Were heavy tanks ever useful in WW2

At least it and the Char B1 didn't run out of fuel as often as the Centurion, so they weren't a total failure in mobility. Not that it prevented the French from paying dearly for having such thirsty tanks in 1940 or that it prevented Germany from paying dearly for the same reason in 1943-1945- they were still very poor in fuel requirements.

looking on the Centurion data:
mass 51,8 tonnes and a 650 hp Rolls-Royce Meteor Mk IVB engine, Range 190 km
Let's compare to the Königstiger Tank
mass 69,7 tonnes and a 700 hp Maybach HL 230 V12-Ottomotor, Range 170 km

Autsch, that Rolls-Royce Meteor Mk IVB engine sucks literally !

A Short Video about "the wild ride of Capitain Billotte"
 
looking on the Centurion data:
mass 51,8 tonnes and a 650 hp Rolls-Royce Meteor Mk IVB engine, Range 190 km
Let's compare to the Königstiger Tank
mass 69,7 tonnes and a 700 hp Maybach HL 230 V12-Ottomotor, Range 170 km

Autsch, that Rolls-Royce Meteor Mk IVB engine sucks literally !

A Short Video about "the wild ride of Capitain Billotte"
The Char B1 worked well in cases where the tanks were at their advantage like Billotte's individual rampage, but those cases were few. The real combat test of the Char B1 Bis en masse and the place where fuel consumption killed it was the battle of Flavion. This battle was one of France's best chances to stop the German advance and probably the only case where concentrations of armor were used on both sides, so the French could have won. Unfortunately, the 1e DCR ran out of fuel as it reached Flavion, and had to stop there for its refueling vehicles to do their job. While there, the Germans launched attacks with the 7th Panzer division to break through against them, and in several battles the Char B1s and some other light tanks, while almost never penetrated or even damaged by German tanks, were slowly forced to retreat due to running out of ammunition or fuel (also they were disoriented because the 1-man turret didn't give them great situational awareness). Eventually, even though a good chunk of the tanks escaped before the lack of fuel disabled them, they had to be abandoned during the retreat because they ran out of fuel shortly afterward. By the next morning only 16 serviceable tanks were in the 1e DCR out of 160 tanks originally, and the formation was effectively wiped out. So even in the one battle where the effects of poor French doctrine and tactics are removed, and the Char B1 was used in concentrated armored formations which packed a huge punch and should have moved fast, the logistics and reliability (and the 1-man turret) still made it lose against the German tanks, even though it was effectively invulnerable to their guns.

In general that is probably the strategy that would have worked well by the Soviets against US and British tanks of the post-WWII era. None of the M26, M46, M47, M48, or Centurion tanks had more than 190 km of range (that latter value held by the later Centurion variants), little better and usually worse than WWII heavies like the Tiger II, so the longer ranged Soviet tanks could strike at either fuel convoys or during refueling operations. They would be immobilized when they ran out of fuel even if they were never penetrated or damaged, which would happen at most 190 km from their last refueling.
 

Deleted member 1487

The thing is unless you can build enough of your 5:1 kill ratio heavies and get them into situations where they can reliably engage 5+ opposing tanks over time all that killing power doesn't help. (Heavy tanks tended to not only be expensive to produce but hard to move about either under their own power or by other means even if they don't break down).

Which basically means a lot of their effectiveness comes down to how they are handled as a force. Against the "WAllies"* in Europe the tigers were in generally defensive which makes that deployment with that goal in mind is easier.
I mean there were any number of such engagements in France in 1944, Italy throughout that campaign, and on the Eastern Front. Kursk was a prime example of doctrine use of the Tiger and when the Soviet armor units willingly impaling themselves on the Tiger spearheads (also plenty of other occasions when Tigers popped up at hot spots) you have a prime example of their best use. Arguably the Germans might have done better to build more Tigers and fewer if any Panthers.
The Tiger I was pretty reliable by the end of the war relative to 1943 (more so than the Panther that year) or the Tiger II; though clearly it would have helped if it wasn't overweight to the design spec for the life of the parts. The Tiger project was supposed to have been 45 tons, not the 55 it ended up at. Given what the Soviets did with the IS-2, having a better internal layout (think final drive at the rear of the tank) it would have been much lighter, easier to move around, more reliable, and less fuel costly.
The problem was the heavy tank idea as much as the execution of the design; ultimately the Soviets did it better in part thanks to having already had their 'Tiger' with it's flaws and an example to work out earlier with the KV-1/2.

BTW in terms of cost, 5:1 is actually pretty good overall; 1 T-34 initially cost 270,000 Rubbles, while the Tiger I was a bit of 250,000 Reichsmarks. I'm not sure what the exchange rate was, but when you factor in the crew, losing 5 or more tanks (all causes for both sides) to take down even a heavy is not a favorable cost exchange, especially factoring in the vicious circle of crew loss and training.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T-34
Over two years, the unit production cost of the T-34 was reduced from 269,500 rubles in 1941, to 193,000, and then to 135,000. This was achieved by underpaying & overworking all the factory workers. Through this time, the workers were treated as little more than slaves.[37]

The M4 Sherman cost about $44-64,000 in 1945 dollars, but in 1940 US dollars the Tiger I cost about $100,000, so the cost exchange was pretty bad there too if 5:1:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M4_Sherman
http://www.alanhamby.com/history.shtml
 
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I mean there were any number of such engagements in France in 1944, Italy throughout that campaign, and on the Eastern Front. Kursk was a prime example of doctrine use of the Tiger and when the Soviet armor units willingly impaling themselves on the Tiger spearheads (also plenty of other occasions when Tigers popped up at hot spots) you have a prime example of their best use.


Yep given the WAllies were advancing and follow up on a retreating German army the Germans were able to deploy their Tigers more easily in a way that would ensure they have plenty to shoot at. Equally when counter attacking, your generally counter attacking knowing where your opposition is (so either going for them or avoiding them depending on what your plan is). This again makes it a bit easier to get your Tiger is a position where it can shoot at lots of things without having to chase around the countryside looking for them.

Mind you a balancing point here is the new air supremacy the WAllies had over these tigers a lot of the time. Sometimes big and expensive just means high value target


Arguably the Germans might have done better to build more Tigers and fewer if any Panthers.
The Tiger I was pretty reliable by the end of the war relative to 1943 (more so than the Panther that year) or the Tiger II; though clearly it would have helped if it wasn't overweight to the design spec for the life of the parts. The Tiger project was supposed to have been 45 tons, not the 55 it ended up at. Given what the Soviets did with the IS-2, having a better internal layout (think final drive at the rear of the tank) it would have been much lighter, easier to move around, more reliable, and less fuel costly.
The problem was the heavy tank idea as much as the execution of the design; ultimately the Soviets did it better in part thanks to having already had their 'Tiger' with it's flaws and an example to work out earlier with the KV-1/2.

BTW in terms of cost, 5:1 is actually pretty good overall; 1 T-34 initially cost 270,000 Rubbles, while the Tiger I was a bit of 250,000 Reichsmarks. I'm not sure what the exchange rate was, but when you factor in the crew, losing 5 or more tanks (all causes for both sides) to take down even a heavy is not a favorable cost exchange, especially factoring in the vicious circle of crew loss and training.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T-34


The M4 Sherman cost about $44-64,000 in 1945 dollars, but in 1940 US dollars the Tiger I cost about $100,000, so the cost exchange was pretty bad there too if 5:1:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M4_Sherman
http://www.alanhamby.com/history.shtml

It's a tough one, I think the systemic issues the German had kind of make any solution in terms of tank balancing moot. The same point makes direct comparison between Rouble, Reichsmark and USD costs really had to truly judge in terms of actual resource draw for each tank. There's also the issue that it's not so much how many T34s the Russians buy for every Tiger the Germans do but how many Panzer4's the Germans could have had (about two and a half I think?), and more importantly how quickly they can be produced. I get that total cost is also a factor of production time (man and factory floor hours cost money), but time is also a limiting factor in its own right as well! Especially when you are being pinched on both sides and bombed day and night. I.e if I can have 25 P4 for every 10 Tigers I invest resources in that's good, but it's even better when I can have them quicker as well! Of course all those issues of transporting and moving the Tigers compounds all this, i.e if yoru Tigers are "late" it really doesn't help when they're "slow" as well!

But yeah It's an interesting one, I don't think it's just a case of binning all tigers and getting another 3k P4's and however many Stugs. BUt I can't help but think given an inherent issue the Germans had was spreading themselves too thin and making good their losses, going expensive and slow isn't the way to go. And of course once you have the Tiger 1 don't then go and do the Tiger 2. But again as you say less tanks, less tank crews.
 
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Deleted member 1487

It's a tough one, I think the systemic issues the German had kind of make any solution in terms of tank balancing moot. The same point makes direct comparison between Rouble, Reichsmark and USD costs really had to truly judge in terms of actual resource draw for each tank. There's also the issue that it's not so much how many T34s the Russians buy for every Tiger the Germans do but how many Panzer4's the Germans could have had (about two and a half I think?), and more importantly how quickly they can be produced. I get that total cost is also a factor of production time (man and factory floor hours cost money), but time is also a limiting factor in its own right as well! Especially when you are being pinched on both sides and bombed day and night. I.e if I can have 25 P4 for every 10 Tigers I invest resources in that's good, but it's even better when I can have them quicker as well! Of course all those issues of transporting and moving the Tigers compounds all this, i.e if yoru Tigers are "late" it really doesn't help when they're "slow" as well!

But yeah It an interesting one, I don't think it's just a case of binning all tigers and getting another 3k P4's and however many Stugs. BUt I cant help but hinkgeven an inherent issue the Germans had was spreading themselves too thin and making good their losses, going expensive and slow isn't the way to go. And of course once you have the Tiger 1 don't then go and do the Tiger 2. But again as you say less tanks, less tank crews.
Not really tough in answering the question of the OP: heavy tanks were useful.
When you get into cost-benefit issues, looking at the loss rates is helpful, because beyond things like steel or copper cost is trained crew losses, how quickly replacements can be brought up, what will maximize crew effectiveness, etc. Given that the Germans had limited resources and manpower, maximizing their combat surviveability and killing power was something that mattered more to them than 'quantity having a quality all it's own'. In rather confined situations like Normandy or Kursk it mattered a great deal. In the latter total write offs to total write offs loss rates were something like 9:1. That meant the heavies mattered a great deal, where the 'mediums' like the Panther were worth a lot less. If a Tiger can kill twice or thrice as many AFVs as a Pz IV plus be far more surviveable, then even if you can make 2.5x as many doesn't mean that much. Why not make a swarms of Hetzers then for half the cost of a Pz IV? Granted though that the Tiger couldn't do what a lighter medium could as far as exploitation given time between refuels, fuel cost, and maintenance (they weren't designed to exploit, rather to breakthrough as a battlewagon, like how mediums were for exploitation, not creating the breakthrough generally).
Edit: BTW the operation range of the Panther and Tiger was about the same.

For the Wallies there were also bottleneck issues beyond just production, like shipping in more armor and all the parts for repairs and the like. For the Soviets it is keeping up with the loss rates (IOTL the entire 1943 and '44 AFV production was lost in those same years). For the Germans moving around a Tiger I isn't much more than a Panther and given the reliability difference especially in 1943-44 the Tiger was more cost effective, even if most expensive due to actually being available and even surviveable in combat, not to mention more versatile thanks to the multipurpose gun. Also the Tiger wasn't any slower than a Panther as I recall, plus the fuel consumption wasn't much greater either.

In the end the answer I was that heavy tanks were very useful in WW2, but were losing their raison d'etre with the advancement of technology making 'universal' AFVs more possible.
 
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it had the 3.7" mountain howitzer from WWI,

The 3.7" Tank Mortar was a completely different weapon to the Mountain Howitzer.
Howitzer Smoke shell was 9.98 inches long weighing *18 or 20 pounds*. Mortars shell smoke was 7.75 inches long weighing 15 pounds
the shell case of the Mountain Howitzer was 92mm long seperately loaded. The Mortar shell case was 120mm long and was a fixed round.
The Howitzer was a screw breech the Mortar had a horizontal sliding breech.
Howitzers barrel was 11.8 calibers. The Mortars barrel was 15 calibers
Howitzer recoil system had a Hydro-Air recuperator. Mortars recoil system had a spring recuperator.

*= I have come across two different weights.
 
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In general that is probably the strategy that would have worked well by the Soviets against US and British tanks of the post-WWII era. None of the M26, M46, M47, M48, or Centurion tanks had more than 190 km of range (that latter value held by the later Centurion variants), little better and usually worse than WWII heavies like the Tiger II, so the longer ranged Soviet tanks could strike at either fuel convoys or during refueling operations. They would be immobilized when they ran out of fuel even if they were never penetrated or damaged, which would happen at most 190 km from their last refueling.

One thing with Armor, it's not just road mileage, but also time spent idling. It's more like construction machinery, where it's not so much miles as hours of operation. Sherman had the advantage of a small APU for the Radio or charging batteries
 
One thing with Armor, it's not just road mileage, but also time spent idling. It's more like construction machinery, where it's not so much miles as hours of operation. Sherman had the advantage of a small APU for the Radio or charging batteries
That's true but a tank that has to idle in one place is little better than the roadblock Patton described the Tiger II as.
 
25 pdrs were used in the AT role frequently in NA with AP, and that penetrated more than the 2pdr. The 18/25 pdr fired a 20 pound Shot at 1550 fps, the 25 pdr mk2 with the muzzle brake could use supercharge, and get 2000fps
http://www.wwiiequipment.com/pencalc/#
shows the 18/25pdr AP@1550fps penetrating the MkIVF2 out to 1300 meters frontally vs Hull or Turret, and 2000 every other aspect. That's the heaviest armored tank they had in the desert, save for the few Tigers late in Tunisia, 91mm for the 18/25pdr, with 119mm penetration for the 25 pdr Mk2 with supercharge.

A tank with a 18/25pdr in 1940 would have filled the panzertruppen with fear

But what kind of defensive role did the Matilda I have against armor?

The problem was the Royal Artillery regarded the 2, 18 and 25 pounder guns theirs and so were reluctant to let the "rough infantry" types to play with their toys until the 6 pounder came along and then this changed so that infantry units owned and controlled their own AT guns.
 

Glyndwr01

Banned
One thing with Armor, it's not just road mileage, but also time spent idling. It's more like construction machinery, where it's not so much miles as hours of operation. Sherman had the advantage of a small APU for the Radio or charging batteries
The British Centurion tank used an Austin A-Series inline-4 as its auxiliary power unit.
ch3stow2.png

Interia of Churchill Tank (40) auxiliary power unit (battery charger)
 
I have had a quick look inside a Churchill and I don't remember seeing an APU in the driving compartment. It was a mkvii and the picture you posted looks like an earlier mark I wonder if it was moved because a two stroke engine buzzing away behind you would make things very unpleasant.
 
It's a tough one, I think the systemic issues the German had kind of make any solution in terms of tank balancing moot. The same point makes direct comparison between Rouble, Reichsmark and USD costs really had to truly judge in terms of actual resource draw for each tank. There's also the issue that it's not so much how many T34s the Russians buy for every Tiger the Germans do but how many Panzer4's the Germans could have had (about two and a half I think?), and more importantly how quickly they can be produced. I get that total cost is also a factor of production time (man and factory floor hours cost money), but time is also a limiting factor in its own right as well! Especially when you are being pinched on both sides and bombed day and night. I.e if I can have 25 P4 for every 10 Tigers I invest resources in that's good, but it's even better when I can have them quicker as well! Of course all those issues of transporting and moving the Tigers compounds all this, i.e if yoru Tigers are "late" it really doesn't help when they're "slow" as well!

But yeah It's an interesting one, I don't think it's just a case of binning all tigers and getting another 3k P4's and however many Stugs. BUt I can't help but think given an inherent issue the Germans had was spreading themselves too thin and making good their losses, going expensive and slow isn't the way to go. And of course once you have the Tiger 1 don't then go and do the Tiger 2. But again as you say less tanks, less tank crews.

Sadly, i did not found -yet- anything written anywhere, WHY was the Tiger so expensive compared to the other german tanks, especially the Panther (should have been about roughly the same in costs, yet, it was not).

So, my 2 cents.

3 main group causing cost increase:

1. The "luxury" items. The better gun, the gearbox, the plush seats, etc. AFAIK, most of the thinks were extra quality compared to other tanks - and lets compare it to the Panther - these items should have been more expensive. Not many things to do with these, again, AFAIK rubber sealing for fording was cancelled on later models, maybe some other top notch items should have been degraded and i have no idea, how much cost/time could have been saved and would have been worth it at all - too much degradation would have been counterproductive.

2. Design issues/flaws. The numerous slits, ports cut into the armour plates, the bended horseshoe-like turret. Cutting/bending 80/100mm of armour was both expensive and time-consuming, the later needed special equipment too. A somewhat radical redesign sometime preferable before trials, but for sure before production.
Putting everything possible on roof, cancelling the pistol ports and co. would have made life easier.
Turret is another thing, but PzIV or Panther-like design, or even an ugly blocky simple box could have saved cost. Yes, maybe more welding, but thats easier and more available than bending the thing.

3. Large, dedicated factory/factories tooled for mass production. You have to commit to have results. The Kassel plant was... small and they did only the final assembly AFAIK.

Should they made some degradation, some design changes and of course, the dedicated large plant, they would have been able to reduce costs and time. How much... probably significantly.
 
Sadly, i did not found -yet- anything written anywhere, WHY was the Tiger so expensive compared to the other german tanks, especially the Panther (should have been about roughly the same in costs, yet, it was not).


Having a quick look, I thing it might came down to the the panther isn't actually that much cheaper than the tiger once you factor in the gun, and the Panther going into production later benefits from some changes in production techniques that cut costs (i.e. slave labour, which comes with it own negatives for all concerned!).

One big factor for Tiger cost was not just the material but the time it took to build, in production time is money.




So, my 2 cents.

3 main group causing cost increase:

1. The "luxury" items. The better gun, the gearbox, the plush seats, etc. AFAIK, most of the thinks were extra quality compared to other tanks - and lets compare it to the Panther - these items should have been more expensive. Not many things to do with these, again, AFAIK rubber sealing for fording was cancelled on later models, maybe some other top notch items should have been degraded and i have no idea, how much cost/time could have been saved and would have been worth it at all - too much degradation would have been counterproductive.

2. Design issues/flaws. The numerous slits, ports cut into the armour plates, the bended horseshoe-like turret. Cutting/bending 80/100mm of armour was both expensive and time-consuming, the later needed special equipment too. A somewhat radical redesign sometime preferable before trials, but for sure before production.
Putting everything possible on roof, cancelling the pistol ports and co. would have made life easier.
Turret is another thing, but PzIV or Panther-like design, or even an ugly blocky simple box could have saved cost. Yes, maybe more welding, but thats easier and more available than bending the thing.

3. Large, dedicated factory/factories tooled for mass production. You have to commit to have results. The Kassel plant was... small and they did only the final assembly AFAIK.

Should they made some degradation, some design changes and of course, the dedicated large plant, they would have been able to reduce costs and time. How much... probably significantly.


Yep I agree, and a lot of that is IMO inherent to the German attitude towards production and resource allocation. I always remember someone (who knows a lot more about this stuff than me) once in order to make a point about german wartime manufacturing pointing out that a lot of German helmets and webbing etc were hand stitched.
 
In March 1943 a counter attack by the US 2d Armored Division was broken up by a half dozen Tiger tanks. Lt Col Hightowers medium tank battalion was the core of the counter attack & was effectively destroyed when caught in the open by the Tigers and their MkIII scout tanks. How the battle would have gone had the Tigers not been present I can't say. The US 2d Armored was missing detached battalions & was fighting multiple German divisions, but US tank losses would have been fewer that day.
And no ones even mentioned Villers-Bocage yet!?
 
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