Was the Versaille Treaty NOT Harsh Enough?
- Thread starter SpicyJuan
- Start date
RousseauX
Donor
You basically need an early enough PoD to avert a Russian collapse to the east, or alternatively, something to keep the Americans on board after 1919. Or alternatively you are permanently stuck with the problem that any peace which can keep Germans down permanently is not going to be enforced properly because the British and the French do not have the political will to do so on the long term. While the "new states" like Poland does not have the strength to do so.
A 1945 style settlement was made possible because there was a strong "Allied" presence to the both east and west capable of enforcing a partitioned Germany. I suspect in 1919 having a relatively intact Tsarist Russia, sharing a border with Germany, might be enough to have a vested interest and power keep a permanently weakened Germany in existence.
The Allies were not willing to enforce a harsher treaty, which would have required an extended occupation of Germany. You can make it harsher in words, but I suspect the end result (Allies unwilling to enforce treaty) would be groups that make the Nazis look tame. A holocaust that doesn't exclusively discriminate against Jews come to mind.
Making people poor + Letting them have weapons + Giving Them A Reason To Hate You = Really Stupid Idea.
Making people poor + Letting them have weapons + Giving Them A Reason To Hate You = Really Stupid Idea.
Reading Material
In The Gathering Storm (the first volume of his second world war memoirs) Churchill also gives some consideration to politics of the period - albeit very much viewed in places through the lens of his own views.
I'm sure that others on this forum could recommend other reading material...
I recommend to you, as reading material, The Nazis: A Warning from History, by Laurence Rees, which contains an analysis of the Nazis' rise to power and the circumstances surrounding it in the early chapters of the book.
In The Gathering Storm (the first volume of his second world war memoirs) Churchill also gives some consideration to politics of the period - albeit very much viewed in places through the lens of his own views.
I'm sure that others on this forum could recommend other reading material...
the problem with trying to permanently carve up germany is that none of the powers even if they had the will, will have the resources, man power, or money to enforce it.
None of the German people would remotely accept it and would do everything they can (whatever that ultimately means) to overturn such a outcome. Plus this ignores what a utter disaster such a move would be for Europe's economy. Germany was for all intents the economic center of Europe and if you dismantle that especially while the rest of Europe is still reeling from the economic chaos the war already caused then you might as well metaphorically cut your legs off just to spite someone.
Understand that there is literally no way you can enforce a break up of Germany at this point without it backfiring dramatically. German unification was a huge political force for most the previous century for a reason.
point is the best sort of peace would have been the same France received after the Napoleonic wars. One that let's it know it lost, and compensates the defeated to a respectable degree but doesn't stoop to petty punishments.
None of the German people would remotely accept it and would do everything they can (whatever that ultimately means) to overturn such a outcome. Plus this ignores what a utter disaster such a move would be for Europe's economy. Germany was for all intents the economic center of Europe and if you dismantle that especially while the rest of Europe is still reeling from the economic chaos the war already caused then you might as well metaphorically cut your legs off just to spite someone.
Understand that there is literally no way you can enforce a break up of Germany at this point without it backfiring dramatically. German unification was a huge political force for most the previous century for a reason.
point is the best sort of peace would have been the same France received after the Napoleonic wars. One that let's it know it lost, and compensates the defeated to a respectable degree but doesn't stoop to petty punishments.
Bluntly, the Versailles treaty was a departure from several centuries of European history, but not in a good way. Generally, Great Power treaties following major wars exacted some costs - and then tried to make sure that the defeated got some good reasons to be on the victor's side during the next round. I.e., how the French went from enthusiastically conquering Europe for a Corsican midget to pillars of the established order within one generation.
A nice mild Versailles with some plums from being on board for the future Commie-slaying means no Nazis. Hordes of butterflys. Could be a good timeline.
A nice mild Versailles with some plums from being on board for the future Commie-slaying means no Nazis. Hordes of butterflys. Could be a good timeline.
This, pretty much. Either set harsh treatent and enforce it or set some (relatively) light treatment and go home. In former case they'll hate you but will not be able to do anything about it. In latter they'll have little reason to hate you.
Well the holocaust was not exclusively targeted only at Jews. Slavs were targeted as well. 2 millions Poles, 3 millions Ukrainians, over million citizens of Yugoslavia, millions of Russians and Belorussians as well as Romas of Europe. After all Nazis killed more Slavic people then Jews.
There is also the book 'The Peacemakers' by Margaret macMillan,
I think one of the major problems was that Germans in general did not feel defeated. Not getting into the 'stab in the back' theory, but to the population at large it must have seemed a bit over the top to give in insofar as German armies still occupied a good part of France, just having negotiated a great treaty with Russia and despite blockade still not defeated.
Comparing it to 1945 where any German would know (in spades) that the war was indeed lost.
East Germany indeed had a harsh treatment after 1945 and were too defeated to do much about it.
Marshall-plan turned the entire West German society around.
So, can we use 1945 to do something about 1919?
I also support the notion that either it was not harsh enough or it was not soft enough.
I am leaning towards the notion that breaking up Germany would kill the European economy. That said, a total defeat in the field of any German army and thereby a conquest of German territory would have made wonders. THEN a benevolent peace could have worked - maybe.
Ivan
I think one of the major problems was that Germans in general did not feel defeated. Not getting into the 'stab in the back' theory, but to the population at large it must have seemed a bit over the top to give in insofar as German armies still occupied a good part of France, just having negotiated a great treaty with Russia and despite blockade still not defeated.
Comparing it to 1945 where any German would know (in spades) that the war was indeed lost.
East Germany indeed had a harsh treatment after 1945 and were too defeated to do much about it.
Marshall-plan turned the entire West German society around.
So, can we use 1945 to do something about 1919?
I also support the notion that either it was not harsh enough or it was not soft enough.
I am leaning towards the notion that breaking up Germany would kill the European economy. That said, a total defeat in the field of any German army and thereby a conquest of German territory would have made wonders. THEN a benevolent peace could have worked - maybe.
Ivan
The problm is, that a peace, which needs permanent enforcement, isn´t really a peace it´s just a cease fire. After some time, the peace have to work just without the permanent threat of war.
The second peace of Paris, had some harsh Terms, occupation und reparations, but they were limited for 5 years and after that the French became a sovereign part of the european System again and even if they were not happy with the new borders, they could live with them.
Versailles was full of Terms which would only work if Germany would stay an allied protectorat for the next hundred years.
Austria-Hungary was dismantled without trashing the economy of Europe, despite being a major industrial power. Painful, certainly, but not enough to destroy the entire European economy. This isn't the Morgenthau plan we're talking about here, but breaking Germany up into segments.
The problem is, I think, that by 1918 it's just too late - the population think of themselves as Germans, not as Bavarians or Saxons. Even if you break them up, they're just going to form themselves back together again within a generation or two and want a rematch. At best you could destroy the military-industrial complex and disband the armed forces so that the accumulated knowledge and experience goes away. If you can enforce that for a couple of generations (and it all comes back to enforcement again) you've got a weakened German army that is no longer a threat to their neighbours.
The key difference between 1814/15 and 1918 is that, in the first case, the victors intended to reinstate a previous monarchical regime. Louis XVIII's dynasty had caused problems for Europe, but it was a comfortably accepted part of the traditional political structure of Europe -- and infinitely less frightening than a regicidal Republic of any sort.
In order to ensure the success of this restoration, they needed to present France with terms that wouldn't cause tremendous resentment.
Further, it should be noted that they weren't negotiating with a defeated France; they were negotiating with a Bourbon regime that had been kicked out prior to the Wars.
Finally, it should be noted that, due to the above, they genuinely negotiated with France, rather than presenting her with a diktat.
Versailles was similar in that the victors refused to deal with the existing regime, but very different in that there was no acceptable prior regime to restore and placate. The nearest equivalent would've been to break Germany back up into the pre-1870 polities, which Germany wouldn't accept and the Entente mostly wasn't willing to do.
In order to ensure the success of this restoration, they needed to present France with terms that wouldn't cause tremendous resentment.
Further, it should be noted that they weren't negotiating with a defeated France; they were negotiating with a Bourbon regime that had been kicked out prior to the Wars.
Finally, it should be noted that, due to the above, they genuinely negotiated with France, rather than presenting her with a diktat.
Versailles was similar in that the victors refused to deal with the existing regime, but very different in that there was no acceptable prior regime to restore and placate. The nearest equivalent would've been to break Germany back up into the pre-1870 polities, which Germany wouldn't accept and the Entente mostly wasn't willing to do.
You may have a point, but the industrial style war of the 20th century does not even start to resemble the wars of the early 19th.
In 1815 Russian troops paraded in Paris, in 1918 nothing similar happened in Germany. Truth is that the Entente powers were deadly tired after 4 years of total war, and no one (not even the French) was willing to march into Germany and set up an occupation government (not even for a limited time). Under this premise it is quite obvious that OTL Versailles was a lot of bluster without the willpower to make it stick. The other problem is that the way the war ended on the western front left the army with too much prestige.
I'd have been in favor of a milder Versailles (still remembering the punitive aspects of the Frankfurt treaty in 1871: reparations cannot just be reduced too much) coupled with an occupation with a clear walk-out date (3 or 5 years). This might (no guarantees here) allow a more structured build up of a new, non-Prussian dominated state structure. At the very least it would kill the legend of the stab in the back before it is born.
The two sticking points are who does the occupation and what happens when there is a communist-inspired uprising.
There was a world's of difference between Austria-Hungary and the German Empire. Austria-Hungary needed German support after a few years just to keep going. Germany was on the other hand able to fund it's own war effort along with keeping all it's allies going to various degree's and keep on the offensive and almost managed to outlast the Entente to the point that US entry was the only thing that saved them.
It's the like difference between say India and China today. Yes the breakup of the first would have bad consequences but not so much that it tanks the whole system, the break up of the second would however have dire consequences.
Germany and A-H were operating on considerably different scales and sizes. not to mention the sheer number of economic connections that were tied to Germany.