Was Trafalgar even that significant?

I've been talking to someone about Trafalgar recently and it's increasingly become clear that it doesn't actually seem to hold all that much significance in the Napoleonic Wars. Especially considering how Napoleon called off an invasion of England in August and the battle wasn't until October, so it could hardly have prevented an invasion. What do the people who actually know about this think?
 
With the fleet intact an invasion was always a possibility. But with it gone that threat was no longer valid, meaning the UK going on the offensive and never looking back...
 

longsword14

Banned
I've been talking to someone about Trafalgar recently and it's increasingly become clear that it doesn't actually seem to hold all that much significance in the Napoleonic Wars. Especially considering how Napoleon called off an invasion of England in August and the battle wasn't until October, so it could hardly have prevented an invasion. What do the people who actually know about this think?
It is significant for its destructive toll and addition to the Nelson story. Otherwise it did not change the overall naval situation. After Austerlitz, Jena-Auerstadt the ball was in Napoleon's court and it was his to fumble, it does not matter how many ships Britain, France has.
 
I would argue that Trafalgar is still important for mythology and the mindset it created in the RN and pretty much everyone else - as in, mess with us and this is what happens.
 
I would argue that Trafalgar is still important for mythology and the mindset it created in the RN and pretty much everyone else - as in, mess with us and this is what happens.

Napoleon himself would disagree that Trafalgar was irrelevant
he himself saw the Austerlitz campaign as a distraction from the real target ... Britain.

He never lost that focus.

In 1806 he wrote:

we shall be able to have peace when we have 150 ships of the line.


As late as January 1813 i.e. while rebuilding the Grand Armee after his disastrous Russion campaign
he was writing to his minister of Marine:

I can by no means agree to reducing my naval armaments ....

there followed an exact list of ships deployed, commissioning and building throughout France, occupied Holland and Italy, finishing with the plan for summer 1814

a total 104 ships of the line

BTW: at that time the RN had only 99 of the line for world wide deployment

(though in theory from 1812 the Russian Navy was available as an ally...
and indeed for a time 15 of the line did flee the Baltic to England and help in the North Sea)

Secondary Source: Warfare in the Age of Bonaparte, Michael Glover, The Command of the Narrow Seas pp 233
sorry dont have the primary to hand
 
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It was crucial. Events in Europe (1) precipitated Napoleon's brilliant Ulm/Austerlitz campaign, so it didn't actually save an invasion at that particular time, but I will again repeat the pattern of the Napoleonic Wars starting there:

1) Safe behind wooden walls, Britain agitates for/funds war coalition to break prior peace treaty with France.

2) Coalition forms, breaks treaty and declares war on France, seeks to converge on Napoleon with overwhelming numbers from many directions.

3) Napoleon defeats coalition against all odds.

4) Coalition signs peace treaty with France, disbands, peace in Europe.

5) Safe behind wooden walls, Britain agitates for/funds war coalition...

Rinse, repeat.

This was endemic, had been since the Revolution and and as long as Britain was safe behind the RN, there was nothing whatever to motivate them to cease constantly breaking the peace. No campaigns were fought on British soil, few British troops were ever risked outside of Iberia, and while at war British privateering (basically sanctioned piracy) and blockading made the state of war an avenue of opportunity rather than loss, unique only to herself. And as with all the other monarchical powers of Europe, Britain viewed post-Rev France and the upstart Corporal himself as an existential threat to their royal authority, and a constantly dangerous example to their own peoples of a successful alternative to old regimes.

Napoleon's Continental system was his attempt to take the constant land victories and translate them into an actual benefit against Britain's ability to indefinitelly fund wars/coalitions. This was made necessary (well, something was made necessary) by the pattern observed above. And Trafalgar ensured that that pattern could not otherwise be broken. Without the Continental system, Alexander is much less likely to break the treaty of Tilsit...at least for a while. This means rather than the Russian adventure Napoleon can either personally mop up in Iberia (as he did easily when personally in charge) or seek a decisive invasion of Britain. Additionally, even given the Continental system, without the overwhelming superiority/freedom afforded by Trafalgar the British cannot afford expand their own control by attacking neutral powers like Denmark, and British smugglers would have to account for a much greater danger to profit ratio.

So it was a pretty huge moment. I personally feel the Nile is arguably even more underestimated in terms of global impact, but that's another discussion.
 
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I think that it is important, even if an 1806 invasion is impossible in any circumstances. The French after Trafalgar had a significant naval construction program, which aimed to eventually rebuild the French navy to the point of being able to challenge the RN, but it wasn't anywhere near completion by the time the war ended. Without losing so many ships at Trafalgar, this can be pushed forward, and it gives the French both significantly more power during the critical 1806-1812 periods where their naval power was at a nadir, and also might steer them away from some bad decisions.

Without the loss at Trafalgar the French fleet would have had many more ships of the line, around 20 more, plus more sailors, and at least some of them must have been the experienced ones the French navy so desperately lacked. Instead of having 104 ships of the line under construction or in service in 1814 (per French Warships in the Age of Sail. 1786-1861, Design, Construction, Careers and Fates), it is ~125, with a larger portion of these being in actual service. Of course this isn't enough to challenge the Royal Navy, as England has more ships total in service and the English ships have a qualitative edge over their French opponents, but there is the eternal problem of trying to keep ships on station, since one has to deal with the wear and tear on these ships by repairs, allot times for ships to sail out and join those on station. I thought I had read somewhere it was that only 1/3 of ships can be maintained permanently on station, but even if it is lower then that means only a relative fraction of the RN can be kept in a constant blockade of the French coast. The French don't need numerical superiority over the RN to be able to have enough ships to conduct a sortie with local numerical superiority, and even if that's just for say, training, that could be very important to start fixing the qualitative problems of the French navy. Of course, the RN does have bases that help them engage in their blockades, but the basic problem persists, even if these bases alleviate it.

I also would wonder if the presence of an intact Spanish fleet - as opposed to having declined from 26 ships in 1805 to 17 in 1810, not even taking into account whatever other losses they had - might have swayed the Peninsula Campaign and prevented the situation there from turning out as it did, so badly for the French. The main Spanish benefit to the French was the Spanish fleet. When they lost the fleet, they had little remaining value. If the Spanish were able to negotiate from a better bargaining position - that they had a fleet which was of at least some marginal value - then they might be able to make the French take them more seriously, and tread more lightly in Spain and prevent the situation there from flaring up into a revolt. In addition, if the French fleet is still in Cadiz, like the POD is that the Allied fleet doesn't sail to sea with Villeneuve being so petty about the prospect of being replaced - then that's 18 ships of the line that the French stand to lose if hostilities with the Spanish break out. Instead of the capture of the Rosily squadron being losing 5 ships of the line (and a frigate), the French would stand to lose 18 ships of the line, and whatever frigates they had. Around 4,000 French sailors were lost, so if we're looking at 18 ships we're looking at well in excess of 15,000 sailors at the very least. Losing 15,000 people to captivity isn't something that can be brushed off lightly. Preventing the Spanish quagmire from happening would be a war-changing event, and might very well win the war then and there. If the Spanish stay as part of the Napoleonic alliance, the Portuguese occupation doesn't flare up into a rebellion or if it does without the Spanish problem the French are able to send enough troops to keep Portugal in check and the English out, then the Continental System, is immensely strengthened. English trade was decisively impacted by the Continental Blockade in the 1806/1807 period, but it recovered with trade to Portugal and the Spanish colonies. Continued Spanish hostility against English denies them this market, a French navy capable of better contesting English smuggling and hence decreasing the porous nature of the Continental System, and it might be enough to cause enough pain to bring the English to the negotiating table as the economy craters. The loss of Portugal would also mean the English would lost a vital allied nation which was important for resupply of their fleet in the theatre.

If we assume that the Spanish fleet isn't destroyed, and stays roughly around the same size, then the Franco-Spanish fleet together has around 150 ships of the line, although of course some of them are under construction. This is a large fleet in being, and as new vessels are commissioned then it raises the possibility for the French navy to be able to challenge the RN in some limited engagements or at least being able to have enough strength to be put to sea for training exercises, taking into account that only a portion of English ships can be actively deployed to blockade the French given world-wide obligations and only some of those available against the French can be used for blockading purposes to keep the French in port since only a fraction can be maintained on station.

Furthermore, if the assumption is made that the Danish fleet is spared from destruction as some above posts seem to indicate might have been the case (I don't know enough myself about whether that is a possibility but just assuming for a moment that it is), then that denies the RN 15 additional ships of the line they captured, and provides an additional neutral which would do much to help the French fleet to build up their own fleet by way of timber shipping from the Baltic on neutral Danish ships. Of course there are some advantages to the English as a continued Danish neutrality would give the British another trade outlet on the continent, but I don't know what the Danish balance of trade was with the English - most of the Baltic had a very positive balance, because they exported their timber supplies to the English, but Denmark I don't know.

If the Danes are brought onto the French side at some point (it doesn't seem unlikely given the repeated attacks the English staged on the Danes and their hostility to neutral nations which wanted to ply their commerce), then that further increases French power, with 15 extra ships of the line and a lot of competent sailors - and another area where the English have to spread themselves thin blockading.

The combination of all of this, presuming an admittedly optimal scenario, is that without Trafalgar it might be enough to either bring about an English economic collapse in the immediate years following the Continental System or in the long term places the French and Allied fleets with sufficient power to leave them well placed to start raising the costs of continued prosecution of the war to dangerous levels and possibly leaving them with the capability for pitched battles against the RN years earlier than otherwise.
 
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...British privateering (basically sanctioned piracy) and blockading made the state of war an avenue of opportunity rather than loss, unique only to herself. .

First of all, there was very little British Privateering in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars
simply because it was not an economic proposition for the civilians who paid out for this.
There were virtually no targets capable of capture by the kind of vessel used as a letter of Marque.

The countries that deployed swarms of these "pirates" were France, its occupied territories like Holland and its satellite states such as Spain (until Napoleon betrayed them and invaded).

Though these attackers never had the effect that Bonaparte wanted (or expected)
the threat forced the RN to deploy light escorts in huge numbers.
  • In 1794 the RN deployed 86 vessels with 24 or less guns
  • in 1814 385 (the vast majority with 18 or less weapons, now mostly short range carronades)
This was the largest part of the RNs increase in manpower during the Wars.

Similarly the MN and its subordinate forces such as Venice continued to try commerce raiding using naval vessels,
The were mostly frigates and sloops which were typically newer, heavier, better armed and had larger crews than RN cruisers.
Even though in almost all cases the older RN Figates proved capable of dealing with this threat
the RN responded by replacing its lost, wrecked and worn out frigates with bigger vessels.
  • In 1794 RN deployed 88 Frigates but only 19 bigger than 950 tons and these armed only with 38x18lbers
  • In 1814 it deployed 121 but of these 107 were at least that big and 6 actually carried 40 or more x 24lbers
Again the most significant effect was a huge increase in manpower required.

In contrast, the number of battleships hardly increased, though quality again did improve as older ships were relegated

For 2 Deckers
  • In 1794 there 91 in commission including ~ 20 Fourth and Fifth rates i.e. with 44- 50 guns
    (already considered obsolete except in particular circumstances such a shallow draft)

  • in 1814 97 but now with only 10 carry less than 64 guns
    (Most newer ships... except captures like Tonnant or Ca Ira... were 74s ... the classic Ship of the Line)


For 3 deckers which were used mostly as Flagships, there was an actual decrease.

  • In 1794 14 with none more than 104 guns (but 8 in reserve or repair including HMS Victory)
  • In 1814 12 with some as big as 120 (However only 5 old 98s in reserve or repair)
It was manpower restrictions that stopped the RN deploying more battleships,

For example In 1807 when the RN destroyed the Danish navy it took away 15 of the line as prizes
but only ever properly commissioned 4 and never fully deployed even these.
 
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