There is an element of doctrine which states that local air superiority, if not supremacy, is required to carry out tactical strikes by whatever means. I don't recall ever reading that German air bases were mapped for pre-strike attack, or indeed ever attacked.
British doctrine was against strikes on airfields in 1940.
French planning in the 1930s initially included large dossiers for airfield bombardment strikes, but by the time of the war had a firmly tactical/defensive doctrine. Even in the early 1930s strikes on airfield were of less emphasis than attacks upon enemy aviation industries.
Frankly given the British and French numerical and operational inferiority and the large amounts of anti-aircraft artillery possessed by the Germans, they probably made the right choice concerning deciding not to strike enemy airfields.
I get this from Mary Coningham, who hasn't written that book in the Western Desert yet. The Germans wrote one in Spain, and the freiherr who wrote it was in charge in France. The French didn't have a book. The French and British couldn't implement a good strike in France, because one of the primary cornerstones of doctrine is communication, and command was too fragmented.
The French very much did have a conception of how they wanted to utilize airpower. From Air Power, Armies, and the War in the West, 1940 :
Like German forces, the services were dominated by the army and by army interests. The organization of the air
forces in the two states was not strikingly different in the late 1930s except in one regard: the separate
army units in France expected to have air units assigned for their individual use, while in Germany, air
units were assigned in “fleets” to support whole army corps. This distinction was to prove a very
significant difference in approach to tactical warfare. At the level of strategy, the chief contrast was
that French leaders geared their forces to defend France, not to promote an offensive. The whole of
France’s large and expensive military effort in the interwar years was based on the establishment of a
“continuous front” with an elaborate, prepared battlefield on which the German attack would be
blunted. Once Germany was contained, the French would wear the enemy down by bombing and
blockade until an offensive could be launched with any prospect of success.14
Given that the French strategic profile was different from the German- a defense strong enough
to absorb and deflect the offense- the French view of how to use aircraft was remarkably similar. The
French General Staff placed emphasis on the defeat of the enemy forces and saw air power
contributing to this strategic aim. The Instruction of 1936 for the air force gave it three functions:
providing a defensive umbrella over the mobilizing armies as they entered and established the prepared
battlefield along the fortified front; air attacks on the advancing enemy, on concentrations of his
troops, supply columns, strong points, etc.; and finally, attacks by bomber aircraft against rear-area
targets. These bombing attacks were supposed to complement the battle-area attacks and were to be
directed at an area no more than 200 kilometers from the front line, where only militarily useful targets
should be attacked, such as communications and ammunition dumps.15 Only in exceptional
circumstances would attacks against industrial or city targets be endorsed. French military leaders were
on the whole unimpressed with the distinction between tactical and strategic air power and opposed
attacks against civilians. French air theorists regarded battlefield support as “strategic” air power
inasmuch as it contributed to the general strategic aim. There were arguments among French military
leaders about how to organize and command air forces, but by the late 1930s there was general
agreement on the need for large tactical air forces to establish air superiority over the front and prevent
the breakthrough that had destroyed French arms in 1870 and had almost done so again in 1914.
Additional and lengthier information about French doctrinal developments can be accessed in "Neither Decadent, nor Traitorous, nor Stupid: The French Air Force and Air Doctrine in the 1930s."
In contrast the British strategy, again from the same source, put little focus on tactical cooperation, and focused on strategic targets. Amazingly, even after the demonstrated efficiency of German tactical aviation in the Battle of France, in the RAF inquiry on the subject the British air command continued to claim that tactical aviation was worthless, saying that tactical support was "unprofitable" and "directed against random targets", in response to the French emphasis on it! When the attack actually came in May 1940, the RAF focus wasn't on attacking the attacking German ground armies, but instead pressuring the beginning of the strategic bombing war.
On the whole I'd say the French doctrine was much more logical and fitting to the Western Front war in 1940 than the British one was. Based on the resources available to the Allies vis-a-vis the German air force, the Allies' strategic disposition, and the attitude of their ally, the English strategy was one which was entirely unworkable. The British continually tried to go for a strategic bombardment strategy which the French were unwilling to agree to, and didn't modify their doctrine in the face of the reality that the ally where they needed bases was unwilling to cooperate with that doctrine, and nor did they modify their thinking to take into account that they weren't fighting the war they had planned for - a strategic, oceanic air conflict - but instead a continental tactical air war. In the end of course, the British paid the price for that, since it partially contributed to the fall of their ally and years more of warfare which bankrupted their empire. I suppose however, that the British air command could take some solace that they finally got to fight the war they wanted to fight, even if the price for that had to be paid by their nation...
One issue was not wanting fighter squadrons getting chewed up in France when they were going to be needed in England.
Any British aircraft deployed to the continent would have occasioned damages to enemy aircraft so hence making their own losses palatable, saved the lives of British (and French) soldiers, possibly if deployed at the beginning of the battle affected greatly the course of the Battle of France, or at the very least have extended it, and strengthened French commitment to the Franco-British alliance. The British decision to not deploy additional aviation forces at the end of May when Reynaud requested them had some justification : keeping so many fighters bound up in England for an attack which never came, instead of fighting to make an impact on the battle that the Germans had to win if they were to attack England, was a horrible strategic decision. Which of course, was hardly out of line with a run of bad British strategy during the Interwar and early part of the Second World War...
Without a major Pod or Pods that would probably prevent the Battle for France happening in the first place there is very little that the British could have done to have prevented the fall of France being as it was the somewhat very junior partner on land and subject to the results of actions that took place largely outside of its ability to impact.
And I am not sure how many more Squadrons the RAF could support at that time in France?
I was suggesting Henleys over Battles, not in addition to - pre war and actual war experience would suggest that a dive bomber instead of the level bombing Battles would have achieved greater success - not necessarily fewer losses (but probably fewer losses).
Britain supposedly had 416 fighters in France out of 1,873 total modern fighters, on May 10. Airbases in France were capable of withstanding 2 additional Hurricane squadrons being flown in on May 13. Let's say instead of hording so many fighter aircraft uselessly in England, the English deployed a thousand additional fighters in France - hardly impossible, since there would have been more than half a year to deploy bases for them, and this still leaves fighters back in Britain against a potential air strike on Britain by the Germans, something which is inherently inefficient without forward bases in France. Combined with French aircraft numbers, its not impossible to see some sort of air parity, something which would dramatically slow down the Battle of France, and if the British air force was willing to abandon the unworkable dreams of a strategic air war and concentrate on striking operational targets, then it could be further slowed. Heavy bombers striking the various bridges that the Germans captured along the Meuse, provided with escorting fighters, might have actually accomplished something instead of being wasted in the Ruhr attacks. Probably not enough to actually win the Battle of France (although possibly it might be, since German victory was by a relatively slim margin and denying air superiority would do a lot to prevent that), but more than enough to make it a much longer and more bloody battle than it was for the Germans, and to keep the French fighting on the British side, while still leaving enough forces to defend Britain, especially given reinforcements that the French could provide without an armistice.
) plus all the horrors told by the fathers and uncles survivors of 14-18. I would have shitted my pants. 