What argument against overt ground forces intervention in Laos was most compelling for LBJ?

Why no overt ground force intervention in Laos under LBJ ?

  • Fear of provoking a ground conflict with China in Laos

    Votes: 3 33.3%
  • To avoid admitting diplomatic failure or puncturing diplomatic fiction

    Votes: 1 11.1%
  • Logistical difficulties of operating in Laos -[ie, physical limitations]

    Votes: 2 22.2%
  • Lack of appreciation for Ho Chi Minh trail's value to adversary

    Votes: 2 22.2%
  • Avoidance of domestic political opposition/criticism

    Votes: 1 11.1%
  • Avoidance of domestic war fever

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Convenience for American bureaucracies

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Avoidance of offense to world opinion

    Votes: 0 0.0%

  • Total voters
    9

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
During Johnson's presidency, 1963-1969, the US escalated a ground war in South Vietnam, a bombing war over North Vietnam a close blockade of seaborne infiltration along the coast of South Vietnam, and a covert air and proxy war against land-based infiltration in Laos. Although the infamous Ho Chi Minh Trail was a key supply and reinforcement route for the VC/NLF, the North Vietnamese Army and a sanctuary for those forces, LBJ felt compelled to not give the ground commanders in South Vietnam latitude to treat it as part of the South Vietnam theater, which it largely was, for the other side. Why?

Here are some contending explanations:

a) Fear of provoking a ground conflict with China in Laos. Possible rationale, Laos was adjacent to China. The last time the US intervened on the territory of a nation adjacent to China (in Korea), the US ended up in a ground war with China. Intervening with ground divisions in Laos would be too provocative towards the Chinese, even if US forces only operated in southern parts of that country

b) To avoid admitting diplomatic failure or puncturing diplomatic fiction. Rationale - The Geneva Agreements of 1962 formally "neutralized" Laos and resulted in pledges by the US and North Vietnam to not have forces there. Through the rest of the war, both sides pretended they were abiding by the agreement. However, the North Vietnamese definitely used the territory for Ho Chi Minh Trail operations and sanctuary, and the US side attacked the trail by air and using CIA-supported local proxy forces assisted by personnel on unacknowledged missions. The US preferred covert for some reason.

c) Logistical difficulties of operating in Laos. Rationale - Rough terrain, poor ground lines-of-communication, non-existent sea lines of communication all made a covert, "light" intervention preferable to to large scale infantry or air cavalry operations. Operations in South Vietnam were preferable and more feasible because they could be supported anywhere along the long South Vietnamese coastline. In support of this argument, note that the US build-up was gradual, it moved at a modest pace from the beaches to the central highlands, and the Americans were building a large logistical network the whole time.

d) Lack of appreciation for Ho Chi Minh trail's value to adversary. Perhaps it just never occurred that ground operations in Laos could disturb the enemy's operations any more than operations in any part of South Vietnam. Maybe this was right

e) Avoidance of domestic political opposition/criticism/backlash. Rationale - the domestic political optics of extending the American ground war from South Vietnam into Laos would simply be bad, with war opponents criticizing the increased scale of warfare and the violation of a "neutral" nation's territory. [Regardless of what could be proven about continuous adversary violation of said neutrality]. IE, anticipation of the later domestic flip-out over Cambodia and the 1970s Congressional restrictions on ground ops in Laos or Thailand.

f) Avoidance of domestic war fever. Rationale - broadening the scale of the war would open the door to demands for more escalation in general, crossing more borders and focusing all effort on winning the fight to the detriment of any domestic priorities.

g) Convenience for American bureaucracies. Explanation - The big Army and Marines were content to have unchallenged direction of the war in South Vietnam and as "team players" were content to let CIA and SOF and Air America run Laos and the Air Force and Navy Aviation run the NVN bombing campaign

h) Avoidance of offense to world opinion. Irrespective of any military retaliation, a feeling that violating Laotian "neutrality", even while exposing adversary violation, would alienate foreign public opinion (among allies, neutrals, rivals) in ways detrimental to the US war effort and global foreign policy via indirect costs.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
I voted for "fear of provoking China". Even if you don't believe that intervention in some or all of Laos would have provoked Chinese forces to move in, I think LBJ did.
 
D, but for a much different reason then you put. The reason, or at least the most compelling reason Laos wasn't strategically appreciated was because of the U.S strategy of LBJ up until at least 68-69 was conducted focused on the idea if they kill enough enemies, there will be a crossover point where eventually the rate of casualties become unsustainable.

After Abrams took over U.S strategy shifted to a more defense-oriented pacification strategy with the occasional raid to try and disrupt the supply lines from Cambodia, Eventually, one point at the hamlets and villages were pacified that a full-scale attack into Cambodia wasn't necessary not to mention politically unfeasible.
 
Top