Was the "starve them out" strategy ever really feasible?

BlondieBC

Banned
By April of 1917, the UK had six weeks of food left and eight weeks of oil. U.S. entry immediately added 28 destroyers to the combined Entente total, making an effective convoy system possible as well as added an insane amount of merchant tonnage to transport war materials. Had the U.S. not entered, Britain would've been forced into starvation by June of 1917.

I agree, except I think the UK breaks in the winter. Starting in early June, the various harvest wills start to come in, and they will be immediately consumed. Once the last harvest is done and the warehouses are empty, the starvation starts about 6-12 weeks later. By starvation, I mean substantially higher than baseline death rates.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Interesting fact.

Surely though, Britain is not a small place and prior to the 20th century, had fed itself for centuries. The Saxons and Normans for example probably weren't importing food, they were growing it locally.

I think it would be possible to grow enough food for everyone, using the land available?

Yea, if the population was still 3 million.
 

Ian_W

Banned
Thank you all for the replies. This is my first time posting a thread here so it was really interesting seeing everyone's different viewpoints. The general consensus I'm getting is that Germany had a much greater opportunity in WW1 then WW2 to force Britain into terms. Now in a First World War scenario would this have still required unrestricted submarine warfare, or could it have been done in more of a longer approach with less diplomatic outrage?

Not really, as once the RN sucks it up and adopts convoy, unrestricted submarine warfare falls apart.
 
Problem is that while the naval imbalance in WW1 between GB and Germany isn't as great as it is in WW2, it's still basically 2:1 in total total tonnage, 2.6:1 in personal and 1.7:1 in dreadnoughts*. So going on the offensive against that kind of imbalance is going to be really tough unless you have a way of removing first.

Now you suggest an wild attack against the German High Seas fleet in the Baltic (i.e home protected waters), the reality is the RN doesn't need to do that to keep the Germans bottled up, so it really would be ASB to go and do it. I.e the German's not only have the disadvantage in numbers but in geography, and while the RN might be over confident it's unlikely go and fight battle in a disadvantageous situation that it doesn't need to. The battle of the Jut might not have been the RN's greatest moment but it still won simply because the KM couldn't get past them and stayed at home.

Also the other problem raids on the east coast in not going to cause major disruption to logistics of inflow of goods. because there are big ports all around the country. So say you take out Hartlepool, Liverpool is on the east coast etc

I'm not saying such an attack is likely: just that it's not ASB if the right set of circumstances play out. One critical factor for allowing the HSF to remain a fully concentrated Fleet in Being in Whilhelmshaven is the fact that it allows the Germans to have their entire fleet (which is superior in designs for tactical engagements close to home waters relative to the British, albet at the cost of crew comfort and cruising endurance) to be in the condition to strike out at once, while the Royal Navy needs to spread out and cycle to maintain the distant blockade. If the Germans manage to get in a fewer minor successful attacks on elements of the blockade by sailing out in force before retiring back to refit,then you could very well cause worry by the First Sea Lord and naval brass that there's a risk of the Home Fleet getting reduced in detail to unacceptable margins if they don't change tactics. At the very least, give them a reason to be worry of sailing too far afield. This could very well lead to an overconfident blunder or bad luck in an effort to draw the Germans into a more decisive showdow, sailing in closer to coastal craft range than they ought to or getting out manuvered.

As for the raiding, I wasn't talking about the inflow of goods. I was talking about the flow of British goods domestically via commercial craft up and down the eastern seaboard. If I recall correctly, that played a pretty big roll in internal logistics.
 
I agree, except I think the UK breaks in the winter. Starting in early June, the various harvest wills start to come in, and they will be immediately consumed. Once the last harvest is done and the warehouses are empty, the starvation starts about 6-12 weeks later. By starvation, I mean substantially higher than baseline death rates.

That depends alot on just how quickly and effectively the UK can impliment a rationing system and how much hoarding takes place in the more agrarian regions. The Island can endure for a fair bit of time if they're capable and willing to adopt some food streching measures and do some fancy bookkeeping with the Sterling, though in all likelihood this is alot worse for the Empire post-war recovery.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
That depends alot on just how quickly and effectively the UK can impliment a rationing system and how much hoarding takes place in the more agrarian regions. The Island can endure for a fair bit of time if they're capable and willing to adopt some food streching measures and do some fancy bookkeeping with the Sterling, though in all likelihood this is alot worse for the Empire post-war recovery.

Not at this time. It is not just the loss of the imported food, it is the loss of all the other supplies. Things like where is the fuel coming from to run the tractors. Industrial production will collapse. Before we do these second tier effects, we are at roughly the calorie levels of Germany in 1917/18. The wheels will come off the system.
 
And then there is the idea in WWII the English never committed more to the Battle of the Atlantic than they had to.
Classic Exhibit #1 is usually to point out the desperate need for long range patrol aircraft, then point to the oversized Bomber Command full of conveniently long ranged aircraft. It is kind of revealing that things never got bad enough that Bomber Command never had its toys taken away.

Similarly in WW1 the RN didn't take destroyers from the Grand Fleet to escort merchant convoys, they didn't even dedicate the coastal destroyers in patrol flotillas to escort merchant convoys.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Not really, as once the RN sucks it up and adopts convoy, unrestricted submarine warfare falls apart.

First, if you go full convoy, you lose roughly 1/3 of capacity. This is hidden IOTL due to the American merchant fleet arriving. The whole key is key is to avoid the USA entering the war. Easy in WW1. Extremely hard in WW2.

And even with convoy, losses don't go to zero, they just go down.

The Entente winning WW1 was a big upset, so merchant warfare can break the UK.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
But isn't that the catch-22? They can sink all the ships they want as they enter the waters around the UK but they're going to end up killing Americans in the process and give Wilson his casus belli.

Not really. It is really the Lusitania and a handful of other big ships. It is fairly easy to avoid.

Also, there was not really a noticeable difference in sinking rates between USW and non-USW U-boats.
 
The options are between Cruiser and USW, the Germans also conducted a 'sharpened' uboat campaign in early 1916, which ended with the Sussex incident and Jutland.
 
Not at this time. It is not just the loss of the imported food, it is the loss of all the other supplies. Things like where is the fuel coming from to run the tractors. Industrial production will collapse. Before we do these second tier effects, we are at roughly the calorie levels of Germany in 1917/18. The wheels will come off the system.

That's true if we assume a late 1916 POD in which the UK has already gone so long without starting to take measures to economize and husband it's financial resources. If we're operating in a timeline where the Germans are getting the upper hand on the naval front in a matter that isen't going to overly alienate the Americans, than I argue itd have to sink in gradually enough to need a change in the 15-16 winter, at latest. This, to be fair to Britain if she's willing to aknowledge reality, gives time to implement changes without dealing too heavy a shock to the system. As an added plausability bonus, giving her time to play Funny Money is likely to further reduce the odds of Washington cutting the Entente any breaks in terms of selling securities on Walk Street or chartering American-company hulls to import supplies under the Stars and Stripes, or try to agitate the situation to lead to war in order to rescue "sunk cost" loans, as it creates the apperance of the British not intending to cover their obligations honestly by inflating their currency and thus devaluing the debt.
 
I'm not saying such an attack is likely: just that it's not ASB if the right set of circumstances play out. One critical factor for allowing the HSF to remain a fully concentrated Fleet in Being in Whilhelmshaven is the fact that it allows the Germans to have their entire fleet (which is superior in designs for tactical engagements close to home waters relative to the British, albet at the cost of crew comfort and cruising endurance) to be in the condition to strike out at once, while the Royal Navy needs to spread out and cycle to maintain the distant blockade. If the Germans manage to get in a fewer minor successful attacks on elements of the blockade by sailing out in force before retiring back to refit,then you could very well cause worry by the First Sea Lord and naval brass that there's a risk of the Home Fleet getting reduced in detail to unacceptable margins if they don't change tactics. At the very least, give them a reason to be worry of sailing too far afield. This could very well lead to an overconfident blunder or bad luck in an effort to draw the Germans into a more decisive showdow, sailing in closer to coastal craft range than they ought to or getting out manuvered.

As for the raiding, I wasn't talking about the inflow of goods. I was talking about the flow of British goods domestically via commercial craft up and down the eastern seaboard. If I recall correctly, that played a pretty big roll in internal logistics.


The first problem the Kaiserlich Marine had was insufficient cruisers and light craft, this often gets over looked as most people focus on the fact they did not have enough battleships but it is also a problem. The Royal Navy could afford to burn up its destroyers, light cruisers and even pre-dreadnoughts in coastal operations which took a long time to have effect and exposed individual ships to a lot of risk. Kaiser Bill's Navy not so much. Yes the Royal Navy needs to spread out but it has spreadable ships, the Grand Fleet has not only battleships and battlecruisers but the light cruisers and destroyers and even some armoured cruisers which were actually rather white elephantine but they were available and still have plenty of light cruisers and destroyers and armoured cruisers doing the job they were actually good at and armed merchant cruisers.

Because an awful lot of the elements of the blockade were in fact ships taken up from merchant service doing what was essentially police work. That is stopping ships and asking to see their papers. These were not even remotely true warships, mostly ex-liners IIRC and yet these are the sort of blockading elements the wonderfully, brilliantly, superbly the HSF need to intercept with their short range ships and the problem is they are a long way away from Wilhelmshaven.
 
EDIT - WW1, I think, was a closer run thing particularity in early 1917. Had the Germans gone harder earlier they might have succeeded.
They came within 6 weeks of bringing famine to the UK. Had the RN not reluctantly changed to organising convoys they could well have succeeded.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
That's true if we assume a late 1916 POD in which the UK has already gone so long without starting to take measures to economize and husband it's financial resources. If we're operating in a timeline where the Germans are getting the upper hand on the naval front in a matter that isen't going to overly alienate the Americans, than I argue itd have to sink in gradually enough to need a change in the 15-16 winter, at latest. This, to be fair to Britain if she's willing to aknowledge reality, gives time to implement changes without dealing too heavy a shock to the system. As an added plausability bonus, giving her time to play Funny Money is likely to further reduce the odds of Washington cutting the Entente any breaks in terms of selling securities on Walk Street or chartering American-company hulls to import supplies under the Stars and Stripes, or try to agitate the situation to lead to war in order to rescue "sunk cost" loans, as it creates the apperance of the British not intending to cover their obligations honestly by inflating their currency and thus devaluing the debt.

Yes, with a 1914 POD making the German U-boats super effective, the UK will easily last out the first winter. Effects will be profound on the battlefield, but the UK should make it to early Spring 1916 at least. A-H screws up stuff so badly in the first few months that if Germany does not win at the Marne, the war nearly has to last til summer 1916.
 
Not really. It is really the Lusitania and a handful of other big ships. It is fairly easy to avoid.

Also, there was not really a noticeable difference in sinking rates between USW and non-USW U-boats.

It's also worth noting that, at the time, the silence around the Lusitania was actually quite deafening from most Americans. Wilson can't declare war; only Congress can, and ifpublic opinion isen't fired up against the Germans I hesitate to think he'll get one.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
They came within 6 weeks of bringing famine to the UK. Had the RN not reluctantly changed to organising convoys they could well have succeeded.

Six weeks supply is different than famine in 6 weeks. It means that if no more ships are unloaded and no corrective action is taken, then the warehouse are empty is six weeks. I guess we need to get to the numbers.

Women probably need 3,000 calories per day, 4,000 for men. They are doing manual labor. So lets take men only for easy numbers. The UK can generate 60% of needed food, or 2400 calories per day. But this 2400 calories are not evenly spread in the year. The UK food production in winter is low (milk?), so it is probably above 3500 in summer, probably under 1000 in winter. And you don't quickly starve to death on 2400 calories out 4000 needed. You lose about a pound every 3 days, and then you will start to work slower.

When I say excess deaths, I don't mean people who look like they are in concentration camps. It is a lot of non-fatal illnesses become fatal with a 1600 calorie deficit. It is why people spend so much time arguing over how many Germans died in the blockade.

But against a population that has already lost weight and the tendency to mismanage a bit, I do expect the UK to leave the war. If the reaction time is a little slow, we can easily have a few months in the winter where food goes below 1500 calories per day for many people.

So then if we are writing a good ATL, we get into a bunch of arguments that sound like we are on some Soviet style planning commission. And that is why we see different things. Some will see very good projections and rapid reactions and the UK quickly dropping to a sustainable level. I see slower reactions as likely and a much tougher winter. Then we deal with secondary impacts such as "How much does food production go down if half of tractors are idle?" "How much slower does a farm worker work who has a 1000 calorie deficit?" etc. etc.
 
Yes, with a 1914 POD making the German U-boats super effective, the UK will easily last out the first winter. Effects will be profound on the battlefield, but the UK should make it to early Spring 1916 at least. A-H screws up stuff so badly in the first few months that if Germany does not win at the Marne, the war nearly has to last til summer 1916.

The British still have assets and faith in the Empire to morgage for credit to hire out forgein shipping to bring in imports that early if, again, they're willing to handle their ledgers creatively. Cripples them in the longer term if the Sterling loses faith as a reserve currency and unit of value by playing fast and loose with the gold standard, but better than losing a major international war that leaves a hegemonic Germany with a chip on their shoulder as far as Whitehall is concerned.

We also need to be fair and realize a major shift in the u-boat effectiveness (the build program shift, if nothing else) will require time for German good descisions and British poor decisions to compound. So you likely don't see a major swing until mid-1915 or so, at which point the British still have a brain and make efforts to stem the loses even if they aren't effective or without drawbacks. With only realistic levels of huberius and bad judgement, I'd say Britain can hold out until very early 1918 before the pressure goes so high she's be truely starved into submission, though things will be bad by 1917 and I imagine Brest-Litovisk negotations of an equivalent will be used by the Western Entente to seek a general peace. That way, they can leverage concessions in the East to try to salvage better terms for themselves.
 
Six weeks supply is different than famine in 6 weeks. It means that if no more ships are unloaded and no corrective action is taken, then the warehouse are empty is six weeks. I guess we need to get to the numbers.

(...)

So then if we are writing a good ATL, we get into a bunch of arguments that sound like we are on some Soviet style planning commission. And that is why we see different things. Some will see very good projections and rapid reactions and the UK quickly dropping to a sustainable level. I see slower reactions as likely and a much tougher winter. Then we deal with secondary impacts such as "How much does food production go down if half of tractors are idle?" "How much slower does a farm worker work who has a 1000 calorie deficit?" etc. etc.

Bigger question: will the farm worker be on a 1000 calorie deficit? If we use the German rationing system as an example, even if the law is being followed to the letter heavy workers in vital war industries were granted more calories than those outside the war economy. And the farmer may decide not to put all his product into the offical market either: hording for himself and family/friends of selling at above prescribed prices of without ration cards on the black market. This creates an imbalance in food availability the more of takes place: leading to more preventable deaths and increased social strife (especially in the urban centers)
 
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