Was the "starve them out" strategy ever really feasible?

The British did not need to win big on any one occasion, Trafalgar was nice but it was in fact the exception to the Royal Navy tradition of grinding out repeated small wins. In fact against Germany the British only needed to suffer sufficient narrow defeats to utterly destroy the ability of the HSF to contest the North Sea as they could make good losses more easily and were starting any conflict in any period of the Riskflotte era from a higher starting base and then in addition they had the advantage of geographical position.

Those numbers don't just apply to the battlefleets but across the board, just as true at the battle of Dover Strait with 23 destroyers as Jutland with 16 battleships, and the British need to win most if not every time week in and week out.

Looking at the aftermath of Jutland is informative the British replace two of the lost battlecruisers and recall one bringing them back to full strength in that rating and in battleships they add three and one, Vanguard, blows up, the German manage to make good their lost battlecruiser and after the battle they lose one battleship to a mine and add two. In other words the Germans being generous they are just as far behind if not further back relative to their opponent even with inflicting significantly more capital ship casualties and this ignores the issues with losses among the light ships while the British lose fewer and again add more.

Can't argue with any of that, although it does show the importance the British placed on their naval security and why it was important they won each and every time they fought.

One of the most interesting things about the pre-war Anglo-German 'Arms Race' is that it can be argued the British were not even racing as they simply carried on building at their typical pace in their typical proportions of battleships/battlecruisers, light cruisers and destroyers during the period 1905-1912.

Yes, although I think they did react with the 'we want 8 and we won't wait' thing. The Germans didn't cause a change in shipbuilding for a decade, the threat was dealt with diplomatically with the Treaty with Japan and ententes with France and Russia.
 
Yes, although I think they did react with the 'we want 8 and we won't wait' thing. The Germans didn't cause a change in shipbuilding for a decade, the threat was dealt with diplomatically with the Treaty with Japan and ententes with France and Russia.

Actually this is one of the reasons a lot of historians argue that Riskflotte was counter productive for the Germans. The Liberal government was trying to rein in defence expenditures but with the Germans seemingly hellbent on getting ahead Fisher had his dream opening with public opinion.
 
Actually this is one of the reasons a lot of historians argue that Riskflotte was counter productive for the Germans. The Liberal government was trying to rein in defence expenditures but with the Germans seemingly hellbent on getting ahead Fisher had his dream opening with public opinion.

Thats fair enough I think, however given the multiple threads that led to WW1 I'm sceptical of claims that it was the key thing. Further, even if it was an important factor in making Britain an enemy it also introduced opportunities that mitigate that cost, which may well have occured anyway. Presenting as purely a loss for Germany is not accurate.
 
Thats fair enough I think, however given the multiple threads that led to WW1 I'm sceptical of claims that it was the key thing. Further, even if it was an important factor in making Britain an enemy it also introduced opportunities that mitigate that cost, which may well have occured anyway. Presenting as purely a loss for Germany is not accurate.

There rarely is anything pure in history and Tirpitz's Navy would not have sunk Anglo-German relations solely by themselves without some epically poor diplomacy, couple as always with the internal politics of both countries and accidents of timing. Once things had hit the nadir point and the BEF had been committed the argument becomes how best the Germans could have used their fleet as obviously with the benefit of hindsight having it sit still was not good for morale. Where I think we differ is that you seem to think the British would have been at a disadvantage if the Germans had tried something more proactive while I tend towards the conclusion the British still had strength in depth. I think we both agree it was a possibility the Kaiserliche Marine could have down more damage to the Royal Navy and the sea lines of communication than they did OTL.
 
I think we both agree it was a possibility the Kaiserliche Marine could have down more damage to the Royal Navy and the sea lines of communication than they did OTL.

Yes, and not so much the big ships, the small ships sat idle as well instead of being sent to Flanders.

Where I think we differ is that you seem to think the British would have been at a disadvantage if the Germans had tried something more proactive while I tend towards the conclusion the British still had strength in depth.

I don't think the Germans could win per se at sea, because as you say the British had defence in depth. However the British didn't really need to use it; they didn't really do anything special against the Flanders bases until late 1916 when the Germans moved 20 destroyers there. Once the Germans did something proactive the British had to respond, but without such actions the British could fight pretty much how they wanted to fight without much hassle. That to me is the big missed opportunity for the Germans. For example the RN had big-gun monitors anchored off Dunkirk in an open road-stead every night for years and not once did the Germans try to attack these vulnerable and valuable targets less than an hour's steaming away when they had 3, 13 or 23 destroyers.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
In late 1899 the Kaiser counselled his British uncle to accept the impending British defeat at the hands of the Boer gracefully, as the British had recently accepted defeat at the hands of the Australian cricket team. This illustrates both a distinct lack of tact and a gross underestimation of British resolve and resilience, which was likely at the core of the absurd German Risk Fleet theory.

The Kaiser didn't understand the English. We were (are) always afraid of the Australian cricket team, but would probably choose to lose a fleet than the Ashes! :openedeyewink:
 
Funnily enough I've heard that Baden-Powell's dispatches from the Siege of Mafeking read like cricket or rugby scores, so maybe the Kaiser was right on the money!
 

BooNZ

Banned
It was a lot of things but paranoid wasn't one of them.
It is often stated that from 1912 the Germans assumed the British would automatically join in the next war against Germany, yet OTL Churchill was the only British Cabinet member enthusiastic about war and Churchill and Grey were the only British Cabinet members determined to support France before the German invaison of Belgium. Further, in my opinon the Schlieffen Plan concept appears considerably less inept if the Germans had also assumed Belgium was ready to join the Entente cause, which was certainly not the case.

I guess you could argue it was conservatism rather than paranoia that caused the Germans to assume everyone was poised to join the other team, but the paranoia tag easily fits with the disfunctional German foreign policy of the time.

I can't think of an area where the Heer was short of equipment or training compared to its rivals; maybe communications equipment? On the other hand it had the best siege train, more heavy artillery and mortars than its rivals and apparently the best training facilities on the continent. It was only when in December 1912 that it was decided to expand the Army by 135,000 men that the Navy began to be impinged, it appears they could keep the Heer at the top level while expanding the Navy until that point.
More motorised transport would have been nice - certainly based on Martin Van Creveld's assessment of thier performance in 1914. Maybe not nice enough to work the miracles many expect of the Schlieffen Plan, but certainly enough for you to win your Race to the Sea.

However Germany decided, with sufficient political support, that they were done with a defensive naval strategy and the capacity to push back at Britain in the future would be useful as a way to deal with Britain on German terms rather than relying on the goodwill of the British for diplomatic relationships.
The Germans had decided to snatch at what Britain had previoulsy given freely. As previously mentioned, the German industry and economy had boomed for decades under the globalised trade championed by Britain. What the Germans decided to do is easy enough to understand, but it was clearly a suboptimal decision by a wide margin.

As for the high-tech French subs, what did they achieve in WW1? People bang on about tech but its a part, and often a small and misused part, of the 'effectiveness' picture. People think French tanks of WW2 were good because they look at the engine power, gun size and armour thickness, but fail to realise that in fact they were complete pieces of shit because of their 1 man turrets. Furthermore these shit tanks were not organised into effective fighting units, which further devalued them. Were French subs of WW1 like this, shiny on paper but actually shit in detail and placed in ineffective command structures?
With the OTL British blockade in place, what role would you imagine for a French submarine fleet?
 
More motorised transport would have been nice - certainly based on Martin Van Creveld's assessment of thier performance in 1914. Maybe not nice enough to work the miracles many expect of the Schlieffen Plan, but certainly enough for you to win your Race to the Sea.

Did the Germans have substantially less trucks than France, Russia and AH?

With the OTL British blockade in place, what role would you imagine for a French submarine fleet?

They operated in the Dardanelles; RN/RAN B11, E15, AE2, E14, E2, E11, E7, E20 and 4 French submarines attempted or succeeded to penetrate the Sea of Marmara, however none of the French submarines had any success and all were sunk, scuttled or captured. Advanced technology didn't seem to generate results.

In any case the French had an entente with Britain in 1904 and a formal naval agreement from 1912, so developing a French sub fleet is a waste of time.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Did the Germans have substantially less trucks than France, Russia and AH?
Neither the Russians nor the French were attempting to defy the laws of logistics...

They operated in the Dardanelles; RN/RAN B11, E15, AE2, E14, E2, E11, E7, E20 and 4 French submarines attempted or succeeded to penetrate the Sea of Marmara, however none of the French submarines had any success and all were sunk, scuttled or captured. Advanced technology didn't seem to generate results.
Are you familiar with the metaphor about shooting fish in a barrel?

In any case the French had an entente with Britain in 1904 and a formal naval agreement from 1912, so developing a French sub fleet is a waste of time.
Perhaps you meant to say pinky swear.

In any case, I was merely pointing out that French submarine technology was more advanced than the German equivalent prior to the war, so German Uboat technology could have been better than OTL if different paths were chosen.
 
It is often stated that from 1912 the Germans assumed the British would automatically join in the next war against Germany, yet OTL Churchill was the only British Cabinet member enthusiastic about war and Churchill and Grey were the only British Cabinet members determined to support France before the German invaison of Belgium. Further, in my opinon the Schlieffen Plan concept appears considerably less inept if the Germans had also assumed Belgium was ready to join the Entente cause, which was certainly not the case.

I guess you could argue it was conservatism rather than paranoia that caused the Germans to assume everyone was poised to join the other team, but the paranoia tag easily fits with the disfunctional German foreign policy of the time.
You're forgetting Edward VII. He may not openly have wanted war, but he did his best to put Britain in the position to.
 
Neither the Russians nor the French were attempting to defy the laws of logistics...

Are you familiar with the metaphor about shooting fish in a barrel?

Perhaps you meant to say pinky swear.

In any case, I was merely pointing out that French submarine technology was more advanced than the German equivalent prior to the war, so German Uboat technology could have been better than OTL if different paths were chosen.

They managed to do very well and advance a huge distance in spite of those laws.

Funny how all the superior French fish got shot in the barrel but only half of the British fish.

Pinky swear? So ,1914 naval dispositions were not according to the agreement?

I'm saying that assuming that blanket statement is true it doesn't mean much in action. And whats the margin of superiority, 50% better or 2%? You don't base a naval strategy on improving an unproven weapon by some mythical margin.
 

BooNZ

Banned
They managed to do very well and advance a huge distance in spite of those laws.
Accordingly to Martin Van Creveld, the Germans got as far in 1914 as their logistics would take them, which was further than expected. You have previously stated you are familiar with Creveld's work, so you should already know this.
Funny how all the superior French fish got shot in the barrel but only half of the British fish.
Why are you comparing the performance of French submarines against the performance of a third party in conditions in no way relevent to the German circumstances. The point I was making was much of French submarine technology was more advanced than Germany, so German uboat tech could have been more advanced if it had been more of a focus. It is a point you have continued to ignore and have not attempted to directly refute, instead pointing out French submarines were of little value in the war - scarcely a surprise with Britain ruling the waves.
Pinky swear? So ,1914 naval dispositions were not according to the agreement?
I suspect you have participated in a dozen threads that have already covered this. The naval understanding between Britain and France was made by parties with no authorisation to bind Britain, nor did those parties claim Britain was bound by this understanding. Your suggestion there was a formal naval agreement in 1912 between Britain is being willfully disingenuous.
I'm saying that assuming that blanket statement is true it doesn't mean much in action. And whats the margin of superiority, 50% better or 2%? You don't base a naval strategy on improving an unproven weapon by some mythical margin.
I never said the Germans would base thier naval strategy on the Uboat. I subsequently claified for you I never said the Germans would base thier naval strategy on the uboat. To to save your confusion, I will again state the Germans would not need to base their defensive strategy on the uboat, but if the Germans adopted a more defensive strategy, submarine technology (among others) would be a higher priority than under thier OTL obsession with capital ships.
 
Accordingly to Martin Van Creveld, the Germans got as far in 1914 as their logistics would take them, which was further than expected. You have previously stated you are familiar with Creveld's work, so you should already know this.

The Germans got as far as their logistics and the state of the Anglo-French armies would permit. Had the French armies been more devastated or surrendered more in the pursuit, different story.

. Your suggestion there was a formal naval agreement in 1912 between Britain is being willfully disingenuous.

He said an agreement, not a formal agreement. A gentlemen's agreement sort of thing.
 
The Germans got as far as their logistics and the state of the Anglo-French armies would permit. Had the French armies been more devastated or surrendered more in the pursuit, different story.



He said an agreement, not a formal agreement. A gentlemen's agreement sort of thing.

Yes, if the 5th army is removed all bets are off. However the fact is that the logistically unsound plan advanced hundreds of miles, captured huge and important parts of France and dictated the course of the war.

I may have said formal, but in any case such legalese arguments don't detract from the fact that ships were deployed as per the agreement regardless of its legalistic questions. Similarly arguing that the British were not committed to France is pointless when the BEF was deployed at Mons on August 19th.
 

BooNZ

Banned
The Germans got as far as their logistics and the state of the Anglo-French armies would permit. Had the French armies been more devastated or surrendered more in the pursuit, different story.
On the western front attackers did not overrun defenders en masse until 1940, yet the Germans are expected to do so after marching and fighting through Belgium. Further, Martin Van Creveld has stated even if the Germans had won the Battle of Marne, logisitics would have prevented them from going much further.

He said an agreement, not a formal agreement. A gentlemen's agreement sort of thing.
No, he said formal agreement - refer #369
In any case the French had an entente with Britain in 1904 and a formal naval agreement from 1912, so developing a French sub fleet is a waste of time.
 
Accordingly to Martin Van Creveld, the Germans got as far in 1914 as their logistics would take them, which was further than expected. You have previously stated you are familiar with Creveld's work, so you should already know this.
Why are you comparing the performance of French submarines against the performance of a third party in conditions in no way relevent to the German circumstances. The point I was making was much of French submarine technology was more advanced than Germany, so German uboat tech could have been more advanced if it had been more of a focus. It is a point you have continued to ignore and have not attempted to directly refute, instead pointing out French submarines were of little value in the war - scarcely a surprise with Britain ruling the waves.
I suspect you have participated in a dozen threads that have already covered this. The naval understanding between Britain and France was made by parties with no authorisation to bind Britain, nor did those parties claim Britain was bound by this understanding. Your suggestion there was a formal naval agreement in 1912 between Britain is being willfully disingenuous.
I never said the Germans would base thier naval strategy on the Uboat. I subsequently claified for you I never said the Germans would base thier naval strategy on the uboat. To to save your confusion, I will again state the Germans would not need to base their defensive strategy on the uboat, but if the Germans adopted a more defensive strategy, submarine technology (among others) would be a higher priority than under thier OTL obsession with capital ships.

The answer to a few things is that these questions are not black and white. Sure French subs may have been more technologically advanced, although by 1913 such claims don't appear obvious, but such technology doesn't work miracles and is at best a marginal advantage. Similarly while the Moltke plan in its ultimate aims was logistically unsound its proven results are significant and show a more than reasonable grasp of campaign planning.

As for focusing on uboat technology, Germany might build more and better uboats (I don't know what technology they were behind in) with some imagined defensive strategy but in fact find that by 1914 have no option but to go to USW. Given how many people think USW is what doomed Germany forcing them into it for a lack of a strong battlefleet seems to be a poor strategy.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Yes, if the 5th army is removed all bets are off. However the fact is that the logistically unsound plan advanced hundreds of miles, captured huge and important parts of France and dictated the course of the war.
The plan was logistially sound, the subsequent expections the plan could achieve much more than what it actually did are unsound. It did dictate the course of the war by allowing A-H to be monstered, enticing Italy into the war and giving the British little choice but to ultimately deploy a million man army to the continent.

I may have said formal, but in any case such legalese arguments don't detract from the fact that ships were deployed as per the agreement regardless of its legalistic questions. Similarly arguing that the British were not committed to France is pointless when the BEF was deployed at Mons on August 19th.
Again, we have had whole threads dedicated to the British commitment to war, which prior to the German invasion of Belgium was limited to Churchill and Grey of the entire British Cabinet. Prior to the invasion of Belgium, Grey needed to threaten his resignation to force the British Cabinet to honor his commitment for the British to block the English Channel.
 
On the western front attackers did not overrun defenders en masse until 1940, yet the Germans are expected to do so after marching and fighting through Belgium. Further, Martin Van Creveld has stated even if the Germans had won the Battle of Marne, logisitics would have prevented them from going much further.

No, he said formal agreement - refer #369

No formal agreement, but this was a circumstance where informal was actually more binding, the British seeking excuses to be entangled. Hence the nonsense of the British needing French protection against the Austrians - a naval Power of no consequence to the Royal Navy that would have signed a naval neutrality agreement with the British in a heartbeat.
 
The plan was logistially sound, the subsequent expections the plan could achieve much more than what it actually did are unsound. It did dictate the course of the war by allowing A-H to be monstered, enticing Italy into the war and giving the British little choice but to ultimately deploy a million man army to the continent.

The plan was sound in that Moltke hoped for a decisive battle in the Ardennes. The pursuit phase is where the logistics got shakey. We've discussed it before - Moltke's mistake was gambling on the Marne, that's when he went from in control of the situation to not in control of the situation. He should have been content to take Amiens and dig in.

Again, we have had whole threads dedicated to the British commitment to war, which prior to the German invasion of Belgium was limited to Churchill and Grey of the entire British Cabinet. Prior to the invasion of Belgium, Grey needed to threaten his resignation to force the British Cabinet to honor his commitment for the British to block the English Channel.

Elements of the British cabinet were a bit like kids just after being told the family was moving to another state. The family is moving, but the process of acceptance takes a while.
 
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