Was the "starve them out" strategy ever really feasible?

Talk about the RN or KM being shit, or not, is both wildly inaccurate and not helpful.

Both navies had their strengths and weaknesses and in a lot of situations these canceled each other out and lead to a stalemate.

For mine, and this is entirely on balance in a relative sense, I'd say the KM was better tactically. This is why they sank more ships at Jutland, waged a hard to defeat uboat war and kept losses low throughout the war despite facing an preponderance of force. Whereas the RN was better operationally, which is why Jellicoe was able to cross Sheer's T twice at Jutland and was getting more and more hits as the battle progressed, as well as moving ships around the globe to deal with situations as they arose.

But, and this is a big but, it is easier to improve operational effectiveness than tactical effectiveness. The former merely requires re-drawing some lines on an org chart affecting a handful of senior officers, whereas the latter requires the selection of correct doctrine followed by a widespread increase in general tactical competence. It would be far easier for the Germans to create a CinC North Sea, and even perhaps CinC of the KM, than the RN to train dozens destroyer and cruiser Commodores and battlecruiser Admirals to scout efficiently and provide timely and tactically useful to the OC of the GF.
 
They were not volunteers they were dietitians and they as pointed out succeeded in working if there was a diet that could be produced entirely from British sources in sufficient quantities to allow the entire population a healthy diet. That such a diet could feed the population rather shows the opposite of your contention. Further your own carefully selected source notes that domestic food production was increased it makes no claim of famine being a prospect.

My problem with this study is that it was composed of volunteers instead of a body that actually reflects the British population; pregnant women and fighting men have massively different food requirements as compared to elderly for example. Further, this was during WWII from what you've both said so far, so not really applicable to the situation in the Great War.

Edit: A further point that seems to be misunderstood, even at the height of its success 3/4 ships heading for Britain made it through the submarine interdiction. This suggests a worst case fall in supplies of around 15% of food deliveries supplies initially and though it would rise it would have taken time to reach the oft quoted 60% that would have to wait until total interdiction was achieved.

Shipbuilding

Cox and Ellis _World War I Databook_ gives the
following stats (in millions of tons) for US
Production of merchant shipping during the war
years

1914 1915 1916 1917 1918

0.16 0.16 0.38 0.82 2.60

Corresponding figures for Britain were

1.68 0.65 0.61 1.16 1.35

And for Japan (the only other significant builder)

0.09 0.05 0.15 0.35 0.49



So in 1918 the US accounted for close to 60% of
_all_ Allied shipbuilding. But in addition to this
she made significant indirect contributions. Frex,
she refused to export American steel to Japan
unless the ships built with it were sent to the
Atlantic or Mediterranean, which meant
considerably more Japanese ships in those theatres
(where the U-Boats were) than had America remained
neutral. And American intervention led to that of
several other states, mostly in Latin America but
also including China, whose declaration of war
owed much to US influence. Many of these countries
had German merchant ships "stranded" in their
ports, which now became available to the Allies.
Iirc there were over 40 in Brazil alone. In
addition, in March 1918 (Stephenson - he doesn't
explain what legal excuse was given) Britain and
the US requisitioned around 130 Dutch merchant
ships in their ports. This was a substantial boost
at a time when the U-Boat campaign was at its
deadliest. US support also made it easier to
"twist the arms" of neutral merchantmen and keep
them coming to Allied ports, when the U-Boat
threat might otherwise have kept them away.

[Incidentally the Cox/Ellis figures may be
conservative. David Stephenson's _1914-1918_ gives
US 1918 production as "over 3 million tons", but
even the lower figure says enough about the
importance of America's contribution in this
area.]

Naval

The most important aspect of this was in
destroyers, which were desperately needed for
convoy escorts. By the end of June 1917 there were
(Massie - _Castles of Steel_) 28 US destroyers on
this duty and by the end of July 37. Stephenson
quotes Lord Jellicoe as stating "after the war"
that without the US Navy it would have been
impossible to introduce convoys in 1917, and at
all events transatlantic convoying was not
introduced until the US ships became available in
late June. (Even this was only for homeward bound
ships - it was not extended to outward bound ones
until August) This was particularly important as
most British oil was from the US and Caribbean
(see below), and by April 1917 it was in
critically short supply. Inability to convoy could
have had disastrous results, as in 1917 sailing
"independently", ie _not_ in a convoy, was getting
very close to suicide. John Terraine (_Business In
Great Waters_) notes that in May-July 93% of all
independents were sunk, and in August-October 83%,
as against only 1.23% of convoyed ships. As
Terraine observes, "Comment is superfluous". Yet
even so, lack of sufficient escorts meant that
even at the end of 1917, only 50% of merchantmen
(though 90% of ocean going ones) were being
convoyed, climbing to 90% of all ships by Nov
1918. This would certainly have been a lot harder,
and from the looks of things impossible, without
the US.

Food.

According to Ambassador Page and others, Britain
was in April 1917 within six weeks of running out
of wheat, so again a long delay in introducing
convoys could have been serious. And in 1918 the
Food Administration enabled the US to export three
times the normal amounts of breadstuffs, meats and
sugar. Presumably most of this went to Allied
countries. Stephenson refers to US supplies having
seen France and Italy through a "subsistence
crisis" in early 1918.

Admiral Sims cabled Navy Secretary Josephus
Daniels on April 14, 1917, "Mr Hoover informs me
that there is only sufficient grain supply in this
counry for three weeks. This does not include the
supply in retail stores." If this is correct (and
Hoover in particular was likely to have known) it
suggests that even few _weeks_ delay in US
intervention (surely possible assuming no
Zimmermann Telegram, or even just a slightly more
stubborn President Wilson) could have put Britain
in quite serious trouble.
 
My problem with this study is that it was composed of volunteers instead of a body that actually reflects the British population; pregnant women and fighting men have massively different food requirements as compared to elderly for example. Further, this was during WWII from what you've both said so far, so not really applicable to the situation in the Great War.

Your problem with that and probably any detailed study is that it does not provide the answers you are seeking. Further in any given period of World War 1 some 26 days worth of ship cargoes were headed into Britain just counting ships from North America so the supply on hand was always going to be at least somewhat supplemented on any given day. This has been explained already in this thread.
 
Your problem with that and probably any detailed study is that it does not provide the answers you are seeking.

Considering I already conceded on the matter of WWII, that's an extremely odd claim to make.

Further in any given period of World War 1 some 26 days worth of ship cargoes were headed into Britain just counting ships from North America so the supply on hand was always going to be at least somewhat supplemented on any given day. This has been explained already in this thread.

And as I just cited, and to which you did not respond to, there was only six weeks of food left by April of 1917 and 80-90% of unescorted shipping was being sunk. Without American destroyers to make convoys possible and the limitations of British merchant shipping production, simple math dictates the end result of the U-Boat campaign.
 

BooNZ

Banned
1. Im sure it looked lovely bobbing around at anchor - there is a reason it failed to come out and fight very often and when it did fled back to port every time and that reason was not because the RN was out performed or hapless.
The aspirational goal of the Royal navy in the years prior to the war was the defeat of the German HSF in a battle of annihilation - Churchill for example saw a British Blockade as a means to entice the Germans to come out to play, but has not appeared to have contemplated the ramifications of the HSF remaining anchored. The commitment of British light forces do defend against a HSF excursion contributed to the British conclusion they had insufficient escorts to implement a widespread convoy system.

2. USW was a reaction to the successful blokade and the failure of the 'Riskflotte' strategy (which again required the RN to be Outperformed and Hapless which the bounders refused to be). The decision to conduct USW made with some angst was supported, no strike that, 'Demanded' by the German peoples in the face of great shortages and suffering that had come about due to the blokade. The KM had no other option in trying to be useful in winning the war other than USW. Damned if they did, damaned if they didn't. A result of the success of the 'not hapless' and 'not outperformed' Royal Navy.
The USW was a gross miscalculation. The shipping loses the British were incuring in the months before the introduction of USW were not sustainable and the Entente access to new North American credit had already dried up. Without the entry of the US (resources and funding) and the widespread introduction of a convoy system, the war would have likely ended in 1917.

3. RN Amphibious Ops went very well - the subsequant Army operations.....hmmm....not so much....I mean getting ashore and stopping for lunch? WTF? Gallipoli was flawed before the first troops went ashore...overly delayed, initially like warm support by the Entente Governments and then telegraphed weeks ahead of the attempt. Not the fault of the Navy. Although you could argue that they bottled the attempts at forcing the Straights which probably would have ended the need for the Gallipoli campaign. One of my Critiques of the RN in WW1.
Preliminary and isolated naval bombardments weeks before the arrival of Entente land forces, coupled with the initial delivery of those land forces to the wrong parts - doomed what was already a deeply flawed plan, championed by the First Sea Lord.

I am genuinely curious as to what the British would be seeking to achieve by forcing the straights, let alone how it would be achieved. On paper the Dardanelles looked there for the taking, but the reality was there were too many unknown, unknowns for the Entente to succeed.

4. Shipping shortages - okay but is that the fault of the Navy? I blame the Germans! And this does not make the RN outperformed or hapless?
The wartime conditions strained British shipping without the efforts of the Germans. The shortage of shipping (along with escorts) was cited as the principal reason why convoys could not be implemented, since it was believed the formation and servicing of convoys would lead to unacceptable levels of downtime among shipping resources.

5. Fuel shortages - Ok but by then the Blokade had arguably succeeded. And no one had predicted the length and bredth of WW1 and could therefore have planned for it. And ultimately they did not run out of fuel. Again not a sign that the RN was outperformed or was hapless.
The British started the war with inadequate tanker capabilities and this proceeded to get even worse without effective steps being taken to rectify this shortage on a timely manner - sufficient tanker resources would have come on line in 1918 after the point of crisis. This is curious since the RN prewar was planning to utilize British oil resources in the middle east, but due to quality issues and refining problems instead relied on more accessable US sources.

As an aside, a high review of shipping losses during WW1 illustrates a disproportionate loss of British tankers, to the extent I question the data.

6. Convoys were made obsolete initially in WW1 by the much faster warships of the day then capable of firing to a horizon, and therefore a single Dreadnought Battleship could have potentially annialated a single convoy in short order unless said convoy was sufficiently escorted by a equally powerful vessel. Such was the thinking of the day. However by 1917 it was clear that the HSF was not sortying and so this was not a risk and the increasing losses of shipping to USW outweighed the other arguments of lose to productivity and ports being overwhelmed by surges of ships arriving in Convoy. Perhaps of your arguments this is the most apt as the RN did take too long to implement IMO but in practice it took time to understand (we have had over 100 years to do this!) the impact of this new type of warfare or perhaps a new form of 'Priviteer' waging an older type of warfare. But ultimately, despite a determined and skillful enemy, the RN was on the winning side of this one. The RN adapted to this new form of warfare and ultimately beat it. The Germans were obliged to resort to USW which is the cause of the losses but which brought the USA into the Entente which certainly guaranteed the defeat of the CP. So in extremis the RN was very sucessful. So again not Hapless and not outfought by pretty much any yard stick you wish to bring.
I have read a decent amount about the implementation of convoys and most of the above is very fresh material...

More common reasons cited for the convoy system not being more widely implemented sooner include the belief by British admiralty that convoys system would be a logistical nightmare requiring additional shipping and escort resources that were not available. It was later determined the British admiralty were working with flawed assumptions/ calculations.

7. This was a result of a war that no one had predicted or could have planned for and had gone on for longer than expected or imagined. And is not something that we can criticise the RN for without laying the same 'unfair' critique at every other armed force involved. Everyone was in the same position or worse. But again this does not make the RN outperformed or hapless.
As previously stated, the British started with the strongest economy, navy and empire. From a naval perspective it also enjoyed overwhelming geographical advantages over the Germans. It's implementation of its 'blockade' was muddled and it mismanaged the protection of British maritime interests against a vastly inferior foe. Despite those overwhelming advantages, the British war effort may not have survived 1917 without US assistance.

The Empire was in decline for a variety of reasons - social changes, industrial changes, political and due to both world wars its end probably came about sooner than would otherwise have been the case. But it certainly would still have ended without the wars and very likely not much later than it did.
I'm not convinced the empire was in decline, but it had probably ceased to expand and likely needed to reform to face new challenges.

And again no one could have planned for the events of both wars and the decline of Empire is not something that can be laid at the feet of the RN which performed its job well.
The RN performed its perceived core roles really well, except those core roles were less relevant in 1914. As distasteful as it sounds, the RN chestnuts were hauled from the fire by the US, which then proceeded to strip Britain of its baubles of empire.
 
Considering I already conceded on the matter of WWII, that's an extremely odd claim to make.

That is not what you said, you instead moved the goal posts...

My problem with this study is that it was composed of volunteers instead of a body that actually reflects the British population; pregnant women and fighting men have massively different food requirements as compared to elderly for example. Further, this was during WWII from what you've both said so far, so not really applicable to the situation in the Great War.

But good to know that is your way of conceding the point.



And as I just cited, and to which you did not respond to, there was only six weeks of food left by April of 1917 and 80-90% of unescorted shipping was being sunk. Without American destroyers to make convoys possible and the limitations of British merchant shipping production, simple math dictates the end result of the U-Boat campaign.

I had responded to your point by trying to make you aware your measure of the stock in warehouses in Britain is not the entirety of supply that the British would receive in be it three weeks nor six. Individual ships and convoys would turn up several times in that period, further but I strongly suspect that a large grain cargo of say 5,000 tons probably took a few days to unload and could be kept off the books when trying to alarm certain people. However I am really interested in your source for the claim of 80%+ sinking of unescorted vessels as that would strongly suggest that the Germans ought to be credited with at least a couple of million more tons of sinking than they have been by most historians of both shipping and warfare of the period.

It may be some measures like 80-90% of unescorted attacked but really if it was 80-90% of all unescorted vessels in April 1917 well this page would be need to find room for another two thousand or so vessels in British waters alone.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Talk about the RN or KM being shit, or not, is both wildly inaccurate and not helpful.

Both navies had their strengths and weaknesses and in a lot of situations these canceled each other out and lead to a stalemate.
Both Navies had spent a decade building an awe inspiring collection of hammers, but neither could actually find any nails to hit after the war kicked off. Neither navy was prepared for the war that ensued, but the British were more vulnerable and had far more to lose because Britain was dependent on maritime trade.
 
Something troubles me about the easy assessments we're making here.

First, is Britain actually six weeks from running out of food, or are they six weeks away from running out of grain, or are they six weeks away from running out of wheat specifically? It's not hard to find references to all three.

Second, how many weeks/months away from running out of wheat was Britain 12 months prior to this point of "crisis"? My fridge is far less than six weeks away from running out of food at any given moment, yet somehow new food just keeps arriving.

Anyhow without the infusion of American men and materiel I don't see how the Entente wins the war, but just sticking specifically to the question of whether Britain would be forced out of the war by the threat to its shipping here.
 
Both Navies had spent a decade building an awe inspiring collection of hammers, but neither could actually find any nails to hit after the war kicked off. Neither navy was prepared for the war that ensued, but the British were more vulnerable and had far more to lose because Britain was dependent on maritime trade.

So why did the Germans have to resort to USW when they well knew it would tip the US into war?
 

BooNZ

Banned
So why did the Germans have to resort to USW when they well knew it would tip the US into war?
The Germans were not fully aware of the dire state of the Entente shipping resources or the dire state of their finances. As previously stated, the USW was a gross miscalculation by the Germans.
 
The Germans were not fully aware of the dire state of the Entente shipping resources or the dire state of their finances. As previously stated, the USW was a gross miscalculation by the Germans.

Except clearly Entente shipping resources were not that dire as they were able to survive the sinking of some 4 millions register tons in 1917 alone while the US merchant fleet was not merely busy shipping the US Army to Europe but also required additional shipping resources from their allies in order to do so.



m3.gif

The most ample credit must be given to the Emergency Fleet Corporation, which turned over nearly a million tons of new ships, and to the Shipping Control Committee, which stripped bare of all suitable vessels our import and export trades and turned over for Army use nearly a million and a half tons of ships. The Army vessels also came from 12 other nations well scattered over the globe and shown in the figures of map 3.

From The War With Germany, A Statistical Summary

The quoted portion and more details from the study can be found by clicking the links

Also out of interest are you in possession of an absolute figure for the financial assistance the US provided?
 
Both Navies had spent a decade building an awe inspiring collection of hammers, but neither could actually find any nails to hit after the war kicked off. Neither navy was prepared for the war that ensued, but the British were more vulnerable and had far more to lose because Britain was dependent on maritime trade.

That's not entirely true; the Germans did undertake a half-arsed effort at Klienkrieg until the setback of Dogger Bank, and then again in 1916 initially in the North Sea then after Jutland in the Channel.

As for the British, they did win a battle in Heliogoland Bight in September 1914 and met every German thrust as quickly and effectively as they could.
 
Except clearly Entente shipping resources were not that dire as they were able to survive the sinking of some 4 millions register tons in 1917 alone while the US merchant fleet was not merely busy shipping the US Army to Europe but also required additional shipping resources from their allies in order to do so.

Well getting a proper convoy system going with American help in order to curb shipping losses was important there, not just the added tonnage available.

I'm still not clear on how dire the shipping situation was anyways though.
 
Without dredging through some research materials, I can't quantify the extent of the shipping shortage. However when the USA joined the war there was a real issue with enough shipping to bring the AEF and associated gear to France - most of the shipping to be used was red ensign. It was a serious issue and the British attempted to use the shipping crunch to blackmail the USA in to accepting the British plan for American soldiers - they wanted US recruits to go to the UK where they would be trained by British Army instructors and then plugged in as replacements in British units, officers above very junior or medical not really needed...
 
Without dredging through some research materials, I can't quantify the extent of the shipping shortage. However when the USA joined the war there was a real issue with enough shipping to bring the AEF and associated gear to France - most of the shipping to be used was red ensign. It was a serious issue and the British attempted to use the shipping crunch to blackmail the USA in to accepting the British plan for American soldiers - they wanted US recruits to go to the UK where they would be trained by British Army instructors and then plugged in as replacements in British units, officers above very junior or medical not really needed...
"We may not have enough shipping to support the personnel and logistical train of an entire army" is not quite the same thing as "gosh we are just about out of food," though, is it. I'm just concerned that a shortage of a single crop on which Britain was highly dependent, namely wheat, is being spun up into an impending famine when the reality may have been a little less severe. And so far nobody has even quantified the extent of the shortage because "we only have six weeks' supply left" is a statement that, on its own, means nothing. I only have five days' worth of food left in my cupboard at the moment, give or take.
 
It probably because you couldn't organise an escort to go to the shop!
Or you were too poor to afford it. At the shop they are hoarding it.
Rationing was introduced in 1918 after there was evidence of malnutrition in poor communities. As prices had doubled since the start of the war, rationing made the distribution of food equitable. In Germany, prices rose 4 fold, further east in A-H and Turkey they went up 16-18 fold when collapse came. Does the notion of 'starve them out' come more from the affordability of food rather than the abundance? If so then Germany would have to trigger a 16 fold increase in inflation to force GB out of the war, all while Germany and her allies are fast reaching that point.
 
Without dredging through some research materials, I can't quantify the extent of the shipping shortage. However when the USA joined the war there was a real issue with enough shipping to bring the AEF and associated gear to France - most of the shipping to be used was red ensign. It was a serious issue and the British attempted to use the shipping crunch to blackmail the USA in to accepting the British plan for American soldiers - they wanted US recruits to go to the UK where they would be trained by British Army instructors and then plugged in as replacements in British units, officers above very junior or medical not really needed...

Yes there was a certain amount of political sleight of hand which colours pop history versions of the situation. BTW if you click on the "more details" link above chapters I and II of The War With Germany deal with the selection and training process of the AEF. One point to be aware of:

The length of training of the men can be got at in another way. By September, 1917, we had 500,000 men in this country training for overseas duty. We did not have 500,000 men in France until May, 1918, or eight months later. It is probable that the millionth man who went overseas began training in December, 1917. He did not reach France until July, 1918, after seven months of training. Evidence of this character goes to show that for our first million men the standard of seven months' training was consistently maintained as an average figure.

In June with the German drives in full swing, the Allies called on US to continue the extraordinary transportation of troops begun in April. The early movement had been met by filling up the divisions that sailed with the best trained men wherever they could be found. Divisions embarked after July 1 had to meet shortages with men called to the colors in the spring. By November the average period of training in the United States had been shortened to close to four months, and the average for the period July 1 to November 11 was probably five months.

Seven months may then be taken as the average training figure for the first million men, five months for the second million, an average of six months before reaching France. After reaching France an average of two months' training before going into frontline trenches was maintained, although the experience of divisions used as replacements in the last months was under this figure.

From the War With Germany, a Statistical Summary

The point that troops even once in Europe were not considered ready to go into the line let alone when first called to the colours may be obvious to professionals like yourself but seems to be more opaque to others.
 
Jeez, then you're fucked!

It probably because you couldn't organise an escort to go to the shop!
Maybe. Or, it just means I never have more than a week or so onhand anyway, which is my point about the "six weeks left" bit.

Kind of hard to appreciate just how dramatic a crisis your wheat storage being down to six weeks is unless you know what it would normally be. Is that six weekscof rationed use or six weeks of uncontrolled consumer purchasing? What about substitutes? etc.
 
That is not what you said, you instead moved the goal posts...

I'm not sure where I did such, but my apologies if I gave you that impression.

I had responded to your point by trying to make you aware your measure of the stock in warehouses in Britain is not the entirety of supply that the British would receive in be it three weeks nor six. Individual ships and convoys would turn up several times in that period, further but I strongly suspect that a large grain cargo of say 5,000 tons probably took a few days to unload and could be kept off the books when trying to alarm certain people. However I am really interested in your source for the claim of 80%+ sinking of unescorted vessels as that would strongly suggest that the Germans ought to be credited with at least a couple of million more tons of sinking than they have been by most historians of both shipping and warfare of the period.

It may be some measures like 80-90% of unescorted attacked but really if it was 80-90% of all unescorted vessels in April 1917 well this page would be need to find room for another two thousand or so vessels in British waters alone.

Citation was previously made here, with John Terraine's Business in Great Waters: The U-Boat Wars 1916-1945. The book states that in May-July 93% of all
independents were sunk and 83% were in August-October. As for what stocks were on hand:

Food.

According to Ambassador Page and others, Britain
was in April 1917 within six weeks of running out
of wheat. Admiral Sims cabled Navy Secretary Josephus
Daniels on April 14, 1917, "Mr Hoover informs me
that there is only sufficient grain supply in this
counry for three weeks. This does not include the
supply in retail stores." If this is correct (and
Hoover in particular was likely to have known) it
suggests that even few _weeks_ delay in US
intervention (surely possible assuming no
Zimmermann Telegram, or even just a slightly more
stubborn President Wilson) could have put Britain
in quite serious trouble.
 
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