Were tactical nukes the only way for NATO to stop the Red Army?

[Jukra]

As well, judging the results of the US coalition tackling the Iraqis in 90/91 is not an accurate way of judging the combat capabilities of the WARPAC v. NATO. Yes, the Iraqis were using Soviet pattern kit and doctrine, but they were using the second line stuff, essentially cast offs from the Soviets.

I do agree, what we need to mind is to remember performance of US led coalition against Iraq, instead. After months of preparation, total air superiority, aerial and artillery campaign lasting a month, superior tactical and strategic intel, huge technological advantage and training advantage against essentially feodal army the Coalition managed to advance some 150km's within four days in essentially flat desert with absolutely no interference on supply lines, essentially about 40km's a day.

In 2003 war, the epic march of 3rd Infantry Division from Kuwait to Baghdad, some 500km's, with even larger amount of every imaginable superiority, took some 20 days, essentially some 25km's a day.

IMHO, any Cold War paranoia scenario about "standing start" succesful Soviet surprise assault is not believable. Good ole' Bundesrepublik wasn't that flat and small to be swallowed quickly.

 

[67th Tigers]

Also remember, in central Europe on average there is a militarily significant water obstacle every 7km....

 

[Jukra]

If the Soviets play every card correctly, there's no way they could lose outright short of nukes, given the right opening. If NATO has warning, however, things become greatly harder for CCCP/WP. And I could see NATO continuing the fight if they still had most of their force intact; those guerillan networks in WWII sprang up in a short time and were mostly effective. If the same thing didn't happen again, I'd be surprised. Again, NATO has to play their hand perfectly to win in this scenario.

To go right to the first post in the thread, NATO can win a completely conventional war against WarPac, but they need a bit of luck on their side in most circumstances. (say, the Soviets attacking just after a REFORGER exercise is completed and the forces are still there.)

In 1989 the WP and NATO had following units in Germany or close by.

There were 28 Soviet divisions in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In addition there were 6 GDR cat A divisions, 10 Czech divisions (Cat C included) and 6 Hungarian divisions. Total of 50 divisions, EG, Czech and Hungarian divisions probably of dubious quality, for the first blow.

NATO had 4 US divisions, 3 UK divisions, 12 BRD divisions (not counting numerous territorial units), 2 Belgian divisions, 1 Danish Division, 3 Dutch Divisions in FRG or close by, a total of 25 divisions, and 3 French Divisions in Germany (out of some 14).

So, in my amateur view, even with satellite countries divisions deployed, WP had only some 2:1 superiority at most. With no technological or training edge I would have hard time seeing WP to pull off Desert Storm or Iraqi Freedom style advance, an assault in style of Israeli bungle to Litani River in 2006 would seem more likely.

In time Soviet Union could have transferred it's reserves, but these were of lesser quality and longer mobilization lead time. Also, by that time French forces and various UK and US reinforcements could have been brought into Germany.

 

[Jukra]

Sure, but without an open communication across the Atlantic, Germany is lost anyhow.

And with WP air assets based out of Norway, the Atlantic is severly threatened.

The Norwegian theater of operation is seriousley underestimated in many "amateur" (dont get that statement wrong, please ) WW3 scenarioes. Trust me, NATO during the Cold War did not underestimate it

You're right, but let's consider a scenario in 1970's or 1980's in which Soviets, by hook and crook, manage to conquer Norway. What's next? They have avoided CVBG operations against Kola peninsula and Denmark, but their position to wage a war against Atlantic convoys isn't that much better. The subs still have to go through GIUK gap. Even if Soviets get to Iceland, their position isn't fundamentally better as NATO can contest any aerial reinforcements to Iceland, and maritime reinforcement of Iceland is a sheer suicide.

The Soviets also now have their SSBN force better protected, but ultimately it won't matter even if they lose it, as they would still have ICBM's.

GIUK Gap isn't that wide, some 1100km's. With USN SSN strength of 1985, counting 637's and 688's alone (48), there would have been ability to put a sub every 70km's even with 1/3 deployment. And this is not counting older USN subs, subs of other NATO countries, ASW aircraft, surface ships, mines etc... Against this crushing superiority I think only those subs deployed before conflict would have been able to prosecute the campaign against NATO. The campaign would have been fought against well-escorted convoys.

IMHO, Red Storm Rising style scenario in which Soviet bombers interdict Atlantic convoys is not believable due to their lack of tankers and probably serious losses of targeting TU-95's in any scenario. Soviets did not have that many long range bombers. Even with Iceland and Norway conquered, any bombers would have to fly by UK and Greenland based fighters.

IMHO2, this may be disputed, but I'd say that entire Maritime Strategy was mostly a ploy to get more USN funding. Even with less spending USN would have been able to secure SLOC's which would have been of prime importance.

 

[AMBOMB]

The United States got some new weapons in the 70's that would've made a big difference. Can you narrow the time period?

 

[AMBOMB]

NATO and Soviet technology were somewhat on par throughout this period, the reason for most of this conventional thinking is in trying to get politicans and civilians scared enough to prevent a war. From 1970-1980 Thermo-nuclear bombs were the rule. This hung over leaders heads for a long time and one well placed missle could sent an EMP to disrupt all electronics in the region.

No they weren't. American technology was more advanced than Soviet technology.

 

[Oddball]

Its all a matter of perception

Sorry, it was not well paraphrased

To formulate better, why would NATO have more advantage against Soviets in mid-80's compared to early-70's?

Because of the general level of tech.

Look, just to make this clear I certainly aint to familiar with each side's hardware and their relative "value. Fare from

I jus look at this at a very loosely perception of how things were.

To me the thing is that the tech level at a global level vere lower in the 70's than in the 80's. And the lower the tech level gets, the more numbers count. Thus, IMHO WP stands better chanses in the 70's than the 80's.

Ofcourse in adition the relative difference in tech between WP and NATO counts. And IMHO the "gap" were bigger in 80's. I do not know how much bigger, but just bigger.

In addition there is the generall world situation/focus. 70's had US recovering from Nam, while 80's had Reagen. Also 80's saw a major development in doctrine at the NATO side. Anti Armour is important here.

Also training of NATO forces IMHO saw a radical change in late 70's and early 80's that made many of the conscript European armise into effective and coherent forces

 

[AMBOMB]

of Nato. After that East-German/USSR/Polish tanks would walsh over the remaining units. Resistance, mostly from West-German units and some Brits/American tank divisions would not be able to stop this wave. They stop at the Rhine. American air superiority will not be able to stop them. France under Mitterand would switch sides or remain neutral. Simultaneous attacks on Norway and Italy would leave Nato to be pushed back to Spain and Brittain and Middel Europe. Pending if the war escalates into an intercontinental nuclear war or if America is able to train and equip and transport a massive tank army to europeit will probably mean an occupation of Northern, western and Southern Europe.

Then we will have to wait to the inevitable Economical collapse of the USSR

Obviously if the Russians used nukes, we would've used them too. After that it just becomes a nukefest that ultimately escalates into a strategic nuclear exchange.

 

[AMBOMB]

On the topic of technology, during the 1970's the US and WP were roughly in parity, but in fact behind slightly Europe. This is largely due to the effect of the Vietnam War diverting resources, and the US launched a deliberate catchup programme in the late 70's (with the products including the M-1 Tank, M-2 IFV, AH-64 etc.).

However, the WP would have some major dramas invading western Europe. The scaling for maps and compasses, for example, was 1 per battalion, and they were entirely dependent on traffic directors to signpost their advance. Knowing this, a Sqn of 22 was detail to kill all the traffic directors.

We weren't behind Europe! Where'd you get that idea? Europe was using our weapons (e.g. the F-4) and we came out with better ones in the 70's (like the F-15).

 

[AMBOMB]

Sorry, it was not well paraphrased

To formulate better, why would NATO have more advantage against Soviets in mid-80's compared to early-70's?

In the mid-80's we had the F-15, the F-16, the A-10 and the M-1.

 

[Oddball]

You're right, but let's consider a scenario in 1970's or 1980's in which Soviets, by hook and crook, manage to conquer Norway.

Conquer Norway? That probably takes more time than WP has. Its more a matter of controlling key airstrips in Northern Norway and depriving NATO controll of these vital staging areas.

Key strip are Bardufoss, Tromsø and Andøya. Perhaps Evenes, but that is a strech. These strips can be taken with an effort with air and naval assets.

What's next? They have avoided CVBG operations against Kola peninsula and Denmark, but their position to wage a war against Atlantic convoys isn't that much better. The subs still have to go through GIUK gap. Even if Soviets get to Iceland, their position isn't fundamentally better as NATO can contest any aerial reinforcements to Iceland, and maritime reinforcement of Iceland is a sheer suicide.

GIUK Gap isn't that wide, some 1100km's. With USN SSN strength of 1985, counting 637's and 688's alone (48), there would have been ability to put a sub every 70km's even with 1/3 deployment. And this is not counting older USN subs, subs of other NATO countries, ASW aircraft, surface ships, mines etc... Against this crushing superiority I think only those subs deployed before conflict would have been able to prosecute the campaign against NATO. The campaign would have been fought against well-escorted convoys.

Again all this is IMHO. And very general.

GIUK is not big? Perhap, but that is a matter of perspective. I do think NATO at that time found GIUK to be frightening big...

The problem er anywaay is not actually GIUK were the subs were supposed to be stoped. The problem is surveilance in the Barents sea and Norwegian sea, a matter crucial to be able to use GIUK to actualy stop them.

IMHO, Red Storm Rising style scenario in which Soviet bombers interdict Atlantic convoys is not believable due to their lack of tankers and probably serious losses of targeting TU-95's in any scenario. Soviets did not have that many long range bombers. Even with Iceland and Norway conquered, any bombers would have to fly by UK and Greenland based fighters.

Im unable to discuss capabilities beyond GIUK. But what I do know, is that such scenario makes WP free to operate in the Barents sea and Norwegian sea. Wich again multiplies the pressure at GIUK tremendousley.

IMHO2, this may be disputed, but I'd say that entire Maritime Strategy was mostly a ploy to get more USN funding. Even with less spending USN would have been able to secure SLOC's which would have been of prime importance.

Very possible. Im not capable of debating this.

 

[Jukra]

In the mid-80's we had the F-15, the F-16, the A-10 and the M-1.

Yup, the US had (with exception of F-16, a NATO plane), but, although well protected, M1 had just 105mm gun, for example, while USSR had introduced T-80 and T-72 in large scale.

Same goes for airpower too, F-15 and F-16 (which did not have BVRAAM before 1990's) were of course better than what they replaced, but by then Soviets had nifty new planes too, such as MiG-29 with very good dogfighting missiles, very useful in probably extremely confused airspace above Central Front. By 1975 WP had mostly MiG-21's along with MiG-23's, both very well manageable by Starfighters and Phantoms.

As for A-10, it was outdated when it was deployed, IMHO, shown by its relative poor performance even against Iraq in 1991, when deployed against units with proper air defense. By mid-1980's the Soviets had SA-11 in place of SA-6, new MANPADS even better than Stinger etc. The A-10 would have been a real killer in Six Days War, though.

But in order not to get into nitpicking, what I'm saying is that while US military and European militaries got new stuff in 1975-1985 period, the Soviets got it too, and I'm not all that sure that technology gap was closer rather than wider.

 

[AMBOMB]

You'd have to better define what constitutes a win for either side(If we're talking in the early 80's).

As well, judging the results of the US coalition tackling the Iraqis in 90/91 is not an accurate way of judging the combat capabilities of the WARPAC v. NATO. Yes, the Iraqis were using Soviet pattern kit and doctrine, but they were using the second line stuff, essentially cast offs from the Soviets.

I'd suggest that if we're talking about a rising escalation that leads to an exchange of hostilities, then I'd put my money on NATO. That spin up time means that they can not only solidify response options, they can muster the political will towards a unified response. Unlike the WARPAC, which is unified politically for all intents and purposes under Moscow, NATO needs to get it's membership on board and willing to support war.

Now, if the WARPAC just throws a bolt from the blue punch at NATO, I'd put the money on the WARPAC. I'd see the most likely reason for this to be a combination of misunderstanding western positions and simply feeling threatened as a result of NATO.

First, they can probably swallow West Germany before NATO even figures out among itself that it is at war. The Low Countries would disappear shortly after that.

Second, the "24 hour war" objective for the Soviets is actually fairly rational, assuming you feel comfortable describing any war as rational. They advance hard for 24 hours, dig in, get on the hotline and basically offer NATO two choices: Ceasefire and acceptance of the new borders or keep slugging. The second choice, which would be offered when things are looking darkest for NATO, with the only possible "salvation" being a nuclear exchange. This would mean NATO trading it's 200 most important cities for the 500 most important cities in the Soviet Union. I'd bet that NATO would lose their bottle and accept the ceasefire.

No way the Russians are winning the conventional war in the early 80's. Our F-15's and F-16's would've taken control of the air. Our C-130's, AC-130's and A-10's would've gone to town on their ground forces while our FB-111's and (if late enough) F-117's would've hit their command and control.

 

[AMBOMB]

Yup, the US had (with exception of F-16, a NATO plane), but, although well protected, M1 had just 105mm gun, for example, while USSR had introduced T-80 and T-72 in large scale.

Same goes for airpower too, F-15 and F-16 (which did not have BVRAAM before 1990's) were of course better than what they replaced, but by then Soviets had nifty new planes too, such as MiG-29 with very good dogfighting missiles, very useful in probably extremely confused airspace above Central Front. By 1975 WP had mostly MiG-21's along with MiG-23's, both very well manageable by Starfighters and Phantoms.

As for A-10, it was outdated when it was deployed, IMHO, shown by its relative poor performance even against Iraq in 1991, when deployed against units with proper air defense. By mid-1980's the Soviets had SA-11 in place of SA-6, new MANPADS even better than Stinger etc. The A-10 would have been a real killer in Six Days War, though.

But in order not to get into nitpicking, what I'm saying is that while US military and European militaries got new stuff in 1975-1985 period, the Soviets got it too, and I'm not all that sure that technology gap was closer rather than wider.

I forgot an important plane, the F-117. With the development of stealth technology, the technology gap did indeed widen. Besides, the new Russian fighters were no match for the F-15. Avionics got more important as time went by. And, if anything, the gap there was widening too. The M-1A1, with a 120mm gun was introduced in 1984.

 

[Boydfish]

No way the Russians are winning the conventional war in the early 80's. Our F-15's and F-16's would've taken control of the air. Our C-130's, AC-130's and A-10's would've gone to town on their ground forces while our FB-111's and (if late enough) F-117's would've hit their command and control.

That's odd, since the NATO airpower you're describing managed just minimal attrition against what were essentially clapped out, semi-formed and cast off Soviet pattern units in Kosovo in 1999. The best they managed to do was force the Serbs into bunkering down intermittently. They didn't give up until the British Army moved in. Bluntly put, the guy with boots on the ground wins in the end, every time.

Related to that example is the fact that airpower, for all intents and purposes, is merely a very technical and whiz-bang way of delivering indirect fire to the battlefield: It's artillery. It's a good tool and it has it's uses, but it can't replace the effects of the combat arms of the Army. It's hard to sortie out of Ramstien with a Soviet brigade group parked on the airstrip. Heck, even some good pathfinder/Spetznaz groups popping an RPG into the fuel or ammo dumps creates havoc for your airpower.

As well, the loss of spares and the difficulty in obtaining those spares once airbases start dropping off means that you might see entire squadrons grounded for want of spares or even weapons.

Another factor would be the time and place. In the early 80's, the US military morale was at it's rock bottom. They were certainly not over the issues of Vietnam and the disaster at Desert One demonstrated that, to be blunt, the US military couldn't spell "Joint Forces Operations", let alone run one.

The NATO airpower simply didn't have the kind of integration with it's land forces, especially in the US command structure, to be used in the face of a serious opponent. Remember, at that point, the Army/Air Force/Navy of the US didn't even have a common radio system. Even in the Gulf91, the biggest casualties came from air based "friendly fire".

 

[Gryphon]

No way the Russians are winning the conventional war in the early 80's. Our F-15's and F-16's would've taken control of the air. Our C-130's, AC-130's and A-10's would've gone to town on their ground forces while our FB-111's and (if late enough) F-117's would've hit their command and control.

I like your thinking, good man.
However, I must say that airpower, despite all of our wishes, will not win the conflict for us. The Eagles and Vipers would have done serious damage to Soviet air forces, but they still had an advantage in numbers and scope. Nearly all of our newest planes were in CONUS, while every Soviet plane was within striking distance of Europe. The European air forces by themselves are very good, but will still be swamped by the sheer number of Russian aircraft. Our CAS aircraft will take heavy losses from Soviet SAM and AAA. The Aardvarks would be a thorn in their side, but they still have a quantity advantage. In 1980, the Soviets could swamp us with 3500tactical aircraft, opposed to NATO's 1000-1500 in Europe (with 1000 more in CONUS). Simple numbers allows that Soviet forces will have an upper hand initially. After that, the Russkiyes could lose that balance, but CONUS would have to provide a lot of punch to get back up. By no means will the Russians get air superiority. However, it will not be a one-sided fight.
Bombers are another story entirely. The Soviets have 2000 in various states of usefulness. NATO has 800, mostly new or useful, but they are outnumbered greatly here, too.

Hold up. Just found something very interesting. From Air Forces of the World, (c) 1979. Paraphrased and partially annotated:
WARSAW PACT/NATO TACTICAL AIR POWER BALANCE

Strike Aircraft
Soviet (Plane, Date introduced, Number)
Mikoyan MiG-27, 1974, 600 and rising
Sukhoi Su-19, 1977, 150 and rising
Tupelov Tu-26, 1976, 130 and rising
NATO
BAe Buccaneer, 1968, 80 in service
BAe/AMD Jaguar, 1972, 150 in service
GD F-111, 1967, 500 in service
Grumman A-6, 1964, 350 in service
Tornado IDS, 1981, 650 on order (but none delivered)
Vought A-7 Corsair, 1968, 600 in service

Includes strike aircraft w/ combat radius over 500nm. Soviet forces include Su-7, NATO still uses F-104/CF-104 and F-4 dual role

Close Support Aircraft
Soviet
Sukhoi Su-17/20, 1971, 600 and rising
New CAS type*, 1980?, ???
NATO
BAe Harrier, 1968, 100 in service
BAe Hawk, 1974, 175+ in service
AMD-BA/Dornier AlphaJet, 1980, 230 on order (but none delivered)
Fairchild A-10, 1976, 730 on order (~150 delivered)

Air Superiority and Defense
Soviet
Mikoyan MiG-21 late model, 1968, 1500 and rising
Mikoyan MiG-23S Flogger B, 1973, 800 and rising
New Air Combat Fighter**, 1982?, ???
NATO
Dassault Mirage F.1, 1972, 40
GD F-16, 1978, 1700 on order (but ~100-300 delivered)
Lockheed F-104S, 1970, 240 in service
F-4M/K Phantom II, 1968, 170 in service
F-4F Phantom II (slatted), 1974, 250 in service
F-15 Eagle, 1976, 730 on order (~400-600 delivered)
F-18 Hornet, 1982, 800 on order (none delivered)
Excludes aircraft committed to strategic or worldwide roles, such as USN F-14s, RAF Tornado F.2s and aircraft reserved for the defense of the continental Soviet Union.***

*I think this is the Su-24 or Su-25
**I think this is the MiG-29 or Su-27, maybe both
***Such as the MiG-25 and others; these could be used in Europe, adding another 800-1500 planes into the mix.

 

[Korwar]

You are focusing just on technical aspects.
Morale is another factor.
While NATO forces would have rather high morale as defending against Soviets, Soviet troops will have serious morale problems.
Many from Soviet Union will be distracted by prospect of looting, others might want to escape if possible.
Common soldiers from countries like Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia will be deserting in mass numbers, especially if engaged against US commanders that speak their own language and they are descended from their own countries. An average Jan Kowalski will run and surrender to John Kovalski at first opportunity.
Behind the front population in Soviet occupied states will rise up against them at first opportunity, forcing Soviets to leave large numbers of soldiers to deal with potential uprisings.
The need to keep control over Central Europe would require some units to remain and distract war planning.

 

[Jukra]

I like your thinking, good man.
However, I must say that airpower, despite all of our wishes, will not win the conflict for us. The Eagles and Vipers would have done serious damage to Soviet air forces, but they still had an advantage in numbers and scope.

Will get back next week, but here's link to three documents which may prove to be of interest, via CIA's Freedom of Information Act site:

http://www.foia.cia.gov and go to advanced search

WARSAW PACT AIR POWER: CONCEPTS FOR CONVENTIONAL AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST NATO

WARSAW PACT FORCES OPPOSITE NATO (NIE 11-14-79)

THE "AIR OPERATION": A WARSAW PACT STRATEGFY FOR ACHIEVING AIR SUPERIORITY

(spelling error in last one is intended)

 

[Svartekaptenen]

As a Swedish citizen I must point out that during the period 1976-1982 Palme was not statsminister we had a rightwing government so my country
would probably have joined with nato especially if Norway and Denmark
are under attack. If it is developing a stalemate in Northern Norway the Russians would probably try some assault with paratroopers on southern
Norway and then they had to fly over our territory and of course our airforce would be waiting for them, we would probably loose that airbattle
because of sheer numbers but we would have inflicted serious losses on their transportplanes maybe even force them to abort. On a further note
after 1981 Swedish-Russian diplomatic relations were on an all low point because
the submarine that went aground on Swedish territorial waters late 1981.

 

[AMBOMB]

That's odd, since the NATO airpower you're describing managed just minimal attrition against what were essentially clapped out, semi-formed and cast off Soviet pattern units in Kosovo in 1999. The best they managed to do was force the Serbs into bunkering down intermittently. They didn't give up until the British Army moved in. Bluntly put, the guy with boots on the ground wins in the end, every time.

Related to that example is the fact that airpower, for all intents and purposes, is merely a very technical and whiz-bang way of delivering indirect fire to the battlefield: It's artillery. It's a good tool and it has it's uses, but it can't replace the effects of the combat arms of the Army. It's hard to sortie out of Ramstien with a Soviet brigade group parked on the airstrip. Heck, even some good pathfinder/Spetznaz groups popping an RPG into the fuel or ammo dumps creates havoc for your airpower.

As well, the loss of spares and the difficulty in obtaining those spares once airbases start dropping off means that you might see entire squadrons grounded for want of spares or even weapons.

Another factor would be the time and place. In the early 80's, the US military morale was at it's rock bottom. They were certainly not over the issues of Vietnam and the disaster at Desert One demonstrated that, to be blunt, the US military couldn't spell "Joint Forces Operations", let alone run one.

The NATO airpower simply didn't have the kind of integration with it's land forces, especially in the US command structure, to be used in the face of a serious opponent. Remember, at that point, the Army/Air Force/Navy of the US didn't even have a common radio system. Even in the Gulf91, the biggest casualties came from air based "friendly fire".

Air power doesn't win wars? You're kidding, right? Tell you what, find a World War II veteran who was in France after D-Day and ask him how much air power matters. Air power is much more than artillery. For one thing, you get much more explosive power with a bomb than with a shell. The majority of a typical bomb's weight is explosives. Only a small percentage of a typical shell's weight is. Air power also has much more range. Planes can go a lot farther than an artillery shell making them much more versatile than cannons. With a cannon, all you can normally do is shoot at enemy ground forces. Planes can bomb any enemy target. And since you brought up the Gulf War, what do you think did the bulk of the damage to the Iraqi ground forces in addition to knocking out their command and control?