Extract taken from report of "Committee on Offensive Use of RAF Fighter Strength",
Sir,
The reasons for our success in the most recent campaign have been covered at some length, and I shall restrain myself from repeating the details that I'm sure you are already aware, however I feel it would be instructive to summarise the critical points as below:
In short, the battle was not me by the few, but won by the many who acted to put them in the right place, at the right time, and kept them steadily supplied with the weapons and replacements.
At best, current operations negate these advantages, or in some cases, actively confer them on the enemy. As such, we are no longer operating in a fashion whereby we can be assured of winning a war of attrition. To do so, we must once again seek to fight on our own terms. We must force the enemy to fight an offensive action over territory we control. We must equip said territory with the latest detection equipment, and develop a control system equal to that which served us so well in the recent campaign, so as to best make use of the information we are provided.
Given that the enemy as curtailed its daytime attacks on the mainland, we must look to other theatres to provide us with such opportunities. As any location we chose will be remote to our bases of production, resupply and maintenance will be markedly more difficult. This presents a challenge- aircraft numbers will be low, therefore we should send aircraft of the highest performance we have, so as to partially offset the lack of quantity with quality. Said aircraft will also need to be as rugged, reliable and easy to maintain as possible.
Only one location currently fits the criteria. Deployment of forces will prove challenging, given the range constraints and distance involved. Nevertheless, it is the unanimous decision of this committee that deployment of a relatively small quantity of high quality aircraft, flown by combat veterans, will provide the best opportunity to atrite the enemies strength, whilst simultaneously supporting offensive actions by other forces held at the same location. We estimate that between 3-6 months are required for the fruition of this plan; this will allow for the required infrastructure to be deployed, specialists to be deployed to train with local forces, the modification of suitable aircraft, and their deployment to the relevant theatre.
I remain, Sir, a humble servant of the Crown.
Sir,
The reasons for our success in the most recent campaign have been covered at some length, and I shall restrain myself from repeating the details that I'm sure you are already aware, however I feel it would be instructive to summarise the critical points as below:
- Operating within our own airspace, over territory that we either control, or can aggressively patrol with suitable recovery craft. This allowed for a large percentage of pilots being recovered after being shot down, with a similarly large subset able to resume operational flying in short order. Of those pilots not able to fly operationally, a significant fraction have been able to undertake other duties, again freeing other personnel for more active roles. Critically, the enemy were denied the same benefit.
- Operating within airspace covered by a highly integrated system of detecting, tracking and assessing enemy raids allowed for the most efficient deployment of our own forces. This frequently gave our forces the ability to attack from an advantageous position, increasing our ability to inflict losses on the enemy.
- Coupled with the above, our ability to secure early warnings of likely raid targets allowed us to judiciously employ our forces in the most economic way possible, prioritising targets for defence based on their importance to the war effort.
- An excellent logistical base, allowing for the swift repair and replacement of damaged aircraft.
- The ability to rotate pilots into and out of the battle. This not only prevented the keen edge of our forces being dulled by continuous combat, it also allowed for combat experience to be more widely spread.
In short, the battle was not me by the few, but won by the many who acted to put them in the right place, at the right time, and kept them steadily supplied with the weapons and replacements.
At best, current operations negate these advantages, or in some cases, actively confer them on the enemy. As such, we are no longer operating in a fashion whereby we can be assured of winning a war of attrition. To do so, we must once again seek to fight on our own terms. We must force the enemy to fight an offensive action over territory we control. We must equip said territory with the latest detection equipment, and develop a control system equal to that which served us so well in the recent campaign, so as to best make use of the information we are provided.
Given that the enemy as curtailed its daytime attacks on the mainland, we must look to other theatres to provide us with such opportunities. As any location we chose will be remote to our bases of production, resupply and maintenance will be markedly more difficult. This presents a challenge- aircraft numbers will be low, therefore we should send aircraft of the highest performance we have, so as to partially offset the lack of quantity with quality. Said aircraft will also need to be as rugged, reliable and easy to maintain as possible.
Only one location currently fits the criteria. Deployment of forces will prove challenging, given the range constraints and distance involved. Nevertheless, it is the unanimous decision of this committee that deployment of a relatively small quantity of high quality aircraft, flown by combat veterans, will provide the best opportunity to atrite the enemies strength, whilst simultaneously supporting offensive actions by other forces held at the same location. We estimate that between 3-6 months are required for the fruition of this plan; this will allow for the required infrastructure to be deployed, specialists to be deployed to train with local forces, the modification of suitable aircraft, and their deployment to the relevant theatre.
I remain, Sir, a humble servant of the Crown.