Was the "starve them out" strategy ever really feasible?

The strategy WW-II was never about starving the Brits. it was mostly about cutting the transatlantic military pipe line and there by threatening one of the pillars of Briti8sh/European security.
 
Its a lot higher than that, way over a 1000. A 1000 a day is more like the Siege of Leningrad.

Edit: I know how they get that number, at least part of the error. They are taking the % reduction and multiplying by what an officer worker eats today (2000 calories or so). People used to eat roughly twice as much when they did manual labor all day.

I have added up the ration allowance by type of food. You get rations more like 1800 to 2400 for civilians, higher for soldiers. Still enough to cause excess fatalities but not 1000 calories. If you go below 1500 average, then people start dying fairly fast and you will go back above 1500 per person due to deaths in not too many months.
The 1,000 calorie figure comes from the UK's national archives.
 
It's easier to do in WW1 but the loss rates show that as soon as Britain adopts convoy, it's over.

So the key is for Germany to persuade Britain that there are more important things for escorts to be doing, and that convoys would be a target for surface ships. This points to a more aggressive role for the HSF, and also towards the importance of grabbing the Channel coast.

In practice, the U-boats' job isn't about starving the British, but about restricting British ability to project power. That should break before the British starve, so you can then win the war in France.
 
Last edited:
You can't just snap your fingers and completely restructure the agricultural system of an economy like the UK. Snip
All those measures are OTL from WW2, farmers went from planing max money per acre to government ordered max calories per acre. Your objections would work in peace but national survival on the line, the rules change drastically. Even in peace depending on prices , what farmers plant year to year can change greatly. Foot and Mouth caused farmers to change from pastoral for a time just as Mad Cow Disease did earlier, milk quotas etc also make changes, farmers tend to be quite flexible.
For example during WW2 as a result of these changes meat production falls by around 300,000t a year but grain and potatoes grow by around 300,000t each ( 1180-> 812 , 4264-> 7132, 4354 -> 8701 ). 10 acres of grassland to raise livestock produces around enough calories to feed about 12 people for a year, of wheat its nearer 200 and potatoes around 400, as a result arable land doubled in size during WW2 ( pre war most was grassland ).
 
Got to take those figures with a pinch of salt if extrapolating to wartime. Remember whats planted is based on what price they can sell in a world market not what they could produce if needed. That the 70's figure is less than was managed OTL in WW2 and possibly only as much as pre war is a big red flag. Also barley and oats at the time would be as big as wheat and a government mandated use of natural flour ( ie milled as brown not purified to white) increased effective yield ( less waste and it also preserved iron, vitamins etc )
 
The UK will do exactly diddly squat if Germany greatly expands it submarine force.

Not really, in 1912 RN Officers were putting together plans based on moving the battleships out to the Scottish west coast and Ireland while filling the North Sea with composite cruiser squadrons supported by 2 ship types that didn't exist yet - Seaplane Carriers and Aircraft Carriers. They were alive to the threat of surprise attacks by submarines against merchant ships even though this activity was illegal at the time.
 
The German (mis)calculations on Britain's needs were based on pre-war rates failing to take into consideration that convoy conserves shipping and rationing guarantees supplies - not reduces consumption. The Brits in WW1 didn't feel pressured enough to ration fodder for racehorses.
 
Yes. I think we could have been starved out. We weren't because the Nazi were unprepared for such a campaign, lacked the forces to impose a blockade and the allies developed technology and tactics faster than the Nazi did.

As an aside I suspect there is a different view between Americans and British contributors. They Americans don't seem to grasp the physiological impact of the battle of the Atlantic or how utterly reliant the UK is on SLOC. The key point is those SLOC don't have to be closed to force us out of a the war, just damaged to the extent that life becomes unacceptably hard for the civilian population ( aka rations cut and cut and cut) and leaves the military short of the resources ( basically fuel and ammo) needed to prosecute the war.

Most of the stuff we needed to carry on came to us by ship over the ocean. Target those key supply areas ( especially fuel) early enough and attack port facilities and ship repair facilities constantly and things are looking very different. if you can also knock out fuel concentration points and handling equipment you make things much harder and lead to more and more imports by ships

Thankfully the Nazis couldn't!


EDIT - WW1, I think, was a closer run thing particularity in early 1917. Had the Germans gone harder earlier they might have succeeded.

I would also add to this: The Nazi also needed to wear down and attempt to write off the community of Merchant Seaman . Obviously every ship you sink reduces the pool of skilled men further but also attack their homes ( and at this time the majority of men in the UK Merchant Navy came from dock towns), put their families under threat, give them no rest, destroy their homes and possessions, drive them away from the sea. Couple that with a black PR campaign pointing out these men are "skulking" cowardly civilians dodging the war in a cushy ship travelling the world with nice food, soft beds and lots to drink while you are getting the shit kicked out of you in some hole in the ground or risking your life every night attacking the enemy by air. Make out that no right minded man would volunteer for the merchant service.

As a further aside I think the men of the Merchant Navy ( and their allied colleagues) are often overlooked in all of this. They were civilians and they were in the front line. They battled, every day, not just the U-Boat threat but also terrible weather and seas to keep the SLOC open and keep Britain in the war. 30,248 UK merchant seamen lost their lives during World War Two, a death rate that was higher proportionately than in any of the armed forces. Most have no grave. They deserve our thanks.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
The 1,000 calorie figure comes from the UK's national archives.

Still know it is wrong, since i pulled the number from primary sources of the time. Also know it is wrong due to biology and the 1500 calorie rule. I also explained how they calculate in all likelihood, i.e only included some rationed items. 2-3 items out of a list of 7 or more. I gave the grams per day per person by category. Notice all the foods missing on the list.

And these facts are not secret, you can go pull the sources yourself, even though I admit it takes a huge amount of work to find them.

Here is the big part of the problem, and people have trouble with this one. The UK intentionally lied and forged records related to WW1 in the naval area for national security reason. The reasons being the German USW almost knocked them out of the war and the UK Grand Fleet did little to win the war. The UK did not want other nations copying Germany strategy. So they lied to discourage submarine building. I currently can pull huge amounts of official US government agency records showing the USA won the War on Terror. I can pull tons of quotes from Cheney, Bush II, and Obama about how we won. Same idea here, I can pull tons of UK government analysis that shows the naval strategy winning plus tons of quotes by Churchill, Sea Lords, Admirals and others about how the UK won.

Or I can go to Vietnam and pull pre-Pentagon Paper records and show we were winning. Quotes from Westmoreland. Walter Cronkie Articles.

I can do the same in the official Nazi archive right up til Berlin fell

For some reason, this board has this one big blind spot. We accept that losing powers lie all the time, yet for some reason, the UK doesn't about WW1.
 
So whenever the Atlantic in either World War is brought up the German attempt to remove the British from the conflict by cutting off its shipping is mentioned. I'm wondering that even if the Kriegsmarine was more successful and effectively removed much of the exported materials and food to the Isles, would that have hurt the United Kingdom enough to drop out before Germany itself began losing? I'd imagine the situation is probably different between the 1910's vs. the 1940's. What are you're thoughts?

I think it was the only viable strategy that the Germans had - they could not invade, they could not bomb into submission - blockade was the only strategy left and it started at a disadvantage with regards to Geography - made slightly better with the occupation of France and Norway but the Atlantic was an Allied lake effectively surrounded by bases and airfields into which German Aircraft, Submarines and surface ships could only raid.

The British was also the only nation with previous experiance of fighting a Uboat war and obviously had lots of Blockade and anti Blockade experiance

Britain had the mass majority of the worlds merchant fleet effectively under its command

In any scenario where the German Uboats do better than OTL it is far far easier for Britain to react than it is for the Germans - paticularly given the sheer number of 2 and 4 engined bombers being built in the UK and USA - it would only take a tiny % of those aircraft (which would still be 100s of planes) shifted to the Coastal command /ASW forces to dramatically impact the operational effectiveness of the Uboats by preventing them from operating on the surface anywhere where they were patrolling - which would be around the areas convoys were. Obsolete 2 Engined bombers in Coastal commadn had already denied the seas around the UK.

A submerged Uboat in 41/42 cannot recharge its batteries and cannot manouvre 'as quickly' to position itself ahead of a convoy as one that is able to operate on the surface with impunity and is therefore less likely to be in a position to attack a given convoy.

For me not realeasing sufficient numbers of suitable aircraft for the Coastal command airforces earlier than they did was one of the biggest strategic mistakes. But faced with an impending defeat releasing more and more 4 engined Bombers to act as LRMPA in the ASW role is a very easy thing to do.
 
A submerged Uboat in 41/42 cannot recharge its batteries and cannot manouvre 'as quickly' to position itself ahead of a convoy as one that is able to operate on the surface with impunity and is therefore less likely to be in a position to attack a given convoy.

Even more importantly a submerged U-boat has a much lower observable horizon and is thus likely to miss ships entirely a surfaced hunter would have detected. These numbers add up.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Not really, in 1912 RN Officers were putting together plans based on moving the battleships out to the Scottish west coast and Ireland while filling the North Sea with composite cruiser squadrons supported by 2 ship types that didn't exist yet - Seaplane Carriers and Aircraft Carriers. They were alive to the threat of surprise attacks by submarines against merchant ships even though this activity was illegal at the time.

You mistaking some War College type work training officers with actual military preparations. These plans had no more substance than some of Imperial Germany's plans to fight a war with the USA. Real war plans have things like budgets, logistical schedules, training schedules and ship buildings. Also be very careful on the copyright date. There is as night and day between the contemperaneous records of what was done and post 1918 record which are mostly CYA works of fiction. I used to believe the stuff you are saying since I too read these post war sources. Once I start looking moving towards primary records, did I get the real picture. The British Empire fell apart largely because the military and political leaders enter a war that they were not prepared to fight.

So you bring up 1912, lets talk about the plans. Before this time by a few years, the naval exercise focused on breaking into the Baltic and attacking the German coast, or invading around Kiel or Hamburg. Cruisers were going to force the Elbe and fight their way past Hamburg. They were switching to this would not be possible, but they games still rehearsed these type of battles or the decisive battle in the southern North Sea. Putting ships in West Ireland had no part of these plans. The type of plans they were switching too had taking a few undefended Dutch or Danish Islands. Grounding supply ships and maybe a few older pre-dread types. Then the DD and SS stay close, back up by cruiser farther back, and the BB at sea probably at the narrow point between England and Norway. And these are not idle musing, the operations orders had been written and sealed.

Basically to put in a modern context, what you are quoting is speculation from some Major who went through the USA war college. What I am quoting would be the equivalent of the SIOP (Single Integrated Operations Plan) of the US DoD.

They also had no plans to mass produce aircraft carriers. It goes against the RN building plan. The RN always did some test work, then would generally stop. Since the RN could build ships much faster, the RN then wanted others to pay most of the development cost. The RN could then rapidly catch up. Also the last thing the RN wanted was something like CV meaning their BB were no longer as useful. I guarantee you that if you trace your Sea Carrier and Aircraft Carrier source, the information was written post German U-boats being a crisis. The key is to look at the copyright date.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
The German (mis)calculations on Britain's needs were based on pre-war rates failing to take into consideration that convoy conserves shipping and rationing guarantees supplies - not reduces consumption. The Brits in WW1 didn't feel pressured enough to ration fodder for racehorses.

While the WW2 300 submarine rule was calculated on WW1 numbers, there are issues with the rest of your post. Convoying reduces shipping capacity by about 1/3 even if nothing is ever sunk. There are only two errors related to the 300 ship rule. The Nazi did not start with the 300 submarines and the WW1 calculation is based on the USA not being in the war, i.e. doesn't have the USA spamming out merchant shipping.

As a part of my ATL, I went back and calculated these numbers using British records. 300 U-boats at the start of WW1 would have quickly broken the back of the UK ability to fight, and cause a German win.

BTW, you have to start your modeling with historical data, so the Nazi had to prepare plans based on WW1 data.
 
There's an element of hindsight here, but operational research showed that defeating the WW2 wolf-pack was astonishingly easy.

You simply stopped it from forming up in the first place. This means forcing a U-boat to dive, at which point it can no longer move from its patrol line quickly enough to intercept the convoy. All you need is the air cover to saturate the area around a convoy and ensure that U-boats cannot approach on the surface. No wolf-pack, hence no problems for the close escort.

This is easy in daytime, but requires some technology at night. But even doing it only at day means that it's far harder for a pack to form up.

ASW in WW2 isn't really about sinking U-boats, and it's certainly not about going looking for them in wasteful hunter-killer groups or bombing German ports. It's just about the safe and timely arrival of the convoy. Let the U-boats dash themselves against, or be outrun by, a mobile fortress and the sinkings will come.
 

BooNZ

Banned
I think it was the only viable strategy that the Germans had - they could not invade, they could not bomb into submission - blockade was the only strategy left and it started at a disadvantage with regards to Geography - made slightly better with the occupation of France and Norway but the Atlantic was an Allied lake effectively surrounded by bases and airfields into which German Aircraft, Submarines and surface ships could only raid.

The British was also the only nation with previous experiance of fighting a Uboat war and obviously had lots of Blockade and anti Blockade experiance

Britain had the mass majority of the worlds merchant fleet effectively under its command
What is routinely ignored is the occupation of the continent by any european power effectively blockades Britain from 100% european trade, even before said european power dips its toes into blue waters. Britain is forced to access almost all its imports across oceans and most of its colonies (and friendly dominions) are even further away. Britain is has to fund higher prices, fund additional transport/ transaction costs, and fund the additional costs of the war. While half its available resources are dedicated to fighting a war, it will struggle to raise export currency to pay the price of war to profiteers.

If Britian stood alone (including with the dregs of empire), Britain would have fallen. However, the reality was the British war effort in both wars was ultimately propped up by American commercial interests.
 
Last edited:
For some reason, this board has this one big blind spot. We accept that losing powers lie all the time, yet for some reason, the UK doesn't about WW1.

Might have something to do with the fact, that most of the writers are from Anglosphere...
 
What is routinely ignored is the occupation of the continent by any european power effectively blockades Britain from 100% european trade, even before said european power dips its toes into blue waters. Britain is forced to access almost all its imports across oceans and most of its colonies (and friendly dominions) are even further away. Britain is has to fund higher prices, fund additional transport/ transaction costs, and fund the additional costs of the war. While half its available resources are dedicated to fighting a war, it will struggle to raise export currency to pay the price of war to profiteers.

If Britain stood alone (including with the dregs of empire), Britain would have fallen. However, the reality was the British war effort in both wars was ultimately propped up by American commercial interests.
Cobblers, without the US its a cold war scenario, Britain cannot invade Europe and Germany cannot invade Britain. Sea power vs land power as per every other continental war Britain was part of for the preceding two centuries. Assuming Germany and Russia go to war ( ideologically hard to avoid ) then there is a good chance WW2 ends with the Iron curtain at the channel.
 
What is routinely ignored is the occupation of the continent by any european power effectively blockades Britain from 100% european trade, even before said european power dips its toes into blue waters. Britain is forced to access almost all its imports across oceans and most of its colonies (and friendly dominions) are even further away. Britain is has to fund higher prices, fund additional transport/ transaction costs, and fund the additional costs of the war. While half its available resources are dedicated to fighting a war, it will struggle to raise export currency to pay the price of war to profiteers.

If Britian stood alone (including with the dregs of empire), Britain would have fallen. However, the reality was the British war effort in both wars was ultimately propped up by American commercial interests.

See the addition of sufficient pejorative terms does not make a weak argument fact. What is in fact routinely forgotten is that the margin of superiority required to conduct a successful offence is many times greater than the defence. There is a huge difference in, to take your example the World War 2 scenario, between British Empire not having sufficient resources to conduct a continental offensive strategy and it being able to hold open the sea lines of communication to the British Isles.

In addition but for the British the same force that defends its sea lanes automatically denies those to the Nazi regime. This means the Nazis cannot offer their people a war dividend to justify their aggression which means the Nazi regime must continue the war which means burning through its stocks of raw materials faster than they could be replaced. Now the benefit of hindsight teaches us that technical partial solutions were sufficient to sustain the Nazi war effort much longer than they expected but Barbarossa, already alluded to as I am typing this, was an intrinsic feature not a bug and was a vital component of Nazi requirements on the economic and not simply ideological levels.

I would agree with the premise that a starvation strategy is viable and is indeed the only realistic one for the Germans in either world war but this thread has turned in a caricature of trying to argue that said starvation strategy is easy. When in fact it was far from easy and very resource and personnel intensive with enormous attrition rates among those personnel, something like 75% did not return from their last patrol in World War 2.
 
All those measures are OTL from WW2, farmers went from planing max money per acre to government ordered max calories per acre. Your objections would work in peace but national survival on the line, the rules change drastically. Even in peace depending on prices , what farmers plant year to year can change greatly. Foot and Mouth caused farmers to change from pastoral for a time just as Mad Cow Disease did earlier, milk quotas etc also make changes, farmers tend to be quite flexible.
For example during WW2 as a result of these changes meat production falls by around 300,000t a year but grain and potatoes grow by around 300,000t each ( 1180-> 812 , 4264-> 7132, 4354 -> 8701 ). 10 acres of grassland to raise livestock produces around enough calories to feed about 12 people for a year, of wheat its nearer 200 and potatoes around 400, as a result arable land doubled in size during WW2 ( pre war most was grassland ).

The British state is a fundamentally different beast in WW 2 than WW 1. The Great War was the Empire's first foray into total industrial war, meaning she was implimenting get social-economic measures without the examined experiences, structures, and shift in national culture/expectations of the potential extremities of wartime that they'd have in the 30's thanks to the hard knocks and mistakes of the 10's. You also had a more extended period of preparation to lay the groundwork for a shift to a war economy in the second war due to a different geostrategic thinking on the nature of the next war (long vs short, what scale would we need to get involved in, ect.). Even before we take into account the technological changes that made centeral control/manipulation of the market easier.
 
Top