Washington Crosses the Delaware. . . into Disaster!

Anaxagoras

Banned
I just finished listening to the audio book of Washington's Crossing by David Hackett Fisher, having read the book itself when it was first published a few years back. An outstanding account of an amazing military campaign, the impact of which was out of all proportion to the numbers of men involved. (If you haven't read it, I strongly recommend picking up a copy.)

This got me to thinking. . . what if the American winter campaign into New Jersey in late 1776 had been a disaster? The Christmas Night crossing of the Delaware, the surprise attack on the Hessians at Trenton, the confused marching and fighting of the days following, and finally the dramatic battle at Princeton in early January all provide any number of potential PODs that could have easily resulted in the destruction of the Continental Army.

What if Washington's army had been destroyed in late December 1776 or early January of 1777? Is the American Revolution finished?
 
It's certainly struck a blow it will have a hard time recovering from. The core of the Continental Army - especially in leadership - is dead or imprisoned.

And without that, the limits on what the British army can occupy are going to be hard to set. Yes, North America is huge, but there's only so much that you can do with that.

Plus, the demoralization factor is going to be very high.

I don't think it's ended immediately, but 1777 is likely to be decisive the other way from OTL.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
It's certainly struck a blow it will have a hard time recovering from. The core of the Continental Army - especially in leadership - is dead or imprisoned.

Quite so. Some of the best regiments, along with the likes of Washington, Greene, and Knox, are quite possibly gone for good. It's hard to see the Americans winning the war after such a disaster.

And without that, the limits on what the British army can occupy are going to be hard to set. Yes, North America is huge, but there's only so much that you can do with that.

Well, we'd end the campaign season with the British in control of New York City, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. In 1777, they'd have an easier time going after Philadelphia than they did IOTL.

Plus, the demoralization factor is going to be very high.

Which would, in turn, bring more Loyalists out of the woodwork.
 
Not sure how many there were to bring out of the woodwork, however. Loyalists never seem to have been as enthusiastic about sacrifice for the crown as the British army wanted.

But still, the situation is hard to find some way of rebuilding from for the Americans.

Question comes up - who takes charge of the army of '77?

Consider Lee is also a prisoner, and Arnold is only a brigadier general, I suspect Gates.

:eek:
 
I wouldn't underestimate the British capacity to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory in such a scenario. Howe is still in overall command, and still stalling in the hope that Parliament will come to its senses and rescind the deployment order of British troops against British subjects. Meanwhile, Lord Germain is reassuring everyone in London that everything's under control and there is no need for additional troops or funds. Burgoyne didn't suddenly get any smarter, so whether Horatio Gates or Ethan Allen gets the credit, he's still going to disintegrate on his way down to the New York theatre, encouraging the French and Spanish to dip their oars in the water. And Clinton still isn't headed to Charleston before 1778, by which time Greene and the partisans have the southern three colonies so firmly in the rebel column that no amount of force will carry the day, and Clinton sees it and says so as in OTL.

While Washington was a great man, the ARW isn't the story of American triumph, it's the story of mind-blowing, systematic incompetence on the part of the British. The war was lost in London, not New Jersey.

The real change, I think, is not in the war but the aftermath. With the Continental Congress in flight and Gates in overall command, I suspect we see Horatio I, King of America.
 
I wouldn't underestimate the British capacity to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory in such a scenario. Howe is still in overall command, and still stalling in the hope that Parliament will come to its senses and rescind the deployment order of British troops against British subjects.

What exactly do we have as a basis for the idea that Howe was stalling for that reason?

No, really, I'd give an arm . . .someone else's arm . . . to read more on Howe than I have at my disposal.

Meanwhile, Lord Germain is reassuring everyone in London that everything's under control and there is no need for additional troops or funds. Burgoyne didn't suddenly get any smarter, so whether Horatio Gates or Ethan Allen gets the credit, he's still going to disintegrate on his way down to the New York theatre, encouraging the French and Spanish to dip their oars in the water.

That would require an American force able to ensure his disintegration, however. Which, with the core of the American army and its leadership gutted, is a hard task.

And Clinton still isn't headed to Charleston before 1778, by which time Greene and the partisans have the southern three colonies so firmly in the rebel column that no amount of force will carry the day, and Clinton sees it and says so as in OTL.

Because British strategy would in no way shape or form be changed in this situation, and even if it wasn't . . . Greene is a prisoner. So much or that.

While Washington was a great man, the ARW isn't the story of American triumph, it's the story of mind-blowing, systematic incompetence on the part of the British. The war was lost in London, not New Jersey.

The real change, I think, is not in the war but the aftermath. With the Continental Congress in flight and Gates in overall command, I suspect we see Horatio I, King of America.

The events in New Jersey happening the way they did were rather relevant, however. If the American army is gutted, not even a Howe or Burgoyne can bungle so completely as to make up for the absence of that cadre of leaders and veterans.
 
What exactly do we have as a basis for the idea that Howe was stalling for that reason?

No, really, I'd give an arm . . .someone else's arm . . . to read more on Howe than I have at my disposal.
I quite recommend Robert Harvey's "A Few Bloody Noses" for analysis, and it's based primarily on Howe's letters and memoranda to other officers. He felt that his orders were, if not illegal, than at least intensely dishonorable, and pursued them with the minimum amount of vigor necessary to avoid insubordination or dereliction of duty charges. To such an extent that he appears to have been polling his immediate subordinates to determine their support if he flatly refused to fight the rebels.
 
I quite recommend Robert Harvey's "A Few Bloody Noses" for analysis, and it's based primarily on Howe's letters and memoranda to other officers. He felt that his orders were, if not illegal, than at least intensely dishonorable, and pursued them with the minimum amount of vigor necessary to avoid insubordination or dereliction of duty charges. To such an extent that he appears to have been polling his immediate subordinates to determine their support if he flatly refused to fight the rebels.

That seems like a rather extreme conclusion.
 
That seems like a rather extreme conclusion.

Not to me. A great many Britons till the French Alliance felt they were in an unfair attempt to oppress their fellow Englishmen who happened to be across the Atlantic. There's a reason Howe tried to set up a peace conference with the Americans.
 
Not to me. A great many Britons till the French Alliance felt they were in an unfair attempt to oppress their fellow Englishmen who happened to be across the Atlantic. There's a reason Howe tried to set up a peace conference with the Americans.

Yes. They (William and his brother Richard) were specifically granted authority to do so.

Being appointed a peace commissioner of sorts as well as a general does not mean that Howe was deliberately trying his damnedest to skirt just short of disobeying orders (in the aspect of "general").

That's what I find to be an extreme conclusion.

After all, we don't see Howe showing this hesitation when it came to the Bunker's Hill business. If anything, Howe is trying to avoid anything like stalling there.
 
I wouldn't underestimate the British capacity to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory in such a scenario. Howe is still in overall command, and still stalling in the hope that Parliament will come to its senses and rescind the deployment order of British troops against British subjects. Meanwhile, Lord Germain is reassuring everyone in London that everything's under control and there is no need for additional troops or funds.

Isn't he right though? The Continental army is smashed, and frankly its units have probably melted away. Philadelphia falls in 1777, except there's no American army in the field to oppose them. With a string of defeats, I think you might see some colonies sending petitions to Parliament for peace...
 
Top