What are plausible decisions Nazi Germany could have made to improve their performance in the War?

Do you think the United States should declare war on Germany and send our army and navy abroad to fight?

Gallup, May 18-23, 1940 (Invasion of the Lowlands and France)

Yes: 7% No: 93%

Which of these two things do you think is the more important for the United States to try to do–to keep out of war ourselves or to help England win, even at the risk of getting into the war?

Gallup, June 27-July 3, 1940 (France Defeated)

Yes: 35% No: 61% Unknown: 4%
I may be wrong, but the phrasing might be important here.
 
Turning defensive after France may be a good idea. Perhaps the English public would start to see the war as pointless and expensive.
Also without the battle of Britain a lot of planes would be saved for future operations in the East.
 
read Wolves without Teeth https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1599&context=etd about German torpedo crisis, correct their problems would be war changing.
Turning defensive after France may be a good idea. Perhaps the English public would start to see the war as pointless and expensive.
Also without the battle of Britain a lot of planes would be saved for future operations in the East.
if they had working torpedoes, there was a list of over half dozen warships struck but not sunk during Norway, also Dunkirk and the subsequent evacuations would have been vulnerable?

I'm not saying they can sink the RN, and ASW developments would have been pushed faster, but the backdrop of post-invasion France would certainly be different.
 
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@TheKennedyMachine. I was thinking that they wouldn't want to join the war in the first couple of years because of general anti-war sentiment and, by the time the American public becomes overwhelmingly pro-war late in 1941, the Axis Powers would be so strong that the Americans wouldn't want to join the losing side in a war that did not affect them and in which they would have to lose tons of men just to turn around the outcome in a war that doesn't directly affect them. The idea here is that no one wants to join a war on the side that is losing very badly. And since the USSR was already crushed by the Axis previously with the West refusing to intervene to save the Soviets, I believe that the Axis Powers can crush the Allies in North Africa once continental Europe has fallen to them.
 
@TheKennedyMachine. I was thinking that they wouldn't want to join the war in the first couple of years because of general anti-war sentiment and, by the time the American public becomes overwhelmingly pro-war late in 1941, the Axis Powers would be so strong that the Americans wouldn't want to join the losing side in a war that did not affect them and in which they would have to lose tons of men just to turn around the outcome in a war that doesn't directly affect them. The idea here is that no one wants to join a war on the side that is losing very badly. And since the USSR was already crushed by the Axis previously with the West refusing to intervene to save the Soviets, I believe that the Axis Powers can crush the Allies in North Africa once continental Europe has fallen to them.
Yeah, I guess I can see what you're saying.
 
An interesting discussion -- there are many tactical / Strategic / hardware / operational things that could have been done :
A. Intelligence --- Have better spy networks and code systems
B. Early on focus on coal (1928 - 36 pre Nazi to current NAZI) conversion to oil (many more synthetic plants)
C. Have tank and wepons programs MASSIVELY more organized instead of the helter-skelter programs
D. Wepons -- FW 187 long range fighter and loiter of Brit air fields
E. Forget the Blue water navy - reassign resources to Tanks and planes
F. Produce Mass production of core type of wepons.
G. Changes in policy and decision as an example below :::

As an interesting aside -- not sure many people caught the following analytical computer models of the BOB ;;;;; not an area of expertise for me -- but interesting modeling results done by mathematicians at the University of York ---

Mathematicians have used a statistical technique to interrogate some of the big “what if” questions in the Second World War battle for Britain’s skies.



What if the switch to bombing London had not occurred? What if a more eager Hitler had pushed for an earlier beginning to the campaign? What if Goring had focused on targeting British airfields throughout the entire period of the Battle?


These are just some of the alternative scenarios that have formed a long running debate among Second World War historians and enthusiasts over what might have affected the outcome of the battle, which took place between May and October 1940.


Mathematicians from the University of York have developed a new model to explore what the impact of changes to Luftwaffe tactics would actually have been. Their approach uses statistical modeling to calculate how the Battle might have played out if history had followed one of several alternative courses.


The researchers say that the method could now be used as a tool to investigate other historical controversies and unrealized possibilities, giving us a deeper understanding of events such as the Battle of the Atlantic (the longest continuous military campaign of the Second World War).


The statistical technique is called “weighted bootstrapping” and the computer simulation is a bit like taking a ball for the events of each day of the Battle of Britain and placing them in a lotto machine. Balls are then drawn, read and replaced to create thousands of alternative sets of days’ fighting, but in a different order, and perhaps with some days appearing more than once or not at all.


The researchers then repeated the process to test out the Battle “what ifs”, making some days more or less likely to be chosen, depending on how a protagonist (such as Hitler) would have changed their decisions had they been using different tactics.


Co-author of the paper, Dr. Jamie Wood from the Department of Mathematics at the University of York, said: “The weighted bootstrap technique allowed us to model alternative campaigns in which the Luftwaffe prolongs or contracts the different phases of the battle and varies its targets.


“The Luftwaffe would only have been able to make the necessary bases in France available to launch an air attack on Britain in June at the earliest, so our alternative campaign brings forward the air campaign by three weeks. We tested the impact of this and the other counterfactuals by varying the probabilities with which we choose individual days.”


The results provide statistical backing to a change in tactics that several historians have argued could have brought the Luftwaffe victory in the summer of 1940: The simulations suggested that if they had started the campaign earlier and focused on bombing airfields, the RAF might have been defeated, paving the way for a German land invasion.


According to the mathematical model, the impact of these two changes would have been dramatic. Although it is impossible to estimate what the real statistical chances of an RAF victory were in July 1940, the study suggests that whatever Britain’s prospects, an earlier start and focused targeting of airfields would have shifted the battle significantly in the Germans’ favor.


For example, had the likelihood of a British victory in the actual battle been 50%, these two tactical changes would have reduced it to less than 10%. If the real probability of British victory was 98%, the same changes would have reduced this to just 34%.


Co-author of the paper, Professor Niall Mackay from the Department of Mathematics at the University of York, said: “Weighted bootstrapping can provide a natural and intuitive tool for historians to investigate unrealized possibilities, informing historical controversies and debates.


“It demonstrates just how finely-balanced the outcomes of some of the biggest moments of history were. Even when we use the actual days’ events of the battle, make a small change of timing or emphasis to the arrangement of those days and things might have turned out very differently.


“This technique can be used to give us a more complete understanding of just how differently events might have played out.”

 
An interesting discussion -- there are many tactical / Strategic / hardware / operational things that could have been done :
A. Intelligence --- Have better spy networks and code systems
B. Early on focus on coal (1928 - 36 pre Nazi to current NAZI) conversion to oil (many more synthetic plants)
C. Have tank and wepons programs MASSIVELY more organized instead of the helter-skelter programs
D. Wepons -- FW 187 long range fighter and loiter of Brit air fields
E. Forget the Blue water navy - reassign resources to Tanks and planes
F. Produce Mass production of core type of wepons.
G. Changes in policy and decision as an example below :::

As an interesting aside -- not sure many people caught the following analytical computer models of the BOB ;;;;; not an area of expertise for me -- but interesting modeling results done by mathematicians at the University of York ---

Mathematicians have used a statistical technique to interrogate some of the big “what if” questions in the Second World War battle for Britain’s skies.



What if the switch to bombing London had not occurred? What if a more eager Hitler had pushed for an earlier beginning to the campaign? What if Goring had focused on targeting British airfields throughout the entire period of the Battle?


These are just some of the alternative scenarios that have formed a long running debate among Second World War historians and enthusiasts over what might have affected the outcome of the battle, which took place between May and October 1940.


Mathematicians from the University of York have developed a new model to explore what the impact of changes to Luftwaffe tactics would actually have been. Their approach uses statistical modeling to calculate how the Battle might have played out if history had followed one of several alternative courses.


The researchers say that the method could now be used as a tool to investigate other historical controversies and unrealized possibilities, giving us a deeper understanding of events such as the Battle of the Atlantic (the longest continuous military campaign of the Second World War).


The statistical technique is called “weighted bootstrapping” and the computer simulation is a bit like taking a ball for the events of each day of the Battle of Britain and placing them in a lotto machine. Balls are then drawn, read and replaced to create thousands of alternative sets of days’ fighting, but in a different order, and perhaps with some days appearing more than once or not at all.


The researchers then repeated the process to test out the Battle “what ifs”, making some days more or less likely to be chosen, depending on how a protagonist (such as Hitler) would have changed their decisions had they been using different tactics.


Co-author of the paper, Dr. Jamie Wood from the Department of Mathematics at the University of York, said: “The weighted bootstrap technique allowed us to model alternative campaigns in which the Luftwaffe prolongs or contracts the different phases of the battle and varies its targets.


“The Luftwaffe would only have been able to make the necessary bases in France available to launch an air attack on Britain in June at the earliest, so our alternative campaign brings forward the air campaign by three weeks. We tested the impact of this and the other counterfactuals by varying the probabilities with which we choose individual days.”


The results provide statistical backing to a change in tactics that several historians have argued could have brought the Luftwaffe victory in the summer of 1940: The simulations suggested that if they had started the campaign earlier and focused on bombing airfields, the RAF might have been defeated, paving the way for a German land invasion.


According to the mathematical model, the impact of these two changes would have been dramatic. Although it is impossible to estimate what the real statistical chances of an RAF victory were in July 1940, the study suggests that whatever Britain’s prospects, an earlier start and focused targeting of airfields would have shifted the battle significantly in the Germans’ favor.


For example, had the likelihood of a British victory in the actual battle been 50%, these two tactical changes would have reduced it to less than 10%. If the real probability of British victory was 98%, the same changes would have reduced this to just 34%.


Co-author of the paper, Professor Niall Mackay from the Department of Mathematics at the University of York, said: “Weighted bootstrapping can provide a natural and intuitive tool for historians to investigate unrealized possibilities, informing historical controversies and debates.


“It demonstrates just how finely-balanced the outcomes of some of the biggest moments of history were. Even when we use the actual days’ events of the battle, make a small change of timing or emphasis to the arrangement of those days and things might have turned out very differently.


“This technique can be used to give us a more complete understanding of just how differently events might have played out.”

Very interesting!
 
...
What if the switch to bombing London had not occurred? What if a more eager Hitler had pushed for an earlier beginning to the campaign? What if Goring had focused on targeting British airfields throughout the entire period of the Battle?
...
“The Luftwaffe would only have been able to make the necessary bases in France available to launch an air attack on Britain in June at the earliest, so our alternative campaign brings forward the air campaign by three weeks. We tested the impact of this and the other counterfactuals by varying the probabilities with which we choose individual days.”
The results provide statistical backing to a change in tactics that several historians have argued could have brought the Luftwaffe victory in the summer of 1940: The simulations suggested that if they had started the campaign earlier and focused on bombing airfields, the RAF might have been defeated, paving the way for a German land invasion.
According to the mathematical model, the impact of these two changes would have been dramatic. Although it is impossible to estimate what the real statistical chances of an RAF victory were in July 1940, the study suggests that whatever Britain’s prospects, an earlier start and focused targeting of airfields would have shifted the battle significantly in the Germans’ favor.
For example, had the likelihood of a British victory in the actual battle been 50%, these two tactical changes would have reduced it to less than 10%. If the real probability of British victory was 98%, the same changes would have reduced this to just 34%.
(my bold)
I know that these are not your words, but - what does the LW gains by attacking airfields in England?
Plus, land invasion - when?
 
(my bold)
I know that these are not your words, but - what does the LW gains by attacking airfields in England?
Plus, land invasion - when?
The general position is if you control the air -- you control the water -- and if you control the water - then you control the beaches -- Brit come to a "deal" or can they stop the invasion -- with no control of the air
 
The general position is if you control the air -- you control the water -- and if you control the water - then you control the beaches -- Brit come to a "deal" or can they stop the invasion -- with no control of the air
Has radar became uninvented, British factories ceased making fighters, and RAF ceased training program?
 
The general position is if you control the air -- you control the water -- and if you control the water - then you control the beaches -- Brit come to a "deal" or can they stop the invasion -- with no control of the air
That's utter nonsense. The LW couldn't make up for the drastic difference in strength between the KM and the RN. Even IF the RAF decided that flying into mountains was the most productive use of their fighters, and that training was for people who cared. That's irrelevant of course since the British were building more planes than the Germans, and training more pilots. The Battle of Britain was not a close affair regardless of its pop culture status. To paraphrase someone on the forum, "The Battle of Britain is often thought of as the talented and plucky amateurs overcoming the professionals. This is almost correct. But in reality the outcome was flipped."

The RAF was a more efficient and professional organization, and that's the reason it won. And that's the reason the LW is going to lose no matter their strategy.

Very interesting!
Eh, maybe theoretically, but the process doesn't seem to be based in reality that much. They just took specific days of fighting from OTL, then randomly chose them again with replacement. Without seeming to look at little things like aircraft production, pilot training, reserve facilities outside German range, or etc.
 
Has radar became uninvented, British factories ceased making fighters, and RAF ceased training program?
The Algo they did, i am assuming (I don't have access to their research just this article) that the erosion of the efficiency of the British Airforce and the correction of the three mistakes the Germans made would have dramatically increased the probability of their winning.
 
The Algo they did, i am assuming (I don't have access to their research just this article) that the erosion of the efficiency of the British Airforce and the correction of the three mistakes the Germans made would have dramatically increased the probability of their winning.
The very moment the article says that result of the BoB was 'finely-ballanced', is the time to raise the BS flag on a 30 ft pole.
Outcome of BoB was not finely ballanced, it was unballanced vs. Luftwaffe. Germans didn't have technology (no over-performing fighter aircraft that also offered long range; no earth-shaking bombers), logistics ( including production of aircraft and pilots in training) and numbers advantage to beat RAF FC into submission.
 
The very moment the article says that result of the BoB was 'finely-ballanced', is the time to raise the BS flag on a 30 ft pole.
Outcome of BoB was not finely ballanced, it was unballanced vs. Luftwaffe. Germans didn't have technology (no over-performing fighter aircraft that also offered long range; no earth-shaking bombers), logistics ( including production of aircraft and pilots in training) and numbers advantage to beat RAF FC into submission.
Personally, if we're gonna go with a near German victory but still a loss, it'd be better if Operation Sea Lion just..doesn't happen.
 
Halder shoots Hitler in one of his one on one planning sessions in early 1940. He had the gun ready.
The Wehrmacht leadership was deeply involved with Hitler's racist and anticommunist politics (which means they probably would still do the foolish thing and antagonize Soviet civilians under their occupation) and wanted to invade the Soviet Union just as badly as he did. Killing Hitler only really means that the Germans go after Moscow and ignore the crucial natural resources in the south and the Caucuses, meaning that they get overextended (as they were IOTL when forward units reached the outskirts of Moscow), which ends very badly for the Germans. The only chance the Germans had of winning the war against the Soviet Union was grabbing the oil fields of the Caucuses, a plan with somewhat low prospects of success, but preferable to not even trying to capture adequate oil sources to conduct further offensives. If the German generals get their way, the Germans vainly try to take Moscow (under the delusion that Stalin would give up if it was taken), fail miserably, and get ground down over the remaining years of the war, their tanks and other motorized vehicles rendered nearly impotent by the rampant fuel shortages.
 
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