Was the "starve them out" strategy ever really feasible?

Two technical improvements that might have changed much with the German U-boat were the Schnorchel invented in 1938 and the use of bigger batteries. There is no reason is some genius had thought it up say in 1935 that something like an elektroboat that could have been in mass production 1940. The big plus here is that an elektroboat could have battled surface warships too.
 
Two technical improvements that might have changed much with the German U-boat were the Schnorchel invented in 1938 and the use of bigger batteries. There is no reason is some genius had thought it up say in 1935 that something like an elektroboat that could have been in mass production 1940. The big plus here is that an elektroboat could have battled surface warships too.

my view the KM abandoning (building) the smaller Type II u-boat with no successor was serious mistake, they tried to rectify the problem with Type XXIII Elektroboot but too late to get them in service. (and not just to battle the RN, they needed something that could be transported overland to Med and Black Sea)

seems as though the rubber coating (Alberich, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-480) would have worked as well or better on smaller u-boats?
 
A submarine with one 4" gun manually directed on a low platform much more subject to wave action is going to have a hard time duking it out with a Flower Class corvette. The ability to stay submerged longer and have a higher speed underwater, like an elektroboat, is no no advantage on the surface. Against anything more robust than a corvette, attempting to fight it out on the surface is a desperation measure to be used only if you can't submerge. Even a submarine armed like the Surcouf is at a disadvantage against a surface warship, although 8" guns will do a lot more damage if they get a hit. The main purpose of the guns on a submarine, even the Surcouf, were for use against merchant vessels in surface attacks which would be more sure than torpedo attacks and conserve torpedoes. Only merchant vessels sailing unescorted were targets for surface gunfire by submarines.
 
Two technical improvements that might have changed much with the German U-boat were the Schnorchel invented in 1938 and the use of bigger batteries. There is no reason is some genius had thought it up say in 1935 that something like an elektroboat that could have been in mass production 1940. The big plus here is that an elektroboat could have battled surface warships too.

Schnorckel was most needed when the Allies developed effective radar, for which there wasno prospect in the 1918-1920 period. Bigger batteries would have been tactically useful, but come at the expense of fewer boats built overall. What the Germans could have used in 1918 was the new Zeppelin Height Climbers being technically able to patrol in the Irish Sea rather than squandered in raids in England, and the conversion of the High Seas Fleet from port skulkers to North Atlantic convoy raiders.
 
"How much does food production go down if half of tractors are idle?"

Petrol powered British Tractors really were not common, let alone popular till after WWI. Before that, it was mostly horse drawn and some Steam Traction Engines.
There were powered by Oats, Hay and Coal. UK Farm mechanization was a late '20s affair, unlike the USA

Blockade wouldn't really effect UK Farm production, other than 17-40 year old Men off at the War
 
IMHO the main difference between a blockade in 1917 and the one in 1940 was at the Home front in British pubs and kitchens. In 1917, Britain was fighting a war mainly on foreign soil (France, Gallipoli) with massive casualties and really no end in sight... There was a strong socialist/communist undercurrent that incessantly pushed the message that 'war was fought by the Rich while we are the ones paying for it" and the same feeling was taking hold in Germany too. All in all, the was was fought between two countries both wary about it.

In 1940, the war had come to the English isles in the form of the bombings of London and Coventry. "If we leave them alone, they'll leave us alone" was not an option anymore. War HAD to be fought and sacrifices HAD to be made. And if England was to run out of gas, we'll just build steam tanks. Remember that was the time of "Dad's Army" where home defense volunteer corps were ready to welcome any invading Germans with hunting rifles and meatcleavers. And forget about the socialists and communists. The ones in Germany were either thrown out or imprisoned and the ones in every other country were as fervently anti-nazi as could be. War was between two ideologies with both sides willing to go to the end, at the battlefield as well as at home. After Coventry, the Nazis could have cut off the British isles completely but the British people would rather starve themselves to death then to surrender.
 
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So the idea is that the UK, while being a bigger economy than Germany, would go broke before Germany? Germany imported just as much food as Britain, as shown earlier in the thread. Germany was literally starving and had serious supply problems in 1918, but a couple more U-Boats were going to kill Britain? The very source of British strength is the ability to trade overseas and that's why Germany struck at it. Now people are saying stuff like "If America didn't lend to Britain." But America did lend to Britain and it didn't lend to Germany. Even if America didn't enter the war, after the implementation of convoys, Germany was losing U-Boats faster than they could build them, and the British blockade on Germany remained.


If Germany focused harder on submarine warfare before the war, it might have disrupted shipping more. But that would have provoked a greater response from the British government, triggering the implementation of convoys and rationing. And if the British don't have to worry about the High Seas Fleet as much, they can put more of their navy towards anti-submarine warfare. Germany has a short window at the beginning of the war to try to cripple the British economy. Their only real chance would be unrestricted submarine warfare. But that would bring a severe American reaction, possibly entry into the war.


The only possible chance Germany has to defeat the British like this is if they seize the north of France and can lock down the Channel ports and base U-Boats out of Brittany. But if they are able to do that, they have already won. Britain won't want to continue WWI after France falls and the BEF is nearly destroyed. Unless Russia is at the gates of Berlin, the UK is coming to terms.
 
The only possible chance Germany has to defeat the British like this is if they seize the north of France and can lock down the Channel ports and base U-Boats out of Brittany.

The Bartenbach commission only studied French ports down to Cherbourg in October 1914.

  • Antwerp: major port and shipbuilding facilities, Scheldt pass through (neutral?) Dutch waters, linked by inland canal to Bruges:

  • Zebrugge: shallow approaches and drifting sand requiring dredging, undefended apart from sea mole requiring major defensive gun emplacement, canal big enough for small cruisers inland to Bruges, minimal repair facilities: in general not considered a desirable base

  • Bruges: linked by canal to Antwerp, Zeebrugge and Ostend, no repair facilities: useful as safe harbour and supply station

  • Ostend: defenceless without guns, linked by small canal to Bruges, some repair facilities including 2 small drydocks

  • Dunkirk: shallow and navigational hazards on approach meant bad for Uboats but easily defended, good repair facilities: Good base for Torpedo boats

  • Calais: Deep approaches mean uboats could dive as soon as leaving port, well equipped with repair facilities, very vulnerable to attack and would need major defensive gun emplacements: useable by uboats but overall worse than Dunkirk.

  • Boulogne: approaches and defensibility similar to Calais but with added disadvantage that the supporting rail line ran along the coast and was vulnerable to naval gunfire leaving the port isolated, limited repair facilities: barely passable for Uboats and Torpedo boats

  • Le Havre: navigation hazards so bad as to require French pilots, excellent defensive works with artillery, exceptional repair facilities, canal access from port to inland, Seine navigable deep inland for shelter against naval gunfire: very promising
  • Cherbourg: deep approaches, excellent defences, very well equipped repair facilities, very well placed for a commerce war against Britain: First class, more promising that Le Havre.
But America did lend to Britain and it didn't lend to Germany.

They did try to raise money in the US without success. The US still did trade with Germany as late as 1916 when the merchant submarine Deutschland arrived in New London.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Very good points, slorek: however, the US having a strict cash and carry policy in WW I isent really a realistic scenario, especially relative to the UK. Britain, after all, has the world reserve currency (Pound Sterling) and a nice balance sheet all things considered in terms of reserves and proven creditworthiness, and US banks looking for a place to invest are going to be more than happy to buy British securities if they're pushed on Wall Street for at least the first few years of the war. Banning such an offer on the part of the Federal government would quickly run afoul with the courts,corperate-industrial interests, and other powerful folks,making it neigh political suicide.
No, OTL in November 1916 a POTUS inspired Federal Reserve warned the US private sector about the risks of advancing loans to the Entente and the Entente's access to new finance dried up almost immediately. The Entente Financial crisis was only remedied after a later Federal Reserve "clarification" when the USA was poised to enter the war.
So the idea is that the UK, while being a bigger economy than Germany, would go broke before Germany?
Not an idea, but OTL fact in 1916 and 1940 - in 1941 it was even verified to the satisfaction of the US as a condition of Lend-Lease.

Germany imported just as much food as Britain, as shown earlier in the thread. Germany was literally starving and had serious supply problems in 1918, but a couple more U-Boats were going to kill Britain? The very source of British strength is the ability to trade overseas and that's why Germany struck at it.
Can you provide a reference for this? My understanding is Germany imported proportionally far less food than Britain and much of those imports were products that supported farming i.e. stock feeds and fertilizers.

Now people are saying stuff like "If America didn't lend to Britain." But America did lend to Britain and it didn't lend to Germany.
As outlined above, Entente access to American funding immediately dried up following a Federal Reserve warning in November 1916 regarding the risk of loans to the Entente and this funding only recovered after the Federal Reserve reversed its assessment immediately prior to the US entry. There was a nexus between US entry into the war and Entente access to American funding.

Even if America didn't enter the war, after the implementation of convoys, Germany was losing U-Boats faster than they could build them, and the British blockade on Germany remained.
In the first instance the US was very instrumental in the introduction of the convoy system, from both a policy and resourcing perspective. Further, I have always found the sudden and immediate impact of convoys almost unbelievable - I understand BlondieBC has a plausible theory the effectiveness of convoys was deliberately and grossly overstated during the inter-war period. This alternative theory might also explain Churchill's focus/concern on the U-boat menace in WW2, when based on WW1 "numbers", convoys were seemingly kryptonite to U-Boats.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Fact, that word does not mean what you think it means. Fact is not defined as "an opinion of BooNZ" but rather as an objective truth for which the evidence is indisputable.
The fact Britain faced crisis of liquidity in each war was recognized by those responsible for British finances and in the case of WW2 verified by US representatives.

So for example claims like the British were financially broke at the end of 1916 is in truth an extreme version of the opinion that the British were broke in the middle in of 1917 which is itself an extreme interpretation that the British had exhausted their means of raising further American credit which in itself ignores that the British were in fact still earning money from various sources.
No, the British access to new American funding rapidly dried up following a reminder/warning from the Federal Reserve of the dangers of extending credit to the Entente in November 1916.

Perhaps you are confusing the British lack of financial liquidity with the British manpower shortage, which was projected to reach crisis by mid 1917 - to the extent the British War Board (or similar) recommended in 1916 to extend the conscription criteria up to the age of 55, prior to the entry of the USA into the war.

Perhaps you are confusing the British lack of financial liquidity with the ongoing British shortage of shipping that was becoming progressively worse and would have been unable to cope with the increased shipping requirements of sourcing supplies beyond North America. The shortage of shipping was especially acute in respect of tankers, which was projected to reach crisis point by mid 1917, prior to the entry of the USA into the war.

Perhaps you are confusing the British lack of financial liquidity with the projected exhaustion of the British Naval fuel reserves before the end of 1917 and/or the actual mid 1917 British army fuel crisis.

In short it is possible that in 1917 the British might have been forced to economise on certain aspects of their war effort but that is not the same as capitulation rather a reduction in the rate at which they attempted offensives which might have in fact reduced the human cost of the war for the British and Empire. Further but it is highly disputable that British credit was exhausted as even in 1917 the US Federal Reserve backtracked on an artificial effort to curtail that credit.
As outlined above, there were number of serious crises that had been building since 1914, which would have required the application of increased resources and initiative to resolve. As outlined above, the British were already facing a shortage of shipping, so remote colonial resources would not have been an practical solution without US complicity. The Federal Reserve in 1916 merely reminded the US creditors of the risk of lending to the Entente, clarifying those risks were for the creditors to make - business takes the risk of war seriously if those risks/costs are not socialized. The subsequent Federal Reserve reversal was because the US was now on the path to war.

Again myth for 1916 and while 1940 is much closer to the truth again we have the point that the US this time artificially stopped British credit at the onset of the war and that we are talking about a situation where the British would have found themselves short of sufficient tools to conduct certain types of offensive operations but defensive programs around the Home area and even threatened corners of the Empire are another matter entirely.
The maintenance of US State neutrality (i.e. not openly funding foreign wars) is scarcely artificially stopping British credit. The British were not precluded from securing finance on the usual terms, but by late 1916 the British had run out of security to back their loans. The Federal Reserve was merely reminding would be American creditors of the risk of unsecured loans to belligerents would be bourn by the creditor, not the State.

In WW2 FDR was already determined (and working to) commit the US to the British cause in WW2, but in late 1916 a jilted President Wilson was the hand behind the Federal Reserve warning that initially choked Entente funding. It is quite conceivable the US might have remained more neutral in WW1 if faced with a less bellicose Germany and without the USW and dabbling in Mexico.

Further but both scenarios rely on the Americans being willing to compromise their own prosperity for the greater good of a kleptocratic clique. In the first case the group of officials close to but not always obedient to the Kaiser and in the second the Nazi Party. It is an interesting argument, "Hey Mr President the British have stopped buying from our factories and they are laying off workers," is assumed to be followed by "Great a President who presides over an economic downturn is guaranteed re-election amirite?"
Nope.

The Americans sponsoring the Entente through unsecured finance is essentially an act of war from a diplomatic perspective and corporate welfare from an economic perspective. It's a clique that a small debt is a debtors problem, but a larger debt increasingly becomes a problem of the creditor. Again, the initial Federal Reserve warning made it clear the US would not be going to war to recover private debts, hence the immediate lack of interest in Entente unsecured loans.

The Americans already compromised their own prosperity when they ultimately accepted an illegal British blockade of the continent. It would be in the interests of Americans to champion the rights of neutral shipping and that would also make good business sense if the Entente could no longer afford to pay for stuff. I guess it suited the Kaiser's kleptocratic clique to maintain peace for forty years, have the best education system in the world and most advanced welfare regime of the time?

Once again and this is also a lot of the reason why the performance of Germany is so often overrated and the performance of the Confederacy in the US Civil War as an another example, when you are on the defensive you need fewer resources to fuel equal or greater apparent victories.
I confess I know next to nothing about the Confederacy, but never thought of the Nazis as being very 'defensive' and understood they had conquored vast amounts of territory on a shoestring?

As has been pointed out by others on this board the wet stuff was effectively Allied territory in both world wars with the British thus having a profound defender advantage in what was always going to be a long fight. Something that in neither instance was the German economy set up for.
I don't think comparing trenches to oceans makes much sense, but I know the British required sea control and this is a far more difficult objective than sea denial - without the assistance of the US. In that context, playing defense in naval matters is far more onerous.
 
Petrol powered British Tractors really were not common, let alone popular till after WWI. Before that, it was mostly horse drawn and some Steam Traction Engines.
There were powered by Oats, Hay and Coal. UK Farm mechanization was a late '20s affair, unlike the USA

Blockade wouldn't really effect UK Farm production, other than 17-40 year old Men off at the War

http://oldecuriosity.blogspot.com/2015/02/ww2-farming-in-britain-during-second.html

In 1940, Britain had about six hundred thousand farm horses and one hundred thousand tractors.

https://livinghistoryfarm.org/farminginthe40s/machines_13.html

A tractor does the work of about 5 horses, so I think we can assume as a first level approximation, its about 50% horses and 50% tractors.

Tractors last about 20 years, so I think we can assume that most will work throughout ww2. In a pinch, a good mechanic can keep old tractors going longer, poorer grades of fuel can often be used by tractors and other vehicles eg trucks and old tanks can be converted to tractors. I think we can assume that the farm horsepower is not going to be greatly affected.
 
Correct me if I'm wrong, but the British financed their own war effort and a good part of the French and Russian war vosts right up April 1917. If Britain couldn't find the money from November 1916 how did they and France and Russia fight for those 5 months?
 
http://oldecuriosity.blogspot.com/2015/02/ww2-farming-in-britain-during-second.html

In 1940, Britain had about six hundred thousand farm horses and one hundred thousand tractors.

https://livinghistoryfarm.org/farminginthe40s/machines_13.html

A tractor does the work of about 5 horses, so I think we can assume as a first level approximation, its about 50% horses and 50% tractors.

Tractors last about 20 years, so I think we can assume that most will work throughout ww2. In a pinch, a good mechanic can keep old tractors going longer, poorer grades of fuel can often be used by tractors and other vehicles eg trucks and old tanks can be converted to tractors. I think we can assume that the farm horsepower is not going to be greatly affected.

I was remarking on the WWI effort.

For WWII, tractors had become popular in the UK, but unlike the USA, UK tractors typically used TVO/Paraffin, pretty much what we would call Kerosene here in the States, instead of Gasoline that was hardly taxed, unlike the UK.
So most of their tractor were using distillate.

A popular unit just before the WWII was the Fordson 'N' and then the 'All-Around' 25HP, 15HP drawbar, typically using a 2 bottom plow and steel wheels, rubber tires were slower to be adopted in the UK. Important enough that were made at Dagenham during the War

For lifespan, there are a lot of 1930s tractors running fine today, simple to take care of, overbuilt for their power
 
IMHO the main difference between a blockade in 1917 and the one in 1940 was at the Home front in British pubs and kitchens. In 1917, Britain was fighting a war mainly on foreign soil (France, Gallipoli) with massive casualties and really no end in sight... There was a strong socialist/communist undercurrent that incessantly pushed the message that 'war was fought by the Rich while we are the ones paying for it" and the same feeling was taking hold in Germany too. All in all, the was was fought between two countries both wary about it.

In 1940, the war had come to the English isles in the form of the bombings of London and Coventry. "If we leave them alone, they'll leave us alone" was not an option anymore. War HAD to be fought and sacrifices HAD to be made. And if England was to run out of gas, we'll just build steam tanks. Remember that was the time of "Dad's Army" where home defense volunteer corps were ready to welcome any invading Germans with hunting rifles and meatcleavers. And forget about the socialists and communists. The ones in Germany were either thrown out or imprisoned and the ones in every other country were as fervently anti-nazi as could be. War was between two ideologies with both sides willing to go to the end, at the battlefield as well as at home. After Coventry, the Nazis could have cut off the British isles completely but the British people would rather starve themselves to death then to surrender.

The Moscow oriented communists tended to be at best neutral towards the Nazis after Molotov/Ribbentrop. Communist groups in France and Britain actually opposed the war and advocated sabotage and other methods to reduce the military capacity of the allies until Barbarossa. Then the tune changed immediately.
 
As an aside, regardless of whether the strategy was a war winner or not, it certainly was a valuable contribution to the German war effort. They would have been mad not to try it.
 
As outlined above, Entente access to American funding immediately dried up following a Federal Reserve warning in November 1916 regarding the risk of loans to the Entente and this funding only recovered after the Federal Reserve reversed its assessment immediately prior to the US entry.


And not immediately even then. GB had to send Balfour over to America in May 1917 to persuade the US Treasury of the urgency of further loans.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Correct me if I'm wrong, but the British financed their own war effort and a good part of the French and Russian war vosts right up April 1917. If Britain couldn't find the money from November 1916 how did they and France and Russia fight for those 5 months?
OK: Up until 1917 the French substanitally financed thier own war effort (it was purportedly the second strongest financial power in 1914). The British facilitated French loans in North America, but those loans were French, using French colateral, which was also running out towards the end of 1916 - I'm not sure about Russian financial arrangements.

My assumption/guess in respect of the intervening period of around 4 month is there was probably sufficient residual liquidity to cover existing purchase orders, which probably substantially covered the period.
 
The fact Britain faced crisis of liquidity in each war was recognized by those responsible for British finances and in the case of WW2 verified by US representatives.

No, the British access to new American funding rapidly dried up following a reminder/warning from the Federal Reserve of the dangers of extending credit to the Entente in November 1916.

So you will have good solid documentary evidence other than your own or another's received opinion for this statement then.

Perhaps you are confusing the British lack of financial liquidity with the British manpower shortage, which was projected to reach crisis by mid 1917 - to the extent the British War Board (or similar) recommended in 1916 to extend the conscription criteria up to the age of 55, prior to the entry of the USA into the war.

Perhaps you are confusing the British lack of financial liquidity with the ongoing British shortage of shipping that was becoming progressively worse and would have been unable to cope with the increased shipping requirements of sourcing supplies beyond North America. The shortage of shipping was especially acute in respect of tankers, which was projected to reach crisis point by mid 1917, prior to the entry of the USA into the war.

The thing about the manpower crisis is that it did not emerge in the manner expected in 1917 now did it? In fact both the Entente main powers were able to go even better than the Central Powers who were also forced to economise manpower by shifting to the triangular division because the Entente powers had greater access to machines such as motor and steam trucks which allowed them to shift personnel from the supply branches to the front while still coping with the greater logistic demands of increasingly mechanised warfare. It is also worth pointing we have tussled over tankers and oil before on this board and the interesting point can be made that in fact British ordered tankers being made in the United States were on the verge of arriving in the supply chain and that in the actual progress of events American entry and the needs to supply the American forces arriving in Europe temporarily exacerbated the issue before more American resources came on line to make the problem all but go away.


Perhaps you are confusing the British lack of financial liquidity with the projected exhaustion of the British Naval fuel reserves before the end of 1917 and/or the actual mid 1917 British army fuel crisis.

No because not only have we tussled before on these issues but we were and you are trying again to discuss temporary bottlenecks caused by multiple factors (including as noted above the arrival of the US into the war in, oh yes, mid 1917) that the Germans were not able to take advantage of.

As outlined above, there were number of serious crises that had been building since 1914, which would have required the application of increased resources and initiative to resolve. As outlined above, the British were already facing a shortage of shipping, so remote colonial resources would not have been an practical solution without US complicity. The Federal Reserve in 1916 merely reminded the US creditors of the risk of lending to the Entente, clarifying those risks were for the creditors to make - business takes the risk of war seriously if those risks/costs are not socialized. The subsequent Federal Reserve reversal was because the US was now on the path to war.

Again you are confusing your interpretation of the facts with actual facts, the US Federal Reserve backtracked much earlier than you are choosing to imply, I know you know this because I know you have seen the actual Federal Reserve statements and bulletins on the matter because I have submitted them here before in debate with you. Perhaps you might care to acknowledge that or are you going to try and deny this for a third time and then we shall see if you still deny once I dig out links to online records of those Federal Reserve Bulletins? Also I note you are trying to shift to arguments that have not been made in this thread.

The maintenance of US State neutrality (i.e. not openly funding foreign wars) is scarcely artificially stopping British credit. The British were not precluded from securing finance on the usual terms, but by late 1916 the British had run out of security to back their loans. The Federal Reserve was merely reminding would be American creditors of the risk of unsecured loans to belligerents would be bourn by the creditor, not the State.

In WW2 FDR was already determined (and working to) commit the US to the British cause in WW2, but in late 1916 a jilted President Wilson was the hand behind the Federal Reserve warning that initially choked Entente funding. It is quite conceivable the US might have remained more neutral in WW1 if faced with a less bellicose Germany and without the USW and dabbling in Mexico.

Nope.

The Americans sponsoring the Entente through unsecured finance is essentially an act of war from a diplomatic perspective and corporate welfare from an economic perspective. It's a clique that a small debt is a debtors problem, but a larger debt increasingly becomes a problem of the creditor. Again, the initial Federal Reserve warning made it clear the US would not be going to war to recover private debts, hence the immediate lack of interest in Entente unsecured loans.

This is an interesting and dare I say novel legal argument in international law but no doubt you have an example of some jurisprudence that backs up your claim?

The Americans already compromised their own prosperity when they ultimately accepted an illegal British blockade of the continent. It would be in the interests of Americans to champion the rights of neutral shipping and that would also make good business sense if the Entente could no longer afford to pay for stuff.

This again largely a matter of interpretation but it is worth noting that the British based their orders in council upon legal precedents set by the US during the US Civil War. Further but on the point of compromising their prosperity German goods and manufactures of the period were the main competition for US goods and manufactures and often direct knock offs of American patent designs. Thus the removal of this competitive influence from global markets was in itself a direct boon to the US manufacturing sector and not really much of an incentive to breach the blockade in Germany's over America's favour.


I confess I know next to nothing about the Confederacy, but never thought of the Nazis as being very 'defensive' and understood they had conquored vast amounts of territory on a shoestring?

Well given we are also talking about the Kaiserreich which was on the defensive in the west (though not the east where things were more fluid) for most of the war and especially after the Verdun Offensive and given that the Nazi regime was on the defensive on all fronts from late 1942 they spent an awful lot of the war on the defensive. Then again the second lot had Romania and Italy on their side that time so if we applied the kind of logic you have applied then we could pretend that Italy and/or Romania were the secret source in German success or failure? See this is why we need to dig deeper and see what impact things like the Federal Reserve warning and retraction actually had.

I guess it suited the Kaiser's kleptocratic clique to maintain peace for forty years, have the best education system in the world and most advanced welfare regime of the time?

Well you are ascribing credit for three different to a group that at best was able to put a stop to one of them. The study of the goings on in the Reichstag are a worthy pursuit in themselves but the foundations of the education and welfare infrastructure in Germany in this period were not simply a top down implementation. The budget battles and compromises are fascinating but the group that had emerged around Wilhelm by 1914 had very little to do with an awful lot of it and actively opposed some of it so can hardly be ascribed credit for it. That said yes they did manage to end forty years of peace for Germany in the European theatre that a fair number of other Germans (remember Bismarck but not just him) had worked very hard on.[/quote]​


I don't think comparing trenches to oceans makes much sense, but I know the British required sea control and this is a far more difficult objective than sea denial - without the assistance of the US. In that context, playing defense in naval matters is far more onerous.


I am not comparing trenches but the essential of defence versus attack. In the Battles of the Atlantic the Royal Navy and its allies who varied across different time periods were defending merchant shipping which represent point targets that must be located before they can even be attacked. A fixed trench position is in many ways a pale imitation of the complexity required of the naval offensive picture under discussion so no I was not comparing the Atlantic sea lanes to the trenches.

In WW2 FDR was already determined (and working to) commit the US to the British cause in WW2, but in late 1916 a jilted President Wilson was the hand behind the Federal Reserve warning that initially choked Entente funding. It is quite conceivable the US might have remained more neutral in WW1 if faced with a less bellicose Germany and without the USW and dabbling in Mexico.

See here we have a statement by you which is actually closer by itself to something we can agree on. Wilson would have kept the US out of the war had USW not forced his hand. The difference between legal norms of blockade and remember the British were following US set precedent and USW was that one was deliberately indiscriminate aggression and one was not. Yes had the Germans not attempted USW then they could well have expected the US to stay out of the war and this might if your interpretation of finances is closer to correct have forced the Entente to the table on terms favourable to the Central Powers or if mine is then there is still a good chance that the terms would not have been nearly so savage as Versailles.

So you ought to decide, if the Ententes finances are that shaky any starvation strategy is an idiot's move but I they are not then it makes sense for a Germany that lacks many other winning options.
 
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if the Ententes finances are that shaky any starvation strategy is an idiot's move but I they are not then it makes sense for a Germany that lacks many other winning options.

The Germans were aware of Britain's difficulty wrt American credit, but could not judge how immediate the danger was. After all, if Britain's economy were to collapse in, say, October 1917, that would be cold comfort for a Germany which had been compelled to surrender the month before.

The decision for ACW was made at a time when both the Russian Revolution and the French May Mutinies were still in the future. As far as the men in Berlin could see, 1917 promised to be 1916 only worse, with a more seasoned British Army and a better-armed Russian one. This of course was why they stopped worrying about the American response to USW. The way things were going the war was likely to be over - one way or the other - before US intervention [1] could make any difference.

[1] If it in fact happened. Iirc Zimmermann, when saying goodbye in Feb '17 to Ambassador and Mrs Gerard, expressed the opinion that Wilson was "all talk", and would never really go to war. Ludendorff reportedly said much the same to a junior officer who expressed concern abt war with the US. Such attitudes were probably widely held in Germany, and indeed many in London feared that this might be the case.
 
Has any country, fighting a war for survival, ever given up from
'Whelp- got no more real Money, got to surrender, pronto'

Look at the American Revolutionary War, Continental Script was near worthless,2% of face value, years before the end.
 
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