The Soviets have just as many high-caliber (in excess of 100mm) artillery tubes as the WAllies. I can't find anything on Soviet heavy shell (again, in excess of 100mm) stockpiles, but if we assume it's of a similar proportion to the level of their expenditure compared to the WAllies in 1945, then it's probably around 8.25 million. I should note that the Soviets more centralized command system meant their more likely to be better at not expending shells in the support of the assaults (or defenses) that don't matter.
An extremely dubious assertion, given that the Red Army's method of breakthrough was to punch a multi-hundred kilometer hole in the enemies lines with a rapid blow.
A prime example of the problem of the Soviet concept of Mass in WW2 was around Rzhev and Kharkov in 1942 when mass against firepower resulted in a lot of dead Soviets (also Sinyavino in late 1942). When the Germans could use firepower they Soviets suffered 3-4:1 losses. The Soviets then picked up very bad habits in 1943-45 fighting the Germans, as their concept of mass to achieve breakthrough, while costly, while successful against a weakening opponent like the Germans, but would have been fatal against the Wallies due to the artillery (ToT and supply/mobility/rapidity of response) and air power advantages. The German artillery arm was fatally weakened by the demands of the FLAK arm in 1943-45, as they lacked the necessary ammo to really fight back in the East but still remained highly dangerous and relevant due to their flexibility and response. It wasn't until 1945 that they were so weakened that the Soviet mass preparations like during the Vistula offensive just hammered them into submission at the very start of the operation. That wouldn't be possible against the Wallies due to their extreme motorization and mass of supply/firepower, because they could move and response with massed fires in a way the Soviets couldn't without extensive preparations beforehand. Add in the air power issue and a key element of Soviet army support is missing, that is the Sturmovik and other bombers, while they'd likely be facing Wallied fighter-bombers slipping through the Soviet fighter screen with rockets, bombs, and napalm. Plus too the Wallies loved using WP to break up massed assaults and against the Soviets, who never experienced significant use of it by the Germans, would have suffered horribly from it. Then add in rapid artillery responding with ToT and proximity fused shells and masses of Soviet infantry and armor would get smashed up. The Soviets, like the Germans, would have to relearn how to fight in an environment where they lacked firepower dominance over a foe.The problem I see with these tactics vs. the Western Allies is the latter's predominance in firepower in general and air power in particular. Such a tight concentration of men and materiel presents a 'target rich environment' that the Germans simply weren't able to take advantage of because of their relative weakness materially. In situations where US and British troops were faced with overwhelming opposition (such as at Mortain, St. Vith, and others), the ability of individual infantry companies to bring down awesome volumes of artillery fire in a timely manner utterly frustrated the timetable of the opponent and inflicted disproportionate losses, while ensuring that higher headquarters could pull together a counterattack to plug the gap. I would imagine that because of their skill in "maskirovka" and the element of surprise in an offensive war the Soviets would make some gains in the initial phase, but the situation would quickly be brought under control once the US and UK realize what's going on and begin to respond. Furthermore, if the Allies establish an MLR along a natural obstacle (i.e, the Weser), the Red Army would be in the unenviable position of having to stage a river crossing. I don't really think they'd be able to get much farther than that, and would consider making the East bank of the Rhine a rather astonishing achievement.
I'm not sure about stockpiling, but I know their expenditures were lower than both the Germans and Americans overall
For example, according to Dunn's "TheSoviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945"[pp. 58-59], during the above timeframeallocations per weapon were as follows:
The Red Army's artillery was also less tactically flexible.
The problem I see with these tactics vs. the Western Allies is the latter's predominance in firepower in general and air power in particular. Such a tight concentration of men and materiel presents a 'target rich environment'
My personal conclusion is that the Red Army would rush forward for a week or two (hemorrhaging men and equipment in the process), be stopped, and then gradually ground down before finallycollapsing a la Normandy '44 at some indeterminate point in the future. After that, the USSR would either be forced to sue for an unfavorable peace or eventually defeated outright.
A prime example of the problem of the Soviet concept of Mass in WW2 was around Rzhev and Kharkov in 1942 when mass against firepower resulted in a lot of dead Soviets (also Sinyavino in late 1942). When the Germans could use firepower they Soviets suffered 3-4:1 losses. [The Soviets then picked up very bad habits in 1943-45 fighting the Germans, as their concept of mass to achieve breakthrough, while costly, while successful against a weakening opponent like the Germans, The German artillery arm was fatally weakened by the demands of the FLAK arm in 1943-45, as they lacked the necessary ammo to really fight back in the East but still remained highly dangerous and relevant due to their flexibility and response. It wasn't until 1945 that they were so weakened that the Soviet mass preparations like during the Vistula offensive just hammered them into submission at the very start of the operation.
That wouldn't be possible against the Wallies due to their extreme motorization and mass of supply/firepower, because they could move and response with massed fires in a way the Soviets couldn't without extensive preparations beforehand.
Add in the air power issue and a key element of Soviet army support is missing, that is the Sturmovik and other bombers, while they'd likely be facing Wallied fighter-bombers slipping through the Soviet fighter screen with rockets, bombs, and napalm.
Stalin summoned his Marshals to the Kremlin for a crisis meeting. He felt that war was inevitable but he was uneasy at the way things seemed to be out of control. Tito's actions had alerted the British and there were signs the Americans were waking up too. Time was running out and his agents in America and Britain told him that the Truman administration had just ordered more Uranium, enough to build another 20 atom bombs.
Stalin ideally preferred to wait until at least 1948 before war with the best case scenario being 1950 so as to allow the USSR to recover from the war, fill the gaps left by the end of lend lease and introduce new equipment into the military. Now he felt it was now or never. He asked his colleagues and the marshals of the Soviet Union to speak frankly about the chances of success.
Zhukov who although out of favour was too important not to bring to the meeting said that if they could defeat the Wehrmacht's 200 divisions then they could easily defeat a few British and American divisions. The problem he said was what were the objectives. This brought nods from those around him.
"Objectives!" declared Stalin as he sat back and played with his greying moustache.
"The objective is to save the Soviet Union"
"But the Allies have only a dozen divsions in Gemany" replied Zhukov.
"Yes I know that. I can read reports too as I'm sure you're only too aware Georgy!" Stalin glared coldly at the former war hero.
"The truth is that their mere presence is politically equal to a 100 divisions. We cannot have long term security so long as the British and Americans set up a permanent camp in Central Europe. The British have already created two treaties against us and everyday their diplomats are trying to turn the Americans against us too. Churchill once said that Bolshevism should be strangled in cradle. Now it seems he intends to strangle us while we lie wounded trying to recover from our wounds sustained in the Great Patriotic War.
And it doesn't stop there. The British are trying to force us out of Iran and they are even thinking of creating an Arab-muslim alliance against us. It will not be long before they are inciting the peoples of the Central Asian republics to agitate for self rule. Finally there's China. Here the Americans have just deployed fighter squadrons. Soon that devious but inept fool Chiang will hood wink the Ameircans into fighting Mao for him. In Japan the Americans have already broken their word about the Emperor and it's only a matter of time before we face an American equipped Japanese army on our eastern flank. Soon comrades we will be encircled. We will face a new German army backed the British and Americans in the West, a Chinese and Japanese army in the east and a muslim army led by a dozen Lawrence of Arabias in the south. All of them supported by American atom bombs.
Gentlemen" he sighed "I really don't want a war. I have never wanted war. All I wanted was to build a secure socialist state here in our motherland. Once built the world would see that Marxist Leninism was the best hope for mankind. But gentlemen we are surrounded by enemies. Enemies that won't hesitate to destroy us all if we show even the slightest weakness. We have to strike now!"
His final words sounded like the announcement of funeral arrangements rather than a defiant call to arms. Stalin was not a Churchill but that made him all the more ruthless.
Around the table there were grim expressions. Only Vatutin seemed to be smiling. Stalin seized the moment to call for a vote. As with most votes in his presence they were unanimous.
Vatutin gestured to Stalin that he wished to speak. The Soviet leader nodded in the affirmative.
"Comrades. I suggest we attack in mid January. The weather will favour us and will hamper the Allies greatest asset, their air power. Also we know the morale among British and American soldiers is not too good and fighting in cold weather would demoralize them further"
Stalin nodded and added,
"We also need a few more weeks to mobilize support from our friends and the 'useful idiots' in western countries. An increase in strike action in the winter would be most helpful.
Unlike the Germans the Wallies have the air, strategic radio intercept, and spying assets to actually identify Soviet main thrusts. Beyond that they also have the mobility to rapidly respond to attacks on a compressed frontage like that in Germany in a way that the Germans never could on the defensive in the East. More than the Soviets, the Wallies had a completely motorized army and an air force larger than the Soviet one. Once Soviet attacks start (or heaven forbid they have to deal with a Wallied one) they are going to find as the Germans did that the Wallies can respond with a rapidity that was unmatched due to their dense radio networks and insane levels of motorization and air support. Deep Battle plans work out fine against immobilized, unsupported German armies in Belarus and Poland, but against the most mobile, well supported armies in the world?Underlying this statement is the assumption that the WAllies are able to identify the timing and location of the Soviet (counter)-offensive and have their firepower all set up to vcome down on the Soviets before the Soviet assault goes off. It is a questionable assumption since the Soviets made ensuring their enemy didn't know exactly that pretty much the top priority of their preparations. An additional fact you leave out are that these extreme concentrations include heavy artillery concentrations...
This is childishly optimistic for the Soviets, bordering on Soviet-aboo territory. I get that you're making an argument and staking out an opposite position to be argued, but again the Soviets never had to conduct their plans against Wallied levels of air support and artillery flexibility/mobility/supply/response time. That's not to say the Soviets won't inflict massive casualties on the Wallies just simply due to the scale of the attacks they could mount but it is a fraction of what they will take in the process, as they learn how to fight in an entirely different way against an enemy that does not fight like the 1944-45 Germans.With that in mind, it would be the Soviets who initially have the local firepower advantage and they would be striking most heavily at WAllied artillery, who would be the ones who found themselves outgunned. Soviet air power and AAA would be heavily concentrated over these sectors, meaning that the WAllies efforts to get air power would end up causing massive air battles that kill lots of planes on both sides, but has limited impact on the ground fight. Soviet local superiority would be so overwhelming By the time additional WAllied reinforcements could be rushed to the scene, the front would have already gone mobile and the masses of Red Army mechanized forces would be fanning out across the countryside in innumerable, supportive armored spearheads. If the WAllies father their power to attack one in the flank, another turns and counterattacks the counterattack in it's flank. These spearheads would not be all conveniently clustered in one giant mass together for WAllied artillery and air power to smash together but would be rolling in a amorphous torrent that would be moving faster then the WAllies could keep tabs on, much less respond too, until the Soviets start straining their motorized supply lines and their advance slows down to the point that the WAllies slower operational OODA loop can get back into it.
Sure they learned to fight against a weakening German forces without air support or mobility hampered by partisan attacks in their rear with limited supply and led by a dictator ordering increasingly irrational operational/strategic moves. By 1944-45 the German artillery was largely immobilized by lack of motor transport and fuel, as well as Soviet air dominance, not to mention their ability to counterfire was limited by lack of artillery ammo. So sure the Soviets were able to achieve firepower dominance at the start of an operation against an enemy with feet of concrete, but then would suffer in mobile engagements. For example during Bagration 5th Tank army got the snot beat out of it when it ran into limited German armor reserves, which led to Stalin firing it's commander, a highly experienced general, and never giving him a command job again. Against highly mobile Wallied forces with air support and the VVS not being able to intervene in the ground battle, key elements of what made Deep Battle work against the Germans would not be a factor. Soviet deception works when their enemy was deep in enemy territory, lacked the ability to conduct aerial recon except when the Soviets allowed it, and the enemy has little ability to respond in a large theater with small amounts of forces, but against the Wallies who have spy networks all over Europe including in Poland, which the Soviets haven't dealt with yet, and would have very willing to help Germans that would report on the Soviets, while the Wallies also have ULTRA and German cryptography work they inherited when the Germans surrendered. They'd know far more what was going on than the Germans were able to in 1944-45. Plus the Soviets wouldn't know where the Wallies were either beyond the tactical level; Germany is not friendly territory where they have partisan support reporting on enemy movements. Even tactical recon isn't going to give the Soviets the picture they had of German forces in 1944-45.In reality, the Soviets learned from their late-1942 and early-1943 experiences and responded by prioritizing German artillery more heavily for identification and destruction. By the start of '44, they were generally able to identify and destroy 70% of German artillery pieces in the breakthrough sectors. They also placed great emphasis on decieving the Germans as to the timing and place of their offensives, ensuring that the bulk of German strategic-operational firepower was out of place to begin with. While the diversion of ammunition to FlaK duties represents a nice excuse, it was really German failure in doctrine to appropriately prioritize the adequate supply of artillery ammo and the fact they were repeatedly caught unawares that prevented them from hitting the Soviets. Finally, Soviet mass preparations were hammering Germans into total submission by the start of 1944, not 1945.
The Soviets were the ones that always had a serious problem with the front going mobile when things didn't adhere to their strict plan, plus without air dominance like the had in 1944-45 they won't be able to get their critical air support, while having to face Wallied air power on the maneuver. The Wallies demonstrated tremendous flexibility in maneuver that didn't adhere to a strict plan, plus had excellent air-ground cooperation and would excel at a fluid battle. And you're totally ignoring the fact that the Soviets had serious logistical issues advancing in Europe; unlike the Wallies they couldn't rely on shipping to German ports and in fact had to face a rail gauge change, so every mile they advanced into Central Europe required a change of rail to fit their needs. Power projection beyond their 1945 halt line is limited, which screws them badly, as they need a quick win to end the war favorably before things turn against them, but they don't have the logistics to get to the Rhein or beyond.By the time WAllied artillery is being motored over, the fronts gone fluid and the WAllies are gonna be back peddling to avoid getting overrun by the fast-moving Soviet tank armies. In all likelihood.
Not really, the only time they were able to consistently do so in the East was after German fighters departed for the West. The Wallies have MORE fighters than the Soviets and many times more than the Germans ever had in the East by a factor of at least 10. Some Soviet aircraft of course will slip through, but on a large scale it ain't happening, especially when marauding Wallied bombers/fighters show the Soviets how the Luftwaffe was defeated in it's own country. Soviet airfields will be priority targets and smashed by bombers and strafed by fighters just like the Luftwaffe was; the Luftwaffe had an integrated air defense system with dense FLAK networks beyond anything the Soviet army/air force ever deployed with their advanced elements in Germany, so they will not be able to stop or even blunt the unrelenting air assault they will face. Certainly air battles will be costly to both sides, but training favors the Wallies, as does supply of aircraft and trained pilots. Even at their best by 1945 the Soviets pilots were still only getting about 1/4th the training that US pilots were and about 1/2 that of British pilots.This pretends that Soviet CAS would not likewise be able to slip through WAllied screens, despite the fact they were capable of doing just that. Neither side is in a position to really shut down the others air power at the start of things, but that just ultimately washes it out. Not to mention that airpowers capabilities at actually dealing physical damage against armored spearheads is extremely limited. Air power is not, and has never been, the sort of instant win button you pretend it is.
And the Wallies contained it and broke the German armies, driving them back into Germany and defeat especially when the weather cleared and air power could intervene.As an utterly irrelevant aside, I realized in the course of writing this post that the Battle of the Bulge is pretty much the only example we have of a multi-army/army group-level attack by the Germans against the WAllies after 1941. Bit of a surprise realization, although in retrospect it's rather obvious...
In OP the moment is in 1945 right at the end of the war before the planned draw down happens. How about we debate around what OP asked, rather than redefining the moment for what is most favorable to the Soviets?@wiking @ObssesedNuker
I think it's important to note that, if for whatever reason Stalin decides that war is inevitable and he might as well strike soon, the attack would come at a time when Allies troops had been drawn down and the weather was poor. In Devolved's TL I linked to before, that moment was January 1947.
Soviet numerical superiority would be so overwhelming (Anglo-Americans had a total of 13 divisions at that moment in his TL IIRC, number may have been slightly different OTL) that little actual ground combat would be taking place in Germany, as the Allies would be mostly concerned with conducting a strategic withdrawal.
If the Allies do stop the Soviets, their best chance IMHO would probably be somewhere between Bretagne and the Seine
In OP the moment is in 1945 right at the end of the war before the planned draw down happens. How about we debate around what OP asked, rather than redefining the moment for what is most favorable to the Soviets?
Patton's view, we didn't fight the Nazis just for the Commies to take over. Troops were there fight while we are ready. One of Robert Conroy's novels has them fighting. Did Stalin have any plans for fighting the west in 1945? What would it take for it to happen? Who would win?
By 1945? Soviet heavy artillery expenditures were 75% that of the Americans and nearly double what the Germans managed to achieve.
Underlying this statement is the assumption that the WAllies are able to identify the timing and location of the Soviet (counter)-offensive and have their firepower all set up to vcome down on the Soviets before the Soviet assault goes off. It is a questionable assumption since the Soviets made ensuring their enemy didn't know exactly that pretty much the top priority of their preparations. An additional fact you leave out are that these extreme concentrations include heavy artillery concentrations...
With that in mind, it would be the Soviets who initially have the local firepower advantage and they would be striking most heavily at WAllied artillery, who would be the ones who found themselves outgunned. Soviet air power and AAA would be heavily concentrated over these sectors, meaning that the WAllies efforts to get air power would end up causing massive air battles that kill lots of planes on both sides, but has limited impact on the ground fight. Soviet local superiority would be so overwhelming By the time additional WAllied reinforcements could be rushed to the scene, the front would have already gone mobile and the masses of Red Army mechanized forces would be fanning out across the countryside in innumerable, supportive armored spearheads. If the WAllies father their power to attack one in the flank, another turns and counterattacks the counterattack in it's flank. These spearheads would not be all conveniently clustered in one giant mass together for WAllied artillery and air power to smash together but would be rolling in a amorphous torrent that would be moving faster then the WAllies could keep tabs on, much less respond too, until the Soviets start straining their motorized supply lines and their advance slows down to the point that the WAllies slower operational OODA loop can get back into it.
Long before the Soviets are ground down, it would be the WAllies who sue for peace as their angry public throws out their leadership.
Is there any data available to corroborate this? The latest I could find was for the end of 1944, and the US figures are for 1942-43 (they didn't change much).
It was more the assumption that before the Soviets are able to break through they'd be hammered by artillery and air power. Allied divisions were bigger and more robust in terms of firepower than the Germans and wouldn't dissolve right away.
though it would hardly be a knockout blow and their casualties would be appalling.
That depends on who's doing the attacking. If this is an "Unthinkable" type scenario then sure, but if the Soviets are attacking then it would be Pearl Harbor 2.0 and war to the death.
I think it's important to note that, if for whatever reason Stalin decides that war is inevitable and he might as well strike soon, the attack would come at a time when Allies troops had been drawn down and the weather was poor. In Devolved's TL I linked to before, that moment was January 1947.
You might recall this google document Crueldwarf posted over on SB. At the bottom are tabs you can switch to which shows exactly what the Soviets, Germans, and US fired in what time periods in numbers. German figures cut out after 1944 and US figures are just for June 1944 through May 1945, but the Soviets have it there for every year. I snagged all of added up all of the data for the 1945 Soviet tube artillery in January-May 1945 and got 10,313,025 shells from January to May 1945, working out to an average of 2,062,605 a month. I should reiterate that this is purely figures for tube artillery of 100+mm, I excluded mortars, rockets, tank guns, and all artillery pieces under 100mms.
For the Americans, the same data comes out to 26,027,605 shells in from June 1944-May 1945. That works out to 2,366,091 shells a month. Working the numbers backward might also give us a rough idea of how many shells were fired in the first five months of 1945: somewhere between 11-12 million. In any case, dividing the two monthly figures against each other actually works out to the Soviets firing just over 87% per month of what the Americans fired. Doesn't include the Brits, though, obviously. I'm still fishing around for how much they were shooting.
The Germans in the Ardennes managed to mostly push through WAllied tactical defenses and into their operational depths before they realized what was going on and that was in a much weaker attack then what the Soviets could be expected to bring down. Granted, the Germans consequently failed to break into the WAllies strategic depths, but that was as much due to a lack of follow on forces and shortage of supply as it was too the WAllies scrambling up reinforcements, neither of which really apply when it comes to the Soviets. That being said, WAllied mobility would probably allow them to scramble back across the Rhine before the Soviets could make truly serious consequence of their push.
There had been military engagements like dogfights, which are firgotten now.Hard to say, but probably not to any real crippling extent. As it was the famines were in the extreme margins of Soviet society and territory.
Yeah, sure. Particularly since LL was very unimportant in the war effort for '45. The overwhelming bulk had already been delivered and what was left was pittance.
That depends: are the Soviets attacking or being attacked? If the WAllies are the ones who come at the Soviets, then they'll be a whole lot less dangerous then the Germans owing to their lack of political will.
In 1945, the WAllies won't be inflicting much more casualties then the Germans as they are facing the 1945 Red Army, not the 1941 one. Over the longer term, though... well, I've been saying the entire thread that a long war doesn't favor the Soviets for a reason, ya know?
Other factors to consider are the unwillingness of the western societies to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of their soldiers in another war, the ignorant and silly sympathy among many in those countries for 'Uncle Joe' and the high level of infiltration of Soviet agents on all levels of western society and their capability to betray, influence, sabotage and confuse. I'm not convinced of a WAllied victory at all. In fact I think Stalin would have had a far better chance to win, or at least conquer the rest of Europe before a stalemate would have become inevitable. I hate to say it, but I think ObsessedNuker is correct when he states that we are underestimating the Russian capacity to wage war on an even bigger scale than they did against Germany.
There's a rather good series on such a war written by the British author Colin Gee, the so-called Red Gambit Series. A very good read (the seventh book has recently been published). Perhaps not always plausible, but the best fiction I've ever read.
Soviet "infiltration" would be a non-factor. Their ability to get spies into the Manhattan project was impressive, but rather useless in a general war.Other factors to consider are the unwillingness of the western societies to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of their soldiers in another war, the ignorant and silly sympathy among many in those countries for 'Uncle Joe' and the high level of infiltration of Soviet agents on all levels of western society and their capability to betray, influence, sabotage and confuse. I'm not convinced of a WAllied victory at all. In fact I think Stalin would have had a far better chance to win, or at least conquer the rest of Europe before a stalemate would have become inevitable. I hate to say it, but I think ObsessedNuker is correct when he states that we are underestimating the Russian capacity to wage war on an even bigger scale than they did against Germany.
There's a rather good series on such a war written by the British author Colin Gee, the so-called Red Gambit Series. A very good read (the seventh book has recently been published). Perhaps not always plausible, but the best fiction I've ever read.
-snip-
The class of 1927 would be, as their name suggests, men who had come of age after being born in 1927, who would have benefitted from the steadily rising educational standards the USSR achieved in the 1930s. That would mean their quality would be if anything higher then many of the classes before.
Your link blatantly admits it ignores the classes of 1926 and 1927 coming of age, so it's underestimating Soviet manpower levels by some where on the order of 4-5 million men (the annual coming of age for those dates is something on the order of 2-2.5 million men), which is quite a big hole.
And that the Soviets also did not bother to reinforce their forces as much in 1945 as the war was ending. In fact, by April 1945 one can see the first stages of Soviet demobilization, as Soviet manpower strength starts to dip. But before that, it stays pretty consistent the entire time, within a few hundred thousand.
Higher education is good for specialist roles, but it doesn't really mean anything if there are not enough of them or if these recruits have been subject to starvation as plenty of sources myself and Wiking have posted in the last few months have shown.
It was mainly dealing with the situation in 1943, but the reference link it provides shows information concerning overall Soviet manpower and class sizes. It specifically notes that the 1926-1927 classes had about two million men between them together,
considering the Soviet mobilization data it references only shows the 1925 class had ~700,000.
Didn't bother to reinforce, or couldn't reinforce as the Soviet data and my book references show? Early demobilization as an excuse in 1945 can't really explain away why they were having to let divisions go massively below paper strength around the time of Bagration, after all. In fact, this tidbit rather heavily shows how bad the situation was, as they were desperate to get the men back into the civilian economy.