Were the Ottomans and Austria doomed to implode?

Of the two, the OE had slightly less external pressure to break apart and weaker internal forces to split. The A-H Empire was composed of more historically independent and distinct minorities who could clamor for independence but it also had external states for those minorities to escape to, i.e. the Italians, the Romanians, etc. In the OE the Greeks are the minority with another state to attach to, the Arabs are too diffuse to build a separate state akin to Hungary within the Empire or go it alone and only Armenians had an external champion and enough gravity to break away yet to where, Russia and a new master? And A-H has similar issues, to gain independence from Vienna is merely to pass into another orbit. So I would say "doomed" is too much trope built on what happened and not what was happening, the war broke open existing fault lines and imposed new fractures but the essential gravity in each was to hold together absent compelling influence. Long term both had serious issues that might melt them down but I would argue the "inevitable" break-up would be in a more distant future where the threat of being gobbled is gone, just like post-Cold War Europe allowed the Czech Slovak divorce, the break up of Yugoslavia and the escape of Soviet states. In the post-Great War era each would, without outside force, hobble forward, to split is just as dangerous as staying aboard is frustrating, but the Devil they knew should be far less frightful than the Deep Blue Sea beyond.

The break-up of A-H served French designs to surround Germany with enemies and the break-up of the OE was pure greed and 18th century thinking, both are stupid moves and merely fed the fire that still burns, while A-H and OE are imperfect and unstable, each had far more utility as stabilizers, a role I think they would keep on fulfilling in a CP-victory for many more decades, at least until Europe was ready to either unite or co-exist with the multitude of small independent states, and the OE might focus the coming oil bonanza into a broader spread of prosperity and integrate the region back with Europe.
 
Long term both had serious issues that might melt them down but I would argue the "inevitable" break-up would be in a more distant future where the threat of being gobbled is gone, just like post-Cold War Europe allowed the Czech Slovak divorce, the break up of Yugoslavia and the escape of Soviet states. In the post-Great War era each would, without outside force, hobble forward, to split is just as dangerous as staying aboard is frustrating, but the Devil they knew should be far less frightful than the Deep Blue Sea beyond.

The break-up of A-H served French designs to surround Germany with enemies and the break-up of the OE was pure greed and 18th century thinking, both are stupid moves and merely fed the fire that still burns, while A-H and OE are imperfect and unstable, each had far more utility as stabilizers, a role I think they would keep on fulfilling in a CP-victory for many more decades, at least until Europe was ready to either unite or co-exist with the multitude of small independent states, and the OE might focus the coming oil bonanza into a broader spread of prosperity and integrate the region back with Europe.
So what actions and reforms would both empires need to survive the age after imperialism dies down, if they had lasted, and not share Yugoslavia's fate?
 

Germaniac

Donor
The Ottomans are not doomed. But I'd argue that once they lost their Balkan progress in 1912/13 they are doomed as a multiethnic empire.

I see no reason any they could not have held modern day turkey and throw in Mosul and northern Syria just for kicks.

The CUP government of the Three Pashas was, contrary to the imperial "Ottomanism" of the past, staunch Turkish nationalists. The arabs were not long for the empire with them in power.
 
That would be a military mission like the one run by von Moltke? Like von der Goltz (otherwise known as “Goltz Pasha”) spent twelve years working on? Or the one Liman von Sanders was posted to in 1913? At no point in this forty year on and off stretch of German military aid and tutelage did anyone in Berlin even propose setting up an Africa style protectorate in the Ottoman Empire (that I’ve ever seen) unless you have an example?

I can’t quote your responses due to the way you’ve posted it, so forgive the format of my response.

A classic way to lose sovereignty it may be (care to furnish us with an example?) but OTL it merely meant until the Ottomans declared war the WAllies (the British had significant financial investment as well) were interested in maintaining the Sultan’s authority to secure their investments. The Crimean War for example. It was always “going to be necessary” until the Sublime Porte paid off the debts (which was highly unlikely, but who knows further down the line if oil income had become significant?) So by not coming to terms (care to furnish us with an example where they even came close, heck, even discussed it?) they were interested in supporting Constantinople to keep it out of the “opposition camp”. This means, basically, keeping the Ottomans viable. I don’t know what the last part is about as it doesn’t seem to be a reply to what I posted.
The Liman mission led to a diplomatic crisis, The details of it, including Willy ordering them to "build me a strong army against the Russians" leaked to St. Petersburg almost instantly. What the Germans plan in Anatolia and what the Russians read and fear are two different thing - putting a German in charge of the Constantinople garrison is a hell of a signal to the one great power eyeing the city for centuries, barely a step away from becoming a Hong Kong. There's a chapter on this in Sleepwalkers.

They came to terms when the Ottomans joined WW1 and everyone got their lines in the sand which would have cut down the Ottoman controlled territory to 5 % of what they held at the start, it only had to be taken, something easily done during "peace time" but there was more important fighting going on at other places which exhausted the Western powers and Russias military and imperial appetite.

There were a 100 years worth of chipping away at Ottoman power and territory by that time, everyone had participated in it. It's hard to see why it would stop instead of ending at the logical conclusion, if it sounds illogical i apologize, it's my own opinion on the matter.
 

Deleted member 94680

The Liman mission led to a diplomatic crisis, The details of it, including Willy ordering them to "build me a strong army against the Russians" leaked to St. Petersburg almost instantly. What the Germans plan in Anatolia and what the Russians read and fear are two different thing - putting a German in charge of the Constantinople garrison is a hell of a signal to the one great power eyeing the city for centuries, barely a step away from becoming a Hong Kong. There's a chapter on this in Sleepwalkers.

Whilst Liman von Sanders was in charge of the “Constantinople garrison” (or at least the Corps covering that area) it did not put him charge of the Ottoman Army. To suggest the Military Mission was “barely a step away from becoming a Hong Kong” is either laughably ignorant or deliberately disingenuous. The Liman von Sanders Affair was a diplomatic crisis though and didn't result in War, did it?

They came to terms when the Ottomans joined WW1 and everyone got their lines in the sand which would have cut down the Ottoman controlled territory to 5 % of what they held at the start, it only had to be taken, something easily done during "peace time" but there was more important fighting going on at other places which exhausted the Western powers and Russias military and imperial appetite.

So in WWI and outside the norms of diplomatic discourse? Fair enough, I suppose - but even then, there were plenty of differences of opinion. The point here is what would happen after the War (ie when diplomacy went back to normal) and natural national interests took over?
 
Whilst Liman von Sanders was in charge of the “Constantinople garrison” (or at least the Corps covering that area) it did not put him charge of the Ottoman Army. To suggest the Military Mission was “barely a step away from becoming a Hong Kong” is either laughably ignorant or deliberately disingenuous. The Liman von Sanders Affair was a diplomatic crisis though and didn't result in War, did it?
For the European powers it was a diplomatic crisis, for the Ottomans it was a crisis of sovereignty, namely that others were taking the libery to decide how matter inside of the Ottoman borders should be handled.

UK, France and Russia had a conference due to it, the Russians demanded military action and if it came to war against Germany and Austria over it so be it, the British and French were against it so there was no war and the problem was settled by the Germans giving Sanders a less provcative job.

The state actors are not exactly rational actors, the Russians want Constantinople for themselves, not for the Turks, not for the Germans, not for the Greeks and not for the Bulgarians. Anyone interfering with that will trigger their fear that it's slipping from the hands of the Turks which could and have been beaten into submission for decades before into the hands of powers with the means to actually defend themselves. The UK also had a military mission there, but by that time Russia and the UK were allied (despite all the mutual differences in Central Asia, Persia, China) while the relationship with Germany was marked by suspicion and distrust. Why would the Russians trust the Germans not to set up a Hong Kong, Tianjin, Port Arthur, or Qingdao there? Everyone had done similar things to the other sick man in the far east.
 
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Deleted member 94680

For the European powers it was a diplomatic crisis, for the Ottomans it was a crisis of sovereignty, namely that others were taking the libery to decide how matter inside of the Ottoman borders should be handled.

UK, France and Russia had a conference due to it, the Russians demanded military action and if it came to war against Germany and Austria over it so be it, the British and French were against it so there was no war and the problem was settled by the Germans giving Sanders a less provcative job.

The state actors are not exactly rational actors, the Russians want Constantinople for themselves, not for the Turks, not for the Germans, not for the Greeks and not for the Bulgarians. Anyone interfering with that will trigger their fear that it's slipping from the hands of the Turks which could and have been beaten into submission for decades before into the hands of powers with the means to actually defend themselves. The UK also had a military mission there, but by that time Russia and the UK were allied (despite all the mutual differences in Central Asia, Persia, China) while the relationship with Germany was marked by suspicion and distrust. Why would the Russians trust the Germans not to set up a Hong Kong, Tianjin, Port Arthur, or Qingdao there? Everyone had done similar things to the other sick man in the far east.

I see what you're saying, but they didn't and (as far as I am aware) didn't plan to either.

I sense you're coming from the "All Empires are evil, land grabbing associations of psychopaths" PoV, but I contend that realpolitik and raison d'etat would keep the Powers from blocking each other from dismembering the OE in the absence of WWI. That is the only way I see of fulfilling the OP's request.
 
The state actors are not exactly rational actors, the Russians want Constantinople for themselves, not for the Turks, not for the Germans, not for the Greeks and not for the Bulgarians. Anyone interfering with that will trigger their fear that it's slipping from the hands of the Turks which could and have been beaten into submission for decades before into the hands of powers with the means to actually defend themselves. The UK also had a military mission there, but by that time Russia and the UK were allied (despite all the mutual differences in Central Asia, Persia, China) while the relationship with Germany was marked by suspicion and distrust. Why would the Russians trust the Germans not to set up a Hong Kong, Tianjin, Port Arthur, or Qingdao there? Everyone had done similar things to the other sick man in the far east.

Actually, Russian policy was that Turkey should hold the straits and these should not fall under the control of another country. First it was Bulgaria that looked like it was going to upset this policy but the Ottomans stabilised and fought them off. The Liman von Sanders affair was the second episode, prior to that the Russians and the Germans had not had any direct areas of friction. Great Britain seemed to be giving up on Turkey to hold Russia in the Black Sea and was courting Greece with a possible defensive alliance and swap of Cyprus for Argostoli.

For the record, the Brits and Russians were not 'allied'. The Russians objected to the British Naval Mission as well but the Brits just said 'would you rather a German one?' The British, French and Germans were quite united against the Russians in regards to Turkey especially the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA) who they blocked the Russians from.

Western Turkey had only 60 businesses of over 100 staff and two thirds of collected tax was from the agricultural sector. Tax revenue for 1913-14 was 29.4 million lira amounting to about 12% of GDP. The Turkish Lira had an exchange rate close to the British Pound, 1.1:1 (£ 1 bought 0.9 TL).

Tax collection was inefficient and collected about half the rates per capita of the Balkan powers. There was also considerable waste. In 1910, the Sultan was drawing £ 7m annually but £ 4m of this was for his estate. This should have been about £ 500,000 so £ 3.5m was frittered away on bribes, graft, palaces, favors, guards and secret police. The Empire's literacy rate was 7% for the Latin alphabet but 40% for the Arabic alphabet placing the Ottoman Empire on par with Spain or Italy.

Turks were forbidden to levee consumption taxes due the terms of the Capitulations (treaties) with foreign powers. France, Britain and Germany blocked a Russian request for a seat on the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA), the vehicle for collecting taxes in Turkey to pay down debt owed to western europeans. Russia's goal was to be able to apply economic pressure to the Porte which the three other powers objected to. The OPDA was also a mechanism to bring in foreign investment such as railway building projects like the Berlin Baghdad railway.

Although it was a great detriment to the sovereignty of the Empire, which had surrendered its rights over revenues and accepted unconditional control to foreigners, the establishment of the OPDA proved to be successful in the sense that it restored the Ottoman creditworthiness. From 1886 to 1914, the government could secure another 23 loans, totalling £150 million at an average rate of issue of over 85 percent.

Despite the fact that the Ottoman state managed to generate a budget surplus and to orderly pay its outstanding debt in the last two decades of the 19th century, rising military expenditures, especially after 1908, began to create serious problems again. Deficits appeared again and they had to be financed through further borrowing. By 1914, the outstanding debt of the government had reached £140 million, equivalent to nearly 60 percent of the Ottoman gross domestic product.

The 1914-15 budged was forecast at 34m lira. Of this, 6m was for the Army of 36 Infantry Divisions, 2m lira for the Gendarmerie and 1.3m lira for the 8000 man Navy. There was only 20m lira in the treasury and the extra 14m was to be added to debt. Efforts to abrogate this debt after the war was declared was what prompted the resignation of the Ottoman Finance Minister in November 1914. 10m-11m lira was the long term trend in Ottoman defense spending and at about 4.7% of GDP, this is quite high. The Army drew 13.3m lira in 1910 as reforms and reequipping were underway. Defense spending peaked at 24m lira at the end of the Balkan wars and 10% of GDP when the defense burden was at about 45% of government spending but this is typical for countries at war. However, this is including significant expenditure for ship building with orders for 2 Battleships, 2 Cruisers and a number of destroyers and submarines. In April, the Ottomans had secured a French loan for £36m that had cleared short term loans and stabilised the financial situation however the bulk of the loan was not due until later in 1914.
 

Lusitania

Donor
To say that Ottoman Empire would be able to survive long term is misleading. Even ifs composition in 1914 was a result of over 100 years of war that had robbed it of all its African territory and majority of its European territory. The western powers, Russia had either taken over the lost territory or supported European nationalities gaining their independence. The Baltic wars prior to WWI had been the latest such big of territory loss.

Ottoman Empire strategic location and the great diplomatic power struggle prevented its fall completely. Russia was being prevented from conquering it but that had resulted in its support of the Armenia and Kurds so that scenario would of continued. With WW1 that would of continued and ottoman actions against those groups would be closely watched by Russia. So a continuing Russia free from internal revolution would been strong opponent of Ottoman Empire and strong supporter of remaining minority revolts (Greek, Armenia snd Kurds). The British would of backed the Arabs and tried to capture the Arab parts of Ottoman Empire if at any time it looked like the country about to implode.

So long term the ottoman were doomed.
 
There were a 100 years worth of chipping away at Ottoman power and territory by that time, everyone had participated in it. It's hard to see why it would stop instead of ending at the logical conclusion, if it sounds illogical i apologize, it's my own opinion on the matter.
I have higher hopes for the Ottomans, although I'll admit that in the event of some sort of Armenian or Arab affair that foreign intervention could kneecap the Ottoman state. I have a previous comment upon the idea of an invasion of the Ottomans by any of the great powers, and while that is somewhat different than the subject under discussion, many of the points remain relevant.

I'm around 10,000 kilometers from my copy of the Climax of French Imperialism: 1914-1924, which makes it hard to check for precise details in some sections, but the French were profoundly unhappy about the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. To the French, from their perspective, losing their influence across the Ottoman Empire as a whole - and getting in return Syria - wasn't desirable. The Comité de l'Asie Française for example, saw de Caix, their main ideologist, say the following: "If means still exist to save the Ottoman Empire, we must seize them . . . we prefer to make our contributions to the cultivation of the great Ottoman garden rather than to have our small plot in Syria to ourselves". Delcassé and Bonpard (the French ambassador to Constantinople before the war), were both opposed to a partition. Most French high diplomats seemed to have shared a general view, this being the intent of the Quai d'Orsay. To take some quotes, unfortunately the Climax of French Imperialism doesn't generally mention exactly who said them...

"Our moral and beneficent influence would be severely limited, perhaps ruined, by a partition of the Empire."

"Everything torn away from Turkey is also lost to the French language . . . We can scarcely hope to find in the Orient, outside of the Turkish empire, Turkish or Arab authors who choose our language in which to write and who sometimes use it with such genuine talent . . . If Turkey were to be disassembled then the loss to our cultural domain would quickly become irreparable."

"[the official policy of the Comité de l'Asia Française was to preserve the Ottomans intact as]One of the most favored areas for our economy activity and-more important still-for our culture."

Only the diplomats in Syria and those who were concerned that the British intended to steal the region from them (quite a correct concern) dissented - and the latter were mostly invigorated when the war began. The French seizure of Syria and Lebanon is the French making sure they got their pound of flesh as their second-best option, rather than necessarily being the over-riding goal for them in the region.

I doubt therefor that the French would be likely to support a partition of the Ottoman Empire, and certainly wouldn't proceed therefor on their own. If the French can, they'll prefer for the Ottomans to stick around. Russian relations with the Ottomans had been quite good a few decades before, and it isn't impossible that they might return to this. French diplomatic pressure on the Russians would help in this regard; the French will still hold those massive loans in Russia and serve as a source of Russian financing, giving them outsized political influence there (and on a similar note, their massive loans and influence inside the Ottoman Empire, of which some might be relinquished by the Ottomans joining just like Siam saw some reprieves from Franco-British imperialism but which much would remain intact, give a very good concrete reason to support keeping the Ottomans together). I don't know what the British relations to the Ottomans were like, but I doubt that the British are going to invade the Ottomans. Greece, Serbia, and Romania attacking the Ottomans seems bizarre... what do the Serbians post First Balkan War, much less the Romanians, get out of it? The Serbs happen to have both Bulgaria and Greece between them and the Ottomans, and no Serbian minorities in Ottoman territory. Greece on its own, has little hope of invading the Ottomans.

Italy meanwhile, while fully capable of biting off disconnected Ottoman territories in Libya and a few islands, seems like a... doubtful, candidate to mount an invasion of the only Ottoman territory of significance remaining, the mainland.

This being said, the French did have that second option of partition, and it existed for a reason. I think the best quote to sum up what French policy is, is one from Raymond Poincaré:

"We must maintain the status quo in Asia Minor as long as possible. But there will come a day when partition takes place . . . and we must make advance preparation in order not to miss out on it."

If the Ottomans look strong, then France will back them; if not, then the buzzards will circle.
Notably, that thread was in one upon the topic of the Ottomans joining the Entente, so an Entente victory world most certainly, which raises additional reasons for a position of Ottoman diplomatic strength, given that the Germans and Austrians both exist as nations which are possibly favorable to the Ottomans. Fundamentally I think that the balance of power by the 20th century is such that for most of the foreign great powers, they would perceive a weak but manageable Ottoman Empire to be more in their favor than one which was split up, and where their enemies might gain an out-sized proportion of influence.
 

yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
Not necessarily doomed, but the odds were stuck against them. Avoid WW1 and they both have a shot to survive, but would indeed face an uphill struggle as more and more people see their national awakenings.
 
Much is said about the national awakenings in the AH empire, but what is neglected is that a lot of small nationalities felt threatened by bigger neighbours and preferred the AH empire.
For instance, the Slovenes and Croats felt threatened by Italian territorial ambitions. In the Austrian part of the empire they have made great strides in 1900-1914. Universal male suffrage since 1907 gave them political clout and their language was better represented in higher education and administration.
That is why they fought so valiantly on the Isonzo front against the Italians to the very last in 1918. They had a lot to lose if AH would desintegrate.
Even a lot of Italians in Trieste preferred being the mainport fot a landlocked empire to being a backwater port in a remote corner of Italy.
A lot of their concerns were justified in retrospect by the interbellum history.
Same goes with Czachs vs Germany. The Poles in Galicia preferred AH to German and Russian rule in the other parts of Poland.
 
The Ottomans are not doomed. But I'd argue that once they lost their Balkan progress in 1912/13 they are doomed as a multiethnic empire.

I see no reason any they could not have held modern day turkey and throw in Mosul and northern Syria just for kicks.

The CUP government of the Three Pashas was, contrary to the imperial "Ottomanism" of the past, staunch Turkish nationalists. The arabs were not long for the empire with them in power.

While I agree, I would argue the scenario you described is still an Ottoman collapse. It's basically modern Turkey with slightly expanded borders.
 
So what actions and reforms would both empires need to survive the age after imperialism dies down, if they had lasted, and not share Yugoslavia's fate?

And I am trying to find the likely reforms they attempt rather than what I think would be best. Overall I think the best path for A-H is to focus on the Imperial institutions, any "federalism" is likely to cement the division, we need a national diet and place for all subjects to interact, so rather than separate states I prefer local autonomy and a more unitary acting overall state governance forcing different minorities to align cross cut by interest rather than language or ethnicity. And I think the same applies to the OE but as someone else observes the danger is CUP rule is more Turkish nationalism and we get the OE acting like Turkey with bigger borders. Overall I think the Arabs have very little commonality to pursue a nationalism, they are barely united by Islam, they can remain fractured inside the OE because an Ottoman hand is better than their neighbor's rule, the wild card is how heavy the Turks press the Arabs to become "Turks".

I suspect A-H goes for something not unlike Imperial Germany, giving more power to the various "states" (really just the ethnics/languages), so we get a Kingdom of Poland or an independent Galicia, retreads on the Austro versus Hungarian division, so long as external threat of being swallowed exists the A-H peoples will try to make it work. Thus I think we see a sort of rot that carries us forward until Europe itself is safe for a multitude of little states.

And I suspect the CUP hobbles on, a little like Iran under the Shah, modernizing, pushing too much to the benefit of too few but the Arabs will be stuck. Only the British can offer a sort of independence and I doubt it looks quite tempting. The best reform would be to elevate the Caliph as a cultural anchor while allowing local democracy to empower people rather than chiefs. Oil money will buy modern trappings but I think the OE at best functions tensely between its Islamic past and the islands of modern, pulled at odds between the Turkish nationalist aspirations and the eclectic Arab tribalism, at worst leaning too heavily on the Army to cower everyone into pretending to live in harmony. But it will likely carry on as they say.
 
For the Ottomans that's because they lost wars to foreign powers who took bits off of it at the edges.
For Austria-Hungary the annexation of Bosnia was just making de jure what has been de facto since the 1870s.

Look at the growth of the French, British and German colonial empires between 1880 and 1914. Those who are paragons of stability in comparison.
The land empire versus sea empire distinction here is important too.
 
1. Ottomans did not implode.

2. No, both could have survived. Maybe Austria has to reform more in to a Yugoslavia alike federation which Hungary won't like. For the sake of survival. The Ottomans don't have minorities like Austria after 1878 which means they can give some consession with regards to language but nothing more. As far as I am concerned, in 1914 the Ottomans could grant some more rights to the Arabs and their language. If the Arabs are okayish the Empire can continue to live on without mich problems. The biggest issues are still the capitulations though.
 
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