Were The Japanese Ocean Liners Converted To Aircraft Carriers A Waste Of Resources?

Before the war the Imperial Japanese Navy subsidised the construction of passenger liners that incorporated features that would enable them to be converted into aircraft carriers. Of the ten ships that were built six were actually converted to or completed as aircraft carriers along with the German Scharnhorst. However, only two of them were fast enough to work with the fleet and the others were used as aircraft transports and for training. The two ships of the Hiyo class were inferior to the Shokaku class fleet carriers of similar displacement and dimensions because they were slower, carried fewer aircraft and their hangars had less headroom.

I think these ships were more valuable to the Japanese as liners because they could be used as troop ships and dry cargo ships or tankers should have been converted in their place. The Americans and British did not convert any of their passenger liners to aircraft carriers for that very reason.

Therefore instead of the five "slow" ships (Taiyo, Unyo, Chuyo, Kaiyo and Shinyo (ex Schanhorst)) the Japanese convert five dry cargo ships as they can't spare the tankers. But for the Hiyo and Junyo I suggest something more ambitions, that is to build them as an additional pair of Shokaku class aircraft carriers. They are about the same displacement so there will be enough steel. They should be built in the same length of time as the real Hiyo and Junyo because they were repeat ships of an existing design. Hiyo was built by the same yard as Zuikaku. She was laid down 3 days after Zuikaku was launched, probably on the vacated slipway. They would still have the plans for Zuikaku and might still be "tooled up" to knock off another one at short notice. The stumbling blocks are manufacturing the more powerful machinery and time because the ships were taken over after they were laid down as liners so an earlier POD is required.

The Japanese also built naval auxiliaries that could be converted to aircraft carriers and five of them were so completed or converted. Two more were sunk before they could be converted. The five dry cargo ship conversions should consume less shipyard resources than the liner conversions because they would be simpler. That might release enough yard capacity to convert at least Mizuhio or Nisshin to light fleet carriers before they were sunk IOTL.

It is ironic that while the Japanese converted two bespoke seaplane carriers of the Chitose class to aircraft carriers while they were also converting the battleships Ise and Hyuga to seaplane carriers. The resources for the battleship conversions should have been used for something else. The Mizuhio and Nisshin had already been sunk, but they could have been used for more dry cargo ship conversions.

If another pair of Shokaku class fleet carriers can't be built instead of the Hiyo class my Plan B is to build 4 additional light fleet carriers based on the Soho and Chitose classes in their place. They were about half the displacement and carry half the aircraft, but were faster and their hangars had more headroom. Plan C is to build a pair of 25,000 ton fast tankers in their place. The high-speed allows them to make more trips and they are harder for submarines to sink. Plan D is to complete them as high-capacity troop ships for the invasion of Australia. Plan E is to complete them as aircraft carriers as OTL.

The only significant battles they took part in were Santa Cruz and the Philippine Sea. If Plans A and B were followed other ships carrying the same or more aircraft would be available. Therefore would they have been missed in Plans C and D?

I know this is like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic because the Japanese still loose the war. Like nearly all World War II what ifs it does not change history enough to make a significant different on its own.
 
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Agree, the Chitose class were a mistake. The Ise class were relatively little use as gunships which was why they were converted, not for any truly rational reason, and they never IIRC had airgroups assigned to them, Japan being seriously short of pilots by then; which is the main problem with any of the carrier conversions.

As the IJN, a training carrier to produce at least some vaguely trained pilots, and at least a handful of CVEs would have been an enormous improvement on what they had; but they may have been institutionally incapable of thinking of it until it was too late.

Light fleets are only of critical value if you have the planes and pilots to operate from them, which you won't have without enough tankers to fetch the fuel for training and operations, and you won't keep those tankers without some means of protecting them from American submarines.

Escort carriers. Desperately need escort carriers- but the mindset is a huge stumbling block in the way.

Plans C, B and A in that order, and save D for after the clash with the first wave of American wartime construction. If the kami descend and grant wisdom to all concerned, of course, and probably only if.
 
Agree, the Chitose class were a mistake. The Ise class were relatively little use as gunships which was why they were converted, not for any truly rational reason, and they never IIRC had airgroups assigned to them, Japan being seriously short of pilots by then; which is the main problem with any of the carrier conversions.

As the IJN, a training carrier to produce at least some vaguely trained pilots, and at least a handful of CVEs would have been an enormous improvement on what they had; but they may have been institutionally incapable of thinking of it until it was too late.

Light fleets are only of critical value if you have the planes and pilots to operate from them, which you won't have without enough tankers to fetch the fuel for training and operations, and you won't keep those tankers without some means of protecting them from American submarines.

Escort carriers. Desperately need escort carriers- but the mindset is a huge stumbling block in the way.

Plans C, B and A in that order, and save D for after the clash with the first wave of American wartime construction. If the kami descend and grant wisdom to all concerned, of course, and probably only if.

Instead of the Chitose class, do you mean the Taiyo class? I think the converted auxiliaries were better than the converted liners because they were faster and the carried the same number of aircraft except for the Hiyos which had double hangars of restricted height.

Your reply has made me think that the money used to subsidizing the construction of the first 8 liners the Japanese would have been better used to subsidize the construction of 8 large-fast tankers. That would at least save Japan some foreign currency in peace as they bring oil in that would otherwise be carried in foreign bottoms. Then they would be a valuable addition to their tanker capacity in war.
 
The British did convert one "liner" to CV

HMS Pretoria Castle

Completed just before the war as a 25,000 ton , 18 knot liner
assigned to the RN almost immediately for conversion to Armed Merchant cruiser ( 5 old 6" and some 3" guns)
Served mostly in South Atlantic

Formally purchased in the RN in mid 1942 when conversion to a CV(E) began
Commissioned July/Aug 43 with estimated air capacity of 21
Never has a proper combat airgroup but did escort some local convoys

Mostly used exactly as you suggest a vessel of this large size but slow speed might be - a training ship.
But also used for some trials
... including Corsairs as part of developing the RN techniques that allowed CV accreditation of this aircraft that USN had previously rejected

also some interesting technical trials e.g. on the degree of "round down turbulence.
 
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HMS Pretoria Castle

Completed just before the war as a 25,000 ton , 18 knot liner
assigned to the RN almost immediately for conversion to Armed Merchant cruiser ( 5 old 6" and some 3" guns)
Served mostly in South Atlantic

Formally purchased in the RN in mid 1942 when conversion to a CV(E) began
Commissioned July/Aug 43 with estimated air capacity of 21
Never has a proper combat air group but did escort some local convoys

Mostly used exactly as you suggest a vessel of this large size but slow speed might be - a training ship.
But also used for some trials
... including Corsairs as part of developing the RN techniques that allowed CV accreditation of this aircraft that USN had previously rejected

also some interesting technical trials e.g. on the degree of "round down turbulence.

As Captain Mainwaring would say, "I wondered who would be first to say that!" According to Friedman a conversion of the two Queens was also studied, but rejected as not worth the effort and they were too valuable in the troop ship role anyway.
 
This requires the Japanese accept that they are in for an old fashioned (19th century style) pugilist bout (unlimited rounds until someone cries uncle). Not the three round amateur olympic match they were expecting. I don't think they even realized they were in for so much as a fifteen round professional match until the height of the Solomons Campaign.

In some ways, the Japanese were even worse than the Germans when it came to refusing to adjust their fighter pilot training regimens.

A couple of good Japanese war films (one of them "Zero!") touched on this subject, where senior field officers were promoted to higher positions, ready to offer their knowledge about what they were experiencing against the enemy. Particularly over the issue of a limited number of Japanese Crack Pilots versus an endless supply of Allied able pilots. But when they encountered career staff officers who'd never gotten close enough to battle to smell gunpowder, they and their advice were summarily dismissed as the words of cowardice. When they were told by these frontline veteran officers that soon there wouldn't be any of these crack pilots left...? Cannonballs off an ironclad.
 
As Captain Mainwaring would say, "I wondered who would be first to say that!" According to Friedman a conversion of the two Queens was also studied, but rejected as not worth the effort and they were too valuable in the troop ship role anyway.

What about using the Revenges?
 
This requires the Japanese accept that they are in for an old fashioned (19th century style) pugilist bout (unlimited rounds until someone cries uncle). Not the three round amateur olympic match they were expecting. I don't think they even realized they were in for so much as a fifteen round professional match until the height of the Solomons Campaign.

In some ways, the Japanese were even worse than the Germans when it came to refusing to adjust their fighter pilot training regimens.

A couple of good Japanese war films (one of them "Zero!") touched on this subject, where senior field officers were promoted to higher positions, ready to offer their knowledge about what they were experiencing against the enemy. Particularly over the issue of a limited number of Japanese Crack Pilots versus an endless supply of Allied able pilots. But when they encountered career staff officers who'd never gotten close enough to battle to smell gunpowder, they and their advice were summarily dismissed as the words of cowardice. When they were told by these frontline veteran officers that soon there wouldn't be any of these crack pilots left...? Cannonballs off an ironclad.

I think the Japanese Admirals were so overawed by the power of America's manufacturing industry that it gave them an inferiority complex. They though there was no point in preparing for a long war that they could not survive let alone win. Therefore they put all their resources into preparations for a short war. That was Japan's best option. However, they could have done more to prepare for a medium to long war as that was an administrative thing as much as due to shortages of raw materials and steel making capacity.

However, as the converted liners weren't fast enough to work for the fleet they were of no use in the short war the Japanese were preparing to fight and used too much resources for the aircraft ferry and training roles.
 
Despite the aggressive and innovative IJN use of carrier strike forces at Pearl Harbor and in the Indian Ocean, Japanese thinking about carriers and naval aviation in general was very conservative and battleship centered. If you still believed (as the Japanese did until 1943 at least) that the decisive battle with the USN would be decided in or near Japanese waters by battleships in a surface engagement, it made some sense to plan for the quick conversion of liners into aircraft carriers, and even design them to facilitate this, as in the Junyos. In this context, carriers limited to speeds less than 25 knots makes some sense.

Also, as noted by others, Japan was acutely aware of their limited construction capacity, and that this would be reduced even further during wartime. Hence the focus on quick liner-carrier conversions and the later emphasis on the relatively small and easily constructed Unryu class
ships for wartime construction as opposed to the much more capable Zuikaku and Taiho class carriers. The only really large carrier built in WW2 was Shinano, and it was a Yamato conversion.
 

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This requires the Japanese accept that they are in for an old fashioned (19th century style) pugilist bout (unlimited rounds until someone cries uncle). Not the three round amateur olympic match they were expecting. I don't think they even realized they were in for so much as a fifteen round professional match until the height of the Solomons Campaign.

In some ways, the Japanese were even worse than the Germans when it came to refusing to adjust their fighter pilot training regimens.

A couple of good Japanese war films (one of them "Zero!") touched on this subject, where senior field officers were promoted to higher positions, ready to offer their knowledge about what they were experiencing against the enemy. Particularly over the issue of a limited number of Japanese Crack Pilots versus an endless supply of Allied able pilots. But when they encountered career staff officers who'd never gotten close enough to battle to smell gunpowder, they and their advice were summarily dismissed as the words of cowardice. When they were told by these frontline veteran officers that soon there wouldn't be any of these crack pilots left...? Cannonballs off an ironclad.

The reality is that the Japanese had no choice but to approach things like they were fighting a single round fight, if that. A reasonable case can be made that the idea was to conduct the wold's largest smash and grab robbery along with a couple muggings. Knock the other guy on his ass and have everything you stole under lock and key before the haziness from the bob on the head wore off. Any other alternative was going to result in a complete failure.

To the OP: They were no more of a waste than any number of other Imperial Japanese projects, and utterly pale in comparison to the Queen Mother of IJN wastes of resources, namely the Yamato class.
 
One could reasonably make the case that almost the entire Japanese navy was a waste of resources.

Failing that, they've got to get carriers SOMEHOW.


Yes to both. There are some options for troop transport and cargo but far fewer of them for carriers. Getting planes in the air where you need them and training pilots to handle them is a high enough priority that it could probably justify even a hasty carrier conversion. Furthermore, the mere presence of such carriers is a strategic asset and could influence the course of actions available to the US navy at any given time.
 
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I was pondering over Junyo and Hiyo and found this. I think the biggest faults with them is that they were initially planned as civilian vessels build on NAVY slipways that were perfectly capable to churning two fleet carriers in the same timeframe. Junyo was laid down after Chikuma and Hiyo as stated after Zuikaku.

I know IJN shipbuilding plans are mercilessly lambasted, but at least in this case they can sort-of be forgiven as they were planning for peace! With the benefit of hindsight it was of course, a mistake. One thing not to forget though was that the prewar shipbuilding plan were tied to certain budgets, so to have IJN build 2 more fleet carriers instead of Junyo/Hiyo they need to include them in said budget and various Maru Keikakus. If they still need the 24,000 tons Izumo and Kashiwara Maru why not build them in the same yards that produced the 17,000 tons Nitta, Kasuga and Yawata Maru that were soon to become CVEs in 1941-42? They will be a bit later than OTL but they'd probably be available as perhaps more austere -compared to OTL- CVEs in 1943, so you can have not only the two Junyos but also two much more formidable extra fleet carriers.

Me i was going with the scenario that after Chikuma instead of Junyo they lay another Hiryu-class that will be ready in spring 1942 or even earlier if they hurry up, while instead of Hiyo in late 1939 they lay Taiho from Maru 4 Keikaku, or rather, a slightly modified Shokaku (with say 10cm type 98 AA guns) as probably Taiho's design wasn't ready in 1939. Again if they work fast it might be ready in late 1942. Both slips would then be available for the next ships of whatever type they might be in spring and late 1941 respectively (preferably more CVs of course!)

I named them "Koryu" and "Ryukaku" respectively, imagine the possible impact if the first one would be available in time for Coral Sea or Midway, and the second one for Santa Cruz (if things still go that way). The Junyos would come online in 1943, actually even better if they'd be more extensively converted (since they will be aquired earlier in their contruction), with say half-cruiser (80,000HP) or twin destroyer (104,000HP) machinery for 27-28.5 kt, they would be almost true fleet carriers!
 
As an afterthought you might suggest the so called "Shadow Program" was a waist of resources, though it is not complete to do so without looking it its political background. Japan was bound to treaties and politics at the time the "Shadow Program" was made, so it was seemingly logical at the time.

Problem 1:
Japan was allowed a certain tonnage of aircraft carriers under the London Naval Treaties, which limmited the total to a fixed size. To bypass this, the "Shadow Program" was invented to create an additional tonnage that in theory could be made available for aircraft carrier conversion quickly. In reality, this was not so easily done, but it gave some space to play with on the short notice and it produced a number of second rate aircraft carriers, useful for secondary missions, where the more limmited number of front line carriers could do their job, without the need to allocate these to secondary missiosn as well. The USN also addopted such a scheme in WW2 with its very large and growing CVE fleet, performing a simmilar role in the Pacific.

Problem 2:
Japan had a limmited number of naval yards capable of producing large complex warships, but a much larger number of merchant shipyards, so to make good use of this, the "Shadow Program" made sense as well. The reconstructed liners and merchant ships were mostly rebuild in these yards, as pure naval yards were already occupied with other projects at the time, such as the true achillesheel in navalshipproduction; the Yamato Class, which consumed a very large proportion of the capacity in the Naval Yards.

Problem 3:
Japan had a warplan, which required a blindingly fast occupationwar in the Pacific and SE asian theater, requiring a larger than available number of aircraft capable ships for support and strike roles. To be able to do so, it simply needed all available flightdecks it could muster, making it urgent to construct carriers form other tnan pure naval sources. This was mainly due to the accepted strategical plan, to get some additional aircraft carriers in time for the missions in the Dutch East Indies mainly, while the Strike Carriers were still in the Pacific, of Indian Ocean, hunting Allied navies, rather than supporting the troops on the ground. Especially the Zuiho, Shoho, Junyo and Hiyo were allocated for this supportrole innitially, when faster, more capable carriers were hunting enemy warships.
 
Despite the aggressive and innovative IJN use of carrier strike forces at Pearl Harbor and in the Indian Ocean, Japanese thinking about carriers and naval aviation in general was very conservative and battleship centered. If you still believed (as the Japanese did until 1943 at least) that the decisive battle with the USN would be decided in or near Japanese waters by battleships in a surface engagement, it made some sense to plan for the quick conversion of liners into aircraft carriers, and even design them to facilitate this, as in the Junyos. In this context, carriers limited to speeds less than 25 knots makes some sense.

I had not thought of it in that way before, that is the liner conversions were fast enough to provide the battleships with a fighter and ASW screen freeing the faster bespoke aircraft carriers for independent operations.

If the 3 Tayios hadn't been sunk before October 1944 I wonder how Leyte Gulf would have turned out if they had been assigned to Kurita's force. Would their 54 fighters and 27 ASW aircraft have prevented the sinking of Mushashi, Atago and Maya? Would Myoko and Takao not have been so heavily damaged that they had to turn back? Would their presence have altered the result of the Battle of Samar?
 
I was pondering over Junyo and Hiyo and found this. I think the biggest faults with them is that they were initially planned as civilian vessels build on NAVY slipways that were perfectly capable to churning two fleet carriers in the same timeframe. Junyo was laid down after Chikuma and Hiyo as stated after Zuikaku.

I know IJN shipbuilding plans are mercilessly lambasted, but at least in this case they can sort-of be forgiven as they were planning for peace! With the benefit of hindsight it was of course, a mistake. One thing not to forget though was that the prewar shipbuilding plan were tied to certain budgets, so to have IJN build 2 more fleet carriers instead of Junyo/Hiyo they need to include them in said budget and various Maru Keikakus. If they still need the 24,000 tons Izumo and Kashiwara Maru why not build them in the same yards that produced the 17,000 tons Nitta, Kasuga and Yawata Maru that were soon to become CVEs in 1941-42? They will be a bit later than OTL but they'd probably be available as perhaps more austere -compared to OTL- CVEs in 1943, so you can have not only the two Junyos but also two much more formidable extra fleet carriers.

Me i was going with the scenario that after Chikuma instead of Junyo they lay another Hiryu-class that will be ready in spring 1942 or even earlier if they hurry up, while instead of Hiyo in late 1939 they lay Taiho from Maru 4 Keikaku, or rather, a slightly modified Shokaku (with say 10cm type 98 AA guns) as probably Taiho's design wasn't ready in 1939. Again if they work fast it might be ready in late 1942. Both slips would then be available for the next ships of whatever type they might be in spring and late 1941 respectively (preferably more CVs of course!)

I named them "Koryu" and "Ryukaku" respectively, imagine the possible impact if the first one would be available in time for Coral Sea or Midway, and the second one for Santa Cruz (if things still go that way). The Junyos would come online in 1943, actually even better if they'd be more extensively converted (since they will be aquired earlier in their contruction), with say half-cruiser (80,000HP) or twin destroyer (104,000HP) machinery for 27-28.5 kt, they would be almost true fleet carriers!

IOTL the Japanese naval program of 1939 included the Tahio (which wasn't laid down until 1941) and the subsidised liners which were completed as Hiyo and Junyo. With hindsight I think they should have used the money to buy 3 Shokakus to be completed PDQ. Apart from the financial and shipbuilding capacity constraints I think the reason why the did what they did in 1939 was fear of US retaliation. IOTL the Americans replied to the Japanese ordering Shokaku and Zuikaku in 1937 by authorising Hornet and Essex in 1938. Unfortunately for the Japanese the cautious building program of 1939 turned out to be an own goal because the Americans ordered another 10 aircraft carriers in their FY1940 program as part of their "Two Ocean Navy" programme anyway.

I think that if the Japanese had ordered 3 fleet carriers in 1939 instead of Tahio and the 2 liners the American retaliation would have been limited to laying Essex down in April 1940 as a repeat Yorktown instead of April 1941 as the first Essex for completion at the end of 1941 instead of the end of 1942.

However, in 1939 the Japanese couldn't to know that the Americans would begin a massive program of naval expansion in 1940. Furthermore an extra Yorktown in 1942 is worth 2 Essex in 1943 as has already been established by another thread. Therefore the Japanese might have done even worse in 1942 had Hiyo and Junyo been built as aircraft carriers from the start.

N.B. although CV9 Essex wasn't formally ordered until FY1940 (along with CVs 10-19) she and Hornet (ordered FY 1939) were authorised as part of the Naval Act of 1938.
 
As an afterthought you might suggest the so called "Shadow Program" was a waist of resources, though it is not complete to do so without looking it its political background. Japan was bound to treaties and politics at the time the "Shadow Program" was made, so it was seemingly logical at the time.

Problem 1:
Japan was allowed a certain tonnage of aircraft carriers under the London Naval Treaties, which limmited the total to a fixed size. To bypass this, the "Shadow Program" was invented to create an additional tonnage that in theory could be made available for aircraft carrier conversion quickly. In reality, this was not so easily done, but it gave some space to play with on the short notice and it produced a number of second rate aircraft carriers, useful for secondary missions, where the more limmited number of front line carriers could do their job, without the need to allocate these to secondary missiosn as well. The USN also addopted such a scheme in WW2 with its very large and growing CVE fleet, performing a simmilar role in the Pacific.

Problem 2:
Japan had a limmited number of naval yards capable of producing large complex warships, but a much larger number of merchant shipyards, so to make good use of this, the "Shadow Program" made sense as well. The reconstructed liners and merchant ships were mostly rebuild in these yards, as pure naval yards were already occupied with other projects at the time, such as the true achillesheel in navalshipproduction; the Yamato Class, which consumed a very large proportion of the capacity in the Naval Yards.

Problem 3:
Japan had a warplan, which required a blindingly fast occupationwar in the Pacific and SE asian theater, requiring a larger than available number of aircraft capable ships for support and strike roles. To be able to do so, it simply needed all available flightdecks it could muster, making it urgent to construct carriers form other tnan pure naval sources. This was mainly due to the accepted strategical plan, to get some additional aircraft carriers in time for the missions in the Dutch East Indies mainly, while the Strike Carriers were still in the Pacific, of Indian Ocean, hunting Allied navies, rather than supporting the troops on the ground. Especially the Zuiho, Shoho, Junyo and Hiyo were allocated for this supportrole innitially, when faster, more capable carriers were hunting enemy warships.

I don't disagree with any of that. However, the first generation of second-rate liner conversions ended up being employed in roles that third-rate ships based on tankers and freighters analogous to the US and British escort carriers could have done just as well.

With hindsight I think they should have built as many auxiliaries that could be converted into aircraft carriers as possible instead of subsidising the first 8 liners because they were fast enough to work with the fleet.

However, by the time the Shokaku class and what would become the Hiyo class were laid down Japan had renounced the naval treaties and therefore was not constrained by the 81,000 ton quota so there was no legal restriction on building the Hiyos as aircraft carriers from the start. Though as I wrote in the previous post it might backfire on them.
 
I don't disagree with any of that. However, the first generation of second-rate liner conversions ended up being employed in roles that third-rate ships based on tankers and freighters analogous to the US and British escort carriers could have done just as well.

With hindsight I think they should have built as many auxiliaries that could be converted into aircraft carriers as possible instead of subsidising the first 8 liners because they were fast enough to work with the fleet.

However, by the time the Shokaku class and what would become the Hiyo class were laid down Japan had renounced the naval treaties and therefore was not constrained by the 81,000 ton quota so there was no legal restriction on building the Hiyos as aircraft carriers from the start. Though as I wrote in the previous post it might backfire on them.

There might have been another problem then: the essential reliance on lift capability for the shipping in of resources needed for Japan and the war itself. Oiltankers were thus excluded, while normal merchantships were also needed to ship cargoes and troops, rendering thm unavailable for reconstruction as well. Only the larger types of liners were left as less useful in their Original form, since shipping of passangers was not longer done in wartime and these ships were left unused otherwise.

Second: The shokaku class was constructed in the only yards capable of building a hull her size, which is the same size as a Yamato class battleship in dimensions, but not weight. This severly limmited the number of large warships to be build as such. Only the later Hiyo was build on such a slip, otherwise used for a large warship from the keel up. The Nagasaki and Kure yards did not build merchant ship type hulls. Japan actually had thre, or four buildingsites for very large warships, so the loss of one buildingsite, for a lesser vessle was not that restricting, as at the time two were building Yamato and Musashi and one Taiho.
 
I had not thought of it in that way before, that is the liner conversions were fast enough to provide the battleships with a fighter and ASW screen freeing the faster bespoke aircraft carriers for independent operations.

If the 3 Tayios hadn't been sunk before October 1944 I wonder how Leyte Gulf would have turned out if they had been assigned to Kurita's force. Would their 54 fighters and 27 ASW aircraft have prevented the sinking of Mushashi, Atago and Maya? Would Myoko and Takao not have been so heavily damaged that they had to turn back? Would their presence have altered the result of the Battle of Samar?

Just a quick reply, actually imo they would have slowed Kurita as they were something like 2-3kt slower than Nagato. If one is to give Kurita some air cover then perhaps better to fill Junyo and maybe even Ryuho (if we talk about OTL) with as many fighters and ASW aircraft as possible, and going further fill Ise/Hyuga with as many floatplane fighters as possible and send them with Kurita, not Ozawa (again, they only slowed him at 25kt). The carriers will be prime targets and will be sunk, but that might save Musashi, so the japanese might have THREE extra battleships available off Samar!

Problem is though, the aircraft intended for Junyo/Ryuho were sent and lost in Taiwan before the Leyte battle. Though i'm sure they could scrap together two or three dozens of Zeros and a dozen of floatplane fighters and a dozen B5N2s from somewhere if they would have thought that way, hell they could get 20-30 aircraft from Ozawa.
 
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