Was the "starve them out" strategy ever really feasible?

Has any country, fighting a war for survival, ever given up from
'Whelp- got no more real Money, got to surrender, pronto'

Look at the American Revolutionary War, Continental Script was near worthless,2% of face value, years before the end.

There's a distinct difference between fighting a defensive pre-industrial war and a powe-projecting industrial war. The former allows for more extreme measures to be accepted and a greater share of national resources diverted to the effort, while the later is much lower loss to pull back from.
 

longsword14

Banned
Look at the American Revolutionary War, Continental Script was near worthless,2% of face value, years before the end.
Your analogy is missing some essential things.
1. Imagine no foreign backing for the Americans. 2. Imagine the Americans had to fight a war of material that consumed orders of magnitude greater quantities of ammunition, metal and blood.
 
Your analogy is missing some essential things.
1. Imagine no foreign backing for the Americans. 2. Imagine the Americans had to fight a war of material that consumed orders of magnitude greater quantities of ammunition, metal and blood.

So give me an example where a country surrendered because of bad finances in a war
 
There's a distinct difference between fighting a defensive pre-industrial war and a powe-projecting industrial war. The former allows for more extreme measures to be accepted and a greater share of national resources diverted to the effort, while the later is much lower loss to pull back from.

UK could project power to anywhere on Earth at that point, the World Hegemon.

Different how?

Still had to pay for stuff.
 
UK could project power to anywhere on Earth at that point, the World Hegemon.

Different how?

Still had to pay for stuff.

You can foist worthless paper off on people in exchange for simple goods at well above its actual value if you're standing on front of them with a loaded gun and they're liable to lose whatever it is you're taking anyways to an invading enemy force if you're unable to stop them. Far less so if that person isen't under personal risk from either you or an enemy: for example, if they're on the opposite side of the Atlantic with their own nation's military defending them.

And I'm not saying Britain can't project power; just that it's more expensive and there's less of a cost to stopping doing it than letting down a fight on your home turf. GB can negotiate terms at some point with minimal if any loses if doing the former, and at a certain point public opinion and practical concern may make that a better option than fighting on.
 
The UK can play games with the currency etc within the Empire Commonwealth, although not indefinitely. If and when their credit rating tanks, they have a problem getting items they need that must be outsourced elsewhere than the Empire/Commonwealth. In both wars, the USA decided having Britain lose was contrary to the US national interest, so in spite of a crappy credit rating (if you will) the US continued to make loans and encourage sales on credit. Some individuals lenders or industrialists can make this choice on their own, and risk personal/corporate bankruptcy, but to really make a difference you need the government to commit to making these sorts of loans. This is the problem the Japanese were up against before PH, within their empire they could play games, but they needed to purchase oil and other essentials outside their empire and could not use funny money/yen to do so, and nobody was willing to extend them credit (let alone the asset freezes).

A shipyard builing tankers/merchant vessels for the UK can't take an IOU, they need to pay suppliers and workers who want to be paid in real money.
 
A shipyard builing tankers/merchant vessels for the UK can't take an IOU, they need to pay suppliers and workers who want to be paid in real money.

The shipyards and the arms factories did not take IOUs by and large although in actual business practice this is not unheard of, however in World War 1 they got paid up front. Now it can be argued that American investors had provided a goodly portion of that money but the thing is they mostly got paid too, the initial coupon on the war bonds was 5.5% and these was paid until the middle of 1932 when the coupon was converted to 3.5% and the bonds themselves to perpetual bonds. So in fact few large investors actually lost much money, if you were a smaller investor reliant on that investment income to pay day to day bills things were however a but different hence a lot of the anger but for America at large extending the British credit was great because they got paid, paid again and then got to be pissed off they did not get paid a third time for the same gun, ship, wad of propellant etc. Not that I am saying the default was a good thing, it hit a number of small investors quite hard but for America and on the scale of the kind of macro-economic policy the Fed is responsible the loans were good business.

Now there were some things that had to come from the US. Oil was a major one, the turn around time on tankers to places like Persia and Burma was too great for the number of tankers the British had built pre-war and also the Med was one of the areas that German submarines were being unusually successful even without the introduction of USW. Explosive under which heading I would include propellants were the next big thing the US provided, it was one of the reasons the Entente could be more lavish with its artillery bombardments, as it turned out they still over ordered, which suggests they could have gone on shooting their guns at above the rate suggested by domestic and Imperial production for probably a year or two even assuming a sudden cessation of US supply.

Firearms and field artillery turned out not to be one of the things that the Entente needed. Indeed several small arms manufacturers were on the verge of getting quite badly burned in 1917 as the British would not have been renewing their orders for the P14 rifle as they now had a surplus of SMLEs, that said it is unlikely Wilson let alone Congress would have authorised war just to provide the likes of Winchester Arms and Remington Arms with orders to cover their blushes.

Still the thing is that businesses with enough of a cash pile or dependent enough suppliers or a willing bank can and do take IOUs all the time, it is how an awful lot of business works. The point being that within limits this was the next line of credit if somehow further bond raising drives had come to a crashing halt. Even so then there was quite of lot of bought and paid for stuff that the British and the French were paying for with their empires' exports and beyond that were their gold reserves British gold reserves were able to fund things for a good sixteen months even in the much more expensive 2nd World War.

The thing is in each of these scenarios America still gets paid. Germany on the other hand faces the problem that the Entente are not coming down to their level until at best 1919.
 

BooNZ

Banned
The thing about the manpower crisis is that it did not emerge in the manner expected in 1917 now did it? In fact both the Entente main powers were able to go even better than the Central Powers who were also forced to economise manpower by shifting to the triangular division because the Entente powers had greater access to machines such as motor and steam trucks which allowed them to shift personnel from the supply branches to the front while still coping with the greater logistic demands of increasingly mechanised warfare. It is also worth pointing we have tussled over tankers and oil before on this board and the interesting point can be made that in fact British ordered tankers being made in the United States were on the verge of arriving in the supply chain and that in the actual progress of events American entry and the needs to supply the American forces arriving in Europe temporarily exacerbated the issue before more American resources came on line to make the problem all but go away.
The absence of the projected British manpower crisis may have had something to do with millions of Americans joining the war effort. The shortage of tankers was ultimately remedied by converting existing doubled hulled boats to carry fuel - sufficient numbers of specialist tankers would have appeared too late.

No because not only have we tussled before on these issues but we were and you are trying again to discuss temporary bottlenecks caused by multiple factors (including as noted above the arrival of the US into the war in, oh yes, mid 1917) that the Germans were not able to take advantage of.

Most of those temporary bottlenecks existed before the entry of the US and were a continuation of patterns established from 1914. The near limitless resources of the USA enabled those shortfalls to be remedied, but without US finance, both Britain and France would have been operating in an environment of scarcity - rather than being able to spend like drunken sailors...

Again you are confusing your interpretation of the facts with actual facts, the US Federal Reserve backtracked much earlier than you are choosing to imply, I know you know this because I know you have seen the actual Federal Reserve statements and bulletins on the matter because I have submitted them here before in debate with you. Perhaps you might care to acknowledge that or are you going to try and deny this for a third time and then we shall see if you still deny once I dig out links to online records of those Federal Reserve Bulletins? Also I note you are trying to shift to arguments that have not been made in this thread.
The Federal Reserve clarification came after US was on the path to war - dig away.

This is an interesting and dare I say novel legal argument in international law but no doubt you have an example of some jurisprudence that backs up your claim?
One of the rationales for the cash and carry policy was extended credit would either breach neutrality or outstanding balances might influence american policy/neutrality in future. It's not even contentious.


This again largely a matter of interpretation but it is worth noting that the British based their orders in council upon legal precedents set by the US during the US Civil War. Further but on the point of compromising their prosperity German goods and manufactures of the period were the main competition for US goods and manufactures and often direct knock offs of American patent designs. Thus the removal of this competitive influence from global markets was in itself a direct boon to the US manufacturing sector and not really much of an incentive to breach the blockade in Germany's over America's favour.
No, the British blockade was based on an obscure doctrine of retaliation that dated back centuries - not the American Civil war. The British legal experts were very careful not to describe their actions as a blockade, since it breached multiple recognised criteria. I guess you could argue the British were following the US Civil War precedent of the blockading power doing whatever other naval powers will let you get away with, rather than what is technically legal.


Well given we are also talking about the Kaiserreich which was on the defensive in the west (though not the east where things were more fluid) for most of the war and especially after the Verdun Offensive and given that the Nazi regime was on the defensive on all fronts from late 1942 they spent an awful lot of the war on the defensive. Then again the second lot had Romania and Italy on their side that time so if we applied the kind of logic you have applied then we could pretend that Italy and/or Romania were the secret source in German success or failure? See this is why we need to dig deeper and see what impact things like the Federal Reserve warning and retraction actually had.
The impact of British access to the near limitless resources and untapped American manpower should be self evident. Similarly, the impact the Federal Reserve warning and clarification had on Entente credit are scarcely secrets. If you are seeking to rationalise British and French economic performance relative to the Germans, you could observe the British had to rapidly build and train a continental army from scratch during wartime conditions, while the French had to adjust to some of its most productive territory being occupied by the Germans. The Germans also started the war with the best equipment and the best trained army, with the least bad doctrines. The above makes more sence than comparing naval combat to trench warfare.

Well you are ascribing credit for three different to a group that at best was able to put a stop to one of them. The study of the goings on in the Reichstag are a worthy pursuit in themselves but the foundations of the education and welfare infrastructure in Germany in this period were not simply a top down implementation. The budget battles and compromises are fascinating but the group that had emerged around Wilhelm by 1914 had very little to do with an awful lot of it and actively opposed some of it so can hardly be ascribed credit for it. That said yes they did manage to end forty years of peace for Germany in the European theatre that a fair number of other Germans (remember Bismarck but not just him) had worked very hard on.
So when you described the leaders of Imperial Germany as a kleptocratic clique, you were just being a troll?​

I am not comparing trenches but the essential of defence versus attack. In the Battles of the Atlantic the Royal Navy and its allies who varied across different time periods were defending merchant shipping which represent point targets that must be located before they can even be attacked. A fixed trench position is in many ways a pale imitation of the complexity required of the naval offensive picture under discussion so no I was not comparing the Atlantic sea lanes to the trenches.
I substantially agree with the above assessment, which is why playing defensive on naval matters (i.e. maintaining sea control) is far more difficult to offensive (i.e. attempting sea denial). The Entente dependence on maintaining sea lanes is not an intrinsic advantage, the advantage is denying access to those sea lanes by the CP powers. However, the CP powers were not as dependent on maritime trade as the Entente.

See here we have a statement by you which is actually closer by itself to something we can agree on. Wilson would have kept the US out of the war had USW not forced his hand. The difference between legal norms of blockade and remember the British were following US set precedent and USW was that one was deliberately indiscriminate aggression and one was not. Yes had the Germans not attempted USW then they could well have expected the US to stay out of the war and this might if your interpretation of finances is closer to correct have forced the Entente to the table on terms favourable to the Central Powers or if mine is then there is still a good chance that the terms would not have been nearly so savage as Versailles.
As outlined above, the British were following the US precedent of setting an illegal blockade and hoping the significant neutral naval powers did not push back.

In my interpretation, without American finance the Entente no longer has ready access to material for war and would need to seek terms some time in 1917. With your interpretation, I am still struggling to see how Britain is going to drag France and Italy to the finish line without the promises of limitless American resources and millions of fresh troops - especially after Russia has folded. In addition to finance, my interpretation does not automatically expect very good decision making from the British based on OTL performance prior to US entry. After US entry OTL the Entente did not appear to make 'bad decisions', because vast American resources enabled the Entente to effectively cover all options.

So you ought to decide, if the Ententes finances are that shaky any starvation strategy is an idiot's move but I they are not then it makes sense for a Germany that lacks many other winning options.
It depends on interpretation - with the benefit of hindsight we know the Germans came very close to breaking the British bank, which would ultimately lead to starvation if war persisted. The Germans never came close to literally starving Britain into submission, but it did provide misery.

From a mini-max perspective the Germans 'should' do as much as they can against British shipping, without dragging the US into the war. Based on this criteria, OTL up until 1917 the Germans outperformed the hapless Royal Navy, either through good luck or good management.
 
Got to take those figures with a pinch of salt if extrapolating to wartime. Remember whats planted is based on what price they can sell in a world market not what they could produce if needed. That the 70's figure is less than was managed OTL in WW2 and possibly only as much as pre war is a big red flag. Also barley and oats at the time would be as big as wheat and a government mandated use of natural flour ( ie milled as brown not purified to white) increased effective yield ( less waste and it also preserved iron, vitamins etc )

IIRC even during WWII with extensive rationing they only managed to achieve 60% of their food needs.
 
IIRC even during WWII with extensive rationing they only managed to achieve 60% of their food needs.
Wrong, a team from Cambridge University, so no duffers, was tasked to devise a diet from internal sources capable of feeding the whole population. Volunteers went on it and were tested both medically and on the ability to do work. The result was it was possible but the diet was bland, repetitive and caused great amounts of flatulence.
Imports were, as I stated earlier, seen as needed for morale not necessity ( 1946, so no U-boats, was actually the most rationed year )
 
Based on this criteria, OTL up until 1917 the Germans outperformed the hapless Royal Navy, either through good luck or good management.

Outperformed?

Hapless?

Perhaps you could explain your criteria you are using to enable those comments to be valid as I find the post somewhat impenitrable in this regards?

The only thing the German navy outperformed the Royal Navy at in WW1 was running away with only one major victory 'Coronel' to their name because Cradock didn't run away when perhaps he should have.
 
Outperformed?

Hapless?

Perhaps you could explain your criteria you are using to enable those comments to be valid as I find the post somewhat impenitrable in this regards?

The only thing the German navy outperformed the Royal Navy at in WW1 was running away with only one major victory 'Coronel' to their name because Cradock didn't run away when perhaps he should have.

The thing is starting in the early war we see the ongoing decimation of the German light forces (i.e destroyers and light cruisers and below) in numerous small engagements. As the Germans found at Jutland light forces actually have quite an impact on the main force engagement where again German light forces got hammered further complicating future fleet operations.

Now that is just one area in which the RN outmatched the Kaiserliche Marine.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Outperformed?

Hapless?

Perhaps you could explain your criteria you are using to enable those comments to be valid as I find the post somewhat impenitrable in this regards?

The only thing the German navy outperformed the Royal Navy at in WW1 was running away with only one major victory 'Coronel' to their name because Cradock didn't run away when perhaps he should have.
In 1914 the British enjoyed extreme advantages in terms of empire, navy and economy yet:
1. The German Navy maintained/remained a fleet in being - at least a victory for common sense;
2. The eventual British blockade only started to bite in 1916 and only became truely effective with the entry of the US;
3. The British attempts at amphibious operations did not go well;
4. The British were facing a gradually mounting shortage of shipping and a crisis in dedicated tankers prior to the US entry into the war and the British independent efforts to remedy those long term problems were woefully inadequite;
5. The British were facing a naval fuel crisis and based on a long term pattern of use since 1914, were projected to exhaust naval fuel reserves before the end of 1917 - until the US entered the war
6. The British admiralty actively opposed the wider implementation of the convoy system until after the US entered the war; and
7. The British had more-or-less burnt through its available financial liquidity prior to the US entering the war.

The Royal Navy and British diplomacy had [superbly] ruled the waves and the world for centuries, but the first world war was not their finest hour. The British were ultimately on the winning side, but the British Empire suffered wounds from which it would never recover.
 

Orry

Donor
Monthly Donor
Also change in shipping patterns

It is far less efficient and takes longer but you can always take vital supplies the other way around. The Germans can do nothing about the Pacific / Indian Ocean/ Suez / Med route.

Nessecity is as they say the Mother of Invention

Before the Great War nobody believed that the great nations could fight for more than a couple of months before they ran out of supplies and were bankrupted.

Look at what rations Germany fought on with for her Civilian population - why assume that the British give up because they have no Jam with their bread??? Now if it was the Tea supply it could go either way - British Army either goes into a beserk rage and takes Berlin in 40 days or collapses in utter despair...... :)
 
In 1914 the British enjoyed extreme advantages in terms of empire, navy and economy yet:
1. The German Navy maintained/remained a fleet in being - at least a victory for common sense;
2. The eventual British blockade only started to bite in 1916 and only became truely effective with the entry of the US;
3. The British attempts at amphibious operations did not go well;
4. The British were facing a gradually mounting shortage of shipping and a crisis in dedicated tankers prior to the US entry into the war and the British independent efforts to remedy those long term problems were woefully inadequite;
5. The British were facing a naval fuel crisis and based on a long term pattern of use since 1914, were projected to exhaust naval fuel reserves before the end of 1917 - until the US entered the war
6. The British admiralty actively opposed the wider implementation of the convoy system until after the US entered the war; and
7. The British had more-or-less burnt through its available financial liquidity prior to the US entering the war.

The Royal Navy and British diplomacy had [superbly] ruled the waves and the world for centuries, but the first world war was not their finest hour. The British were ultimately on the winning side, but the British Empire suffered wounds from which it would never recover.

1. Im sure it looked lovely bobbing around at anchor - there is a reason it failed to come out and fight very often and when it did fled back to port every time and that reason was not because the RN was out performed or hapless.
2. USW was a reaction to the successful blokade and the failure of the 'Riskflotte' strategy (which again required the RN to be Outperformed and Hapless which the bounders refused to be). The decision to conduct USW made with some angst was supported, no strike that, 'Demanded' by the German peoples in the face of great shortages and suffering that had come about due to the blokade. The KM had no other option in trying to be useful in winning the war other than USW. Damned if they did, damaned if they didn't. A result of the success of the 'not hapless' and 'not outperformed' Royal Navy.
3. RN Amphibious Ops went very well - the subsequant Army operations.....hmmm....not so much....I mean getting ashore and stopping for lunch? WTF? Gallipoli was flawed before the first troops went ashore...overly delayed, initially like warm support by the Entente Governments and then telegraphed weeks ahead of the attempt. Not the fault of the Navy. Although you could argue that they bottled the attempts at forcing the Straights which probably would have ended the need for the Gallipoli campaign. One of my Critiques of the RN in WW1.
4. Shipping shortages - okay but is that the fault of the Navy? I blame the Germans! And this does not make the RN outperformed or hapless?
5. Fuel shortages - Ok but by then the Blokade had arguably succeeded. And no one had predicted the length and bredth of WW1 and could therefore have planned for it. And ultimately they did not run out of fuel. Again not a sign that the RN was outperformed or was hapless.
6. Convoys were made obsolete initially in WW1 by the much faster warships of the day then capable of firing to a horizon, and therefore a single Dreadnought Battleship could have potentially annialated a single convoy in short order unless said convoy was sufficiently escorted by a equally powerful vessel. Such was the thinking of the day. However by 1917 it was clear that the HSF was not sortying and so this was not a risk and the increasing losses of shipping to USW outweighed the other arguments of lose to productivity and ports being overwhelmed by surges of ships arriving in Convoy. Perhaps of your arguments this is the most apt as the RN did take too long to implement IMO but in practice it took time to understand (we have had over 100 years to do this!) the impact of this new type of warfare or perhaps a new form of 'Priviteer' waging an older type of warfare. But ultimately, despite a determined and skillful enemy, the RN was on the winning side of this one. The RN adapted to this new form of warfare and ultimately beat it. The Germans were obliged to resort to USW which is the cause of the losses but which brought the USA into the Entente which certainly guaranteed the defeat of the CP. So in extremis the RN was very sucessful. So again not Hapless and not outfought by pretty much any yard stick you wish to bring.
7. This was a result of a war that no one had predicted or could have planned for and had gone on for longer than expected or imagined. And is not something that we can criticise the RN for without laying the same 'unfair' critique at every other armed force involved. Everyone was in the same position or worse. But again this does not make the RN outperformed or hapless.

The Empire was in decline for a variety of reasons - social changes, industrial changes, political and due to both world wars its end probably came about sooner than would otherwise have been the case. But it certainly would still have ended without the wars and very likely not much later than it did.

And again no one could have planned for the events of both wars and the decline of Empire is not something that can be laid at the feet of the RN which performed its job well.
 
The USN "blockade" during the ACW was not technically a blockade under the maritime law of the time. The US declared that the ports in the CSA, being in a state of rebellion, were closed to shipping. A state can declare any of its ports closed for any reason or no reason, and one thing the British (and French) never did was to recognize the CSA as an independent nation and therefore changing the rule from port closure to blockade. Furthermore what was done was the definition of a "close blockade", where the interceptions took place near the closed/blockaded ports. What the British did in WWI was to create a distant blockade, nowhere near the enemy ports, and to declare a list of "contraband" that included things like food and medical supplies which might reasonably considered humanitarian under the Geneva Convention and Red Cross agreements. On top of that they would confiscate "contraband" destined for neutral ports, not just obvious military supplies, on the basis that it might be transshipped to Germany. All of this was quite contrary to accepted maritime law/law of war. The reason the British/RN got away with this was that the USA was sufficiently pro-Entente from the beginning that such protests about this were few and muted.

The British distant blockade and contraband list that included basically anything and everything (teddy bears may not have been on the list) was completely contrary to the US position on freedom of navigation and trade that had been around since independence. Had the USA been really neutral or even pro-CP, you would have seen US warships escorting American merchants at least to neutral ports. This would have totally blown the blockade, and even if some merchants went right to German ports the RN would not have been able to maintain a close blockade of the sort required under international "rules". To say the British/RN complaints about U-boat tactics not complying with cruiser rules while they maintained this blockade style is hypocrisy is a total understatement.

Not a value judgment here, just a review of the "legal" facts. In war both sides tend to break the rules, sometimes in a balanced way, sometimes one side breaks way more than the other.
 
Wrong, a team from Cambridge University, so no duffers, was tasked to devise a diet from internal sources capable of feeding the whole population. Volunteers went on it and were tested both medically and on the ability to do work. The result was it was possible but the diet was bland, repetitive and caused great amounts of flatulence.
Imports were, as I stated earlier, seen as needed for morale not necessity ( 1946, so no U-boats, was actually the most rationed year )

A team of volunteers is hardly representative of the ability of the entire population to be sustained on a diet, but I'll concede the point as far as WWII is concerned because I'm mainly talking about World War I. In this regard there is no question the English would starve as I was actually wrong about domestic production contributing 60% of the food supply; in actuality, it was only 40% with 60% of food needs being imported. Given that level, famine and outright starvation is assured as the Soviet example of WWII shows.
 
In 1914 the British enjoyed extreme advantages in terms of empire, navy and economy yet:
1. The German Navy maintained/remained a fleet in being - at least a victory for common sense;
2. The eventual British blockade only started to bite in 1916 and only became truely effective with the entry of the US;
3. The British attempts at amphibious operations did not go well;
4. The British were facing a gradually mounting shortage of shipping and a crisis in dedicated tankers prior to the US entry into the war and the British independent efforts to remedy those long term problems were woefully inadequite;
5. The British were facing a naval fuel crisis and based on a long term pattern of use since 1914, were projected to exhaust naval fuel reserves before the end of 1917 - until the US entered the war
6. The British admiralty actively opposed the wider implementation of the convoy system until after the US entered the war; and
7. The British had more-or-less burnt through its available financial liquidity prior to the US entering the war.

The Royal Navy and British diplomacy had [superbly] ruled the waves and the world for centuries, but the first world war was not their finest hour. The British were ultimately on the winning side, but the British Empire suffered wounds from which it would never recover.
1) Hard to sink a fleet if it cowers in port. Point is it never contested the sea after Jutland and mutinied when it was ordered to.
2) Blockades take time to have an impact , as it was a distant blockade anyway US entry made no difference
3) Everyone's amphibious operations did not go well
4) Solved by Convoys
5) Solved by Convoys
6) Yes but US entry had no impact on the decision to implement them
7) Debatable , however all the warring parties were in the same , bad, financial position
 
A team of volunteers is hardly representative of the ability of the entire population to be sustained on a diet, but I'll concede the point as far as WWII is concerned because I'm mainly talking about World War I. In this regard there is no question the English would starve as I was actually wrong about domestic production contributing 60% of the food supply; in actuality, it was only 40% with 60% of food needs being imported. Given that level, famine and outright starvation is assured as the Soviet example of WWII shows.

They were not volunteers they were dietitians and they as pointed out succeeded in working if there was a diet that could be produced entirely from British sources in sufficient quantities to allow the entire population a healthy diet. That such a diet could feed the population rather shows the opposite of your contention. Further your own carefully selected source notes that domestic food production was increased it makes no claim of famine being a prospect.

Edit: A further point that seems to be misunderstood, even at the height of its success 3/4 ships heading for Britain made it through the submarine interdiction. This suggests a worst case fall in supplies of around 15% of food deliveries supplies initially and though it would rise it would have taken time to reach the oft quoted 60% that would have to wait until total interdiction was achieved.
 
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Outperformed?

Hapless?

Perhaps you could explain your criteria you are using to enable those comments to be valid as I find the post somewhat impenitrable in this regards?

The only thing the German navy outperformed the Royal Navy at in WW1 was running away with only one major victory 'Coronel' to their name because Cradock didn't run away when perhaps he should have.

Ah, you see, it's much more important to score some meaningless tactical victories and pull off some snazzy handbrake turns with your fleet than, you know, actually achieve some strategic goals...;)
 
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