Fact, that word does not mean what you think it means. Fact is not defined as "an opinion of BooNZ" but rather as an objective truth for which the evidence is indisputable.
The fact Britain faced crisis of liquidity in each war was recognized by those responsible for British finances and in the case of WW2 verified by US representatives.
So for example claims like the British were financially broke at the end of 1916 is in truth an extreme version of the opinion that the British were broke in the middle in of 1917 which is itself an extreme interpretation that the British had exhausted their means of raising further American credit which in itself ignores that the British were in fact still earning money from various sources.
No, the British access to new American funding rapidly dried up following a reminder/warning from the Federal Reserve of the dangers of extending credit to the Entente in November 1916.
Perhaps you are confusing the British lack of financial liquidity with the British manpower shortage, which was projected to reach crisis by mid 1917 - to the extent the British War Board (or similar) recommended in 1916 to extend the conscription criteria up to the age of 55, prior to the entry of the USA into the war.
Perhaps you are confusing the British lack of financial liquidity with the ongoing British shortage of shipping that was becoming progressively worse and would have been unable to cope with the increased shipping requirements of sourcing supplies beyond North America. The shortage of shipping was especially acute in respect of tankers, which was projected to reach crisis point by mid 1917, prior to the entry of the USA into the war.
Perhaps you are confusing the British lack of financial liquidity with the projected exhaustion of the British Naval fuel reserves before the end of 1917 and/or the actual mid 1917 British army fuel crisis.
In short it is possible that in 1917 the British might have been forced to economise on certain aspects of their war effort but that is not the same as capitulation rather a reduction in the rate at which they attempted offensives which might have in fact reduced the human cost of the war for the British and Empire. Further but it is highly disputable that British credit was exhausted as even in 1917 the US Federal Reserve backtracked on an artificial effort to curtail that credit.
As outlined above, there were number of serious crises that had been building since 1914, which would have required the application of increased resources and initiative to resolve. As outlined above, the British were already facing a shortage of shipping, so remote colonial resources would not have been an practical solution without US complicity. The Federal Reserve in 1916 merely reminded the US creditors of the risk of lending to the Entente, clarifying those risks were for the creditors to make - business takes the risk of war seriously if those risks/costs are not socialized. The subsequent Federal Reserve reversal was because the US was now on the path to war.
Again myth for 1916 and while 1940 is much closer to the truth again we have the point that the US this time artificially stopped British credit at the onset of the war and that we are talking about a situation where the British would have found themselves short of sufficient tools to conduct certain types of offensive operations but defensive programs around the Home area and even threatened corners of the Empire are another matter entirely.
The maintenance of US State neutrality (i.e. not openly funding foreign wars) is scarcely artificially stopping British credit. The British were not precluded from securing finance on the usual terms, but by late 1916 the British had run out of security to back their loans. The Federal Reserve was merely reminding would be American creditors of the risk of unsecured loans to belligerents would be bourn by the creditor, not the State.
In WW2 FDR was already determined (and working to) commit the US to the British cause in WW2, but in late 1916 a jilted President Wilson was the hand behind the Federal Reserve warning that initially choked Entente funding. It is quite conceivable the US might have remained more neutral in WW1 if faced with a less bellicose Germany and without the USW and dabbling in Mexico.
Further but both scenarios rely on the Americans being willing to compromise their own prosperity for the greater good of a kleptocratic clique. In the first case the group of officials close to but not always obedient to the Kaiser and in the second the Nazi Party. It is an interesting argument, "Hey Mr President the British have stopped buying from our factories and they are laying off workers," is assumed to be followed by "Great a President who presides over an economic downturn is guaranteed re-election amirite?"
Nope.
The Americans sponsoring the Entente through unsecured finance is essentially an act of war from a diplomatic perspective and corporate welfare from an economic perspective. It's a clique that a small debt is a debtors problem, but a larger debt increasingly becomes a problem of the creditor. Again, the initial Federal Reserve warning made it clear the US would not be going to war to recover private debts, hence the immediate lack of interest in Entente unsecured loans.
The Americans already compromised their own prosperity when they ultimately accepted an illegal British blockade of the continent. It would be in the interests of Americans to champion the rights of neutral shipping and that would also make good business sense if the Entente could no longer afford to pay for stuff. I guess it suited the Kaiser's kleptocratic clique to maintain peace for forty years, have the best education system in the world and most advanced welfare regime of the time?
Once again and this is also a lot of the reason why the performance of Germany is so often overrated and the performance of the Confederacy in the US Civil War as an another example, when you are on the defensive you need fewer resources to fuel equal or greater apparent victories.
I confess I know next to nothing about the Confederacy, but never thought of the Nazis as being very 'defensive' and understood they had conquored vast amounts of territory on a shoestring?
As has been pointed out by others on this board the wet stuff was effectively Allied territory in both world wars with the British thus having a profound defender advantage in what was always going to be a long fight. Something that in neither instance was the German economy set up for.
I don't think comparing trenches to oceans makes much sense, but I know the British required sea control and this is a far more difficult objective than sea denial - without the assistance of the US. In that context, playing defense in naval matters is far more onerous.