Western Allies - Soviets Clash 1945

To me the Russians are running on borrowed time. By Mid 1946 the Americans would have enough Bombs in stock to just level Russia with there B29's.

They don't even need to be on mainland Europe to his Moscow since London to Moscow is half there max range.
 
The Soviets have just as many high-caliber (in excess of 100mm) artillery tubes as the WAllies. I can't find anything on Soviet heavy shell (again, in excess of 100mm) stockpiles, but if we assume it's of a similar proportion to the level of their expenditure compared to the WAllies in 1945, then it's probably around 8.25 million. I should note that the Soviets more centralized command system meant their more likely to be better at not expending shells in the support of the assaults (or defenses) that don't matter.

I'm not sure about stockpiling, but I know their expenditures were lower than both the Germans and Americans overall and that their 2-3 day Unit of Fire for heavy combat was not particularly large. For example, according to Dunn's "The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945" [pp. 58-59], during the above timeframe allocations per weapon were as follows:

Rifle: 100 rounds
LMG: 800 "
SMG: 300
HMG: 2,500
50mm mortar: 120
82mm mortar: 120
120mm mortar: 60
76mm gun: 140
122mm howitzer: 80
152mm gun: 60
203mm howitzer: 40
By comparison, according to Coakley and Leighton's "Global Logistics and Strategy" 1940-43 p. 736, the Unit of Fire for one day of heavy combat in the US Army was:

Rifle: 150
BAR: 750
SMG: 200
LMG: 2,000
HMG (30 cal): 3,000
HMG (50 cal): 900
60mm mortar: 100
81mm mortar: 100
75mm howitzer: 300
90mm gun: 125
105mm howitzer: 225
155mm howitzer: 150
Basically, even under the optimistic assumption that the above only correlates to two days' wastage, every shell 105mm to 150mm in caliber the Soviets fire will be returned more than five times over on a gun for gun basis. The Red Army's artillery was also less tactically flexible.

An extremely dubious assertion, given that the Red Army's method of breakthrough was to punch a multi-hundred kilometer hole in the enemies lines with a rapid blow.

The larger organizations (Fronts, Armies), had that kind of frontage, but the initial breakthrough zones were much smaller to ensure sufficient concentration of forces. Using the Manchurian Campaign as an example, a major offensive action involving a typical Combined Arms Army assigned a 55 km front would unfold like so:

1. The Army masses approximately two Rifle Corps (roughly six Rifle Divisions) along a zone of 8 to 14 kilometers (i.e, the equivalent frontage of only 1 to 1.5 divisions of the opponent) backed by division and corps artillery. Behind them are the AT reserve and Army artillery group.

2. Just prior to the assault, infiltrators sneak through the enemy lines, cutting wires, killing sentries, ID'ing positions, etc.

3. H-Hour: heavy artillery barrage w/Tactical air followed by waves of infantry - those defenders who survive the shelling are initially too dazed to offer an effective response, when resistance stiffens the RKKA pushes forward regardless of loss - this is where German stories of "human waves" come from.

4. 2nd Echelon of either Tank/Mech Corps plus an additional Rifle Corps is thrown in to exploit the breakthrough while the infantry anchor its flanks. Of this Second Echelon, very high quality motorized troops (borderline Special Forces) equipped with tanks and APCs are set aside as an "Operational Maneuver Group" to penetrate deep into the enemy's rear areas, disrupt communication and supply lines, cause panic, and generally hinder the progression of an effective response. Once a breakthrough is achieved, the tempo of advance is generally set at around 20-40 km/day as supplies allow, depending on the terrain and enemy resistance.
There would be several of these launched across a given Front's operational zone, with each successive penetration being assigned converging objectives about 30 to 100 km deep (again, depending on the former factors plus the commitment of forces in a given zone) so that the enemy's crumpled front-line troops would find themselves separated into pockets and cut off from reinforcements. After the Red Army finished digesting these pockets, the front would stabilize and they'd begin the process over again somewhere else.

The problem I see with these tactics vs. the Western Allies is the latter's predominance in firepower in general and air power in particular. Such a tight concentration of men and materiel presents a 'target rich environment' that the Germans simply weren't able to take advantage of because of their relative weakness materially. In situations where US and British troops were faced with overwhelming opposition (such as at Mortain, St. Vith, and others), the ability of individual infantry companies to bring down awesome volumes of artillery fire in a timely manner utterly frustrated the timetable of the opponent and inflicted disproportionate losses, while ensuring that higher headquarters could pull together a counterattack to plug the gap. I would imagine that because of their skill in "maskirovka" and the element of surprise in an offensive war the Soviets would make some gains in the initial phase, but the situation would quickly be brought under control once the US and UK realize what's going on and begin to respond. Furthermore, if the Allies establish an MLR along a natural obstacle (i.e, the Weser), the Red Army would be in the unenviable position of having to stage a river crossing. I don't really think they'd be able to get much farther than that, and would consider making the East bank of the Rhine a rather astonishing achievement.

The biggest advantage the Red Army has over the Allies here would be its greater experience in conducting operations on this level, plus the Allies' inexperience in repelling Army-Group level attacks. The closest they had (since 1940) was the Ardennes Offensive, which was relatively feeble compared to what the Soviets were capable of. In addition, the Allied Armies never experienced the kind of casualty rates that fighting the Soviets would entail outside the Pacific and a few set instances in ETO, and those actions were on a much smaller scale.

My personal conclusion is that the Red Army would rush forward for a week or two (hemorrhaging men and equipment in the process), be stopped, and then gradually ground down before finally collapsing a la Normandy '44 at some indeterminate point in the future. After that, the USSR would either be forced to sue for an unfavorable peace or eventually defeated outright.
 
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Deleted member 1487

The problem I see with these tactics vs. the Western Allies is the latter's predominance in firepower in general and air power in particular. Such a tight concentration of men and materiel presents a 'target rich environment' that the Germans simply weren't able to take advantage of because of their relative weakness materially. In situations where US and British troops were faced with overwhelming opposition (such as at Mortain, St. Vith, and others), the ability of individual infantry companies to bring down awesome volumes of artillery fire in a timely manner utterly frustrated the timetable of the opponent and inflicted disproportionate losses, while ensuring that higher headquarters could pull together a counterattack to plug the gap. I would imagine that because of their skill in "maskirovka" and the element of surprise in an offensive war the Soviets would make some gains in the initial phase, but the situation would quickly be brought under control once the US and UK realize what's going on and begin to respond. Furthermore, if the Allies establish an MLR along a natural obstacle (i.e, the Weser), the Red Army would be in the unenviable position of having to stage a river crossing. I don't really think they'd be able to get much farther than that, and would consider making the East bank of the Rhine a rather astonishing achievement.
A prime example of the problem of the Soviet concept of Mass in WW2 was around Rzhev and Kharkov in 1942 when mass against firepower resulted in a lot of dead Soviets (also Sinyavino in late 1942). When the Germans could use firepower they Soviets suffered 3-4:1 losses. The Soviets then picked up very bad habits in 1943-45 fighting the Germans, as their concept of mass to achieve breakthrough, while costly, while successful against a weakening opponent like the Germans, but would have been fatal against the Wallies due to the artillery (ToT and supply/mobility/rapidity of response) and air power advantages. The German artillery arm was fatally weakened by the demands of the FLAK arm in 1943-45, as they lacked the necessary ammo to really fight back in the East but still remained highly dangerous and relevant due to their flexibility and response. It wasn't until 1945 that they were so weakened that the Soviet mass preparations like during the Vistula offensive just hammered them into submission at the very start of the operation. That wouldn't be possible against the Wallies due to their extreme motorization and mass of supply/firepower, because they could move and response with massed fires in a way the Soviets couldn't without extensive preparations beforehand. Add in the air power issue and a key element of Soviet army support is missing, that is the Sturmovik and other bombers, while they'd likely be facing Wallied fighter-bombers slipping through the Soviet fighter screen with rockets, bombs, and napalm. Plus too the Wallies loved using WP to break up massed assaults and against the Soviets, who never experienced significant use of it by the Germans, would have suffered horribly from it. Then add in rapid artillery responding with ToT and proximity fused shells and masses of Soviet infantry and armor would get smashed up. The Soviets, like the Germans, would have to relearn how to fight in an environment where they lacked firepower dominance over a foe.
 
I'm not sure about stockpiling, but I know their expenditures were lower than both the Germans and Americans overall

By 1945? Soviet heavy artillery expenditures were 75% that of the Americans and nearly double what the Germans managed to achieve.

For example, according to Dunn's "TheSoviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945"[pp. 58-59], during the above timeframeallocations per weapon were as follows:

Dunn's figure is for mid-1944, not mid-1945.

The Red Army's artillery was also less tactically flexible.

Tactically. Operationally it proved a lot more flexible.

The problem I see with these tactics vs. the Western Allies is the latter's predominance in firepower in general and air power in particular. Such a tight concentration of men and materiel presents a 'target rich environment'

Underlying this statement is the assumption that the WAllies are able to identify the timing and location of the Soviet (counter)-offensive and have their firepower all set up to vcome down on the Soviets before the Soviet assault goes off. It is a questionable assumption since the Soviets made ensuring their enemy didn't know exactly that pretty much the top priority of their preparations. An additional fact you leave out are that these extreme concentrations include heavy artillery concentrations...

With that in mind, it would be the Soviets who initially have the local firepower advantage and they would be striking most heavily at WAllied artillery, who would be the ones who found themselves outgunned. Soviet air power and AAA would be heavily concentrated over these sectors, meaning that the WAllies efforts to get air power would end up causing massive air battles that kill lots of planes on both sides, but has limited impact on the ground fight. Soviet local superiority would be so overwhelming By the time additional WAllied reinforcements could be rushed to the scene, the front would have already gone mobile and the masses of Red Army mechanized forces would be fanning out across the countryside in innumerable, supportive armored spearheads. If the WAllies father their power to attack one in the flank, another turns and counterattacks the counterattack in it's flank. These spearheads would not be all conveniently clustered in one giant mass together for WAllied artillery and air power to smash together but would be rolling in a amorphous torrent that would be moving faster then the WAllies could keep tabs on, much less respond too, until the Soviets start straining their motorized supply lines and their advance slows down to the point that the WAllies slower operational OODA loop can get back into it.

My personal conclusion is that the Red Army would rush forward for a week or two (hemorrhaging men and equipment in the process), be stopped, and then gradually ground down before finallycollapsing a la Normandy '44 at some indeterminate point in the future. After that, the USSR would either be forced to sue for an unfavorable peace or eventually defeated outright.

Long before the Soviets are ground down, it would be the WAllies who sue for peace as their angry public throws out their leadership.

A prime example of the problem of the Soviet concept of Mass in WW2 was around Rzhev and Kharkov in 1942 when mass against firepower resulted in a lot of dead Soviets (also Sinyavino in late 1942). When the Germans could use firepower they Soviets suffered 3-4:1 losses. [The Soviets then picked up very bad habits in 1943-45 fighting the Germans, as their concept of mass to achieve breakthrough, while costly, while successful against a weakening opponent like the Germans, The German artillery arm was fatally weakened by the demands of the FLAK arm in 1943-45, as they lacked the necessary ammo to really fight back in the East but still remained highly dangerous and relevant due to their flexibility and response. It wasn't until 1945 that they were so weakened that the Soviet mass preparations like during the Vistula offensive just hammered them into submission at the very start of the operation.

In reality, the Soviets learned from their late-1942 and early-1943 experiences and responded by prioritizing German artillery more heavily for identification and destruction. By the start of '44, they were generally able to identify and destroy 70% of German artillery pieces in the breakthrough sectors. They also placed great emphasis on decieving the Germans as to the timing and place of their offensives, ensuring that the bulk of German strategic-operational firepower was out of place to begin with. While the diversion of ammunition to FlaK duties represents a nice excuse, it was really German failure in doctrine to appropriately prioritize the adequate supply of artillery ammo and the fact they were repeatedly caught unawares that prevented them from hitting the Soviets. Finally, Soviet mass preparations were hammering Germans into total submission by the start of 1944, not 1945.

That wouldn't be possible against the Wallies due to their extreme motorization and mass of supply/firepower, because they could move and response with massed fires in a way the Soviets couldn't without extensive preparations beforehand.

By the time WAllied artillery is being motored over, the fronts gone fluid and the WAllies are gonna be back peddling to avoid getting overrun by the fast-moving Soviet tank armies. In all likelihood.

Add in the air power issue and a key element of Soviet army support is missing, that is the Sturmovik and other bombers, while they'd likely be facing Wallied fighter-bombers slipping through the Soviet fighter screen with rockets, bombs, and napalm.

This pretends that Soviet CAS would not likewise be able to slip through WAllied screens, despite the fact they were capable of doing just that. Neither side is in a position to really shut down the others air power at the start of things, but that just ultimately washes it out. Not to mention that airpowers capabilities at actually dealing physical damage against armored spearheads is extremely limited. Air power is not, and has never been, the sort of instant win button you pretend it is.

As an utterly irrelevant aside, I realized in the course of writing this post that the Battle of the Bulge is pretty much the only example we have of a multi-army/army group-level attack by the Germans against the WAllies after 1941. Bit of a surprise realization, although in retrospect it's rather obvious...
 
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Happy and Glorious has WW3 breaking out in January '47, after a substantially different WW2 that ends with a divided Yugoslavia, Hitler dead and Goring surrendering, a western-aligned Poland, Soviet occupation zone in East Germany and civil wars in Yugoslavia, Iran, Greece and China.

Stalin's paranoia pushes him to think he's being backed into a corner:
Stalin summoned his Marshals to the Kremlin for a crisis meeting. He felt that war was inevitable but he was uneasy at the way things seemed to be out of control. Tito's actions had alerted the British and there were signs the Americans were waking up too. Time was running out and his agents in America and Britain told him that the Truman administration had just ordered more Uranium, enough to build another 20 atom bombs.

Stalin ideally preferred to wait until at least 1948 before war with the best case scenario being 1950 so as to allow the USSR to recover from the war, fill the gaps left by the end of lend lease and introduce new equipment into the military. Now he felt it was now or never. He asked his colleagues and the marshals of the Soviet Union to speak frankly about the chances of success.

Zhukov who although out of favour was too important not to bring to the meeting said that if they could defeat the Wehrmacht's 200 divisions then they could easily defeat a few British and American divisions. The problem he said was what were the objectives. This brought nods from those around him.

"Objectives!" declared Stalin as he sat back and played with his greying moustache.

"The objective is to save the Soviet Union"

"But the Allies have only a dozen divsions in Gemany" replied Zhukov.

"Yes I know that. I can read reports too as I'm sure you're only too aware Georgy!" Stalin glared coldly at the former war hero.

"The truth is that their mere presence is politically equal to a 100 divisions. We cannot have long term security so long as the British and Americans set up a permanent camp in Central Europe. The British have already created two treaties against us and everyday their diplomats are trying to turn the Americans against us too. Churchill once said that Bolshevism should be strangled in cradle. Now it seems he intends to strangle us while we lie wounded trying to recover from our wounds sustained in the Great Patriotic War.

And it doesn't stop there. The British are trying to force us out of Iran and they are even thinking of creating an Arab-muslim alliance against us. It will not be long before they are inciting the peoples of the Central Asian republics to agitate for self rule. Finally there's China. Here the Americans have just deployed fighter squadrons. Soon that devious but inept fool Chiang will hood wink the Ameircans into fighting Mao for him. In Japan the Americans have already broken their word about the Emperor and it's only a matter of time before we face an American equipped Japanese army on our eastern flank. Soon comrades we will be encircled. We will face a new German army backed the British and Americans in the West, a Chinese and Japanese army in the east and a muslim army led by a dozen Lawrence of Arabias in the south. All of them supported by American atom bombs.

Gentlemen" he sighed "I really don't want a war. I have never wanted war. All I wanted was to build a secure socialist state here in our motherland. Once built the world would see that Marxist Leninism was the best hope for mankind. But gentlemen we are surrounded by enemies. Enemies that won't hesitate to destroy us all if we show even the slightest weakness. We have to strike now!"

His final words sounded like the announcement of funeral arrangements rather than a defiant call to arms. Stalin was not a Churchill but that made him all the more ruthless.

Around the table there were grim expressions. Only Vatutin seemed to be smiling. Stalin seized the moment to call for a vote. As with most votes in his presence they were unanimous.

Vatutin gestured to Stalin that he wished to speak. The Soviet leader nodded in the affirmative.

"Comrades. I suggest we attack in mid January. The weather will favour us and will hamper the Allies greatest asset, their air power. Also we know the morale among British and American soldiers is not too good and fighting in cold weather would demoralize them further"

Stalin nodded and added,

"We also need a few more weeks to mobilize support from our friends and the 'useful idiots' in western countries. An increase in strike action in the winter would be most helpful.
 

Deleted member 1487

Underlying this statement is the assumption that the WAllies are able to identify the timing and location of the Soviet (counter)-offensive and have their firepower all set up to vcome down on the Soviets before the Soviet assault goes off. It is a questionable assumption since the Soviets made ensuring their enemy didn't know exactly that pretty much the top priority of their preparations. An additional fact you leave out are that these extreme concentrations include heavy artillery concentrations...
Unlike the Germans the Wallies have the air, strategic radio intercept, and spying assets to actually identify Soviet main thrusts. Beyond that they also have the mobility to rapidly respond to attacks on a compressed frontage like that in Germany in a way that the Germans never could on the defensive in the East. More than the Soviets, the Wallies had a completely motorized army and an air force larger than the Soviet one. Once Soviet attacks start (or heaven forbid they have to deal with a Wallied one) they are going to find as the Germans did that the Wallies can respond with a rapidity that was unmatched due to their dense radio networks and insane levels of motorization and air support. Deep Battle plans work out fine against immobilized, unsupported German armies in Belarus and Poland, but against the most mobile, well supported armies in the world?

With that in mind, it would be the Soviets who initially have the local firepower advantage and they would be striking most heavily at WAllied artillery, who would be the ones who found themselves outgunned. Soviet air power and AAA would be heavily concentrated over these sectors, meaning that the WAllies efforts to get air power would end up causing massive air battles that kill lots of planes on both sides, but has limited impact on the ground fight. Soviet local superiority would be so overwhelming By the time additional WAllied reinforcements could be rushed to the scene, the front would have already gone mobile and the masses of Red Army mechanized forces would be fanning out across the countryside in innumerable, supportive armored spearheads. If the WAllies father their power to attack one in the flank, another turns and counterattacks the counterattack in it's flank. These spearheads would not be all conveniently clustered in one giant mass together for WAllied artillery and air power to smash together but would be rolling in a amorphous torrent that would be moving faster then the WAllies could keep tabs on, much less respond too, until the Soviets start straining their motorized supply lines and their advance slows down to the point that the WAllies slower operational OODA loop can get back into it.
This is childishly optimistic for the Soviets, bordering on Soviet-aboo territory. I get that you're making an argument and staking out an opposite position to be argued, but again the Soviets never had to conduct their plans against Wallied levels of air support and artillery flexibility/mobility/supply/response time. That's not to say the Soviets won't inflict massive casualties on the Wallies just simply due to the scale of the attacks they could mount but it is a fraction of what they will take in the process, as they learn how to fight in an entirely different way against an enemy that does not fight like the 1944-45 Germans.


In reality, the Soviets learned from their late-1942 and early-1943 experiences and responded by prioritizing German artillery more heavily for identification and destruction. By the start of '44, they were generally able to identify and destroy 70% of German artillery pieces in the breakthrough sectors. They also placed great emphasis on decieving the Germans as to the timing and place of their offensives, ensuring that the bulk of German strategic-operational firepower was out of place to begin with. While the diversion of ammunition to FlaK duties represents a nice excuse, it was really German failure in doctrine to appropriately prioritize the adequate supply of artillery ammo and the fact they were repeatedly caught unawares that prevented them from hitting the Soviets. Finally, Soviet mass preparations were hammering Germans into total submission by the start of 1944, not 1945.
Sure they learned to fight against a weakening German forces without air support or mobility hampered by partisan attacks in their rear with limited supply and led by a dictator ordering increasingly irrational operational/strategic moves. By 1944-45 the German artillery was largely immobilized by lack of motor transport and fuel, as well as Soviet air dominance, not to mention their ability to counterfire was limited by lack of artillery ammo. So sure the Soviets were able to achieve firepower dominance at the start of an operation against an enemy with feet of concrete, but then would suffer in mobile engagements. For example during Bagration 5th Tank army got the snot beat out of it when it ran into limited German armor reserves, which led to Stalin firing it's commander, a highly experienced general, and never giving him a command job again. Against highly mobile Wallied forces with air support and the VVS not being able to intervene in the ground battle, key elements of what made Deep Battle work against the Germans would not be a factor. Soviet deception works when their enemy was deep in enemy territory, lacked the ability to conduct aerial recon except when the Soviets allowed it, and the enemy has little ability to respond in a large theater with small amounts of forces, but against the Wallies who have spy networks all over Europe including in Poland, which the Soviets haven't dealt with yet, and would have very willing to help Germans that would report on the Soviets, while the Wallies also have ULTRA and German cryptography work they inherited when the Germans surrendered. They'd know far more what was going on than the Germans were able to in 1944-45. Plus the Soviets wouldn't know where the Wallies were either beyond the tactical level; Germany is not friendly territory where they have partisan support reporting on enemy movements. Even tactical recon isn't going to give the Soviets the picture they had of German forces in 1944-45.

Beyond that its not an excuse that FLAK was prioritized because of the enormous damage that strategic bombing was doing to industry in 1943-45, the Germans had only so many resources and they had to triage needs and artillery got the cut because FLAK was more important to ensure that industry could continue to produce ANY shells whatsoever. It wasn't the lack of German desire to make artillery shells, it was a lack of capacity to meet all needs and realization that if factories are bombed then there are no shells for artillery or FLAK. Anyway it is irrelevant to the discussion of Wallied supply, because they'd have plenty of artillery shells AND AAA.

By the time WAllied artillery is being motored over, the fronts gone fluid and the WAllies are gonna be back peddling to avoid getting overrun by the fast-moving Soviet tank armies. In all likelihood.
The Soviets were the ones that always had a serious problem with the front going mobile when things didn't adhere to their strict plan, plus without air dominance like the had in 1944-45 they won't be able to get their critical air support, while having to face Wallied air power on the maneuver. The Wallies demonstrated tremendous flexibility in maneuver that didn't adhere to a strict plan, plus had excellent air-ground cooperation and would excel at a fluid battle. And you're totally ignoring the fact that the Soviets had serious logistical issues advancing in Europe; unlike the Wallies they couldn't rely on shipping to German ports and in fact had to face a rail gauge change, so every mile they advanced into Central Europe required a change of rail to fit their needs. Power projection beyond their 1945 halt line is limited, which screws them badly, as they need a quick win to end the war favorably before things turn against them, but they don't have the logistics to get to the Rhein or beyond.

This pretends that Soviet CAS would not likewise be able to slip through WAllied screens, despite the fact they were capable of doing just that. Neither side is in a position to really shut down the others air power at the start of things, but that just ultimately washes it out. Not to mention that airpowers capabilities at actually dealing physical damage against armored spearheads is extremely limited. Air power is not, and has never been, the sort of instant win button you pretend it is.
Not really, the only time they were able to consistently do so in the East was after German fighters departed for the West. The Wallies have MORE fighters than the Soviets and many times more than the Germans ever had in the East by a factor of at least 10. Some Soviet aircraft of course will slip through, but on a large scale it ain't happening, especially when marauding Wallied bombers/fighters show the Soviets how the Luftwaffe was defeated in it's own country. Soviet airfields will be priority targets and smashed by bombers and strafed by fighters just like the Luftwaffe was; the Luftwaffe had an integrated air defense system with dense FLAK networks beyond anything the Soviet army/air force ever deployed with their advanced elements in Germany, so they will not be able to stop or even blunt the unrelenting air assault they will face. Certainly air battles will be costly to both sides, but training favors the Wallies, as does supply of aircraft and trained pilots. Even at their best by 1945 the Soviets pilots were still only getting about 1/4th the training that US pilots were and about 1/2 that of British pilots.

As to air power's ability to smash armored spearheads....well look at the example of the Ardennes, the Germans found their armor useless even when hiding in the forests, because their supply lines were all shot up. Even the meager Luftwaffe ground attack elements left in 1944-45 found Soviet supply columns easy pickings during mobile engagements, which means the Wallies will have a field day.

And an example of US air power being decisive in defeating a German armored spearhead in concert with strong US armor maneuver warfare:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Arracourt#Battle

As an utterly irrelevant aside, I realized in the course of writing this post that the Battle of the Bulge is pretty much the only example we have of a multi-army/army group-level attack by the Germans against the WAllies after 1941. Bit of a surprise realization, although in retrospect it's rather obvious...
And the Wallies contained it and broke the German armies, driving them back into Germany and defeat especially when the weather cleared and air power could intervene.
 
@wiking @ObssesedNuker

I think it's important to note that, if for whatever reason Stalin decides that war is inevitable and he might as well strike soon, the attack would come at a time when Allies troops had been drawn down and the weather was poor. In Devolved's TL I linked to before, that moment was January 1947.

Soviet numerical superiority would be so overwhelming (Anglo-Americans had a total of 13 divisions at that moment in his TL IIRC, number may have been slightly different OTL) that little actual ground combat would be taking place in Germany, as the Allies would be mostly concerned with conducting a strategic withdrawal.

If the Allies do stop the Soviets, their best chance IMHO would probably be somewhere between Bretagne and the Seine
 

Deleted member 1487

@wiking @ObssesedNuker

I think it's important to note that, if for whatever reason Stalin decides that war is inevitable and he might as well strike soon, the attack would come at a time when Allies troops had been drawn down and the weather was poor. In Devolved's TL I linked to before, that moment was January 1947.

Soviet numerical superiority would be so overwhelming (Anglo-Americans had a total of 13 divisions at that moment in his TL IIRC, number may have been slightly different OTL) that little actual ground combat would be taking place in Germany, as the Allies would be mostly concerned with conducting a strategic withdrawal.

If the Allies do stop the Soviets, their best chance IMHO would probably be somewhere between Bretagne and the Seine
In OP the moment is in 1945 right at the end of the war before the planned draw down happens. How about we debate around what OP asked, rather than redefining the moment for what is most favorable to the Soviets?
 
In OP the moment is in 1945 right at the end of the war before the planned draw down happens. How about we debate around what OP asked, rather than redefining the moment for what is most favorable to the Soviets?

This is the OP:
Patton's view, we didn't fight the Nazis just for the Commies to take over. Troops were there fight while we are ready. One of Robert Conroy's novels has them fighting. Did Stalin have any plans for fighting the west in 1945? What would it take for it to happen? Who would win?

1. Any plans Stalin draws up for fighting the west will almost surely involve waiting things out for a bit, in order to try and take advantage of an allied draw down IMO. There certainly wouldn't be any attack whilst the Flemsburg gov't was still up and running or anything like that.
2. For the above to make sense, there needs to be, at the very least, a series of flashpoints that bring Stalin towards accepting the conclusion that war is inevitable, which also need time to fester
3. Who said this was advantageous to the Soviets? If anything, not losing their entire force right on the border to a surprise Soviet assault helps the Allies immensely, and ensures that the decisive battles would be fought well away from the Soviet logistical hubs.
 
By 1945? Soviet heavy artillery expenditures were 75% that of the Americans and nearly double what the Germans managed to achieve.

Is there any data available to corroborate this? The latest I could find was for the end of 1944, and the US figures are for 1942-43 (they didn't change much).

Underlying this statement is the assumption that the WAllies are able to identify the timing and location of the Soviet (counter)-offensive and have their firepower all set up to vcome down on the Soviets before the Soviet assault goes off. It is a questionable assumption since the Soviets made ensuring their enemy didn't know exactly that pretty much the top priority of their preparations. An additional fact you leave out are that these extreme concentrations include heavy artillery concentrations...

With that in mind, it would be the Soviets who initially have the local firepower advantage and they would be striking most heavily at WAllied artillery, who would be the ones who found themselves outgunned. Soviet air power and AAA would be heavily concentrated over these sectors, meaning that the WAllies efforts to get air power would end up causing massive air battles that kill lots of planes on both sides, but has limited impact on the ground fight. Soviet local superiority would be so overwhelming By the time additional WAllied reinforcements could be rushed to the scene, the front would have already gone mobile and the masses of Red Army mechanized forces would be fanning out across the countryside in innumerable, supportive armored spearheads. If the WAllies father their power to attack one in the flank, another turns and counterattacks the counterattack in it's flank. These spearheads would not be all conveniently clustered in one giant mass together for WAllied artillery and air power to smash together but would be rolling in a amorphous torrent that would be moving faster then the WAllies could keep tabs on, much less respond too, until the Soviets start straining their motorized supply lines and their advance slows down to the point that the WAllies slower operational OODA loop can get back into it.

It was more the assumption that before the Soviets are able to break through they'd be hammered by artillery and air power. Allied divisions were bigger and more robust in terms of firepower than the Germans and wouldn't dissolve right away. Plus, the aforementioned tactical flexibility means that any given small unit within the space of a few minutes can call for fire support on these masses of Soviets trying to overrun them; not to mention in the event a battle goes fluid the Allies were no slouches themselves and the Red Army's supply lines would be promptly shot up - the size of the Allied air arm was so huge that VVS fighter support and anti-air power would be unable to prevent this from happening (even the Japanese were able to hit them repeatedly in Manchuria).

Granted, the advantage of operational surprise means that the Allies would be unprepared during the opening days of a Red Army attack and wouldn't be as able to bring these advantages to bear- this time period would see the greatest extent of Soviet success, though it would hardly be a knockout blow and their casualties would be appalling.

Long before the Soviets are ground down, it would be the WAllies who sue for peace as their angry public throws out their leadership.

That depends on who's doing the attacking. If this is an "Unthinkable" type scenario then sure, but if the Soviets are attacking then it would be Pearl Harbor 2.0 and war to the death.
 
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Is there any data available to corroborate this? The latest I could find was for the end of 1944, and the US figures are for 1942-43 (they didn't change much).

You might recall this google document Crueldwarf posted over on SB. At the bottom are tabs you can switch to which shows exactly what the Soviets, Germans, and US fired in what time periods in numbers. German figures cut out after 1944 and US figures are just for June 1944 through May 1945, but the Soviets have it there for every year. I snagged all of added up all of the data for the 1945 Soviet tube artillery in January-May 1945 and got 10,313,025 shells from January to May 1945, working out to an average of 2,062,605 a month. I should reiterate that this is purely figures for tube artillery of 100+mm, I excluded mortars, rockets, tank guns, and all artillery pieces under 100mms.

For the Americans, the same data comes out to 26,027,605 shells in from June 1944-May 1945. That works out to 2,366,091 shells a month. Working the numbers backward might also give us a rough idea of how many shells were fired in the first five months of 1945: somewhere between 11-12 million. In any case, dividing the two monthly figures against each other actually works out to the Soviets firing just over 87% per month of what the Americans fired. Doesn't include the Brits, though, obviously. I'm still fishing around for how much they were shooting.

It was more the assumption that before the Soviets are able to break through they'd be hammered by artillery and air power. Allied divisions were bigger and more robust in terms of firepower than the Germans and wouldn't dissolve right away.

The Germans in the Ardennes managed to mostly push through WAllied tactical defenses and into their operational depths before they realized what was going on and that was in a much weaker attack then what the Soviets could be expected to bring down. Granted, the Germans consequently failed to break into the WAllies strategic depths, but that was as much due to a lack of follow on forces and shortage of supply as it was too the WAllies scrambling up reinforcements, neither of which really apply when it comes to the Soviets. That being said, WAllied mobility would probably allow them to scramble back across the Rhine before the Soviets could make truly serious consequence of their push.

though it would hardly be a knockout blow and their casualties would be appalling.

I'd say that casualties on both sides would probably be appalling, but the failure to deliver a knock out blow... well, I agree but mainly because there isn't anyway for the Soviets too deliver a knockout blow to the WAllies. Even if we assumed, for the magical sake of argument, that the God(s) decided to smile upon the Red Army or whatever and the Soviets wipe out the entirety of the AEF... well, okay the British aren't ever fielding a solid army again, but the Americans certainly have the manpower and industry to bounce back from that and the Soviets just don't have any means to get at it.

That depends on who's doing the attacking. If this is an "Unthinkable" type scenario then sure, but if the Soviets are attacking then it would be Pearl Harbor 2.0 and war to the death.

Oh, I was thinking Unthinkable style.

I think it's important to note that, if for whatever reason Stalin decides that war is inevitable and he might as well strike soon, the attack would come at a time when Allies troops had been drawn down and the weather was poor. In Devolved's TL I linked to before, that moment was January 1947.

Operation Unthinkable: The Third World War actually does devote a chapter to American planning in the event of war with the USSR, which first started cropping up in November 1945. The plans up until 1949 can basically be consistently summed in 3 steps:

1. GTFO off the continental Eurasian landmass.
2. Hold along the Suez until overwhelming conventional and nuclear forces can be built up in Britain, North Africa, and Japan.
3. Invade once overwhelming force has been established.

The issue was that the US's post-WW2 demobilization of it's conventional forces were extremely fast and extremely steep. By June 1947, total US armed force personnel was around 1.5 million of which ~990,000 were in the army and ~92,000 in the Marines. The Soviets also demobbed, but nowhere near as far and fast: by 1947 the Soviet armed forces had around 3 million men, of whom 2.4 million were in the ground forces. Rebuilding the US's conventional forces would take years of wartime mobilization. The US also didn't feel it had the nuclear arsenal for a proper knock-out blow against the USSR until 1949, after which the US started moving towards what would become Massive Retaliation.
 
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You might recall this google document Crueldwarf posted over on SB. At the bottom are tabs you can switch to which shows exactly what the Soviets, Germans, and US fired in what time periods in numbers. German figures cut out after 1944 and US figures are just for June 1944 through May 1945, but the Soviets have it there for every year. I snagged all of added up all of the data for the 1945 Soviet tube artillery in January-May 1945 and got 10,313,025 shells from January to May 1945, working out to an average of 2,062,605 a month. I should reiterate that this is purely figures for tube artillery of 100+mm, I excluded mortars, rockets, tank guns, and all artillery pieces under 100mms.

The link's dead, but I remember.

For the Americans, the same data comes out to 26,027,605 shells in from June 1944-May 1945. That works out to 2,366,091 shells a month. Working the numbers backward might also give us a rough idea of how many shells were fired in the first five months of 1945: somewhere between 11-12 million. In any case, dividing the two monthly figures against each other actually works out to the Soviets firing just over 87% per month of what the Americans fired. Doesn't include the Brits, though, obviously. I'm still fishing around for how much they were shooting.

I'd assume the volume of fire was similar, but the Brits didn't use as many heavy guns as the US (most of their pieces were light 25 pdrs).

The Germans in the Ardennes managed to mostly push through WAllied tactical defenses and into their operational depths before they realized what was going on and that was in a much weaker attack then what the Soviets could be expected to bring down. Granted, the Germans consequently failed to break into the WAllies strategic depths, but that was as much due to a lack of follow on forces and shortage of supply as it was too the WAllies scrambling up reinforcements, neither of which really apply when it comes to the Soviets. That being said, WAllied mobility would probably allow them to scramble back across the Rhine before the Soviets could make truly serious consequence of their push.

Ehh, that was sort of an exception in that the division bearing the brunt of the attack, the 106th Infantry, was the only formation that well and truly fell apart, and only after several days. The low troop density in the region enabled the Germans to more or less split the gap in the Allied line and push forward, but they weren't able to expand the breadth of their penetration because veteran formations on their flanks (see for example the 99th Infantry) were able to hold firm and repel everything that came at them. Afterward the Germans were slowed and stopped, but this was as much if not more due to the weather permitting the lavish use of tactical air power within a week and resistance on the ground as the panzers' lack of fuel, which OKW reckoned would at least be sufficient to reach the Meuse before captured stocks would have to be drawn on.

In other cases where the initial situation wasn't as favorable (such as Nordwind and Mortain) the Germans weren't even as successful as that.
 

FBKampfer

Banned
I think the determining factor would be airpower. Soviets were severely lacking in tactical and strategic airpower, and were weaker than the Allies in terms of close air support. The only area where they could have an edge would be total sortie rate, but this would be of somewhat limited value, owing to the sever vulnerability of their ground attack platforms, and almost non existent ordnance capacity of their fighters, coupled with the greater ability of the Allies to provide air coverage for combat formations relative to the Germans.

Combined with advanced models entering service with the Allied airforces, and reallocated matériel and troops from the Pacific post-VJ-Day, and the Soviets would have a very rough time of it against the Western Allies.

And this is entirely neglecting other issues, such as the superiority of Allied tanks, numbers relative to the Germans, the already crippling German transportation network they'd have to advance over, lengthening supply lines, and an almost total inability to affect allied logistics to even the slightest degree, as well as active and aggressive interdiction from the Allied airforces, and the Soviet armies in Western and Central Europe are facing a pretty desperate situation.

They might see successes for the first week or two, but then fuel and ammunition starts to run low with supplies piling up at destroyed rail junctions, and the road conditions deteriorating further as allied bombing starts to take effect, and trucks become bogged down as too many trucks try to bypass bomb craters and road damage. All while trying to justify attacking former allies to the men at the front line.
 
Other factors to consider are the unwillingness of the western societies to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of their soldiers in another war, the ignorant and silly sympathy among many in those countries for 'Uncle Joe' and the high level of infiltration of Soviet agents on all levels of western society and their capability to betray, influence, sabotage and confuse. I'm not convinced of a WAllied victory at all. In fact I think Stalin would have had a far better chance to win, or at least conquer the rest of Europe before a stalemate would have become inevitable. I hate to say it, but I think ObsessedNuker is correct when he states that we are underestimating the Russian capacity to wage war on an even bigger scale than they did against Germany.

There's a rather good series on such a war written by the British author Colin Gee, the so-called Red Gambit Series. A very good read (the seventh book has recently been published). Perhaps not always plausible, but the best fiction I've ever read.
 
Hard to say, but probably not to any real crippling extent. As it was the famines were in the extreme margins of Soviet society and territory.



Yeah, sure. Particularly since LL was very unimportant in the war effort for '45. The overwhelming bulk had already been delivered and what was left was pittance.



That depends: are the Soviets attacking or being attacked? If the WAllies are the ones who come at the Soviets, then they'll be a whole lot less dangerous then the Germans owing to their lack of political will.



In 1945, the WAllies won't be inflicting much more casualties then the Germans as they are facing the 1945 Red Army, not the 1941 one. Over the longer term, though... well, I've been saying the entire thread that a long war doesn't favor the Soviets for a reason, ya know?
There had been military engagements like dogfights, which are firgotten now.
 
Other factors to consider are the unwillingness of the western societies to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of their soldiers in another war, the ignorant and silly sympathy among many in those countries for 'Uncle Joe' and the high level of infiltration of Soviet agents on all levels of western society and their capability to betray, influence, sabotage and confuse. I'm not convinced of a WAllied victory at all. In fact I think Stalin would have had a far better chance to win, or at least conquer the rest of Europe before a stalemate would have become inevitable. I hate to say it, but I think ObsessedNuker is correct when he states that we are underestimating the Russian capacity to wage war on an even bigger scale than they did against Germany.

There's a rather good series on such a war written by the British author Colin Gee, the so-called Red Gambit Series. A very good read (the seventh book has recently been published). Perhaps not always plausible, but the best fiction I've ever read.

Not if the Soviets attack first. It would be seen as a bigger stab in the back than Pearl Harbor, and as we know from the planning and publicity surrounding preparations for Operation Downfall, a Western society was more than willing to accept huge losses if the outcome could be justified.

Moreover, given the correlation of forces in 1945 the notion that the Soviets, who were materially weaker than the Allies in every way and held only a slight manpower advantage (albeit distributed differently among their military apparatus), could completely drive the Anglo-Americans off the continent is, frankly, fanciful.
 

FBKampfer

Banned
Other factors to consider are the unwillingness of the western societies to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of their soldiers in another war, the ignorant and silly sympathy among many in those countries for 'Uncle Joe' and the high level of infiltration of Soviet agents on all levels of western society and their capability to betray, influence, sabotage and confuse. I'm not convinced of a WAllied victory at all. In fact I think Stalin would have had a far better chance to win, or at least conquer the rest of Europe before a stalemate would have become inevitable. I hate to say it, but I think ObsessedNuker is correct when he states that we are underestimating the Russian capacity to wage war on an even bigger scale than they did against Germany.

There's a rather good series on such a war written by the British author Colin Gee, the so-called Red Gambit Series. A very good read (the seventh book has recently been published). Perhaps not always plausible, but the best fiction I've ever read.
Soviet "infiltration" would be a non-factor. Their ability to get spies into the Manhattan project was impressive, but rather useless in a general war.

Soviets would have to achieve one of three things to have any "infiltration" be worth more than a burned-out T-34 hull.
1) widespread sabotage
2) cripple the Western publics' will to fight
3) significant direct military espionage on an operational or strategic level.

1 and 2 are greatly unlikely due to the fact that a Soviet attack would galvanize the Western Allies in much the same way Pearl Harbor did for the United States. Terror bombing doesn't work, shooting up office buildings doesn't work, there's limited munitions, particularly heavy munitions, not already under military guard, or in the hands of resistance groups already aligned to the Western Allies, some French partisan bands being notable exceptions, however France had already been knocked out of the game as a major player in 1940.

And number 3, while being the most likely, is still improbable on any significant scale, due to military security, and the strength of Western counter-intel.

The Soviets would have no sitting resentment and enmity to build on, nothing to leverage, no ways to exert more than a modicum of influence, and not a snowball's chance in hell of standing up to Allies.

Allied armor was superior.
Allied infantry equipment was superior.
Allied artillery support was superior
Allied air power was worlds ahead of the Soviets.
Allied naval strength was so dominating they could park their carriers offshore anywhere in the world, and there wasn't a single, isolated thing anybody anywhere could do about it.
Allied logistics were superior


The battle would play out quite simple. Soviets would surge over the Elbe and enjoy 11 days of success before things went sideways. After about four weeks, any Soviet formations West of the Elbe will cease to exist as an organized fighting unit.

Exhausted, depleted, hungry, harassed constantly by artillery, and held in place by allied fighter-bombers and lack of supplies, Soviet units East of the Elbe would be split down the middle before a second Soviet group is trapped for complete annihilation when allied forces reach the sea somewhere around Greifswald.

Soviet forces would face nothing but debacle after debacle until they stabilize the front at the Vistula river.
 

Worth noting that in 1945 in France the French Communist Party had 5million votes and in 46 the Italian Communist Party had 4.3 million (in 48 it had 8 million!).

It is also of note that both these parties had played a significant role in the liberation of their countries and thus had significant combat experience in both conventional and guerilla warfare. So sabotage behind WAllie lines goes without question.

Whilst in this scenario they will certainly have far less public support it is not beyond question that they would point to Greece at what happened to EAM--ELAS as a reason to fight, it is certainly enough to galvanise the membership of those parties as it's a case of fight or land in a concentration camp.

They'll be a thorn, but the WAllies can probably overcome them.

Tables turned and the WAllies are the initial aggressors, you can feasibly expect civil war in France and Italy alongside Greece. But that's for another thread.
 
I sincerely apologize for not getting to this sooner, I had two exams this past week that took precedence.

The class of 1927 would be, as their name suggests, men who had come of age after being born in 1927, who would have benefitted from the steadily rising educational standards the USSR achieved in the 1930s. That would mean their quality would be if anything higher then many of the classes before.

Higher education is good for specialist roles, but it doesn't really mean anything if there are not enough of them or if these recruits have been subject to starvation as plenty of sources myself and Wiking have posted in the last few months have shown.

Your link blatantly admits it ignores the classes of 1926 and 1927 coming of age, so it's underestimating Soviet manpower levels by some where on the order of 4-5 million men (the annual coming of age for those dates is something on the order of 2-2.5 million men), which is quite a big hole.

It was mainly dealing with the situation in 1943, but the reference link it provides shows information concerning overall Soviet manpower and class sizes. It specifically notes that the 1926-1927 classes had about two million men between them together, which is much more reasonable than your 4-5 million figure considering the Soviet mobilization data it references only shows the 1925 class had ~700,000.

And that the Soviets also did not bother to reinforce their forces as much in 1945 as the war was ending. In fact, by April 1945 one can see the first stages of Soviet demobilization, as Soviet manpower strength starts to dip. But before that, it stays pretty consistent the entire time, within a few hundred thousand.

Didn't bother to reinforce, or couldn't reinforce as the Soviet data and my book references show? Early demobilization as an excuse in 1945 can't really explain away why they were having to let divisions go massively below paper strength around the time of Bagration, after all. In fact, this tidbit rather heavily shows how bad the situation was, as they were desperate to get the men back into the civilian economy.
 
Higher education is good for specialist roles, but it doesn't really mean anything if there are not enough of them or if these recruits have been subject to starvation as plenty of sources myself and Wiking have posted in the last few months have shown.

The Soviet class of 1926 was just as large as the class of 1927, enjoyed just a slightly lower level of education, and suffered the same level of deprivation, and the Soviets had been able to turn them into quality soldiers in spite of all that and keep the Red Army up to strength.

It was mainly dealing with the situation in 1943, but the reference link it provides shows information concerning overall Soviet manpower and class sizes. It specifically notes that the 1926-1927 classes had about two million men between them together,

Which is interesting, seeing as the 1927 class hadn't been mobilized. So in reality, it's just counting the 1926 and that the number comes out to 2 million is... almost exactly in line with what I posted. In fact, Walter S. Dunn, citing a classified Soviet post-war study from 1971 on exactly the issue of war and population that was only published in the west in 2003, states it outright:

"The class of 1926, those reaching age 18 during 1944, included at least 2.2 million men as a result of a annual birth rate of 43.6 children per thousand in 1926. Prior to 1942 the annual class had provided only 1.6 million men because of the low birth rate in the Soviet Union caused by World War 1 and the Civil War... The addition of a half-million men to the annual class of recruits in 1942 and subsequent years was a determining factor in keeping the Red Army up to strength." - Soviet Blitzkrieg: The Battle of White Russia.

considering the Soviet mobilization data it references only shows the 1925 class had ~700,000.

Actually, your link shows that there were only 700,000 who remained unmobilized from the 1925 class by September 1942, which is 9 months into the year. Unless your going to pretend that the Soviets hadn't bothered to conscript any of the Class of 1925 for the previous 9 months (which would be stupid), that makes it pretty clear that the class of 1925 was a lot greater then 700,000.

Didn't bother to reinforce, or couldn't reinforce as the Soviet data and my book references show? Early demobilization as an excuse in 1945 can't really explain away why they were having to let divisions go massively below paper strength around the time of Bagration, after all. In fact, this tidbit rather heavily shows how bad the situation was, as they were desperate to get the men back into the civilian economy.

Didn't bother to reinforce, as your data and book references don't really show that they couldn't have reinforced. What the data does show is they couldn't have strengthened their forces compared to previous years. While the average Soviet rifle divisions were indeed understrength by mid-'44, they were no more understrength then they had been in mid-'43 nor would be by the start of '45. That this was the case inspite of the Soviets taking 2 million irrecoverable (in 1943). So Soviet manpower strength was certainly enough to sustain their existing strength in the face of losses, even if it wasn't enough to grow it.

In fact, given that Soviet irrecoverable losses in 1944 amounted to just around a million and then the irrecoverable in 1945 amounted to just a half-million, those coming of age in 1945 likely would have been enough to grow the Soviet divisional manpower strength had the Soviets bothered to fully call them up.
 
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