Western Culture and Politics if the French Revolution never happened

I actually think the most plausible is a third option: the King or his advisers are savvy enough to give concessions before they are seen as being forced upon him, and the Estates General dissolves with a happy program of moderate promises. This buys the King time to do a slower reform and repression approach: blaming the nobility for ills, abolishing privileges and tax exemptions, clamping down on the salons, censorship of pamphlets, cloaking himself in patriotism and piety, building a security apparatus etc. I feel populist absolutism is a much more likely end state than constitutional monarchy.

I find that plausible. That has the feel of late 19th century Prussia. Coopt enough of the third estate to prevent liberalism (and then radical liberalism) from really taking hold. This was of course the strategy of Bismark.
 

Skallagrim

Banned
I find that plausible. That has the feel of late 19th century Prussia. Coopt enough of the third estate to prevent liberalism (and then radical liberalism) from really taking hold. This was of course the strategy of Bismark.

A difference would be that in the late 18th and early 19th century, a certain liberalism would be embraced by the monarchy. The idea wouldn't be "tainted" by association with radicalism. This would be like the Bismarck strategy in that the monarch(s) would appease moderate liberals to "take the wind out of the sails" of radical liberals-- same as Bismarck appeased the moderate social democrats to keep the more radical-mnded ones (and the socialists) far from power.

But a big factor here would be that the likely reformers of France are going to be classical liberals. Heirs to the physiocratic movement. A surviving Condorcet would be a major figure, I'd imagine. Regardless of how much power the monarch retains (a lot), one may expect policy to become more liberal than Bismarck would find comforatable. And the ATL rulers would be cmfortable with it, precisely because the radicalism that Bismarck so feared will never have come into being.
 
Revolutions were in earlier cases more about securing independence etc. -- and not about realising unprecedented social transformation (with an underlying vision that veered well into zealous utopianism). Note that the American revolution was a decade earlier, and embraced enlightenment ideas, but didn't aim for massive social transformation. A delayed French revolution in, say, 1899, would probably have been more along those lines.

The American Revolution was much more moderate because there wasn't a mass of urban poor ready to explode. That isn't the case for most countries. And new ideas and thinkers will happen all the time. It's just in the period 1800-1850 in our timeline it was all romanticism and reactionary ideas because the French Revolution went so wrong. Without that, there will be ongoing Enlightenment thinkers, likely getting more radical as reform is frustrated and the urban port's conditions get worse with urbanization and industrial pollution.
 
A difference would be that in the late 18th and early 19th century, a certain liberalism would be embraced by the monarchy. The idea wouldn't be "tainted" by association with radicalism. This would be like the Bismarck strategy in that the monarch(s) would appease moderate liberals to "take the wind out of the sails" of radical liberals-- same as Bismarck appeased the moderate social democrats to keep the more radical-mnded ones (and the socialists) far from power.

But a big factor here would be that the likely reformers of France are going to be classical liberals. Heirs to the physiocratic movement. A surviving Condorcet would be a major figure, I'd imagine. Regardless of how much power the monarch retains (a lot), one may expect policy to become more liberal than Bismarck would find comforatable. And the ATL rulers would be cmfortable with it, precisely because the radicalism that Bismarck so feared will never have come into being.

Monarchs tended to like liberalism and Enlightenment thinking as long as it took power away from others and not themselves. The association with radicalism made the wealthy merchant elite more sceptical of it, but the monarchies were driven by pure self-aggrandizement. We know what their preferred "liberal" reform looks like because it is exactly what was done in Prussia , Spain and the Habsburg monarchy.
 

Skallagrim

Banned
The American Revolution was much more moderate because there wasn't a mass of urban poor ready to explode. That isn't the case for most countries. And new ideas and thinkers will happen all the time.

I subscribe to the view that ideas primarily influence conditions, rather than the other way around. The last sentence is of course correct, but note that this doesn't mean that all OTL ideas must appear "on schedule". To the contrary: if we somehow alter the ideological landscape of the late 18th century, that will have vast ramification. The dominant ideas determine how people will respond to their conditions (and I stress again: not primarily the other way around, in my very firm opinion).


It's just in the period 1800-1850 in our timeline it was all romanticism and reactionary ideas because the French Revolution went so wrong. Without that, there will be ongoing Enlightenment thinkers, likely getting more radical as reform is frustrated and the urban port's conditions get worse with urbanization and industrial pollution.

I expect the opposite. With less radicalism, there will indeed be no reactionary counter-radicalism-- but that exact effect will also prevent radicalisation of the ATL later Enlightenment. Break the spiral, and the logical outcome isn't "the Enlightenment radicalises further". On the contrary: if you take the cooker off the fire in time, things... settle down. The viability of legislative reforms by normal political means will prevent radicals from becoming meaningful in any way.

Instead of a lot of radical forces smashing into each other, you'll see more moderate forces dominate-- which means co-operation and synthesis will be far more realistic.


Monarchs tended to like liberalism and Enlightenment thinking as long as it took power away from others and not themselves. The association with radicalism made the wealthy merchant elite more sceptical of it, but the monarchies were driven by pure self-aggrandizement. We know what their preferred "liberal" reform looks like because it is exactly what was done in Prussia , Spain and the Habsburg monarchy.

It was what was begun in said countries before the French revolution. After that, this development was aborted. The revolution killed all chances for further evolution. (Revolutions are generally murderous things, and almost always do this. Only relatively "moderate" revolutions tend to avoid this, because they cause less blood-thirsty radicalism.) If the French revolution is averted, then we will see the pre-revolutionary "Enlightened despotism" continue to evolve. In some countries, this will look like the Dutch Republic or like Great Britain. In other countries, it will look like Frederick the Great's Prussia. But in all cases, it will continue to develop. It's not like it's fair to look at OTL 1780, and then say "See, that's what it'll be like forever now". It's more honest to point at that and say "See, that's the basis that the ATL Modernity will be build upon instead of the French revolution and the counter-revolutionary reaction".

Well... extrapolate from that.
 
I subscribe to the view that ideas primarily influence conditions, rather than the other way around. The last sentence is of course correct, but note that this doesn't mean that all OTL ideas must appear "on schedule". To the contrary: if we somehow alter the ideological landscape of the late 18th century, that will have vast ramification. The dominant ideas determine how people will respond to their conditions (and I stress again: not primarily the other way around, in my very firm opinion).

I think it's a two-way process, but I would argue that societal conditions affect the mentality of opinions, which later leads into types of ideas. Economic struggle and miserable lives tends more towards a "screw the whole damn system" type thinking, whereas small property holding tends towards more "woah, let's not upset the whole apple cart" type beliefs.

I expect the opposite. With less radicalism, there will indeed be no reactionary counter-radicalism-- but that exact effect will also prevent radicalisation of the ATL later Enlightenment. Break the spiral, and the logical outcome isn't "the Enlightenment radicalises further". On the contrary: if you take the cooker off the fire in time, things... settle down. The viability of legislative reforms by normal political means will prevent radicals from becoming meaningful in any way.

Instead of a lot of radical forces smashing into each other, you'll see more moderate forces dominate-- which means co-operation and synthesis will be far more realistic.

Except that Europe entails a whole host of states, each with potential to follow their own path. Just because France moves in a moderate direction (and as I said, I think that is less likely than absolutist monarchy) doesn't mean every country from the Two Sicilies to Russia to Serbia does. And I am not convinced moderation calms things down for more than a couple of decades. Look at the radicalism of the 1960s, just two decades after the massive expansion of the welfare state. Human mentality is an inherently negative thing. We quickly take for granted the progress made so far and start focusing on what we don't have. You need consistent advancement in people's lives decade after decade to stop that and sooner or later some regime will falter and ignite a powder keg.

It was what was begun in said countries before the French revolution. After that, this development was aborted. The revolution killed all chances for further evolution. (Revolutions are generally murderous things, and almost always do this. Only relatively "moderate" revolutions tend to avoid this, because they cause less blood-thirsty radicalism.) If the French revolution is averted, then we will see the pre-revolutionary "Enlightened despotism" continue to evolve. In some countries, this will look like the Dutch Republic or like Great Britain. In other countries, it will look like Frederick the Great's Prussia. But in all cases, it will continue to develop. It's not like it's fair to look at OTL 1780, and then say "See, that's what it'll be like forever now". It's more honest to point at that and say "See, that's the basis that the ATL Modernity will be build upon instead of the French revolution and the counter-revolutionary reaction".

Well... extrapolate from that.

Britain and the Netherland are terrible examples here because the legislatures of both countries only established their dominance via violent rebellion. No 18th Century King in a non-parliamentary system will give his power away to that extent. Prussian monarchy is a much better example and that was something that required constant war to sustain itself, until it eventually hit a cataclysm. And that constant warfare, even if freakishly successful as it was in this case, results in defeat and drama for the losers on the other side.
 
One drastic change is that modern ideas of left and right wing politics are rooted in the seating arrangements leading up to the French Revolution. As a little joke on this concept I had an idea for an ATL European Union where the main political division was over centralization of government contested between the big government Mountain and the federalist Levelers. If the Revolution is butterflied away the way political factions are conceptualized relative to one another could be radically different in the modern day.
 
One drastic change is that modern ideas of left and right wing politics are rooted in the seating arrangements leading up to the French Revolution. As a little joke on this concept I had an idea for an ATL European Union where the main political division was over centralization of government contested between the big government Mountain and the federalist Levelers. If the Revolution is butterflied away the way political factions are conceptualized relative to one another could be radically different in the modern day.
One of the biggest challenges in constructing a world in which the French Revolution never happened.
 
One of the biggest challenges in constructing a world in which the French Revolution never happened.
Centralization is a decent axis, but I think populism vs elitism (where power lies) and radicalism vs gradualism (the pace of reform) would both work. In the latter example for example the horseshoe theory would be garbage because Nazis and Stalinists would both be in the radical camp.
 
If the French Revolution never kicks off then imo your still going to get alot of the ideas of the enlightenment over time especially too the fact that the higher ups will not be opposed to such ideas which hatred for which was cemented by th actions of the revolutionaries. One such idea i think will not be effected is that of nationalism which could still develop like our time. There is a sociological thoery that alot of political natures of nations and cultures are like a pendulum swing it far to one side it will flip back the other way such as the french and 1948 revolutions where there was a large reactionary response. You’re likely to see a more tug of war level of change with it seing a more longer but stable and constant level of change. I do believe we would see a Europe which is more authoritarian and steeped in tradition and monarchical and aristocratic power but i also believe that alot of the social reforms such as education reforms made by kaiser wilhelm the 2 will come about easier with less of an association to revolution and a way to appease the lower classes.
I do however think that this is optimistic. I would certainly extend the ideas of empire.
 

Skallagrim

Banned
I think it's a two-way process, but I would argue that societal conditions affect the mentality of opinions, which later leads into types of ideas. Economic struggle and miserable lives tends more towards a "screw the whole damn system" type thinking, whereas small property holding tends towards more "woah, let's not upset the whole apple cart" type beliefs.

I repeat again that the French revolution was a "perfect storm". Things literally went as wrong as they possibly could. Every single opportunity to avert a cataclysm was ignored, every attempt to force the matter was bungled. It is almost a comedy of errors. The chance that it would go wrong if a similar situation was reached at another time are susprisingly small. In an ATL where one of the dozen or so decent opportunities to prevent escalation was actually grabbed onto, nobody would believe that the French revolution as seen in OTl was a realistic possibility. If you posted a TL on it, the first ten reactions would be yelling "ASB!"

And then there's the fact that -- in a vindication of your "two-way process" -- the whole issue only came to a head because a giant vulcano erupted in Iceland and caused crop failures across Europe. France was hardest-hit, because its imbecilic policies of mercantilism made adequately responding (via global trade) to the food shortages much harder. If that vulcano had erupted at another time -- without the Enlightenment ideas having been primed a generation earlier, and thus without a younger generation of zealots (a decade after the successful ARW) just then ready to slit throats -- then the famine would have been a tragedy, but no impetus for revolution.

All the exact wrong things happened in OTL, at the exact wrong time, with exactly the most dangerous ideas being perfectly in place to guide ambitious and radicalised men to commit a vast massacre. I tell you: such a "perfect storm" isn't likely to be just be repeated. So I maintain that averting the OTL French revolution is not just a delay, but in all likelihood a total cancellation of that whole revolutionary process.


Except that Europe entails a whole host of states, each with potential to follow their own path. Just because France moves in a moderate direction (and as I said, I think that is less likely than absolutist monarchy) doesn't mean every country from the Two Sicilies to Russia to Serbia does.

That is exactly what I argued in my own post, a few lines further down. The key difference in my analysis being that events in France caused continent-wide radicalisation, and we'd be averting that. Before the revolution, a trend of moderation and gradual reform was well-underway for nearly a century. Your apparent belief that this trend would juat disappear if we remove the exact thing that killed it in OTL just seems baseless to me.


And I am not convinced moderation calms things down for more than a couple of decades. Look at the radicalism of the 1960s, just two decades after the massive expansion of the welfare state. Human mentality is an inherently negative thing. We quickly take for granted the progress made so far and start focusing on what we don't have. You need consistent advancement in people's lives decade after decade to stop that and sooner or later some regime will falter and ignite a powder keg.

This reflects the OTL "history-as-progress" mentality (dogma, even) that resulted from the Enlightenment and the French revolutionary tradition. I don't believe for asecond that this is how humans (and history) really work.

The idea the constant progress is needed to keep people happy is a delusion. On the contrary: the more radically you change things, and the faster you do it, the more you stir things up and agitate matters. Moderation does calm things down. And that is, in fact, the natural state. Humans aren't naturally radical: they are naturally placid. Only if no other choices are left do they start taking mad risks ("screw the whole damn system", as you said). And even then: in most cases, they just throw over the apple cart and hang a few designated victims, loot a bit... and things go back to normal. Only under absurd conditions, with the exact "right" mix of ideas already present in the cultural backdrop, do such upheavals become crusades for drastic social change.

You mention "the radicalism of the 1960s, just two decades after the massive expansion of the welfare state". Have you not considered that said expansion of the state is in itself a radical development? There were also several other radical developments/occurences two decades previous to the '60s, if you'll recall. Let's not pretend that the first half of the 20th century was somehow moderate and placid. If it had been, you would not have seen that radicalism in the '60s!

If you wish to prevent a radicalism... prevent the radicalism that preceded it. In OTL, we are living in an age of radicalisms, and have been since the French revolution (and, to be fair, since the radical Enlightenment itself). "Modernity" is a paradigm of radical notions, born in those early radicalisms, and if you abort those incipient factors, then you create an ATL "Modernity" that is far less radical. You change the character of the era, although probably not its fundamental building blocks.


Britain and the Netherland are terrible examples here because the legislatures of both countries only established their dominance via violent rebellion. No 18th Century King in a non-parliamentary system will give his power away to that extent. Prussian monarchy is a much better example and that was something that required constant war to sustain itself, until it eventually hit a cataclysm. And that constant warfare, even if freakishly successful as it was in this case, results in defeat and drama for the losers on the other side.

Britain saw a conservative revolution of the elite (much the same as the USA, really) and the Dutch Republic won its revolution long before the enlightenment and had its representative bodies well-entrenched by then. Their traditions can provide examples for others: in fact, the moderate French Enlightenment thinkers saw much to amire in both examples. Clearly the examples are hardly as terrible as you seem to think.

Prussian monarchy is another example, certainly, but you seem to have a skewed perception of it. The idea that Enlightened despotism requires constant warfare to be sustained is ludicrous.
 
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I repeat again that the French revolution was a "perfect storm". Things literally went as wrong as they possibly could. Every single opportunity to avert a cataclysm was ignored, every attempt to force the matter was bungled. It is almost a comedy of errors. The chance that it would go wrong if a similar situation was reached at another time are susprisingly small. In an ATL where one of the dozen or so decent opportunities to prevent escalation was actually grabbed onto, nobody would believe that the French revolution as seen in OTl was a realistic possibility. If you posted a TL on it, the first ten reactions would be yelling "ASB!"

The Revolution was not ASB. There were certainly elements that were misfortunes, but there have been plenty of examples throughout history where things have spiralled out of control. This is especially the case in societies with mass urban populations. Rulers who have had things their way for generations don't make a habit of grasping changing societal [power structures and technological changes that mean it's not sustainable any longer. The idea that a spiral to radicalization is alien space bats is just ridiculous. There is at least a 30-40% chance of it happening here, and if it doesn't, it is highly likely to come to its head somewhere else. The growth in the urban poor, increased literacy and cheap publication of inflammatory materials meant the mob have much more power than anyone realized. In fact, without the French Revolution as a warning sign of how the mob can grab power, the rulers in other countries are more likely to be overconfident in refusing to give way to reform.

That is exactly what I argued in my own post, a few lines further down. The key difference in my analysis being that events in France caused continent-wide radicalisation, and we'd be averting that. Before the revolution, a trend of moderation and gradual reform was well-underway for nearly a century. Your apparent belief that this trend would juat disappear if we remove the exact thing that killed it in OTL just seems baseless to me.

The trend existed in certain countries but not others. There was no gradual reform in the Papal States, or the Two Sicilies, or the Balkans. In Russia, serfdom was actually becoming more entrenched. Even where reform was happening, in most places it was towards supposed "Enlightened" despotism, which was mainly centralization of powers away from aristocracy to central governments. As we saw in the Habsburg monarchy or the Spanish dominions, that can cause its own revolts and revolutions.

This reflects the OTL "history-as-progress" mentality (dogma, even) that resulted from the Enlightenment and the French revolutionary tradition. I don't believe for asecond that this is how humans (and history) really work. The idea the constant progress is needed to keep people happy is a delusion. On the contrary: the more radically you change things, and the faster you do it, the more you stir things up and agitate matters. Moderation does calm things down. And that is, in fact, the natural state. Humans aren't naturally radical: they are naturally placid. Only if no other choices are left do they start taking mad risks ("screw the whole damn system", as you said). And even then: in most cases, they just throw over the apple cart and hang a few designated victims, loot a bit... and things go back to normal. Only under absurd conditions, with the exact "right" mix of ideas already present in the cultural backdrop, do such upheavals become crusades for drastic social change.

Human beings are naturally negative, discontented and resentful of others who have more. We evolved in societies of 30-40 people with relative egalitarianism between people in our group, and occasional warfare with the handful of other groups. Our brains are not developed to handle being in a society with hundreds of thousands around us and some people will clearly far more money, wealth and status than us. In modern society, if people have a stake in the system, they have a tendency towards caution about expressing that negative discontent. But if they live brutal, impoverished lives with no economic or political power, they are prone to radicalization. And the increase in literacy and pamphleteering had created a medium to take advantage of that. If it doesn't happen in France, it will happen elsewhere. There will be a spark in one of these other societies elsewhere.

You mention "the radicalism of the 1960s, just two decades after the massive expansion of the welfare state". Have you not considered that said expansion of the state is in itself a radical development? There were also several other radical developments/occurences two decades previous to the '60s, if you'll recall. Let's not pretend that the first half of the 20th century was somehow moderate and placid. If it had been, you would not have seen that radicalism in the '60s!

The expansion in the state was at the time widely considered a compromise, moderate method to ward off communism. The idea it caused the 1960s movements is crazy. Without it, the radicalization would have happened in the 1950s. It happened because people are more receptive to ideas of "you are being cheated out of what you could have" than "you're doing fine with your lot in life, just accept others have more and always will". The growth in media, from pamphlets to radio to TV to social media, means we get exposed to more and more communications, which tilts our beliefs ever more towards the resentful negative ones we are more receptive to.

If you wish to prevent a radicalism... prevent the radicalism that preceded it. In OTL, we are living in an age of radicalisms, and have been since the French revolution (and, to be fair, since the radical Enlightenment itself). "Modernity" is a paradigm of radical notions, born in those early radicalisms, and if you abort those incipient factors, then you create an ATL "Modernity" that is far less radical. You change the character of the era, although probably not its fundamental building blocks.

The idea you can stop certain ideas from existing just because the French Revolution didn't happened is crazy. You will always have people coming up with utopian society reordering ideas. You will always get occasional situations somewhere in the world that are powder kegs. You will always get some rulers that refuse to give way. And you will thus always get the occasional group in power that tries to do extreme things.
 

Skallagrim

Banned
The Revolution was not ASB. There were certainly elements that were misfortunes, but there have been plenty of examples throughout history where things have spiralled out of control. This is especially the case in societies with mass urban populations. Rulers who have had things their way for generations don't make a habit of grasping changing societal [power structures and technological changes that mean it's not sustainable any longer. The idea that a spiral to radicalization is alien space bats is just ridiculous.

I'm not saying it was ASB. I'm saying that it was so unlikely that people living in a world where it didn't happen would consider it so unlikely as to call it ASB.


There is at least a 30-40% chance of it happening here, and if it doesn't, it is highly likely to come to its head somewhere else.

You're pulling those numbers from thin air, of course. In any event, I consider the chances to have been far lower. And as I have repeatedly argued: no, it's not likely to just come to a head elsewhere. You can't replicate the intellectual climate that made it possible, nor the same social conditions. You can replicate some of the same intellectual influences, and some of the same social conditions, but bringing it all together again in the same way is vanishingly unlikely.


The growth in the urban poor,

You appear almost obsessed with this one factor, even though it isn't very relevant at all. Urban poor have existed throughout many times in history. (Urban unrest plagued the Roman Empire again and again, for instance; that's how far back it goes.) But it doesn't typically lead to the fixed outcome you are so certain of. It mostly just leads to localised violence and looting, and then everything calms down again. Even when pressure is constant (which it rarely is), the most realistic outcome is reform, not revolution.


increased literacy and cheap publication of inflammatory materials meant the mob have much more power than anyone realized.

It happened because people are more receptive to ideas of "you are being cheated out of what you could have" than "you're doing fine with your lot in life, just accept others have more and always will". The growth in media, from pamphlets to radio to TV to social media, means we get exposed to more and more communications, which tilts our beliefs ever more towards the resentful negative ones we are more receptive to.

Increased access to media is often argued to similarly work in the state's favour (effective propaganda). Methinks those two cancel each other out, quite often. If your argument is solid, then no propaganda campaign to keep people docile could ever work, because simply spreading agitprop will rile everybody up (sincer it's negative, so according to you effective) whereas the propaganda will never work (since it's positive, so accorsing to you less effective).

I don't buy it for a second.


In fact, without the French Revolution as a warning sign of how the mob can grab power, the rulers in other countries are more likely to be overconfident in refusing to give way to reform.

That may prove to be the case in certain times and places. You seem to think it will be a general rule, which is your bias speaking, but okay. I say: what of it? Rulers have miscalculated on such matters countless times. Rarely does it lead to anything like the French revolution. Because, as I have argued, the French revolution wasn't the rule, but a vanishingly rare exception. A once-in-a-few-centuries perfect storm.


The trend existed in certain countries but not others. There was no gradual reform in the Papal States, or the Two Sicilies, or the Balkans. In Russia, serfdom was actually becoming more entrenched.

Did I claim it was going to be everywhere? Or at the same pace everywhere? In any event, you are too confident in your Russian analysis. Without the French revolution and Napoleon thereafter, the attitude of Alexander is going to be almost impossible to be predict. He veered wildly between wanting to be modern and "Enlightened" and being the protector of tradition.


Even where reform was happening, in most places it was towards supposed "Enlightened" despotism, which was mainly centralization of powers away from aristocracy to central governments. As we saw in the Habsburg monarchy or the Spanish dominions, that can cause its own revolts and revolutions.

Again, I've never said everything will be milk and honey. But we're looking at normal issues here. Nothing that's going to cause transformative change on a continental level. Struggles between monarchs and nobles are as old as civilisation itself.


Human beings are naturally negative, discontented and resentful of others who have more. We evolved in societies of 30-40 people with relative egalitarianism between people in our group, and occasional warfare with the handful of other groups. Our brains are not developed to handle being in a society with hundreds of thousands around us and some people will clearly far more money, wealth and status than us. In modern society, if people have a stake in the system, they have a tendency towards caution about expressing that negative discontent. But if they live brutal, impoverished lives with no economic or political power, they are prone to radicalization. And the increase in literacy and pamphleteering had created a medium to take advantage of that. If it doesn't happen in France, it will happen elsewhere. There will be a spark in one of these other societies elsewhere.

I have major caveats with this hypothesis of yours, on which your whole argument hinges. Even to the extent that humans have any "natural jealousy", however, you -- again -- just blindly assume that this will inevitably lead to something like the French revolution. Which is nonsense. It will lead to exactly what I predicted earlier: "[the aggrieved populace] just throw over the apple cart and hang a few designated victims, loot a bit... and things go back to normal."

That's what happens almost every time. Exceptions like the French revolution aren't the norm-- or we'd see such events a lot more frequently. But we don't, because it's far too easy to maintain the status quo. Everthrowing the existing order only ever happens when all other options have been exhaused or squandered.


The expansion in the state was at the time widely considered a compromise, moderate method to ward off communism. The idea it caused the 1960s movements is crazy. Without it, the radicalization would have happened in the 1950s.

Not what I wrote. My point is that radicalism (of any kind) causes more radicalism. It's about the amount of available energy in a system. Fast-moving molecules: heat. Slow-moving: things stay cool. If you agitate things, if you introduce radicalism... things are going to bounce around. You heat things up. You reach a boiling point. If you prevent radicalism, things stay cool. The reaction to radicalism is more radicalism. The reaction to moderation is more moderation.

The French revolution is the explosion of radicalism that instigated Modernity-- which is an inherently radicalised era. We're still living in a "heated" society, and it started back then. Keep things cool then, and Modernity as a whole will be much less heated.


The idea you can stop certain ideas from existing just because the French Revolution didn't happened is crazy.

The French revolution is what brought certain ideas to prominence and dominance. It was a course-altering event. Prevent that, and the course of the "history of ideas" is going to go in a different direction. Thinking you'll end up in the same destination if you change direction hundreds of kilometers back... that's crazy.


You will always have people coming up with utopian society reordering ideas. You will always get occasional situations somewhere in the world that are powder kegs. You will always get some rulers that refuse to give way. And you will thus always get the occasional group in power that tries to do extreme things.

You will very rarely get all of those things at the exact same place in the exact same place in the exact right combination to produce a transformative revolutionary development. The ultimate flaw of your whole line of reasoning is that you assume that these things will inevitably co-incide again (on short notice, instead of once every few centuries or so). I keep saying it: "perfect storm". You can't just replicate that.
 
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Another Fronde after Louis XVI tries to reform by imposing taxes on the nobles; to defeat them he accepts the idea of doubled representation for the Third Estate, with the monarch getting the deciding vote. Control over the purse leads (with attendant squabbles) to a gradual growth in power for the Third Estate, which comes to more closely resemble ( the Whig portion of) the House of Commons.
 
First, a disclaimer: I am no expert on the French Revolution, but I'll give my cursory understanding here.
The French Revolution is probably the most influential event in the past 250 years. The old order was torn down and the modern age officially began, having monumental affects on the culture of the Western World. However, things could have very easily gone differently, and the Revolution could have been averted.
First, culture. While secularism had been developing amongst the intellectual class before the French Revolution, the Revolution was the first time that secularism became widespread. Today, a large proportion of the population in Europe and former European settler colonies (North America, Australia, parts of Latin America) professes no religion, and among those who do profess a faith, it is often times only nominally (not saying that all pre-1789 Christians were fervently devout). Now, other factors obviously affect how secular people are (wealth, for example, it's much easier to believe in a higher power when you're dirt poor and the grim reaper could drop by any day), but I do think that the French Revolution did have an affect.
Second, politics. It could be argued that both Fascism and Communism have at least some of their roots in the excesses of the revolution (as previously mentioned, I'm no expert, but that's my cursory understanding). The terms Left and Right also came from the revolution, so our understanding of the political spectrum would be incredibly different.
So, why am I asking this? Well, I am currently working on a timeline where the French Revolution is butterflied, and I plan on taking the TL up until the present day. The opinions of people who are more knowledgeable than myself will be quite useful for the social side of the TL.
The political definition of right and left wouldn´t be so defined.
 
What more are you looking for? I thought Skallagrim and myself should probably stop from turning the thread into one of those tedious back and forths on micro points, but happy to answer specific questions you still want to discuss.
we saw great debate by the way must take ques on how to stop. ahh what do you think would happen too alot of the concepts of social programs do you think they would be impeded?
 
we saw great debate by the way must take ques on how to stop. ahh what do you think would happen too alot of the concepts of social programs do you think they would be impeded?

I think it would be delayed but it's impossible to hold back the tide forever. Social programs are necessary when the poor live terrible lives and have substantial potential power. As soon as they realise their power, the elites will need to buy them off.
 
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