distinction, but consider this. Despite all the numerous attempted usurpations in the empire's long history, none of them (besides maybe the Palmyrenes) appeared to be associated with any sort of national consciousness. Even the so-called "Gallic Empire" was just a copy/paste of Roman institutions without any apparent regional patriotism (otherwise the rebellion would likely not have ended with the capture of Trier).
 
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But the Empire was still able to fight effectively late in the third century after these factors, and more, had become felt.

Yes because it was still wealthy, had resources, and a numerical advantage. Take these factors away subsequently (gradually 4th/5th century), and they lose decisively. (I'll note the late 3rd century Empire was far less effective than the early Principate when these factors favoured the empire even more + tribal loyalty towards Rome had not totally diminished).

I beg to differ. Prior to the late 4rth century, the Empire had always been able to recover fairly rapidly from setbacks. The civil wars of the 190s didn't prevent Severus from taking Ctesiphon in 198. The terrible losses of the mid third century didn't prevent the victories of 268-98. And look at the very costly civil war c 350-53. Not one decade later, Julian led a huge army against Persia. He didn't fare well, but that's beside the point.

Severus is a good example of what I was talking about. The civil war caused a collapse in Roman security that Severus had to spend the entirety of his reign fixing, everything from his Parthian, African, British campaign/wars was about restoring Roman credibility which wouldn't have taken a loss in the early days of the empire, or late Republic. The late Republic endured decades of civil war, yet there were no real security problems in the wake.

Ferrill claimed this long ago but his view was challenged by e.g. Elton. I don't think the problem was a decline in the quality of the army. It was a lack of sufficient soldiers, especially after 408. Even if the roman army had become "barbarized' that didn't necessarily mean it was no good. Goths, vandals, Huns and others proved that barbarian forces could be very effective.

The two are linked inevitably. If you have trouble finding enough soldiers, it's likely your soldiers aren't very good, because the whole culture has changed. Previously Rome was a very military orientated culture, this began to change with Augustus. In parallel to this, the quality of soldiers was maintained a while in the professional army even as the masses forgot about military matters. Then professionalism too began to wane due to the decline of military culture in general society (which is necessary to support it), and so you have not enough willing recruits, and crappy recruits at the same time, and so you must recruit increasingly foreigners.
 
I think this is inferring more than is reasonable. The empire may have been a melting pot of ethnicities, but it was certainly not a melting pot of nationalities. This may seem to be a semantic distinction, but consider this. Despite all the numerous attempted usurpations in the empire's long history, none of them (besides maybe the Palmyrenes) appeared to be associated with any sort of national consciousness. Even the so-called "Gallic Empire" was just a copy/paste of Roman institutions without any apparent regional patriotism (otherwise the rebellion would likely not have ended with the capture of Trier).

It's not separatism Rome had to worry about at this point, it was the inability to settle amongst themselves who should be emperor and who should hold power. This damaged the empire through unending civil wars as rivalling regions who all agreed they were part of the empire, couldn't agree easily with who should lead it. Thus you had regional revolts all the time, every time a power vacuum opened up in Rome.

In early years of the empire, this would have been unthinkable for regional troops to challenge Rome directly (since all the troops were from Italy). All challenges in the days of the Republic were indirect, not wanting to overthrow the powers to be, but to uphold justice, ect. Then when the justice matters were settled, all the troops were happily unified again. With regionalism, this wouldn't easily be the case. The regions would have to be bought off, regional relations became purely defined by power relations, not ideological ones.

This loss of the Italian master nation, is also responsible for the necessary division of the empire east and west, because they couldn't easily agree to be together anymore.
 
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Yes because it was still wealthy, had resources, and a numerical advantage. Take these factors away subsequently (gradually 4th/5th century), and they lose decisively. (I'll note the late 3rd century Empire was far less effective than the early Principate when these factors favoured the empire even more + tribal loyalty towards Rome had not totally diminished).



Severus is a good example of what I was talking about. The civil war caused a collapse in Roman security that Severus had to spend the entirety of his reign fixing, everything from his Parthian, African, British campaign/wars was about restoring Roman credibility which wouldn't have taken a loss in the early days of the empire, or late Republic. The late Republic endured decades of civil war, yet there were no real security problems in the wake.



The two are linked inevitably. If you have trouble finding enough soldiers, it's likely your soldiers aren't very good, because the whole culture has changed. Previously Rome was a very military orientated culture, this began to change with Augustus. In parallel to this, the quality of soldiers was maintained a while in the professional army even as the masses forgot about military matters. Then professionalism too began to wane due to the decline of military culture in general society (which is necessary to support it), and so you have not enough willing recruits, and crappy recruits at the same time, and so you must recruit increasingly foreigners.

It all depended on the quality of the leading generals. Generally, barbarian armies avoided pitched battles against the Romans because they knew thatthe Romans, or the barbarians trained and equipped by the Romans, would beat them. When their leader was a good commander, and there had been time to train recruits, the Romans never lost. The Roman army, as late as the fifth century, was still the best military asset force of antiquity.
 
Unfortunately as modern nations attest, there can be warring ethnicities within the nation. That's why homogenous nations are ceteris paribus more politically stable. It's not separatism Rome had to worry about at this point, it was the inability to settle amongst themselves who should be emperor and who should hold power. This damaged the empire through unending civil wars as rivalling ethnicities who all agreed they were part of the empire, couldn't agree easily with who should lead it. Thus you had regional revolts all the time, every time a power vacuum opened up in Rome.

In early years of the empire, this would have been unthinkable for regional troops to challenge Rome directly (since all the troops were from Italy). All challenges in the days of the Republic were indirect, not wanting to overthrow the powers to be, but to uphold justice, ect. Then when the justice matters were settled, all the troops were happily unified again. With regionalism, this wouldn't easily be the case. The regions would have to be bought off, regional relations became purely defined by power relations, not ideological ones.

This loss of the Italian master nation, is also responsible for the necessary division of the empire east and west, because they couldn't easily agree to be together anymore.

But none of that had anything to do with ethnicity. Soldiers in Gaul weren’t necessarily born there, they just happened to be there and to have settled there. Severus, an African, was supported by his troops in Pannonia. Probus was born in Pannonia, and he was supported by troops in the East. Diocletian was from Illyricum, and he too was supported by the Eastern troops. It’s got nothing to do with regionalism.

Troops didn’t care about their general’s ethnicity, as long as he promised them that they would get payed right away, they’d fight for him.
 
It all depended on the quality of the leading generals. Generally, barbarian armies avoided pitched battles against the Romans because they knew thatthe Romans, or the barbarians trained and equipped by the Romans, would beat them. When their leader was a good commander, and there had been time to train recruits, the Romans never lost. The Roman army, as late as the fifth century, was still the best military asset force of antiquity.

Not pound by pound, man to man. If a numerically similar Roman force fought with a barbarian force, and both were equipped equally, it was a tossup by the late 3rd century onwards who would win. The Romans even lost some battles with these factors favouring them. After the mid 3rd century crisis, barbarians were increasingly willing to challenge Roman armies directly, if they had the numbers. Most of the time however they didn't and thus they favoured raids, ect.

Also the Romans lost plenty of battles, as early as Augustus with Teutoberg, also Nero in the Batavium revolt humiliatingly, they lost to Boudica, they were crushed by Dacians under Domitian, and lost entire legions in the Jewish revolts, just to name a few examples. The Roman legion basically peaked under Caesar (who was a genius, but the quality of his soldiers was utmost important), and began to decline (slowly) soon afterwards. It experienced something of a revival under Trajan and subsequent adopted emperors, but after Severus its quality continued to decline. By the mid 3rd century, it was a shadow of its former self. Defeat was no longer the exception.
 
But none of that had anything to do with ethnicity. Soldiers in Gaul weren’t necessarily born there, they just happened to be there and to have settled there. Severus, an African, was supported by his troops in Pannonia. Probus was born in Pannonia, and he was supported by troops in the East. Diocletian was from Illyricum, and he too was supported by the Eastern troops. It’s got nothing to do with regionalism.

You're right, ethnicity is not the right term. It's regional power bases. But troops were mostly born and recruited where the armies were situated, in the same region at least. Very few were recruited from Italy for example, less than half under Nero, 10% under Hadrian, fewer later on.

This is what I said earlier: "In the early days of the empire, the concept of Italy as the master nation kept the provincials in line who didn't try to usurp imperial authority by making a hopeful power play themselves. As emperors increasingly came from the provinces, and Italy lost its central importance, and even the role of the Senate became inferior to equestrians, the psychological authoritative hierarchy broke down, leading to a loss of unity, paradoxically as Rome was becoming a melting pot of ethnicities."

So Rome was a melting pot of ethnicities, yet regionalism/the provinces were forever disputing who should hold central power.
 
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Yes because it was still wealthy, had resources, and a numerical advantage. Take these factors away subsequently (gradually 4th/5th century), and they lose decisively. (I'll note the late 3rd century Empire was far less effective than the early Principate when these factors favoured the empire even more + tribal loyalty towards Rome had not totally diminished).

The Roman army was the most effective fighting force in the ancient world from the Punic Wars right down to the eve of the Islamic invasion. The shortcomings of Rome during the 3rd century were failings of command and control, rather than effectiveness. In the entire 3rd century there were only a handful of significant military defeats at Abrittus, Edessa, and maybe a few others. The longevity of the crisis is attributable to the insecurity of government legitimacy and the decentralized structure of the military serving as an inadequate measure against foreign threats. When these factors were addressed, the crisis ended.

Severus is a good example of what I was talking about. The civil war caused a collapse in Roman security that Severus had to spend the entirety of his reign fixing, everything from his Parthian, African, British campaign/wars was about restoring Roman credibility which wouldn't have taken a loss in the early days of the empire, or late Republic. The late Republic endured decades of civil war, yet there were no real security problems in the wake.

I think this is a function not of imperial failing, but rather the increasing competence and intensity of foreign threats. If the empire of Augustus had been faced by threats like the Goths, Huns, and Sassanids I doubt that it would have been able to parry them effectively. If these groups had been around during the 1st century BCE, they likely would have taken better advantage of Roman insecurity than the Parthians or Cherusci did. I can counter your example by illustrating the numerous civil wars of the Tetrarchy that were waged for nearly twenty years with no significant foreign threats to speak of.
 
Not pound by pound, man to man. If a numerically similar Roman force fought with a barbarian force, and both were equipped equally, it was a tossup by the late 3rd century onwards who would win. The Romans even lost some battles with these factors favouring them. After the mid 3rd century crisis, barbarians were increasingly willing to challenge Roman armies directly, if they had the numbers. Most of the time however they didn't and thus they favoured raids, ect.

Not with competent leadership it wasn’t. Name me one battle where that happened, cause from Gallienus to Diocletian all I can remember is barbarians getting regularly crushed by the Romans.

Also the Romans lost plenty of battles, as early as Augustus with Teutoberg, also Nero in the Batavium revolt humiliatingly, they lost to Boudica, they were crushed by Dacians under Domitian, and lost entire legions in the Jewish revolts, just to name a few examples. The Roman legion basically peaked under Caesar (who was a genius, but the quality of his soldiers was utmost important), and began to decline (slowly) soon afterwards. It experienced something of a revival under Trajan and subsequent adopted emperors, but after Severus its quality continued to decline. By the mid 3rd century, it was a shadow of its former self. Defeat was no longer the exception.

Teutoberg was a very well planned ambush, no pitched battle. Boudicca won against a couple of legions in raids, once a proper Roman army was assembled, she was annihilated, same goes for the Jews. Against the Dacians, Domitian apparently didn’t choose the best of commanders, since Trajan destroyed the Dacians a little more than a decade later. The Romans were the best of the best from beginning to end, or else their hegemony until the early fifth century makes no sense at all.
 
The Roman army was the most effective fighting force in the ancient world from the Punic Wars right down to the eve of the Islamic invasion. The shortcomings of Rome during the 3rd century were failings of command and control, rather than effectiveness. In the entire 3rd century there were only a handful of significant military defeats at Abrittus, Edessa, and maybe a few others. The longevity of the crisis is attributable to the insecurity of government legitimacy and the decentralized structure of the military serving as an inadequate measure against foreign threats. When these factors were addressed, the crisis ended.

Firstly I think it's not possible to judge military performance with the factor of "command and control", because generals are made by their soldiers rather than the other way around in my opinion. Thus you can judge tactics, weaponry, results, but you can't plead bad command as an excuse. No one knows how much better Caesar would have done in the late 3rd century with the troops of the period for example.

Second, I don't dispute Romans were very effective, only that that effectiveness diminished steadily as tribal loyalty diminished, and in the end it was purely money and resources that was holding together that professionalism/quality of fighting force. Problem is these factors proved to be ephemeral, and when the money, resources ran out, the Romans were finished.

I think this is a function not of imperial failing, but rather the increasing competence and intensity of foreign threats. If the empire of Augustus had been faced by threats like the Goths, Huns, and Sassanids I doubt that it would have been able to parry them effectively. If these groups had been around during the 1st century BCE, they likely would have taken better advantage of Roman insecurity than the Parthians or Cherusci did. I can counter your example by illustrating the numerous civil wars of the Tetrarchy that were waged for nearly twenty years with no significant foreign threats to speak of.

Firstly Severus never faced these kinds of threats if we are talking about the aftermath of his civil war.

I'm also of the opinion that if late Republican or early Principate legions faced the Goths they would have defeated them easily. Huns, Sassanids are a different matter because they fight using different tactics unsuitable for the traditional Roman legion, so they would have struggled. But they would have had more success, and they would have replenished losses much more effectively compared to the late empire. The Romans in the late Republic lost far more men in civil war than any of the civil wars during the empire, yet the consequence was a golden age of stability once they reunified, not a decade long struggle to re-secure the borders.
 
You're right, ethnicity is not the right term. It's regional power bases. But troops were mostly born and recruited where the armies were situated, in the same region at least. Very few were recruited from Italy for example, less than half under Nero, 10% under Hadrian, fewer later on.

This is what I said: "In the early days of the empire, the concept of Italy as the master nation kept the provincials in line who didn't try to usurp imperial authority by making a hopeful power play themselves. As emperors increasingly came from the provinces, and Italy lost its central importance, and even the role of the Senate became inferior to equestrians, the psychological authoritative hierarchy broke down, leading to a loss of unity, paradoxically as Rome was becoming a melting pot of ethnicities."

So Rome was a melting pot of ethnicities, yet regionalism/the provinces were forever disputing who should hold central power.

It’s not regions that were disputing, it was the generals who happened to be there. Emperors coming from the province didn’t bring the empire to disunity, as loyalty to Trajan and his successors, who were either born outside Italy or descended from people outside Italy, attests.

And senators becoming inferior to equestrians played no part in the ensuing civil wars. Most usurpers before Gallienus were senators.
 
Not with competent leadership it wasn’t. Name me one battle where that happened, cause from Gallienus to Diocletian all I can remember is barbarians getting regularly crushed by the Romans..

I'm of the opinion soldiers and armies make generals far more than the other way around. Simply put, place Gallienus during the time of Caesar with Caesar's legions he would have done better. Place Caesar in Gallienus' time with his troops, he would have had far more trouble. Thus qualitatively, the Romans held a much decreased edge over their enemy for a variety of reasons by the late 3rd century onwards, after 50 year crisis.

Teutoberg was a very well planned ambush, no pitched battle. Boudicca won against a couple of legions in raids, once a proper Roman army was assembled, she was annihilated, same goes for the Jews. Against the Dacians, Domitian apparently didn’t choose the best of commanders, since Trajan destroyed the Dacians a little more than a decade later. The Romans were the best of the best from beginning to end, or else their hegemony until the early fifth century makes no sense at all.

I maintain qualitatively, their armies were superior in the early Principate, but this edge gradually began to decline until the late 3rd century, when Roman and barbarian armies were much more comparable. After this point, Romans were more likely to win when they had superior resources, wealth, equipment, numbers, compared to the time earlier. The fact that the Romans could lose to these enemies used to be considered shocking, by the late 3rd century onwards it no longer was as much.
 
It’s not regions that were disputing, it was the generals who happened to be there. Emperors coming from the province didn’t bring the empire to disunity, as loyalty to Trajan and his successors, who were either born outside Italy or descended from people outside Italy, attests.

My only point was that usurping generals used to be a much less problem in the early Principate, particularly with the Julio Claudian dynasty when Italy was still considered the master nation. Once this was lost, regionalism became a big problem. Generals were able to find support of troops recruited from particular regions, rather than from Italy, and these troops held no loyalty to Italy, as opposed to the whole cosmopolitan empire which they were a part of. This would be unthinkable in the early Principate, or even in the 2nd century when the idea of provincials fighting for the mantle of empire was done only in emergencies, not as a regular matter of imperial power plays.

As for provincial emperors, this was the first step towards the idea that anyone from the provinces could thus become emperor, making regional usurpations more likely in the future, even if the early provincial emperors had stable successions. It was a gradual fragmenting process of legitimacy.

And senators becoming inferior to equestrians played no part in the ensuing civil wars. Most usurpers before Gallienus were senators.

One question, was post-Severus more political stable or pre-Severus? Pre-Severus, senators held most of the power other than the emperor. Post-Severus the power balance shifted to the equestrians. Soon you had equestrians trying to become emperor directly. Clearly giving equestrians military/provincial power did not bode well for the empire in the long run, even if it did help the emperor in the short run by marginalizing his enemies in the Senate and giving power to equestrians he could trust.
 
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Firstly I think it's not possible to judge military performance with the factor of "command and control", because generals are made by their soldiers rather than the other way around in my opinion. Thus you can judge tactics, weaponry, results, but you can't plead bad command as an excuse. No one knows how much better Caesar would have done in the late 3rd century with the troops of the period for example.

You’re way underestimating how actually hard it is to properly lead an army, especially in ancient times were you had to rely on scouts and informers for intelligence, and were highly subjected to climate changes. If Caesar had been born in the third century, he’d use tactics typical of the third century. Conquering Gaul was an incredible feat, to credit it solely on the army would be greatly unfair to Caesar, who was the one giving the orders to the soldiers.

Second, I don't dispute Romans were very effective, only that that effectiveness diminished steadily as tribal loyalty diminished, and in the end it was purely money and resources that was holding together that professionalism/quality of fighting force. Problem is these factors proved to be ephemeral, and when the money, resources ran out, the Romans were finished.

It was always about money and resources that people fought, why do you think soldiers attached themselves to their general’s fortunes in the late Republic? They wanted him to grant them the retirement lands that the Senate very probably wouldn’t have provided them. Augustus fixed this by granting soldiers an annual salary, plus a pension after retirement.



Firstly Severus never faced these kinds of threats if we are talking about the aftermath of his civil war.

Course not, he spent a quarter of his reign fighting the civil war, fought all by senators. After that, he very wisely pruned the Senate of all his enemies, and stationed a legion of his supporters in Rome.


I'm also of the opinion that if late Republican or early Principate legions faced the Goths they would have defeated them easily. Huns, Sassanids are a different matter because they fight using different tactics unsuitable for the traditional Roman legion, so they would have struggled. But they would have had more success, and they would have replenished losses much more effectively compared to the late empire. The Romans in the late Republic lost far more men in civil war than any of the civil wars during the empire, yet the consequence was a golden age of stability once they reunified, not a decade long struggle to re-secure the borders.

Well, the civil wars in the late Republic, coupled all together, lasted about, what, slightly more than twenty years? Civil wars in the empire, however, counting all usurpers, would make for about a fourth of its five hundred years’ existence. Doubt losses in the Late Republic can rival that.
 
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