Sorry this one is late, guys; the amount of research for the Battle of France is rather daunting. 

Stay on board, as we're getting to the good stuff soon...

And that's the last time I'm bringing this up again, unless I feel like it.
Onwards, friends!
Concurrent with the Scandinavian Campaign was the main phase of the Spring War, where Germany decided to end the threat to their western borders once and for all. Several plans were drawn up by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces; OKW) to achieve this aim, based on the strategic goal of seizing large tracts of land in France and the entirety of the Low Countries in an attempt to hold these hostage in the hopes of achieving an armistice, if not a treaty, with the Allied powers. There were several conflicting views on how to best conduct this operation, with the only things common to all strategies being the necessity of sidestepping the massive row of French defences known as the Maginot Line, and the unreliability of the Italians in providing a sufficient diversion for French forces, given the Italians’ indifferent performance during the Second Italo-Abyssinian War and their obvious unpreparedness revealed at the Coburg Conference.
To this end, a “lightning strike” was required to pass through the Low Countries, which the Maginot Line did not extend into, and had to have a reasonable chance of success against the bulk of prepared French forces. The Italian forces would then move into place along the Alps, and engage French border troops in a massive feint, where it would be hoped that substantial French forces would be diverted southwards. Even if this was not fully achieved, German forces would engage the French in a series of encirclement manoeuvres, and the Maginot Line thus undermined. If this was achieved, the Wehrmacht would close in on Paris and coerce the French government into signing an armistice to end the Franco-British threat.
Figure 16: Evolution of Fall Gelb (Plan Yellow). Note inclusion of Manstein’s proposals.
The OKW was not optimistic about the Wehrmacht’s chances of victory, and original plans predicted a standstill around the French border, and losses of up to nearly a half a million personnel, all in preparation for a second wave which would only be ready by 1942. However, Generalleutnant Erich von Manstein proposed a more dynamic plan involving the independent movement of Panzer formations, without infantry support or even much logistical cover, in order to secure key areas and encircle enemy units through overwhelming armoured assault. The proposals were considered bold for their time, but more in line with the predominant traditional doctrine of “manoeuvre warfare” espoused by German military academies. Furthermore, time was of the essence: the sooner any agreement ensuring no more future interference could be coerced from the British and the French, the earlier Germany could extricate itself from its economic issues by freeing itself from the blockade conducted by the Royal Navy in the Atlantic, consolidating its gains in Poland and ensuring the security of its iron ore from Sweden through Norway, and more importantly, arm itself for the soon-to-be inevitable conflict with the Soviet Union.
Weber himself stated at an OKW conference that “all we need to do is push to within bombing range of Paris and they will drop to their knees and beg us to stop. As long as we hold France and Belgium and the rest hostage, the British too will stop their intransigence.” Nonetheless, the plans for Fall Gelb (Plan Yellow) underwent several radical changes both due to the nature of Manstein’s proposals and friction between his colleague Generalleutnant Heinz Guderian, who agreed with his ideas, and their superior Franz Halder, who disliked Manstein’s increasing influence. Manstein’s proposals, however, eventually reached Weber, who agreed that a rapid end to the conflict was in Germany’s best interest.
Figure 17: Generalleutenant (later Generalfeldmarschall) Erich von Manstein, prominent Wehrmacht commander and mastermind of Germany’s strategy in the Battle of France.
The timing of the invasion depended on several more factors; the preparedness of the Wehrmacht to conduct offensive operations following losses in Poland, the ability of Mussolini to prepare the Royal Italian Army for the alpine operations it would inevitably be performing, and most importantly, being able to pre-empt the inevitable Anglo-French reaction. Germany was most vulnerable immediately following their successful invasion in Poland, as its diminished forces were concentrated in the East. The only forces defending the border were dominated by Volkssturm-Vaterland recruits using outmoded equipment – even Great War surplus such as Gewehr 98 rifles. Military historians such as Fergusson, based on strength assessments in the winter and spring of 1940, generally agree that a French assault into the Saarland during this period would have at least forestalled the subsequent German-Italian invasion of France, potentially nipping the German threat in the bud. Unfortunately in retrospect, the French government instead opted to fight a defensive war, waiting for the Germans to come to them, where it was felt they would have the advantage.
The Royal Italian Army was in a state of massive disorganisation prior to its contribution – 10 out of the 30 divisions which it had committed to the invasion of France had only been prepared weeks before its entry into the war, its construction of M11/39 medium tanks was enough only to supplement and not supplant the obsolete L3/35 light tanks still in service, the commercial Engima D machines which were used to coordinate with the Wehrmacht were slow in being distributed, and less than half of its troops were fully equipped for alpine combat, where weather conditions still fell to subzero levels even in spring. The Italian merchant fleet would also have to be concentrated before committing to war. For these reasons, Mussolini informed Weber that Italy would not be ready to invade France until spring at the earliest, which would have slightly more favourable weather for alpine operations. The final timing of Fall Gelb was, in the end, decided by the continuing Norwegian front of the Scandinavian campaign. As the campaign dragged on, Weber gambled that action in France would convince the British to withdraw from Norway, and that if they did not, the French campaign would be easier without the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) supporting France. Thus convinced that decisive action was the key, the invasion of France was set for 1 May 1940 – May Day, or Walpurgis Night, as alluded to in the transmission sent to the Wehrmacht to begin operations – “Walpurgis ist jetzt” (“Walpurgis is now”.)
Thank you very much, and for the assertion that I haven't gone nuts with the TL!Just discovered this. I love it because you've made it about Weber, how things are different, rather than just generic, X went differently TL. The war is important, but more of a way to examine how Weber's Germany is different to hitler's Germany. Very unique. Subbed.
And if you're wandering if it's realistic, I just studied Weimar and nazi Germany for half a year in history, and I'd definitely say so.
Stay on board, as we're getting to the good stuff soon...
I think the POD was inventive, but as for Paul, has nobody in the future learned that trying to change history just results in something worse happening? 1/2 the TL's on this site will tell you that.
ASB TIME: I think he's one of the first in fiction to consider the idea, and thus on the ASB side of things, probably set temporal legal precedent for "no killing dictators to solve all your problems". So thanks for nothing, Paul. You let Nazi Germany last even longer, and now nobody can save the inhabitants of this universe from Weber by throwing him under a horse during World War I or something. Not that it would have changed much, really.Time Police? Oh dear, i feel bad for Paul. Was he the first one to kill Hitler?
And that's the last time I'm bringing this up again, unless I feel like it.
Onwards, friends!
=======
THE BATTLE OF FRANCE
Figure 15: British prisoners-of-war taken by the Wehrmacht at Dunkirk.
Concurrent with the Scandinavian Campaign was the main phase of the Spring War, where Germany decided to end the threat to their western borders once and for all. Several plans were drawn up by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces; OKW) to achieve this aim, based on the strategic goal of seizing large tracts of land in France and the entirety of the Low Countries in an attempt to hold these hostage in the hopes of achieving an armistice, if not a treaty, with the Allied powers. There were several conflicting views on how to best conduct this operation, with the only things common to all strategies being the necessity of sidestepping the massive row of French defences known as the Maginot Line, and the unreliability of the Italians in providing a sufficient diversion for French forces, given the Italians’ indifferent performance during the Second Italo-Abyssinian War and their obvious unpreparedness revealed at the Coburg Conference.
To this end, a “lightning strike” was required to pass through the Low Countries, which the Maginot Line did not extend into, and had to have a reasonable chance of success against the bulk of prepared French forces. The Italian forces would then move into place along the Alps, and engage French border troops in a massive feint, where it would be hoped that substantial French forces would be diverted southwards. Even if this was not fully achieved, German forces would engage the French in a series of encirclement manoeuvres, and the Maginot Line thus undermined. If this was achieved, the Wehrmacht would close in on Paris and coerce the French government into signing an armistice to end the Franco-British threat.
Figure 16: Evolution of Fall Gelb (Plan Yellow). Note inclusion of Manstein’s proposals.
The OKW was not optimistic about the Wehrmacht’s chances of victory, and original plans predicted a standstill around the French border, and losses of up to nearly a half a million personnel, all in preparation for a second wave which would only be ready by 1942. However, Generalleutnant Erich von Manstein proposed a more dynamic plan involving the independent movement of Panzer formations, without infantry support or even much logistical cover, in order to secure key areas and encircle enemy units through overwhelming armoured assault. The proposals were considered bold for their time, but more in line with the predominant traditional doctrine of “manoeuvre warfare” espoused by German military academies. Furthermore, time was of the essence: the sooner any agreement ensuring no more future interference could be coerced from the British and the French, the earlier Germany could extricate itself from its economic issues by freeing itself from the blockade conducted by the Royal Navy in the Atlantic, consolidating its gains in Poland and ensuring the security of its iron ore from Sweden through Norway, and more importantly, arm itself for the soon-to-be inevitable conflict with the Soviet Union.
Weber himself stated at an OKW conference that “all we need to do is push to within bombing range of Paris and they will drop to their knees and beg us to stop. As long as we hold France and Belgium and the rest hostage, the British too will stop their intransigence.” Nonetheless, the plans for Fall Gelb (Plan Yellow) underwent several radical changes both due to the nature of Manstein’s proposals and friction between his colleague Generalleutnant Heinz Guderian, who agreed with his ideas, and their superior Franz Halder, who disliked Manstein’s increasing influence. Manstein’s proposals, however, eventually reached Weber, who agreed that a rapid end to the conflict was in Germany’s best interest.
Figure 17: Generalleutenant (later Generalfeldmarschall) Erich von Manstein, prominent Wehrmacht commander and mastermind of Germany’s strategy in the Battle of France.
The timing of the invasion depended on several more factors; the preparedness of the Wehrmacht to conduct offensive operations following losses in Poland, the ability of Mussolini to prepare the Royal Italian Army for the alpine operations it would inevitably be performing, and most importantly, being able to pre-empt the inevitable Anglo-French reaction. Germany was most vulnerable immediately following their successful invasion in Poland, as its diminished forces were concentrated in the East. The only forces defending the border were dominated by Volkssturm-Vaterland recruits using outmoded equipment – even Great War surplus such as Gewehr 98 rifles. Military historians such as Fergusson, based on strength assessments in the winter and spring of 1940, generally agree that a French assault into the Saarland during this period would have at least forestalled the subsequent German-Italian invasion of France, potentially nipping the German threat in the bud. Unfortunately in retrospect, the French government instead opted to fight a defensive war, waiting for the Germans to come to them, where it was felt they would have the advantage.
The Royal Italian Army was in a state of massive disorganisation prior to its contribution – 10 out of the 30 divisions which it had committed to the invasion of France had only been prepared weeks before its entry into the war, its construction of M11/39 medium tanks was enough only to supplement and not supplant the obsolete L3/35 light tanks still in service, the commercial Engima D machines which were used to coordinate with the Wehrmacht were slow in being distributed, and less than half of its troops were fully equipped for alpine combat, where weather conditions still fell to subzero levels even in spring. The Italian merchant fleet would also have to be concentrated before committing to war. For these reasons, Mussolini informed Weber that Italy would not be ready to invade France until spring at the earliest, which would have slightly more favourable weather for alpine operations. The final timing of Fall Gelb was, in the end, decided by the continuing Norwegian front of the Scandinavian campaign. As the campaign dragged on, Weber gambled that action in France would convince the British to withdraw from Norway, and that if they did not, the French campaign would be easier without the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) supporting France. Thus convinced that decisive action was the key, the invasion of France was set for 1 May 1940 – May Day, or Walpurgis Night, as alluded to in the transmission sent to the Wehrmacht to begin operations – “Walpurgis ist jetzt” (“Walpurgis is now”.)
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Not much to say about this update other than the following points:
- The Italians are slightly more ready than they were in OTL, although as you can see, not by much.
- The Engima D machines were used by the Regia Marina in OTL, and since the Germans and Italians are actually working in concert, more are quickly sent over for communication.
- The Mechelen incident never happens in TTL as there's no reason for him to be there. The invasion is instead delayed due to strategic considerations.
Next update: The battle starts proper.
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