The thing about the manpower crisis is that it did not emerge in the manner expected in 1917 now did it? In fact both the Entente main powers were able to go even better than the Central Powers who were also forced to economise manpower by shifting to the triangular division because the Entente powers had greater access to machines such as motor and steam trucks which allowed them to shift personnel from the supply branches to the front while still coping with the greater logistic demands of increasingly mechanised warfare. It is also worth pointing we have tussled over tankers and oil before on this board and the interesting point can be made that in fact British ordered tankers being made in the United States were on the verge of arriving in the supply chain and that in the actual progress of events American entry and the needs to supply the American forces arriving in Europe temporarily exacerbated the issue before more American resources came on line to make the problem all but go away.
The absence of the projected British manpower crisis may have had something to do with millions of Americans joining the war effort. The shortage of tankers was ultimately remedied by converting existing doubled hulled boats to carry fuel - sufficient numbers of specialist tankers would have appeared too late.
No because not only have we tussled before on these issues but we were and you are trying again to discuss temporary bottlenecks caused by multiple factors (including as noted above the arrival of the US into the war in, oh yes, mid 1917) that the Germans were not able to take advantage of.
Most of those
temporary bottlenecks existed before the entry of the US and were a continuation of patterns established from 1914. The near limitless resources of the USA enabled those shortfalls to be remedied, but without US finance, both Britain and France would have been operating in an environment of scarcity - rather than being able to spend like drunken sailors...
Again you are confusing your interpretation of the facts with actual facts, the US Federal Reserve backtracked much earlier than you are choosing to imply, I know you know this because I know you have seen the actual Federal Reserve statements and bulletins on the matter because I have submitted them here before in debate with you. Perhaps you might care to acknowledge that or are you going to try and deny this for a third time and then we shall see if you still deny once I dig out links to online records of those Federal Reserve Bulletins? Also I note you are trying to shift to arguments that have not been made in this thread.
The Federal Reserve clarification came after US was on the path to war - dig away.
This is an interesting and dare I say novel legal argument in international law but no doubt you have an example of some jurisprudence that backs up your claim?
One of the rationales for the cash and carry policy was extended credit would either breach neutrality or outstanding balances might influence american policy/neutrality in future. It's not even contentious.
This again largely a matter of interpretation but it is worth noting that the British based their orders in council upon legal precedents set by the US during the US Civil War. Further but on the point of compromising their prosperity German goods and manufactures of the period were the main competition for US goods and manufactures and often direct knock offs of American patent designs. Thus the removal of this competitive influence from global markets was in itself a direct boon to the US manufacturing sector and not really much of an incentive to breach the blockade in Germany's over America's favour.
No, the British blockade was based on an obscure doctrine of retaliation that dated back centuries - not the American Civil war. The British legal experts were very careful not to describe their actions as a blockade, since it breached multiple recognised criteria. I guess you could argue the British were following the US Civil War precedent of the blockading power doing whatever other naval powers will let you get away with, rather than what is technically legal.
Well given we are also talking about the Kaiserreich which was on the defensive in the west (though not the east where things were more fluid) for most of the war and especially after the Verdun Offensive and given that the Nazi regime was on the defensive on all fronts from late 1942 they spent an awful lot of the war on the defensive. Then again the second lot had Romania and Italy on their side that time so if we applied the kind of logic you have applied then we could pretend that Italy and/or Romania were the secret source in German success or failure? See this is why we need to dig deeper and see what impact things like the Federal Reserve warning and retraction actually had.
The impact of British access to the near limitless resources and untapped American manpower should be self evident. Similarly, the impact the Federal Reserve warning and clarification had on Entente credit are scarcely secrets. If you are seeking to rationalise British and French economic performance relative to the Germans, you could observe the British had to rapidly build and train a continental army from scratch during wartime conditions, while the French had to adjust to some of its most productive territory being occupied by the Germans. The Germans also started the war with the best equipment and the best trained army, with the least bad doctrines. The above makes more sence than comparing naval combat to trench warfare.
Well you are ascribing credit for three different to a group that at best was able to put a stop to one of them. The study of the goings on in the Reichstag are a worthy pursuit in themselves but the foundations of the education and welfare infrastructure in Germany in this period were not simply a top down implementation. The budget battles and compromises are fascinating but the group that had emerged around Wilhelm by 1914 had very little to do with an awful lot of it and actively opposed some of it so can hardly be ascribed credit for it. That said yes they did manage to end forty years of peace for Germany in the European theatre that a fair number of other Germans (remember Bismarck but not just him) had worked very hard on.
So when you described the leaders of Imperial Germany as a
kleptocratic clique, you were just being a troll?
I am not comparing trenches but the essential of defence versus attack. In the Battles of the Atlantic the Royal Navy and its allies who varied across different time periods were defending merchant shipping which represent point targets that must be located before they can even be attacked. A fixed trench position is in many ways a pale imitation of the complexity required of the naval offensive picture under discussion so no I was not comparing the Atlantic sea lanes to the trenches.
I substantially agree with the above assessment, which is why playing defensive on naval matters (i.e. maintaining sea control) is far more difficult to offensive (i.e. attempting sea denial). The Entente dependence on maintaining sea lanes is not an intrinsic advantage, the advantage is denying access to those sea lanes by the CP powers. However, the CP powers were not as dependent on maritime trade as the Entente.
See here we have a statement by you which is actually closer by itself to something we can agree on. Wilson would have kept the US out of the war had USW not forced his hand. The difference between legal norms of blockade and remember the British were following US set precedent and USW was that one was deliberately indiscriminate aggression and one was not. Yes had the Germans not attempted USW then they could well have expected the US to stay out of the war and this might if your interpretation of finances is closer to correct have forced the Entente to the table on terms favourable to the Central Powers or if mine is then there is still a good chance that the terms would not have been nearly so savage as Versailles.
As outlined above, the British were following the US precedent of setting an illegal blockade and hoping the significant neutral naval powers did not push back.
In my interpretation, without American finance the Entente no longer has ready access to material for war and would need to seek terms some time in 1917. With your interpretation, I am still struggling to see how Britain is going to drag France and Italy to the finish line without the promises of limitless American resources and millions of fresh troops - especially after Russia has folded. In addition to finance, my interpretation does not automatically expect very good decision making from the British based on OTL performance prior to US entry. After US entry OTL the Entente did not appear to make 'bad decisions', because vast American resources enabled the Entente to effectively cover all options.
So you ought to decide, if the Ententes finances are that shaky any starvation strategy is an idiot's move but I they are not then it makes sense for a Germany that lacks many other winning options.
It depends on interpretation - with the benefit of hindsight we know the Germans came very close to breaking the British bank, which would ultimately lead to starvation if war persisted. The Germans never came close to literally starving Britain into submission, but it did provide misery.
From a mini-max perspective the Germans 'should' do as much as they can against British shipping, without dragging the US into the war. Based on this criteria, OTL up until 1917 the Germans outperformed the hapless Royal Navy, either through good luck or good management.