I didn't really answer your question of course. My answer is that in terms of the regime that brought Stalin to power and that he shaped--or adapted to--collectivization was a solution, not a problem, and the problem was one of political economy. The whole point of Bolshevism was to accomplish industrialization comparable in capability to capitalism by non-capitalist means. As a socialist utopian myself I think it is very sad and shameful that they did not find ways to accomplish that that also were more humane and democratic than capitalist methods. That's a failure, for those of us drawn to Marxism in part because of the humane spirit evident in Marx's motivations.
A regime that could solve the problems of relations between industrial and agricultural aspects of Soviet society by far less harsh means and yet accomplish the level of industrial development Stalinism did achieve would be pretty amazing and inspirational I'd think.
But given that the Bolsheviks were a bloc of people who had long ago accepted that they were engaged in class warfare and diagnosed the failure of the rural peasantry to sacrifice voluntarily for the sake of collective investment and for the promise of eventual improvement via voluntary acceptance of collective farm labor with the help of eventual industrial products they'd have to wait decades for as an instance of reactionary class antagonism to Communism, they were resolved as a group to squeeze what they judged industry needed out of the land somehow. Stalinist industrialism was much the same as Trotsky's notions of how it should be accomplished, and the former Trotskyists whom Stalin recruited to mastermind much of the earliest phases of the first Five Year Plan after NEP was definitively abandoned in the late 1920s were quite frank about how they'd be in effect taxing the working class as a whole, and harshly. Industrial workers bore their own share of hardships (although as heroes of Marxist ideology, they certainly didn't have to suffer the insults and contempt heaped on the agrarian workers on top of the mass enslavement and working to death large sectors suffered, or the confiscations those left on the land routinely suffered).
Thus, Stalin would have been far more likely to be deposed by the Bolsheviks if he hesitated to perform these mass reorganizations than for any hardships caused by executing them.
So I suppose you are asking whether ATL circumstances could have empowered some anti-Bolshevik movement to come to power due to the mass discrediting of the Bolshevik system as a whole. Could the Social Revolutionary party, discredited in the Civil War period, have come back? Could the peasants of the countryside have mounted a successful resistance on the theory they had nothing to lose and their prosperity and freedom to gain?
Well in one sense it is the nature of a concept of alternate realities as potentially existing things that even low-probability events have a certain chance of happening anyway. Also, as we sift through ATLs where the Bolsheviks form, come to power more or less on OTL terms, and resolve as OTL to adopt similar priorities in dealing with the crises of late NEP, we might find ATL political formations outside the USSR that make a military intervention that peasant discontent might profitably link up with possible on a non-ASB basis. Could we have a scenario for instance whereby both Poland and Germany come, by 1930 let us say, to have strongly social-democratic regimes that can plausibly assert they will have the best interests of Russian (and Ukrainian etc) peasantries in mind when they engage the Red Army militarily to break Bolshevik domination, not in the name of restoring a capitalist class order, but of introducing a more freely democratic Russian socialism? Then conceivably the morale as well as material strength of a German-Polish socialist alliance might be sufficient to break Red Army resolve, especially in the face of very humane policy toward prisoners and occupied territories. The will of Red Army soldiers might weaken in favor of defecting or turning the allegiance of their units around the better to liberate their comrades sooner.
A movement of the countryside to overthrow Bolshevism in the name of restoring (or rather introducing, because Russian agrarian policy always retained a certain degree of collectivism) purely capitalist property relations in the countryside and stamping out socialism as such would be much more problematic. Your question presumes that Bolsheviks, who have adopted policies broadly similar to OTL, rule in Moscow (or conceivably Petrograd/Leningrad) and Stalin, or someone with very similar policies (Trotsky say) is trying to introduce collectivism for the same reasons presumably as OTL. The hard thing to grasp, without learning some Soviet history, is that even in the countryside, the Bolsheviks enjoyed some support! Trotsky's recommended approach to achieving what Stalin did OTL was to intensify the class war in the countryside, to encourage, empower and aid the poorest peasants to turn on their better-off neighbors as landlord class oppressors and ram through Bolshevik-guided industrialized collectivism from below--and from the side, and above, because the Party would be their champions. In the lead-up to collectivization, and during it and in its aftermath, the Party did undertake some actions that they believed were in the interest of the working-class peasant, such as fostering mass education in the villages. Certainly the recruits to the Communist Party drawn from the country population who were promoted to schoolteachers, farm managers, and so forth did accept the Party as their patron and OTL Stalin as their champion and leader. The fact that in any year a certain number of them were subsequently purged, exiled to labor camps or killed outright did not discredit the regime in the minds of most of the survivors of these purges--in fact this created a certain revolving door effect that opened up paths for advancement for those who were most diligent in their duties (which were often unpleasant) and slavish in their loyalty. From their point of view the purged were insufficiently loyal or hard-working and paid the price for allowing themselves to be infected by bourgeois doubts or weaknesses.
Thus, even if it seems quite plain to outsiders that large numbers of peasants would have been better off to rebel and overthrow their Bolshevik oppressors even in the name of a capitalist regime that would favor only a few of them with actual wealth while most slipped or stayed in the status of propertyless hired workers for little pay, a substantial number of those we'd expect to turn on their Communist masters judged they too were in the working class that the Soviet system championed and would deliver a better life to, and lined up with the Party members and the poorest to support various Stalinist measures. Even in cases where the vast majority of peasants in a particular situation might all agree they were for the moment clearly worse off and consider joining with the "kulaks" singled out for destruction, the broad solidarity and trust needed to organize effective resistance had been dissolved effectively by Party policies of divide and rule.
It was by the way Marxist doctrine, based in large part on Marx's analysis of the fate of the 1848 revolution in France, that peasants could not be the basis of a successful Communist movement. (Mao of course later revised this doctrine considerably, in the case of China anyway). Marx argued that the basis on which Louis Bonaparte ultimately tossed aside any dependency on functional democracy in France and took power was the support of the peasant masses of the countryside, who, he argued, were incapable of exercising true democratic power due to their dispersal and isolation from the mainstream currents of political power running through the cities and industrial settings, but could and did instead give backing to a single hero-figure who must necessarily rule as a dictator. To the Bolsheviks, by doctrine, there could be no such thing as a genuine peasant democratic party--they must necessarily be actually bowing either to a Napoleonic dictator figure, or to the class hegemony of their local land-holding ruling classes. (Or as the Bolsheviks believed, to the rule of a proletarian party such as their own, which would act more in sympathy with their needs and interests than any bourgeois party. The Communists believed they were genuinely coming as close to realizing true democracy in the countryside as was possible, and that with progress, the greater industrialization of agriculture, higher levels of education and mechanization in the countryside, the peasants would at long last become capable of democratic self-government--and therefore support the Communist Party that championed them!)
To try to set up a situation where the country people had the means and solidarity to rebel as a group, and overcome the urban-industrial based Red Army and impose a new order on the USSR, or tear it down completely, begs the question of how the Bolsheviks ever won the Civil War in the first place to be in a position to think they could implement collectivism. If the peasantry had retained such capabilities, then the Bolsheviks could never have claimed victory and drawn various former enemies to support Red institutions on patriotic grounds as they did; it would have been necessary to agree to share power with a strong, organized rural interest party of some kind or other, and the question of collectivization could never come up (unless the majority of country people, in control of their pro-agriculturalist party or defecting over to the Bolshevik side belatedly, decided something like it was in their own interests--in which case presumably the numbers of people badly mistreated would have been lower, and blame would fall not on the overlords of the Party, but on the agrarian working classes themselves for any excesses that have happened.
Therefore I assume that in fact, to make up for the obvious deficit of organization and effective power of the country people, some foreign invader or other would have to take their side, and be strong and resolved enough to punch through Soviet defenses and link up with peasant masses greeting them as liberators. Then it would be necessary for these triumphant foreign invaders to act with restraint and conciliatory good will to keep that pretense up--indeed it would need to be no pretense, the invaders would need to sacrifice potential gains (not all of them, but some) in order to win goodwill among the liberated peoples, to shore up their ongoing attack on Bolshevik power.
Again this is less unlikely if the attackers are some sort of democratic populists with a track record of doing good for the less favored classes. If we have a typical conqueror aiming at gratifying their own national interests as top priority with conciliatory policy only as a political tactic, it seems likely to me that even recently oppressed peasant masses will side with the devil they know, their own national government, rather than invaders of uncertain intentions.
Now it occurs to me your question might not apply to a sweeping and total defeat of the Bolshevik regime, but merely a rising of some kind that discredits Stalin, and causes the other Bolshevik leaders to blame him and throw him under the bus in the hope of patching things up and limiting the damage.
However, in that circumstance, they would still be faced with the problem of how to extract sufficient resources from the countryside when they are not presently in a position to pay them fair prices. Indeed putting it in terms of "fair prices" is a concession to pre-socialist market economics and thus a surrender to bourgeois power. The whole premise of Bolshevik rule is undermined by allowing even a portion of the peasantry to throw off collectivization; their partial victory serves as a dangerous example to other peasants and to the working classes in general that the Party may not after all be destined for victory nor be purely socialist in its priorities. Despairing of Stalin would be taken as a sign they despaired of themselves as a whole and a signal for general collapse of the whole Communist movement. If defeat takes the form of some foreign power or coalition invading Soviet soil and seizing territories out of its control, their problems are compounded by a much worsened strategic situation and a blow to Red Army morale that might be fatal.
Stalin, I believe, may have looked like he was moving recklessly, but in fact I suppose he had a very shrewd idea of the balance of power and judgement how it would go. He moved when he was ready to move, taking steps he judged would be successful and taking the next step when in turn the situation favored it.
I should not dismiss the possibility his judgement would err and he'd set off a powder keg that was worse than he expected. But I think the Bolsheviks, under any leadership, would proceed methodically with collectivization having chosen to execute it, and under whatever supreme leaders, would show no remorse and not dare back up.
I'm more interested in ATLs where the Bolsheviks find alternate paths to success that are less reprehensible. I suspect such an opportunity may have risen and been missed for ideological reasons in the 1920s, late in NEP. But this speculation would have nothing to do with your question, and it is more about managing industrial development than about how to handle the countryside. Even in the ATL I vaguely envision, the "scissors" problem of having insufficient material incentives to offer the country people to induce to them to produce efficiently and to trade freely would remain I suppose, and the "syndicate" based organization that might have offered an alternative to Trotskyist/Stalinist command-driven industrialization might or might not offer fresher alternatives to the stark ones the regime faced OTL.