Talk about the RN or KM being shit, or not, is both wildly inaccurate and not helpful.
Both navies had their strengths and weaknesses and in a lot of situations these canceled each other out and lead to a stalemate.
For mine, and this is entirely on balance in a relative sense, I'd say the KM was better tactically. This is why they sank more ships at Jutland, waged a hard to defeat uboat war and kept losses low throughout the war despite facing an preponderance of force. Whereas the RN was better operationally, which is why Jellicoe was able to cross Sheer's T twice at Jutland and was getting more and more hits as the battle progressed, as well as moving ships around the globe to deal with situations as they arose.
But, and this is a big but, it is easier to improve operational effectiveness than tactical effectiveness. The former merely requires re-drawing some lines on an org chart affecting a handful of senior officers, whereas the latter requires the selection of correct doctrine followed by a widespread increase in general tactical competence. It would be far easier for the Germans to create a CinC North Sea, and even perhaps CinC of the KM, than the RN to train dozens destroyer and cruiser Commodores and battlecruiser Admirals to scout efficiently and provide timely and tactically useful to the OC of the GF.
Both navies had their strengths and weaknesses and in a lot of situations these canceled each other out and lead to a stalemate.
For mine, and this is entirely on balance in a relative sense, I'd say the KM was better tactically. This is why they sank more ships at Jutland, waged a hard to defeat uboat war and kept losses low throughout the war despite facing an preponderance of force. Whereas the RN was better operationally, which is why Jellicoe was able to cross Sheer's T twice at Jutland and was getting more and more hits as the battle progressed, as well as moving ships around the globe to deal with situations as they arose.
But, and this is a big but, it is easier to improve operational effectiveness than tactical effectiveness. The former merely requires re-drawing some lines on an org chart affecting a handful of senior officers, whereas the latter requires the selection of correct doctrine followed by a widespread increase in general tactical competence. It would be far easier for the Germans to create a CinC North Sea, and even perhaps CinC of the KM, than the RN to train dozens destroyer and cruiser Commodores and battlecruiser Admirals to scout efficiently and provide timely and tactically useful to the OC of the GF.