just a tidbit
@ Blackfox5
I agree with you. Westy was fine in a conventional slugout at the Fulda Gap, but was way out of his element in Nam.
I might point out that Westy's staff knew they needed to build up the ARVN, but IIRC, the major problem was that they trained the ARVN to fight US style without providing the whole TOE.
Americans since WW2 rely on artillery and airpower to get things done, not their infantry.
The ARVN had lots of infantry, but not a lot of armor or aircraft to work with.
As many have said, Congress voting down not resupplying the ARVN with heavy weaponry or ammo or aircraft in 1972 was a key factor in their defeat in 1975 when the NVA finally came out in the open field.
Special Forces trained the Montganards to fight guerrilla style and do pretty well, but that didn't filter up to MACV, because they wanted the ARVN to be just like the US Army and the ARVN weren't too pleased that independent militias existed outside their control.
IMO that's why Operation Phoenix was too little too late. Too many cooks who didn't talk to each other spoiling the soup as it were as to when to switch from COIN to conventional warfare.
Basically, you needed a flip, Creighton Abrams to handle the COIN battle, Westy to bitch-slap the NVA in 1972-1975.
As to the OP, Westy actually listening to intelligence and having a good handle on staying alert? I'd say, not even on a cold day in Hell.
Not aggressive enough a strategy for Westy. He'd have the opposite problem, wearing everyone out beating the bushes for any sign of VC activity from what I've read of how he conducted things in Nam.