Ways for CSA to Win Civil War?

[Anaxagoras]

If I have my time machine, and I'm in charge, Cleburne gets a corps in 1863, and I cross my fingers that he can handle the learning curve in a hurry.

1863 is a bit too early. But there are three reasonable occasions for Cleburne to be given corps command in 1864. Davis could have appointed Cleburne rather than Hood to command the AoT's second corps in February. Cleburne rather than Stewart could be appointed to replace Polk in June. Finally, Cleburne rather than Cheatham could be appointed to take over Hood's corps after the latter was (disastrously) promoted to command the army.

Of the three, the best for the AoT would have been the first. Hardee and Cleburne trusted one another utterly and without hesitation. Johnston got along reasonably well with both of them. So the army commander and his two corps commanders would have been on good terms and willing to trust one another, which is something the AoT never had at any point during the war.

On the other hand, having Hardee and Cleburne in command of the two corps would have been greeted very badly by the remnants of the pro-Bragg faction within the AoT and Cleburne's promotion over the heads of higher-ranking generals would have been taken rather badly.

And, of course, with Wheeler in command of the cavalry the AoT is still effectively blind. Perhaps the best command change the AoT could have done in early 1864 would have been to put the cavalry under the command of General John Wharton rather than ship him out to the Trans-Mississippi.

 

[Athelstane]

1863 is a bit too early. But there are three reasonable occasions for Cleburne to be given corps command in 1864. Davis could have appointed Cleburne rather than Hood to command the AoT's second corps in February. Cleburne rather than Stewart could be appointed to replace Polk in June. Finally, Cleburne rather than Cheatham could be appointed to take over Hood's corps after the latter was (disastrously) promoted to command the army.

Of the three, the best for the AoT would have been the first. Hardee and Cleburne trusted one another utterly and without hesitation. Johnston got along reasonably well with both of them. So the army commander and his two corps commanders would have been on good terms and willing to trust one another, which is something the AoT never had at any point during the war.

On the other hand, having Hardee and Cleburne in command of the two corps would have been greeted very badly by the remnants of the pro-Bragg faction within the AoT and Cleburne's promotion over the heads of higher-ranking generals would have been taken rather badly.

And, of course, with Wheeler in command of the cavalry the AoT is still effectively blind. Perhaps the best command change the AoT could have done in early 1864 would have been to put the cavalry under the command of General John Wharton rather than ship him out to the Trans-Mississippi.

Not bad. I would agree with much of that.

I still would have taken my chances in 1863, with the advantage of hindsight - but only because good generals were damned thin on the ground in the West. Sometimes you just do the best with what you have. And the in-fighting in the AOT could NOT have been any worse than it actually was in OTL. Victory (or at least avoiding defeat) can cure a lot of those ills anyway.

But failing that - certainly the second corps job in Feb. 1864. If (and it is an "if") he does well enough at that, you have a more ready, capable successor available later in the year if Johnston has to be sacked. (Prescinding from the fact that here really was one already in Hardee, I suppose. It's just that Cleburne's ceiling seems higher to us).

No question about Wheeler. That would hurt whoever was in charge.

Problem is, of course, that by 1864 the war is pretty much lost anyway.

 

[Athelstane]

Honestly, the CSA has too much of a shortage of good men for me to feel confident in any of the "If only X had been in Y Position" scenarios. Even if they do do well, there are so many spots needing capable men that it might not be enough.

I think the only real odds - and they would still be long ones - get made by something very early on in the game. The South delays the war, gets lucky to have Fremont put in charge in Kentucky (alienating so many people that he drives the state into secession), or gets a really lucky stroke at First Manassas, something like that. The longer the war goes on, the steeper the odds get, the more committed the North is to seeing it through.

 

[Elfwine]

Something I'd note about Wheeler - Johnston, for whatever reason, seems to have believed in him early on.

And be was a Bragg guy.

Thorny problem to sort out with the kind of people (Davis et all) who would have to sort it out.

A Lincoln could probably resolve it, a Davis . . . that's going to be teeth gnashingly frustrating to watch.

 

[Athelstane]

Something I'd note about Wheeler - Johnston, for whatever reason, seems to have believed in him early on.

And be was a Bragg guy.

Thorny problem to sort out with the kind of people (Davis et all) who would have to sort it out.

A Lincoln could probably resolve it, a Davis . . . that's going to be teeth gnashingly frustrating to watch.

And yet Davis was probably the best guy the South had - at least in February, 1861.

Hard to imagine what a disaster Toombs or Yancey or Cobb or Rhett or even Stephens would have been...

Breckenridge, now, could have been something, I think. But Kentucky had not seceded.

My sense is that Cleburne played well with others and could have better handled issues like Wheeler and the other conflicts that would emerge from his promotion. Bragg was just tone-deaf to all that.

Johnston is underrated in this regard - he was generally well-liked, and managed to keep the peace, more or less, if horrible at administration.

 

[Anaxagoras]

Something I'd note about Wheeler - Johnston, for whatever reason, seems to have believed in him early on.

He also trusted Hood, which was a big mistake.

 

[Ariosto]

Alright, in an effort to try for a different direction, what if we have William H Seward nominated by the Republicans in '60? It is a relatively simple matter to rectify; he had been so sure of the nomination that he spent months abroad, and only really campaigned or made any motions at the convention itself. Lincoln during the time he was absent had essentially 'campaigned' among the delegates, shoring up support for his own bid.

However, Lincoln I could almost certainly see as his running mate, given the advantages he brings from residing in the West (Seward the North Atlantic), his oratorical ability, and in addition further assuaging those concerned with the past Radical nature of Seward (who himself had been moderating his positions over the past months in preperation for the expected campaign).

So first, before I can go even further than that, would a Seward/Lincoln ticket still carry the day? I would assume the answer is yes, but I don't wish to jump the gun.
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[Shogun]

It would have been helpful for the Cause if Kentucky had been more sympathetic to the South, and if its legislature had voted to secede after Fort Sumter (and the subsequent call from President Lincoln for 75,000 volunteers to crush the rebellion), following its sister state Virginia out of the Union and into the Confederacy.

 

[Anaxagoras]

So first, before I can go even further than that, would a Seward/Lincoln ticket still carry the day? I would assume the answer is yes, but I don't wish to jump the gun.

Almost certainly yes. After all, when we crunch the actual numbers from the 1860 election, you can see that the Republicans would have still won even if the Breckinridge Democrats, the Douglas Democrats and the Constitutional Unionists were all on the same ticket. Clearly, the tide was strongly in favor of the Republicans in 1860, no matter who their nominee was.

 

[Ariosto]

Almost certainly yes. After all, when we crunch the actual numbers from the 1860 election, you can see that the Republicans would have still won even if the Breckinridge Democrats, the Douglas Democrats and the Constitutional Unionists were all on the same ticket. Clearly, the tide was strongly in favor of the Republicans in 1860, no matter who their nominee was.

Looking at it, I can see Douglas picking up California and Illinois, with Breckenridge picking up Oregon (due to Seward losing votes to Douglas). The margins were close in those states already, and Seward is going to push quite a few away that Lincoln didn't. New York, which in OTL is the tipping point, would largely remain the same given its Seward's home state.

I'd argue someone like Simon Cameron would manage to lose the election, though he could never get the nomination in OTL circumstances.

Reading up on Seward, I believe his Presidency would definitely be interesting; as a proposal to Abraham, he wished to provoke an international conflict, in the hopes of diverting the attention of Americans away from the slavery issue. I doubt this would go through even under his leadership, but I am certain there might be some motions in that direction. He was, however, perfectly willing to threaten war against European powers whom he thought too friendly with the Confederacy (a policy that Lincoln also held him back from).

On another point, he was, lacking a better word, repulsed that Lincoln had brought many Democrats into the Cabinet, and attempted to hand in his resignation (which Lincoln denied). Thus, I am lead to believe that his Administration would be almost exclusively Republican.

Lot more maneuvering room here it appears.
​

 

[Athelstane]

Alright, in an effort to try for a different direction, what if we have William H Seward nominated by the Republicans in '60? It is a relatively simple matter to rectify; he had been so sure of the nomination that he spent months abroad, and only really campaigned or made any motions at the convention itself. Lincoln during the time he was absent had essentially 'campaigned' among the delegates, shoring up support for his own bid.

However, Lincoln I could almost certainly see as his running mate, given the advantages he brings from residing in the West (Seward the North Atlantic), his oratorical ability, and in addition further assuaging those concerned with the past Radical nature of Seward (who himself had been moderating his positions over the past months in preperation for the expected campaign).

So first, before I can go even further than that, would a Seward/Lincoln ticket still carry the day? I would assume the answer is yes, but I don't wish to jump the gun.
​

The question, to my mind, is not so much whether Seward would win - I think there's pretty good reason to think that any reasonably viable Republican would have won - but whether his election would still have caused the Deep South to secede.

 

[Ariosto]

The question, to my mind, is not so much whether Seward would win - I think there's pretty good reason to think that any reasonably viable Republican would have won - but whether his election would still have caused the Deep South to secede.

Considering they seceded when Lincoln was elected President, why would it be any different with Seward, who had direct connections with the Radicals?
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[Athelstane]

It would have been helpful for the Cause if Kentucky had been more sympathetic to the South, and if its legislature had voted to secede after Fort Sumter (and the subsequent call from President Lincoln for 75,000 volunteers to crush the rebellion), following its sister state Virginia out of the Union and into the Confederacy.

I'm afraid that Kentucky needs an extra push - Union sentiment was stronger in the state, and more of its economy was tied to the Midwest.

Lincoln making the mistake of sending Fremont rather than Anderson to secure Kentucky might have done it. Fremont presumably would have done what he did in Missouri - act rashly to move in force into the state to arrest or chase out known secessionists and southern sympathizers, enraging many leaders who might otherwise have been on the fence. Anderson, by contrast, was smart enough to hang back in Cincinnati, respecting Governor Magoffin's neutrality declaration, waiting for the Confederates to lose patience and break Kentucky neutrality first (which, of course, Bishop Polk did).

 

[Athelstane]

Considering they seceded when Lincoln was elected President, why would it be any different with Seward, who had direct connections with the Radicals?
​

My suspicion is that they would have seceded.

But Lincoln was identified with the anti-slavery cause in an unusually strong way, thanks to the Lincoln-Douglas debates. Seward had also shifted more to the center in the lead up to the election.

Seward is a mercurial figure. I think he's less likely to remain quite and inactive during the lame deck session. For all his bluster back in '58 about the "irrepressible conflict," he was less willing than Lincoln to force such a conflict. He really might have tried a hare-brained scheme to start a foreign war to bring the country together. In short, A Seward presidency would be harder to predict.

 

[Ariosto]

My suspicion is that they would have seceded.

But Lincoln was identified with the anti-slavery cause in an unusually strong way, thanks to the Lincoln-Douglas debates. Seward had also shifted more to the center in the lead up to the election.

Seward is a mercurial figure. I think he's less likely to remain quite and inactive during the lame deck session. For all his bluster back in '58 about the "irrepressible conflict," he was less willing than Lincoln to force such a conflict. He really might have tried a hare-brained scheme to start a foreign war to bring the country together. In short, A Seward presidency would be harder to predict.

Alright, I see what you mean. I will mention though I had put Lincoln on the ticket next to Seward (given it seemed the likely result), so his presence is still there, is weakened somewhat for not being the leading man. So as you said, they still secede much as they did in OTL.

Now, if he were to try and forment a foreign war of some sort, or even and just some international incident, what could it possibly be? The British come up almost instantly, but that seems like something that would surely come back to bite them. The French are certainly a better target, but there is little cause that I can think of at the time. The Spanish.............attempting anything there is politically impossible given it almost assuredly will involve Cuba, and the image of Cuba has largely been combined with the expansion of slavery.

Um..............Mexico?
​

 

[Elfwine]

And yet Davis was probably the best guy the South had - at least in February, 1861.

Hard to imagine what a disaster Toombs or Yancey or Cobb or Rhett or even Stephens would have been...

Breckenridge, now, could have been something, I think. But Kentucky had not seceded.

I am not sure on Breckenridge (confession of ignorance, not argument) - but I agree. The CSA being stuck with him as one of their best speaks volumes more about why the CSA lost than any list of economic statistics alone, IMO.

My sense is that Cleburne played well with others and could have better handled issues like Wheeler and the other conflicts that would emerge from his promotion. Bragg was just tone-deaf to all that.

Johnston is underrated in this regard - he was generally well-liked, and managed to keep the peace, more or less, if horrible at administration.

In fairness to Bragg, Bragg was dealing with some very uncooperative subordinates - the Archangel Michael would have trouble with Polk.

Joe Johnston had the distinct benefit of not having to deal with him (although unhappily Hood seems to have tried to fill his shoes).

 

[Nytram01]

In fairness to Bragg, Bragg was dealing with some very uncooperative subordinates - the Archangel Michael would have trouble with Polk.

Joe Johnston had the distinct benefit of not having to deal with him (although unhappily Hood seems to have tried to fill his shoes).

Perhaps you missed the moment when Polk moved from Mississippi into Georgia with 20,000 odd men and joined up with Johnston at Resaca and was with the Army of Tennessee until his death at Pine Mountain.

The reason Joe didn't have half as many problems with Polk that Bragg did is simple, Joe was friends with Polk and kept him close to his HQ, and he trusted Polk and was trusted in return. When Polk died Joe mourned him just as much as the AoT did, if not more so - its hard to see Bragg having such a friendly relationship with any subordinate let alone one that could be as difficult as Polk, indeed I wouldn't be surprised if Bragg showed as little sympathy for the news of Polk's death that Sherman did.

 

[Elfwine]

Perhaps you missed the moment when Polk moved from Mississippi into Georgia with 20,000 odd men and joined up with Johnston at Resaca and was with the Army of Tennessee until his death at Pine Mountain.

Resaca to Pine Mountain is barely a month. Bragg had to put up with him from the beginning of his command until he left the Army of Tennessee, Sidney Johnston . . . well, Sidney seems to have ignored him thanks to his attention elsewhere, but Polk certainly doesn't seem to have made much of an effort to act like a good subordinate to him either.

So compared to the other two commanders cursed with his presence? Yes, Joe didn't have to deal with him.

The reason Joe didn't have half as many problems with Polk that Bragg did is simple, Joe was friends with Polk and kept him close to his HQ, and he trusted Polk and was trusted in return. When Polk died Joe mourned him just as much as the AoT did, if not more so - its hard to see Bragg having such a friendly relationship with any subordinate let alone one that could be as difficult as Polk, indeed I wouldn't be surprised if Bragg showed as little sympathy for the news of Polk's death that Sherman did.

I would be willing to bet good money that if Joe Johnston had Polk in his army for more than a month Polk would be the same "I don't care what my superiors think" he'd been since the beginning of the war. Blaming Bragg's problems with a subordinate who refused to accept being a subordinate on Bragg's personality is about as unfair as calling Joe Johnston a coward.

So - speaking as a Bragg fan I'll admit - Bragg had good reason to thank God that someone who never went to any trouble to even act like a good soldier was dead. Joe mourning him speaks a lot about Joe as a person, I'm sure, but it doesn't change Polk's record as maddening.

 

[Nytram01]

Resaca to Pine Mountain is barely a month. Bragg had to put up with him from the beginning of his command until he left the Army of Tennessee, Sidney Johnston . . . well, Sidney seems to have ignored him thanks to his attention elsewhere, but Polk certainly doesn't seem to have made much of an effort to act like a good subordinate to him either.

So compared to the other two commanders cursed with his presence? Yes, Joe didn't have to deal with him.

I would be willing to bet good money that if Joe Johnston had Polk in his army for more than a month Polk would be the same "I don't care what my superiors think" he'd been since the beginning of the war. Blaming Bragg's problems with a subordinate who refused to accept being a subordinate on Bragg's personality is about as unfair as calling Joe Johnston a coward.

So - speaking as a Bragg fan I'll admit - Bragg had good reason to thank God that someone who never went to any trouble to even act like a good soldier was dead. Joe mourning him speaks a lot about Joe as a person, I'm sure, but it doesn't change Polk's record as maddening.

Its still a month or so with him and the way the anti-Polk brigade go on I'd expect that to be more than enough time for Polk to destroy cohesion of an army and start quarrelling with his commander and ignoring his orders - it was certainly more than enough time for Wheeler to ignore his orders to scout and complain to Bragg about not being allowed to raid behind the enemy, and it was more than enough time for Hood to get his cloak-and-dagger campaign to get Johnston's job firmly underway.

And I was not blaming Bragg personality solely, I was saying it contributed. Polk was a very difficult subordinate and to get any effective use out of him he had to be treated much more carefully, with much more sympathy than Bragg was capable of. This doesn't excuse Polk's unprofessional behaviour at any level, it is merely an attempt to explain why he worked more harmoniously with Joe than he did with Bragg.

One of the greatest attributes Joe Johnston's possessed was his personal touch, his cult-of-personality, that even such ardent critics as Mary Chesnut could not deny was powerful and attractive, so it is not hard to see why he was able to work easier with Polk having established a friendly and trusting relationship with him than Bragg or Sidney were.

Though I would not deny that Polk's death so soon after joining with Joe averted some serious problems that would have arisen later in the campaign, because no matter how good Joe was at inspiring trust and friendship the fact is that Polk couldn't play well with others.

 

[Elfwine]

Its still a month or so with him and the way the anti-Polk brigade go on I'd expect that to be more than enough time for Polk to destroy cohesion of an army and start quarrelling with his commander and ignoring his orders - it was certainly more than enough time for Wheeler to ignore his orders to scout and complain to Bragg about not being allowed to raid behind the enemy, and it was more than enough time for Hood to get his cloak-and-dagger campaign to get Johnston's job firmly underway.

And I was not blaming Bragg personality solely, I was saying it contributed. Polk was a very difficult subordinate and to get any effective use out of him he had to be treated much more carefully, with much more sympathy than Bragg was capable of. This doesn't excuse Polk's unprofessional behaviour at any level, it is merely an attempt to explain why he worked more harmoniously with Joe than he did with Bragg.

Polk had already destroyed the AoT's ability to act as a well oiled team, in my opinion, that he didn't sabotage Johnston personally may well be influenced by getting along with Joe (hereafter for convenience Joesph Johnston is "Joe") - but it still leaves him as beyond "difficult" into borderline mutinous.

One of the greatest attributes Joe Johnston's possessed was his personal touch, his cult-of-personality, that even such ardent critics as Mary Chesnut could not deny was powerful and attractive, so it is not hard to see why he was able to work easier with Polk having established a friendly and trusting relationship with him than Bragg or Sidney were.

Though I would not deny that Polk's death so soon after joining with Joe averted some serious problems that would have arisen later in the campaign, because no matter how good Joe was at inspiring trust and friendship the fact is that Polk couldn't play well with others.

The thing I don't get - this is a statement of confusion - is why that appears to have had so little impact on Hood.

Joe did everything one could reasonably (in Hood's shoes) expect, and quite a bit more than Hood meritted as his junior corps commander. But Hood seems to have felt - at best - insatiable ambition, and at worst I'd call him one of the worst human beings to wear a gray uniform.

It's understandable to feel upset with one's commander at times.

But there's a huge gulf between Longstreet at Gettysburg and Hood in the Atlanta Campaign. Hell, there's a gulf between Longstreet towards Bragg (not one of Longstreet's finer hours as a human being or a subordinate) and Hood towards Joe.

So it makes me wonder how much Joe's charm worked on the other insubordinate cusses. You've studied him more than I have, and I'm not going to argue he wasn't charming in certain contexts (writing seems not to be one of them, at least in official correspondence) - but it's worrisome.