But one could argue that they where only really needed because France fell, so stopping FoF would also stop the BoB from happening and limit German bomber raids to far less size and numbers due to range.
what aircrafts and what tactics to crush the Sedan bridgehead ?
- Thread starter Archibald
- Start date
Cryhavoc101
Donor
Britian at that time could only support so many squadrons of fighters and bombers etc in France - my suggestion would be to replace Battles with Dive bombers ie Hendons - however this alone would be rearranging the deck chairs.
Had there been more purpose built airfields - perhaps with hard runways in the region they could have supported more - maybe....
But given to then historical events and fears of city bombing fighter command would be kept to a minimum strength and it was not so much that Spitfire Squadrons were kept back - simply that the production of them was not yet at the same stage as Hurricane (Castle Bromwich only really pulled its finger out in mid 1940) and the relatively few squadrons formed before teh BOF were not as experienced as the existing Hurricane ones.
I think that to answer the POD we first have to massively improve the French Air Force's ability to impact events as well as (already mentioned up thread) a much much better command and control apparatus that allows them to be used in a timely fashion - before we look at the RAF becoming the villain of the piece
In retrospect. At the time the RAF leaders grossly overestimated the capability of the bomber. Theirs and the German bombers. In that context what they did send after 10 May increased the danger to Britain.
As of 9 May the German AF leaders had little confidence the attack would gain them air bases on the Channel coast. Like most Army leaders they thought the Sickle cut plan would have incomplete results. Their plan was to use Netherlands airfields to launch bomber strikes on Britain put a fright on the English. Does not take much thought to guess how it would have gone with unescorted He111 attacking in reduced numbers.
Been traveling this weekend & can't look up the answers to my questions. I can lift the following from some items I placed in other threads.
1. The German 19th Corps built two pontoon bridges @ Sedan from evening of the 13th through morning of the 14th. One each at the 1st & 10 Pa Dv crossing sites. The 2d Pz Div failed to cross on the 13th & bridge construction did not start there unit midday of the 14th. There were ferry rafts in operation as well, but don't know how many there were or how many ferry sites there were.
2. The US 9th Bomber Div accumulated 20 months experience attacking bridges in NW Europe from mid1943 through April 1945. These were primarily reinforced concrete or steel span construction. A small portion were temporary pontoon bridges the Germans built. From Assorted AAR & summaries I've noticed the following:
a. The 9th Bomber Div started in 1943 very overconfident about the sortie rate needed to drop a bridge. In their initial efforts in 1943 they estimated less than 20 sorties, or a bomber box of 18 B26 Medium bombers would have better than 80% success rate. The reality was most bridges attacked were still standing after 40+ sorties, or two separate attacks by 18 place boxes or groups.
b. After borrowing more experienced bombardiers from the 15h AF, retraining in new tactics or techniques and relentless training in the basics of the pilots and bombardiers roles in the attack the 9BD acquired success in dropping bridges. The usual successful combination in 1944 was a 54 plane group/box, attacking from 10,000 to 15,000 feet, with a combination of 500lb & 1000lb bombs. Properly gained crews were able with this combination to consistently drop bridges.
c. The altitude of between 10k & 15k feet kept the bombers above the effective range of the light rapid fire AAA & allowed far better accuracy than possible from the 20,000+ feet originally used.
d Experienced crews found that dropping the attack altitude increased the odds of dropping the bridge. Where they knew of suspected the AAA was light some attack commanders would risk a lower altitude attack in hope of bring the number of second attacks to effectively zero. If what I've read here is accurate then smaller attack groups of 36 & 18 planes were consistently successful dropping bridges in latter 1944 & 1945. Attacks below 10,000 feet became not uncommon & in some cases the aircrews placed attack altitudes below 5,000 feet in their mission reports.
This suggests the French had the right equipment in their LeO 45 & similar bombers. What the level or training was, the tactics, and air defense was @ the Sedan bridge sites I can't say at this point. That they were attacking pontoon bridges means they were attacking a very vulnerable target, not at all of the same class as steel or reinforced concrete spans. However the bomb actually has to hit the target. A near miss won't do it even vs a relatively vulnerable pontoon span.
1. The German 19th Corps built two pontoon bridges @ Sedan from evening of the 13th through morning of the 14th. One each at the 1st & 10 Pa Dv crossing sites. The 2d Pz Div failed to cross on the 13th & bridge construction did not start there unit midday of the 14th. There were ferry rafts in operation as well, but don't know how many there were or how many ferry sites there were.
2. The US 9th Bomber Div accumulated 20 months experience attacking bridges in NW Europe from mid1943 through April 1945. These were primarily reinforced concrete or steel span construction. A small portion were temporary pontoon bridges the Germans built. From Assorted AAR & summaries I've noticed the following:
a. The 9th Bomber Div started in 1943 very overconfident about the sortie rate needed to drop a bridge. In their initial efforts in 1943 they estimated less than 20 sorties, or a bomber box of 18 B26 Medium bombers would have better than 80% success rate. The reality was most bridges attacked were still standing after 40+ sorties, or two separate attacks by 18 place boxes or groups.
b. After borrowing more experienced bombardiers from the 15h AF, retraining in new tactics or techniques and relentless training in the basics of the pilots and bombardiers roles in the attack the 9BD acquired success in dropping bridges. The usual successful combination in 1944 was a 54 plane group/box, attacking from 10,000 to 15,000 feet, with a combination of 500lb & 1000lb bombs. Properly gained crews were able with this combination to consistently drop bridges.
c. The altitude of between 10k & 15k feet kept the bombers above the effective range of the light rapid fire AAA & allowed far better accuracy than possible from the 20,000+ feet originally used.
d Experienced crews found that dropping the attack altitude increased the odds of dropping the bridge. Where they knew of suspected the AAA was light some attack commanders would risk a lower altitude attack in hope of bring the number of second attacks to effectively zero. If what I've read here is accurate then smaller attack groups of 36 & 18 planes were consistently successful dropping bridges in latter 1944 & 1945. Attacks below 10,000 feet became not uncommon & in some cases the aircrews placed attack altitudes below 5,000 feet in their mission reports.
This suggests the French had the right equipment in their LeO 45 & similar bombers. What the level or training was, the tactics, and air defense was @ the Sedan bridge sites I can't say at this point. That they were attacking pontoon bridges means they were attacking a very vulnerable target, not at all of the same class as steel or reinforced concrete spans. However the bomb actually has to hit the target. A near miss won't do it even vs a relatively vulnerable pontoon span.
Or the Martin 167. But, as I pointed out earlier the LeO 45 had the performance. Unfortunatly there were less than 100 operational 10 May, & the training of the aircrew is unknown to me.
The French were also taking a close look at what became the B24 Liberator. But, getting that involved is about as ASB as Mirage Jets with Pave Blue.
The French were also taking a close look at what became the B24 Liberator. But, getting that involved is about as ASB as Mirage Jets with Pave Blue.
Driftless
Donor
More of all of the above, plus more the homegrown Bloch 174. All reasonably fast maneuverable planes, capable of carrying a useful bomb load.
More, more, more of any or all of the modern planes the French had on the historic verge of useful number and readiness. More D.520's, more Arsenal VG.33's, more Bloch 150 series. More of the Curtis Hawk 75's would have been real useuful and even some more of the stop-gap Koolhoven FK.58's
Archibald
Banned
They were in service by 10 May... in small numbers. Too much were still in their crates, on a dock near the Bearn aircraft transport carrier (sigh).
The two squadrons of Martin 167F had been send to French Lebanon for Operation Pike (no kidding).
There were DB-7s in service (a couple of suqadrons), but too few of them by 10 may. And most importantly, far, far away from Sedan.
I once read in a serious source (Le Fana de l'aviation) that the Armée de l'air had 27 modern bombers on 10 May on the ZOAN (Zone d'Operation Aerienne Nord, that is, near the belgian border).
27
...
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Archibald
Banned
Very interesting analyzis, thanks for sharing. Now I wonder if the AASF Blenheim and Battles could so a similar job (since they are the most numerous bombers immediately available on May 13).
Archibald
Banned
They missed Sedan and were used only in the second week of the Battle against the Dunkirk pocket in northern France. They operated with France very own Stuka, the Loire Nieuport LN-401 and 411. The results were absymals: they were butchered, just like the Breguet 693. Barely three missions, and most aircrafts were downed.
Once again, no good training, not enough aircrafts and what's more, bad intelligence.
When you think about it, the French striking power between 10 - 20 May was quite weak.
Barely 27 Leo-451 near Belgium.
Very few Amiot 350
Three squadrons of Aeronavale dive bombers (one of them, a Vindicator, was entirely crushed by He-111 bombing of its hangar on May 11)
Two squadrons of Breguet 693, 25 aircrafts (I checked the French wikipedia)
A couple of squadrons operational with DB-7s
That's 100 aircrafts, perhaps 120, no more. Far less than the AASF (think they had 235 aircrafts), which was only a fraction of RAF bomber command !
So bad was the bombardment strength, aircrafts send to Sedan where Amiot 143, true flying relics.
The French bombing effort near Sedan was mostly Leo-451 and Amiot 143, with some 351 and 354 here and there.
As for the other bombers
- The Breguets had been slaughtered in Gembloux, too few were left
- the Aeronavale dive bombers were near the Mediterranean to scare the Italians, and entered the fight only after May 15
- the DB-7s did not entered the fight before May 15, too late for Sedan
- The Martin 167 were not in the Metropole
Things got really better for bombing squadrons early June, in the fight for the Weygand line, north of Paris. At this moment dozens of aircrafts could be send to battle, with better results.
Once again, no good training, not enough aircrafts and what's more, bad intelligence.
When you think about it, the French striking power between 10 - 20 May was quite weak.
Barely 27 Leo-451 near Belgium.
Very few Amiot 350
Three squadrons of Aeronavale dive bombers (one of them, a Vindicator, was entirely crushed by He-111 bombing of its hangar on May 11)
Two squadrons of Breguet 693, 25 aircrafts (I checked the French wikipedia)
A couple of squadrons operational with DB-7s
That's 100 aircrafts, perhaps 120, no more. Far less than the AASF (think they had 235 aircrafts), which was only a fraction of RAF bomber command !
So bad was the bombardment strength, aircrafts send to Sedan where Amiot 143, true flying relics.
The French bombing effort near Sedan was mostly Leo-451 and Amiot 143, with some 351 and 354 here and there.
As for the other bombers
- The Breguets had been slaughtered in Gembloux, too few were left
- the Aeronavale dive bombers were near the Mediterranean to scare the Italians, and entered the fight only after May 15
- the DB-7s did not entered the fight before May 15, too late for Sedan
- The Martin 167 were not in the Metropole
Things got really better for bombing squadrons early June, in the fight for the Weygand line, north of Paris. At this moment dozens of aircrafts could be send to battle, with better results.
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Driftless
Donor
In perfect hindsight, I do think the first priority post-Munich agreement was for France to get more modern fighters and fighter pilots as combat ready as time allowed - French or foreign origin. Don't cede air superiority over the battle front to the Germans. Then, if your bomber force has an improved chance at survival, you should have had a better chance at damaging the Sedan bridgehead AND the supply line through the Ardennes.
Also, is it too much of a reach to think more French fighters and pilots might also have persuaded the British to look less over their shoulder at reserving their own fighter strength for protecting Britain? Dowding did the attrition math and he calculated that sending more fighters to France was not going to appreciably alter the outcome of the historic Battle of France, but would bleed British fighter strength to a dangerous level.
However, those changes would have been a lot of bureaucratic and doctrinal inertia to overcome.
Also, is it too much of a reach to think more French fighters and pilots might also have persuaded the British to look less over their shoulder at reserving their own fighter strength for protecting Britain? Dowding did the attrition math and he calculated that sending more fighters to France was not going to appreciably alter the outcome of the historic Battle of France, but would bleed British fighter strength to a dangerous level.
However, those changes would have been a lot of bureaucratic and doctrinal inertia to overcome.
Archibald
Banned
The RAF really did the best it could and send a maximum of aircraft squadrons to help France. By early June Reynauld and others were asking more and more, but the battle was lost so the RAF refusal was all too logical. Yet the defeatists promptly used it to scream "British betrayal !"
I agree with not doing more later as it would still be wasted.
But I question if the RAF really did all it could, a very large amount of the force and therefore pre war budget was wasted by not being deployed to France or not doing much at all as it was made up of the wrong types of aircraft.
I would think with any reasonable thought about freighting WWI, it would have been obvious that the land battle was going to require more than home defence....etc.
Archibald
Banned
Spitfires were needed for home defence and were scarce even during BoB. Plus they helped in dunkirk; flying from their bases. Hurricanes were good enough for France and were engaged in large numbers. The heavy bombers were not as efficient as in 1942-45. Battles and Blenheim were send in large numbers - 235. How could the RAF have done more ?
Unless attacks are made in strength, with fighter support to keep German off the backs of the attacking French bombers, EARLY (meaning within the first 24 hours) then attacking the bridgeheads is suicidal. The Germans were very, very good at lugging along AA with them, considering the importance of the Sedan bridgeheads then (just as in OTL) within a day or two overcoming the Flak will be almost impossible. While it is conceivable the ADA could move enough fighters into the area to achieve superiority the problem of Flak will not be overcome.
The only answer, as I see it, is to ignore the bridges, and bomb Belgium. Bridges are hard to hit from any altitude, even in daylight, without more training. There is no time for that now. The Sedan bridges are well protected by fighters and murderous flak, this cant be overcome. What can be done, is to systematically bomb the towns and villages of the Ardennes (Belgium) with road and rail intersections leading to Sedan. This has to be done at night, but is (IMO) possible. The ADA has over 300 heavy bombers in Metropolitan France (https://forum.axishistory.com//viewtopic.php?t=162041) to use in night bombing. These aircraft are older, obsolescent aircraft (Farman's, LeO 20's, Potez 540's) but can survive at night, and carry heavy bombloads. Any delay accomplished by use of these aircraft will cause hours of delay in clearing rubble, repairing streets and bridges, and direct losses to German units. Bombing along a route of advance, hitting towns in order, will cause these hours to accumulate into days of delay, giving the French time to shift forces northward. The Germans don't really have an effective counter to this in 1940. If enough of these aircraft can be massed soon enough, and enough of them hit their targets, it gives the army as least as good a chance as it had in 1914. I think they could stop the Germans again.
The only answer, as I see it, is to ignore the bridges, and bomb Belgium. Bridges are hard to hit from any altitude, even in daylight, without more training. There is no time for that now. The Sedan bridges are well protected by fighters and murderous flak, this cant be overcome. What can be done, is to systematically bomb the towns and villages of the Ardennes (Belgium) with road and rail intersections leading to Sedan. This has to be done at night, but is (IMO) possible. The ADA has over 300 heavy bombers in Metropolitan France (https://forum.axishistory.com//viewtopic.php?t=162041) to use in night bombing. These aircraft are older, obsolescent aircraft (Farman's, LeO 20's, Potez 540's) but can survive at night, and carry heavy bombloads. Any delay accomplished by use of these aircraft will cause hours of delay in clearing rubble, repairing streets and bridges, and direct losses to German units. Bombing along a route of advance, hitting towns in order, will cause these hours to accumulate into days of delay, giving the French time to shift forces northward. The Germans don't really have an effective counter to this in 1940. If enough of these aircraft can be massed soon enough, and enough of them hit their targets, it gives the army as least as good a chance as it had in 1914. I think they could stop the Germans again.
