Was the "starve them out" strategy ever really feasible?

When the German command called an end to USW on 24th Oct 1918 it was because losses to Uboats had become unsustainablel.

The submarines were recalled because Germany was seeking an armistice with the United States, and the US was strongly objecting to the U-boat war. In terms of losses, they'd built 70 and lost 78. Total 1918 KIA casualties in submarines therefore was less than 10,000 - less than the first days KIA of Operation Michael.

Edit - a quick check gives a cause of destruction for 69 U-boats in 1918 -

Mine - 25
Depth Charge - 16
Scuttle or surrender - 15
Ram - 6
Torpedoed - 6
Gunfire - 1
 
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What stopped the RN from deploying its Baltic plans was the BEF was in Belgium before the RN gots its act together. If one looks at Gallipoli, the possible other landings on Turkey Med coast, Basra, East Africa, it is pretty clear the RN had an pro amphibious strategy.


So what you're saying is the RN would have gone into the baltic in order to do a huge amphibious landing through the Baltic, the KM and then into Germany?

Yeah that was never on the cards as variable plan. The RN didn't need to go into the baltic to its it job. The KM stayed in et Baltic and achieved nothing, job done.


Merchant warfare refers to sinking merchant shipping, and the German navy focused on that for about half the war. As I went over in other posts, it was under 10 sinkings that really angered the USA, and which ships these were was predictable. Also, again, the sinking rate did not decline if subs followed cruiser rules, i.e. let people go to life boats. And every month of the war, the Germans used USW in areas.

The data does not support your position.

Right but because they had to rely in Subs to do this (the surface fleet being being bottled up in the Baltic), and that was further hampered by the restricted warfare rules (because the RN would have let the Surface KM swan about the atlantic at leisure) they ability win it was severely restricted.

Also what Data? have you got data that shows the KM (U boat or surface fleet) that sunk enough british shipping to the point that Britain sued for peace or face starvation, while also avoiding bringing the US into war due to unrestricted sub warfare? (I'm sure I'd have remembered that)
 
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And did the twins defeat the entire British merchant Navy in one raid? basilly the occasional raid by the occasional ship is not a long term strategic naval plan.

You stated that the KM would have to defeat the RN before embarking on merchant warfare. I asked in response to that whether the Twins defeated the RN before embarking on their 1940 merchant shipping raid? You indicate in reply that an occasional raid did not a strategy make, which is true, but your original assertion was that the KM had to defeat the British navy before making such raids, which was not true. Indeed, the entire point of guerre de course since the age of sail was that one did not have to defeat a navy to do it, so the navy that was in the weaker position could commerce raid as a substitute for defeating the enemy fleet.
 
Even on the BB, the more budgetary minded Admirals and Sea Lords had a great deal of qualms about making ships obsolete. In fact, you can see it in the entire Naval treaty strategy of the UK in the interwar years. And they had even more concerns about a new class of ships making an entire type of ship obsolete. And this fear was not irrational if one looks at the budget issues in the interwar years and the naval mutiny.

So yes, the UK did one big leap frog effort with the Dreadnought, but even then there were fears of budget issues. And the UK did everything possible to avoid high spending, that is why even in the prewar years the UK wants other countries to agree to naval ratio favorable to the UK. Take the UK 2 to 1 advantage it wanted from the Germans. Since the UK had more than twice the ship building capacity, it was physically impossible for the Germans to have a fleet more than half as big as the UK IF the UK spent the funds. So why was the UK so keen on the naval agreement with Imperial Germany? To avoid spending the funds.

As to the 1920's aircraft carrier, that does not refute my point about the 1912 aircraft carrier. The UK wanted another nation to pay most of the development costs. Once WW1 made the UK pay the development cost and learning curve of the first few carriers, then this budget logic went away by the 1920s.

You always start with limited budgets if you are an Admiral. Then these limits overlay strategy, politics, diplomacy, and a whole lot of other areas. You are figuratively looking at one chopped down tree (Dreadnought leap frog) and ignoring the other scores of trees still standing (choice to save budget by not advancing new technology). The UK focused on the main fleet, large number of smaller but proven cruisers and the like, and a good R&D department. The UK slashed heavily the new technology development department as a choice. If the modern USA DoD did the same thing, we would have Darpa. We might research anti-ballistic missile tech if cheap enough, but we would not deploy them. The US Air Force would have researched stealth technology but kept spamming out F-15 and wait for the Soviets to deploy the first stealth fighter.

Sorry, I thought we were talking about pre-WW1, rather than interwar, so I don't see how the interwar naval treaties are relevant.

Everyone wants to reduce costs if possible. Particularly the Treasury. Always the Treasury! So what? If Britain wanted a 2:1 ratio against Germany, then why wouldn't it be keen on an agreement that gave it that? Sorry, I can't identify a coherent argument here.

No, there was another generation of carrier development costs in the 1920s to pay, as seen by the transitions from the Follies' conversions to Ark Royal and the armoured carriers. Not that it's really relevant, because of the 1920s context.

I rebutted your point about 1912 carriers, that the RN was unwilling to fund innovation except as a reaction to others', by demonstrating that it was quite happy to fund a fleet-obsoleting programme of dreadnought and DAC/BC construction, and instead proposed that the reluctance arose because of the limited capability of naval aircraft and the limited understanding of their utility in 1912 - a quite different driver. I mean, look at the capabilities of 1914 land-based aircraft. I'd also note that one of the rationales for the DAC programme was that they were far more capable and strategically mobile than armoured cruisers, yet only a bit more expensive, hence overall cheaper; the DACs and BCs were economising innovations. As were dreadnoughts, in terms of the cost required for equivalent combat power when set against pre-dreads.

I don't know whether the RN did slash R&D spending pre-WW1 (or how you'd define or measure it!), but given that the real world pre-war impact was leadership of the ongoing dreadnought and battle cruiser races, it doesn't seem to have had any impact. Which is what really shows the absurdity of your idea.
 
You stated that the KM would have to defeat the RN before embarking on merchant warfare. I asked in response to that whether the Twins defeated the RN before embarking on their 1940 merchant shipping raid? You indicate in reply that an occasional raid did not a strategy make, which is true, but your original assertion was that the KM had to defeat the British navy before making such raids, which was not true.




No I said in order to engage in merchant warfare the KM would need to defeat the RN, my point was the occasional surface ship raid did not constitute the KM surface fleet engaging in Merchant warfare

Put it this what do you think the RN would do if somehow the entire KM slip past the one cloudy night in the north sea and starts merrily sinking everything with an ensign in the atlantic?


Indeed, the entire point of guerre de course since the age of sail was that one did not have to defeat a navy to do it, so the navy that was in the weaker position could commerce raid as a substitute for defeating the enemy fleet.

True, however you still have to do that by avoiding engaging with the more powerful force. How does the KM manage to do that bottled up the Baltic with the RN sitting in the north sea. Even if they somehow get past the blockade how do they then continue to to advod that while also staying out their and sinking enough ships in the North Atlantic to matter and while operating from baltic bases with the RN prowling about after them and the RN has closer home ports to the action, not to mention European ports they can operate from as well as European allied navies as well!
 
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You stated that attacking convoys were "a lot harder" to attack in WW1, meaning presumably, harder than attacking convoys in WW2. The problem in WW1 was U-boat tactics and doctrine from the fall of 1917 to the fall of 1918 - convoys presented different challenges that required different tactics, and the evolution of the U-boat arm to meet the challenge ran out of time about a year beforehand. The submarines themselves were not that much different. The big problem in WW2 was that once radar entered into it, the tactic of attacking on the surface at night after gathering ahead of the convoy no longer worked. So attacking convoys in WW2 was harder and more dangerous than in WW1.
Submarines not different ? What are you smoking ?
WW1 , 12 kts surfaced , 2 front tubes , 7 torpedoes vs WW2 18kts surfaced , 4 front tubes , 22 torpedoes . Bit of a difference there, not including most are far smaller with corresponding lower endurance and sea keeping ( so harder to spot convoys ). Add in WW2 availability of long reconnaissance planes and better radios, pretty obvious that they could not do WW2 tactics in WW1.
You are also arguing against reality , WW1 convoys suffered , proportionally , far lower losses and killed proportionally more U-boats compared to WW2.
 
No I said in order to engage in merchant warfare the KM would need to defeat the RN, my point was the occasional surface ship raid did not constitute the KM surface fleet engaging in Merchant warfare

Given that every heavy unit in the German navy except Blucher (sunk in Norway) and Tirpitz (under construction) engaged in at least one high seas shipping raid, I wondered where did you got the idea of the 1940 strategy being "occasional"? It was pretty much the strategy that year, after ships were repaired from Norway.

Put it this what do you think teh teh RN would be doing if somehow the entire KM slip past the one cloudy night in the north sea asn starts merrily sinking everything with an ensign in the atlantic?

In two world wars the casualties for warships during commerce warfare were -

Emden - sunk during port raid
Karlsruhe - internal explosion.
Scharnhorst - sunk during port raid
Gneisenau - sunk during port raid
Dresden - fuel exhaustion
Nuremburg - sunk during port raid
Leipzig - sunk during port raid
Konigsberg - fuel exhaustion
Graf Spee - scuttled after battle during port raid
Bismarck - sunk by battleships after being crippled in air attack
Scharnhorst - sunk attacking convoy.

The list suggests that the best place to encounter a raider was near a port, not hunting in the open ocean. 6 lost to port raids, 2 to fuel exhaustion, 1 to carrier and surface, 1 to convoy attack, 1 to accident.
 
Submarines not different ? What are you smoking ?

Two things. First, I said the submarines were not that much different, meaning, broadly speaking, they were similar animals. Second, a lot of the wartime boats (U63-U139) had surfaced speeds of 16kt-17kt, not 12kt. A Type VII U-boat from WW2 had a speed of about 17.5kt surfaced.

Bit of a difference there, not including most are far smaller with corresponding lower endurance and sea keeping ( so harder to spot convoys ). Add in WW2 availability of long reconnaissance planes and better radios, pretty obvious that they could not do WW2 tactics in WW1.

As already stated, not only was there no impediment whatsoever to U-boats switching over to night time surface attacks, by the summer of 1918 many U-boats already were doing so. 1918 was the second most successful year for ship sinkings for U-boats in WW1. Yes, losses were also up, but production was keeping pace.
 
When talking about food/starvation there are a couple of points to put in the mix. One is it is not all about calories, nutrient mix is important. Knowledge about nutrient needs/vitamins was pretty rudimentary during WWI, and manufactured vitamin supplements were non-existent. By WWII this was much more understood, and vitamin/nutrient supplements were more available to make up for the reality that many "natural" nutrient sources will be/were greatly reduced in the UK during the wars. Missing vitamins/nutrients, even before they cause serious health problems, can cause weakness, loss of energy, fuzzy thinking and so forth all of which can cause reduced efficiency in workers or soldiers. Another factor is that during wartime a disproportionate amount of food gets directed to the military. By this I mean not just the additional calories that active military men need compared to whatever they were doing in civilian life, but also the fact that a certain percentage of the food sent to the military will be lost. Shipments of food by sea or land can be destroyed/sunk. A ship involved in combat if hit may have some rations destroyed, of course if the vessel is sunk whatever is on board feeds the fish. Soldiers killed outside of their lines usually have some rations carried on them, which is either lost or taken by then enemy, likewise those taken prisoner, whatever rations they have on them at the time of capture will be taken. Just like ships hit in combat represent ration loss, rations in the frontline mess area or depots can be destroyed or captured. I'm not sure what percentage of the ration calories sent to the military are thus "wasted", but it is not a negligible number.

IMHO if one was to calculate the total caloric needs of the UK, including the increased requirement for men in the military, and workers putting in more overtime (which requires more calories) and women now working outside the home (another caloric increase) I would want to add 30-50% over that to account for "wartime wastage", over and above some number for normal wastage/spoilage.

This is only a look at food, there are other key "raw materials" such as petroleum, which if they drop below a certain flow rate the situation becomes critical. In both WWI and WWII American financial help was key from early on. Even without the issue of U-Boat or surface raiders disrupting the flow of goods to the UK, absent the MONEY to pay for food and other raw materials that is irrelevant. Had the US had a strict cash and carry policy with no credit...
 
Food for thought. In 1914 the Germans had 14 submarines to the English 74.

So clearly the obvious plan was to engage in undersea warfare against the Germans who had barely considered merchant defence at all ;)
 
The submarines were recalled because Germany was seeking an armistice with the United States, and the US was strongly objecting to the U-boat war. In terms of losses, they'd built 70 and lost 78. Total 1918 KIA casualties in submarines therefore was less than 10,000 - less than the first days KIA of Operation Michael.

Edit - a quick check gives a cause of destruction for 69 U-boats in 1918 -

Mine - 25
Depth Charge - 16
Scuttle or surrender - 15
Ram - 6
Torpedoed - 6
Gunfire - 1

The USA strongly objected to the U-boat war? Yep - they definitely had a burr up their arses about it! ;)
 
When talking about food/starvation there are a couple of points to put in the mix. One is it is not all about calories, nutrient mix is important. Knowledge about nutrient needs/vitamins was pretty rudimentary during WWI, and manufactured vitamin supplements were non-existent. By WWII this was much more understood, and vitamin/nutrient supplements were more available to make up for the reality that many "natural" nutrient sources will be/were greatly reduced in the UK during the wars. Missing vitamins/nutrients, even before they cause serious health problems, can cause weakness, loss of energy, fuzzy thinking and so forth all of which can cause reduced efficiency in workers or soldiers. Another factor is that during wartime a disproportionate amount of food gets directed to the military. By this I mean not just the additional calories that active military men need compared to whatever they were doing in civilian life, but also the fact that a certain percentage of the food sent to the military will be lost. Shipments of food by sea or land can be destroyed/sunk. A ship involved in combat if hit may have some rations destroyed, of course if the vessel is sunk whatever is on board feeds the fish. Soldiers killed outside of their lines usually have some rations carried on them, which is either lost or taken by then enemy, likewise those taken prisoner, whatever rations they have on them at the time of capture will be taken. Just like ships hit in combat represent ration loss, rations in the frontline mess area or depots can be destroyed or captured. I'm not sure what percentage of the ration calories sent to the military are thus "wasted", but it is not a negligible number.

IMHO if one was to calculate the total caloric needs of the UK, including the increased requirement for men in the military, and workers putting in more overtime (which requires more calories) and women now working outside the home (another caloric increase) I would want to add 30-50% over that to account for "wartime wastage", over and above some number for normal wastage/spoilage.

This is only a look at food, there are other key "raw materials" such as petroleum, which if they drop below a certain flow rate the situation becomes critical. In both WWI and WWII American financial help was key from early on. Even without the issue of U-Boat or surface raiders disrupting the flow of goods to the UK, absent the MONEY to pay for food and other raw materials that is irrelevant. Had the US had a strict cash and carry policy with no credit...

Very good points, slorek: however, the US having a strict cash and carry policy in WW I isent really a realistic scenario, especially relative to the UK. Britain, after all, has the world reserve currency (Pound Sterling) and a nice balance sheet all things considered in terms of reserves and proven creditworthiness, and US banks looking for a place to invest are going to be more than happy to buy British securities if they're pushed on Wall Street for at least the first few years of the war. Banning such an offer on the part of the Federal government would quickly run afoul with the courts,corperate-industrial interests, and other powerful folks,making it neigh political suicide.
 
Submarines not different ? What are you smoking ?
WW1 , 12 kts surfaced , 2 front tubes , 7 torpedoes vs WW2 18kts surfaced , 4 front tubes , 22 torpedoes . Bit of a difference there, not including most are far smaller with corresponding lower endurance and sea keeping ( so harder to spot convoys ). Add in WW2 availability of long reconnaissance planes and better radios, pretty obvious that they could not do WW2 tactics in WW1.
You are also arguing against reality , WW1 convoys suffered , proportionally , far lower losses and killed proportionally more U-boats compared to WW2.

The classic 'u-boat' was fully developed and matured by 1914. Compare the German U43 class designed pre-WW1 and under construction in 1914 with the later Type VII refined during the 1920's and 30's:
Type U43 - 725 tons surfaced 940t submerged
Type VII - 769 tons surfaced 871t submerged
Type U43 - 65m long, 6.2m beam
Type VII - 67m long, 6.2m beam,
Type U43 - 2,400 hp 17.1 knots, 1200 hp - 9.1 knots submerged
Type VII - 2,800 hp 17.7 knots, 750 hp - 7.6 knots submerged
Type U43 - Range 9,400miles at 8knots, 55miles at 5knts submerged
Type VII - Range 8,500 miles at 10knots, 80 miles submerged at 4 knots
Type U43 - 4TT 2bow/2stern, 88mm deck gun
Type VII - 5TT 4bow/1stern, 88mm deck gun
Type U43 - Crew 36
Type VII - Crew 44
Type U43 - 164ft depth
Type VII - 750ft depth

As you can see, 20 years of development went into structural improvements following war experience to increase diving depth from 164ft to 750ft. Why? Because concealment as a defense wasn't enough, great depth was required too. The second war showed that great speed at depth was also required and thus the Elektro Boot was required. However, the high speed submarine had been developed in WW1 by the RN - the R class submarine from completely different requirements ie. to ambush submarines.

Type U43:

German_submarine_SM_U-53.jpg

u43.gif
 
In WW2, resources needed for a succesful starvation strategy via U-boat and surface offensive are insufficient - unless the war goes on and on as UK-Nazi Germany fight, and even then it would take years. There's no way Germany can knock out Britain out of the war before DEC 1941.

More viable strategy would be to invest more in Luftwaffe and just enough in Kriegsmarine to keep the convoying going on, with perhaps a tint to littoral warfare in British East Coast. Luftwffe could bomb ports, though. The German resources invested in Kriegsmarine were rather large and mere numbers do not tell all the tale as the Kriegsmarine sucked some of the best manpower and best industrial efforts.

had somewhat the same idea myself but only proposed shrinking the KM (individual ships and overall service branch) https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...arck-and-the-rest-of-the-kriegsmarine.452983/ and did not deal with issue of LW taking over more of the maritime warfare.

of course some of the same problems arise, with "perfect" pursued over practical (or available) so the earlier air launched guided munition (based on SC-250 bomb) grows into Fritz-X bomb, 6x's larger.
 
I used to think that too, before I did all the reading.

  • You can do it with doctrine and training along with some planning.
  • Adding extra budget to build extra SS probably lower tensions since the fleet will look more balance. i.e. less threating.
  • Having more SS will be what the UK expects of a "second class navy" and will lower tensions.
  • Diverting BB budget to CA, CL, DD or SS will greatly lower tensions.
  • Overseas base lower tensions since that is what is doctrinally correct for a SecondClassPower.

You are using a 1930 mindset to describe the 1910 Royal Navy actions. The UK will do exactly diddly squat if Germany greatly expands it submarine force.

You mistaking some War College type work training officers with actual military preparations.

There were several trials between 1903 and 1908 when the Admiralty decided that kites as then known had little to offer and it is interesting that the problem of the disturbed air behind the funnels and superstructure was already apparent.

Charles Samson flew off the forecastle of the old battleship Africa in Sheerness harbor on 10th January 1912. His aeroplane (a Short 538) was equipped with pontoons attached to the wheels for emergency tough-down on the sea. As a result, Admiral E C T Troubridge, the Chief of Staff at the Admiralty, produced a paper on naval air requirements, both for coast defence and for operations with the fleet. For the former, further experiments involved flying-off from cruiser’s deck at sea and while underway at 10 ½ kts. For the latter, he called for four trials ships, preferably large Home Fleet cruisers. Each would carry two small single-engine floatplanes, launched from the ship, using Samson’s platforms. These may have been Eclipse class cruisers. There were two proposals for aviation ships in 1913, Admiral Mark Kerr suggesting a purpose built ‘true’ carrier while the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, had a less ambitious scheme. He wanted to convert an Eclipse class cruiser, removing the main mast and building a landing platform aft with a take-off platform forward. Special cranes would lift planes from one deck to the other. In the event, an even more limited scheme was adopted – this was the conversion of the cruiser Hermes.

This is all serving officers in the fleet leading to concrete ship acquisition planning not a training officer exercise.

Here is Hermes in 1913 - not a post 1920's fiction:
hmshermesmpl684.jpg


This was conceived and ordered before the war:
nl072wa_Ark_royal_plan_800x301.jpg


In December 1911 Lieutenant H A Williamson, a submariner, forwarded a proposal to the Admiralty to convert existing warships, or even to build a new carrier, to launch and retrieve aeroplanes for fleet anti-submarine duties. On 5th March (1915) Williamson, injured in a seaplane crash from Ark Royal, went home for treatment and was appointed to the Supply Section of the Air Department on 19th July. Williamson turned to the problem of fleet carrier aircraft when scouting and attacking Zeppelins and, as in 1911, concluded that the solution lay in superior performance of both aeroplanes and landing-on technique. He'd carved a crude wooden model of a ship with a starboard island. Seddon also showed Williamson’s model; to Sueter, now Superintendent of Aircraft Construction (SAC), who recognised the originality and importance of the ‘island’ on the starboard side. As Williamson required advice on placing the funnels on one side of the ship, Sueter arranged for him to see Chief Constructor J H Narbeth (DNC’s carrier designer) who saw ‘no difficulty’. The idea was considered on 25th August 1915 by the Admiralty Airship, Aeroplane and Seaplane Subcommittee. (Reports and Minutes of the Airship, Aeroplane and Seaplane Subcommittee, Adm 116/11140 PRO). His design consisted of a long deck with flying-off forward and alighting aft (aided by arrestor gear) with a streamlined ‘island’ (for navigation, funnel and mast) on the starboard side to give a clear air flow. His explanatory model was similar to Eagle in the 1920’s.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Cobblers, without the US its a cold war scenario, Britain cannot invade Europe and Germany cannot invade Britain. Sea power vs land power as per every other continental war Britain was part of for the preceding two centuries. Assuming Germany and Russia go to war ( ideologically hard to avoid ) then there is a good chance WW2 ends with the Iron curtain at the channel.
OTL Britain was financially broke by the end of 1916 and financially broke again by the end of 1940 - without the US it would have been a very short European cold war ending in the collapse of the British Empire - slightly earlier than OTL.

Which specific ideologies are you referring to? The French and Russians were both traditionally British rivals....

See the addition of sufficient pejorative terms does not make a weak argument fact. What is in fact routinely forgotten is that the margin of superiority required to conduct a successful offence is many times greater than the defence. There is a huge difference in, to take your example the World War 2 scenario, between British Empire not having sufficient resources to conduct a continental offensive strategy and it being able to hold open the sea lines of communication to the British Isles.
Fact: OTL the British Isles were far more dependent on international trade than continental powers, with over half their calories being imported. Fact: OTL the British had run out of financial liquidity by the end of 1916 and again by the end of 1940. Fact: The British Isles are a long way away from most of the British empire and shipping resources were already strained to breaking point by the transatlantic trade substitutes. Fact: Britain is a sea power dependent on maritime trade for its survival - as a continental power, Germany was far less dependent on maritime trade.

I would agree with the premise that a starvation strategy is viable and is indeed the only realistic one for the Germans in either world war but this thread has turned in a caricature of trying to argue that said starvation strategy is easy. When in fact it was far from easy and very resource and personnel intensive with enormous attrition rates among those personnel, something like 75% did not return from their last patrol in World War 2.
OTL Germany came remarkably close to breaking the British financially, but the intervention of the US prevented this. A prolonged battle of attrition resulting in an economic collapse, certainly is not easy, but it was almost achieved OTL. Breaking the British bank is bit of a variation on the starve them out thread.
Right and while that is an economic concern in peace time (and why Britain does it's best to prevent a European hegemony), it sort stops being relevant when Europe is largely at war with itself including Britain i.e european trade is already pretty disrupted!
The problem is with your examples of British resilience is the British finances were spent by the end of 1916 and 1940 respectively, which instead highlights their fragility.

Right but by 1918 Britain has just spent best part of two centuries creating a system to not only do that but profit by it. Also you say forced, but what it actually mean is Britain has other avenues for trade that say central european powers fighting on east, south and west fronts and being blockaded in the north, don't have.
By the end of 1916 the British were facing a shipping crisis to maintain lines of supply to North America, without American finance those lines of supply would be stretched to breaking point as alternative supplies from further afield were sought. OTL demonstrated the British open regime/ empire was more efficient and profitable in peacetime, but in wartime the diminutive CP economies proved to be very resilient.

Further, the contemporary thinking around the turn of the century was the age of the blockade had essentially passed (for major continental powers), since railways now enabled those powers to bypass such problems. However, the scale of WW1 & WW2 effectively closed land borders and made blockades relevant again.

everything get tougher and more expensive in war it's true, but again it snot like german was saying "Whew thank god we're completely cut from trade i'd hate to think how much we'd be paying for grain on the open market right now"
The British economy was more open to outside trade in peacetime with over half of its calories imported, so prima facie genuine wartime conditions hit such economies harder.

It's dregs of empire in 1918:
Riseandfall1.PNG


I mean yeah, blink and you'd miss it!
Gee, lucky the British won those wars... As an aside, what exactly is that bar graph measuring?
 

Fact, that word does not mean what you think it means. Fact is not defined as "an opinion of BooNZ" but rather as an objective truth for which the evidence is indisputable. So for example claims like the British were financially broke at the end of 1916 is in truth an extreme version of the opinion that the British were broke in the middle in of 1917 which is itself an extreme interpretation that the British had exhausted their means of raising further American credit which in itself ignores that the British were in fact still earning money from various sources. In short it is possible that in 1917 the British might have been forced to economise on certain aspects of their war effort but that is not the same as capitulation rather a reduction in the rate at which they attempted offensives which might have in fact reduced the human cost of the war for the British and Empire. Further but it is highly disputable that British credit was exhausted as even in 1917 the US Federal Reserve backtracked on an artificial effort to curtail that credit.

OTL Germany came remarkably close to breaking the British financially, but the intervention of the US prevented this. A prolonged battle of attrition resulting in an economic collapse, certainly is not easy, but it was almost achieved OTL. Breaking the British bank is bit of a variation on the starve them out thread.
The problem is with your examples of British resilience is the British finances were spent by the end of 1916 and 1940 respectively, which instead highlights their fragility.

Again myth for 1916 and while 1940 is much closer to the truth again we have the point that the US this time artificially stopped British credit at the onset of the war and that we are talking about a situation where the British would have found themselves short of sufficient tools to conduct certain types of offensive operations but defensive programs around the Home area and even threatened corners of the Empire are another matter entirely.

Further but both scenarios rely on the Americans being willing to compromise their own prosperity for the greater good of a kleptocratic clique. In the first case the group of officials close to but not always obedient to the Kaiser and in the second the Nazi Party. It is an interesting argument, "Hey Mr President the British have stopped buying from our factories and they are laying off workers," is assumed to be followed by "Great a President who presides over an economic downturn is guaranteed re-election amirite?"

Once again and this is also a lot of the reason why the performance of Germany is so often overrated and the performance of the Confederacy in the US Civil War as an another example, when you are on the defensive you need fewer resources to fuel equal or greater apparent victories.

As has been pointed out by others on this board the wet stuff was effectively Allied territory in both world wars with the British thus having a profound defender advantage in what was always going to be a long fight. Something that in neither instance was the German economy set up for.
 
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