Was the "starve them out" strategy ever really feasible?

BooNZ

Banned
Why did Germany have the budget and population to afford 12 armies and still spend less than rival compared to GDP. Why was missing 300K troops in 1905 plans never raised? Why did all of Germany war plans take such huge chances? Or A-H? Answer same to your question as these. People are not optimized decision engines.

I would also like to point out that I have read a huge number of primary and secondary sources from the era (over 10K pages). Literally every book I could find that was free and in English. What I am telling you is correct, even if goes against what you have learned.
Then you should have no problem supporting with a reference your supposition the Franco-Prussian war illustrated the need for an elaborate German naval force. You should have no problem explaining why despite this learning the Germans waited 25 years before even starting to build a decent navy.

The realities were the Germans up until 1900 were secure in the knowledge their armies could smash the French long before naval issues developed. Further the French had commitments in Mediterranean and its Jeune École naval doctrine did not espouse the construction of battle fleets. Further, geography meant French naval forces would need to brave the English channel and the neutral waters of both Belgium and the Netherlands to get at even the limited western coastline of Germany.

Essentially you are arguing the Germans were logical to build hammers to cut down trees...

Now as to why did Germany finally find the money for its navy despite ignoring the need for at least a decade.
25+ years
Big navies go with prestige and colonies.
As previously stated, up until 1900 the Royal Navy was the only genuinely big navy and the German colonial empire was a joke, consisting of the uneconomic crumbs no other colonial powers wanted.
Germany economy was rapidly expanding meaning more $$$ to spend.
No, rapidly growing economies ordinarily have a lack of liquidity and Imperial Germany was no exception. In part it was a product of industrial lobbying by Germany's industrial giants.
Germany was secure based on its army size if one makes the assumptions the Germans made. i.e. that in addition to A-H that either Russia or Italy would come to war to defend Germany.
The French were destroyed as a military force 25 years before the Risk Fleet was conceived and a German-Russian non-aggression pact was firmly in place. The Risk Fleet was conceived after the Franco-Russian alliance was in place and prima facie posed a greater continental threat to Germany.
Outrages over the Boer treatment by UK.
As previously outlined, the Risk Fleet was conceived prior to the Boer war and harnessed the hostility generated by the Kruger Telegram in both Britain and Germany.

And most importantly, UK constant poking of Germany coastline. Same reason that when USSR had navy that threatened Atlantic, US Navy went to 600 ship. When not true, US Navy struggles to find funding for 300 ships.
Can you provide a reference to support this? I doubt either party could have conceived of hostilities between those traditional allies before 1895. From my understanding any vague British threats prior to 1900 were related to maritime trade rather than continental Germany.
You mean beside the Germans had war plans to take Jutland if needed? Beside that Germany had fought a war against Denmark within the preceding 50 years. Beside that when needed in the next war, Germany just rolled over Denmark like Denmark military did not exist. The Germans clearly would take Jutland if required.
My point being you are busy espousing the virtues of primary sources, yet happy to resort to your own unsupported deductive reasoning when it suits.
Now you also seem to be missing my point. There was a long diplomatic game played by the UK on one side and by Russia and Germany on the other related to the Baltic Sea entrance. Norway, Sweden, and Denmark had to choose a side. They choose the non-UK side IOTL. The pressure relates to how the Danes perceived how the Germans would react in a war. And the UK. And the Russians.
No, Germany relations were generally friendly, at least up until 1895, when things changed - not a long game at all.
Also, the Germans offered a better deal. The Germans asked for Danish neutrality and mining of coastal waters. The UK offer would mean the Danes joined the war.
The naval equivalent of Belgium in some respects.
Also, you words by Tirpitz support my position that the UK triggered the naval race. And he may be right that this one Telegram was the most important single factor in obtaining additional funding. Not sure how UK misstep to trigger bigger German naval budget impacts Germany moving into Jutland.
No, the British provided Tirpitz with an excuse to build the German fleet - the naval race was the consequence. A naval race that Germany was doomed to lose, even if it did have every right to compete.
 
No, the British provided Tirpitz with an excuse to build the German fleet - the naval race was the consequence. A naval race that Germany was doomed to lose, even if it did have every right to compete.

That's kind of my impression as well - Tirpitz seized the moment. Where the problem came in was that, because he was building for the sake of building, he wasn't really generating useful activity for German security. A big submarine force would probably have been a more useful deterrent, especially if it demonstrated in peacetime exercises it could move into the Western Approaches in large numbers and patrol.
 
The 1st naval law was more of a rebalancing and clarification of naval strategy than a massive expansion. While BBs were to go from 12 to 19, CA were only going from 10 to 12 and CLs from 23 to 30. This increased German ability to contest the North and Baltic sea and reduce the RNs freedom of action, although it is hardly a challenge to the RNs dominance.

It was the 2nd naval law, which was indeed a reaction to the British in the 2nd Boer War, that set Germany on the trajectory to directly challenge the RN in the North Sea. It wasn't until the 6th naval law of 1912 that the 4 battle squadrons was increased to 5, and even then it was sleight of hand : changing the material reserve of 4 BBs into a full squadron of 8 but then putting 2 squadrons into reserve along the lines of the RN.
 

BooNZ

Banned
That's kind of my impression as well - Tirpitz seized the moment. Where the problem came in was that, because he was building for the sake of building, he wasn't really generating useful activity for German security. A big submarine force would probably have been a more useful deterrent, especially if it demonstrated in peacetime exercises it could move into the Western Approaches in large numbers and patrol.
The first step would be to develop more advanced German submarines and torpedoes, since in the 1890s those submarines available were either experimental or earmarked for harbour (defense or similar).

If the Germans were actually focused on defending the continent from foreign naval incursions as some claim, a more balanced naval force with greater emphasis on submarines would be a logical development. The irony being, this more defense orientated German navy with greater numbers and more advanced submarines would have better tools than those available OTL to knock Britiain out of the war - assuming Britiain still enters the war against its traditional friend, Germany.

The 1st naval law was more of a rebalancing and clarification of naval strategy than a massive expansion. While BBs were to go from 12 to 19, CA were only going from 10 to 12 and CLs from 23 to 30. This increased German ability to contest the North and Baltic sea and reduce the RNs freedom of action, although it is hardly a challenge to the RNs dominance.

It was the 2nd naval law, which was indeed a reaction to the British in the 2nd Boer War, that set Germany on the trajectory to directly challenge the RN in the North Sea. It wasn't until the 6th naval law of 1912 that the 4 battle squadrons was increased to 5, and even then it was sleight of hand : changing the material reserve of 4 BBs into a full squadron of 8 but then putting 2 squadrons into reserve along the lines of the RN.
I agree, but both pieces of legislation were working to the same long term game plan to threaten Britain. To obtain the ever increasing budget for this vision, it was in the interest of Tirpitz and his cohorts to ratchet up Anglo-German friction. That's not to say there were not similar factions in Britain, but the Boer War was about the Empire, not the Germans.

In late 1899 the Kaiser counselled his British uncle to accept the impending British defeat at the hands of the Boer gracefully, as the British had recently accepted defeat at the hands of the Australian cricket team. This illustrates both a distinct lack of tact and a gross underestimation of British resolve and resilience, which was likely at the core of the absurd German Risk Fleet theory.
 
The first step would be to develop more advanced German submarines and torpedoes, since in the 1890s those submarines available were either experimental or earmarked for harbour (defense or similar).

If the Germans were actually focused on defending the continent from foreign naval incursions as some claim, a more balanced naval force with greater emphasis on submarines would be a logical development. The irony being, this more defense orientated German navy with greater numbers and more advanced submarines would have better tools than those available OTL to knock Britiain out of the war - assuming Britiain still enters the war against its traditional friend, Germany.

I agree, but both pieces of legislation were working to the same long term game plan to threaten Britain. To obtain the ever increasing budget for this vision, it was in the interest of Tirpitz and his cohorts to ratchet up Anglo-German friction. That's not to say there were not similar factions in Britain, but the Boer War was about the Empire, not the Germans.

In late 1899 the Kaiser counselled his British uncle to accept the impending British defeat at the hands of the Boer gracefully, as the British had recently accepted defeat at the hands of the Australian cricket team. This illustrates both a distinct lack of tact and a gross underestimation of British resolve and resilience, which was likely at the core of the absurd German Risk Fleet theory.

Last first: was the Kaiser giving official 'advice' or just yapping to a close relative? These days we laugh at the Willy Nikki telegrams, but back then such familiarity was a sign of massive influence and proximity to power, even these men's wives would be more deferential in public.

As for the strategy: the kerosene powered U1 was commissioned in December 1906, 8 years after the 1st naval law. The diesel powered U 19 didn't enter service until 1912, the year of the 8th and final naval law. You can't develop a strategy around a technology that doesn't exist, nor can you climb a ladder by not using the rungs. It is ludicrous for Germany base its pre 1912 naval strategy around uboats.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Last first: was the Kaiser giving official 'advice' or just yapping to a close relative? These days we laugh at the Willy Nikki telegrams, but back then such familiarity was a sign of massive influence and proximity to power, even these men's wives would be more deferential in public.
The Kaiser was essentially the head of state and his yapping was frequently conflated with official advice. In the example I provided, it was written correspondence between Wilhelm and the future King of England. I thought it was insightful because today we know the British were never going to let the Boers win, but the Germans (or at least the Kaiser) apparently thought it was a real possibilty.

As for the strategy: the kerosene powered U1 was commissioned in December 1906, 8 years after the 1st naval law. The diesel powered U 19 didn't enter service until 1912, the year of the 8th and final naval law. You can't develop a strategy around a technology that doesn't exist, nor can you climb a ladder by not using the rungs. It is ludicrous for Germany base its pre 1912 naval strategy around uboats.
To clarify, I never said Germany should base its navy strategy around u-boats.

What I was suggesting was if Germany adopted defensive naval strategies, defensive tools would have gained greater prominance in its naval development. Defensive tools included: mines, torpedoes, torpedo boats and by extrapolation, ultimately submarines - probably in addition to the equivalent of those elements set out in the first naval law.

Despite being the leading scientific power, Germany often trailed France in the military application of technologies including: the mitrailleuse; Poudre B; fast firing artillery; spitzer bullets; submarines and army aviation prior to WW1. There was certainly scope for German uboats to be far superior and far more numerous in 1914 - obviously for strictly defensive purposes.
 
. It is ludicrous for Germany base its pre 1912 naval strategy around uboats.

The larger symptom was that Tirpitz was behind the eight ball on technical innovation, when Power in Germany's position with a robust scientific and weapons industry in Germany and Austria should have been investing heavily in new technology to overcome its geographical disadvantages.
 
Despite being the leading scientific power, Germany often trailed France in the military application of technologies including: the mitrailleuse; Poudre B; fast firing artillery; spitzer bullets; submarines and army aviation prior to WW1. There was certainly scope for German uboats to be far superior and far more numerous in 1914 - obviously for strictly defensive purposes.

Also, U-boats wedded well with the Risk Fleet doctrine, especially if the German navy could exercise in the Western Approaches with them every year in numbers. Older models are still useful for training crews and creating doctrine and institution that can pass easily into more modern diesel boats. Hard to believe the RN had over twice as many as the HSF when the war broke out.
 
What I was suggesting was if Germany adopted defensive naval strategies, defensive tools would have gained greater prominance in its naval development. Defensive tools included: mines, torpedoes, torpedo boats and by extrapolation, ultimately submarines - probably in addition to the equivalent of those elements set out in the first naval law.

Given Tirpitz and co were only going for 60% of the RN strength and to fight between Heligoland and the Thames the line between a defensive strategy and what the Germans did is a fine line. Further a defensive strategy is a weak position from which to conduct international diplomacy, and out of step with Germany's influence in other spheres.

Hard to believe the RN had over twice as many as the HSF when the war broke out.

They had twice as much of everything else. :)

U-boats wedded well with the Risk Fleet doctrine, especially if the German navy could exercise in the Western Approaches with them every year in numbers. Older models are still useful for training crews and creating doctrine and institution that can pass easily into more modern diesel boats.

We're talking about a period of 15 years, during which there was massive technological advances. Was the Riskflotte of 1898 1st NL the same as that of 1912 with the 8th NL, and in 1914 when war broke out.

Further, U boats and T boats can be built in crash 'war emergency' programmes whereas capital ships and to a lesser extent cruisers cannot be. So in peacetime a somewhat unbalanced fleet is accepted in the knowledge that 6 months into a war such imbalances will be mitigated to an extent. In the particular case of the Germans they began building UB and UC class coastal u boats and A class coastal T boats immediately when the war began and these began operations from Ostend and Zeebrugge in April-May 1915, some 6 months after these ports were captured. Indeed these small vessels were built in Antwerp and transited through inland canals and in sections in Germany and transported to Antwerp for final assembly.

UB_13_disassembled.jpg
 

BooNZ

Banned
Also, U-boats wedded well with the Risk Fleet doctrine, especially if the German navy could exercise in the Western Approaches with them every year in numbers. Older models are still useful for training crews and creating doctrine and institution that can pass easily into more modern diesel boats.
I suspect Riain assumed I was making this point with his rebuttal in post #345 - I was not.

During the vast majority of the time the German Risk Fleet concept was in vogue, submarines were viewed as a defensive tools due to their lack of range, reliability and speed. There would be limited rationale for Tirpitz to promote submarine development ahead of is beloved battle fleets.

With the benefit of hindsight, the advancement of submarine tech would have been an affordable and prudent idea - very doable given the scientific resources available to the Germans, but the Germans daft risk fleet doctrine had wedded them to primacy of expensive and increasingly obsolete battle fleets to the exclusion of many other better ideas.

Hard to believe the RN had over twice as many as the HSF when the war broke out.
Not when you consider that submarines were probably still considered defensive tools and British had more to defend than anybody else.
 
I suspect Riain assumed I was making this point with his rebuttal in post #345 - I was not.

During the vast majority of the time the German Risk Fleet concept was in vogue, submarines were viewed as a defensive tools due to their lack of range, reliability and speed. There would be limited rationale for Tirpitz to promote submarine development ahead of is beloved battle fleets.

With the benefit of hindsight, the advancement of submarine tech would have been an affordable and prudent idea - very doable given the scientific resources available to the Germans, but the Germans daft risk fleet doctrine had wedded them to primacy of expensive and increasingly obsolete battle fleets to the exclusion of many other better ideas.

Not when you consider that submarines were probably still considered defensive tools and British had more to defend than anybody else.

Its a chicken and egg thing; shitty early subs were seen as defensive in the early days because they were slow and short ranged, which they were because they were early subs. The maturation of subs occured very late in the game.

In addition, if the German Army is limited by the 'requirement' to keep the Officer Corps full of aristocrats, what purpose is served by the German Navy being kept as a defensive force? It won't increase the size of the budget, nor will it prevent the Anglo-Japanese Treaty or the entente with France and therefore Britain's 'splendid isolation'.
 
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Its a chicken and egg thing; shitty early subs were seen as defensive in the early days because they were slow and short ranged, which they were because they were early subs. The maturation of subs occured very late in the game.

Tirpitz might have seen them that way, but Tirpitz had a vision problem - he completely, utterly, lacked any sense of opportunity or imagination on the visionary front. Fisher, OTOH, was all about technical innovation and drove the process mercilessly in the direction he felt the RN needed to go, (mostly for good, but a little for bad). How was it that the RN could appoint officials into positions of authority that were energetic towards technical innovation, but the HSF didn't?
 
Tirpitz might have seen them that way, but Tirpitz had a vision problem - he completely, utterly, lacked any sense of opportunity or imagination on the visionary front. Fisher, OTOH, was all about technical innovation and drove the process mercilessly in the direction he felt the RN needed to go, (mostly for good, but a little for bad). How was it that the RN could appoint officials into positions of authority that were energetic towards technical innovation, but the HSF didn't?

Tirpitz faced different problems and was in a different position than Fisher. Tirpitz was responsible for expanding the navy from 1 battle squadron to 2 then 4 then 5 as State Secretary of the Navy, more akin to the First Lord of the Admiralty than First Sea Lord, with no seagoing command responsibilities. Fisher didn't face the political problems Tirpitz did, the RN had formally adopted the 2 power standard way back in 1889 and was building ships like there was no tomorrow, so Fisher could concentrate on design concepts like the Dreadnought and Battlecruiser knowing that he'd be building a certain number of capital ships in coming years no matter what.

While the Germans were behind the RN in terms of design concepts; the Blucher was plain and simple wrong-footed by the Battlecruiser concept and were behind in the Dreadnought concept as well. However to say the Germans were behind technologically isn't really accurate; their smaller guns had similar ship-killing power as the larger British guns but were much lighter in construction, their rangefinders were 20' compared to 8' British ones giving the Germans the edge in getting early hits in battle and while they were behind in turbine engines their small-tube boilers were more efficient, not to mention that their ships were build really tough and not prone to explosive sinking.
 
Tirpitz faced different problems and was in a different position than Fisher. Tirpitz was responsible for expanding the navy from 1 battle squadron to 2 then 4 then 5 as State Secretary of the Navy, more akin to the First Lord of the Admiralty than First Sea Lord, with no seagoing command responsibilities. Fisher didn't face the political problems Tirpitz did, the RN had formally adopted the 2 power standard way back in 1889 and was building ships like there was no tomorrow, so Fisher could concentrate on design concepts like the Dreadnought and Battlecruiser knowing that he'd be building a certain number of capital ships in coming years no matter what.

While the Germans were behind the RN in terms of design concepts; the Blucher was plain and simple wrong-footed by the Battlecruiser concept and were behind in the Dreadnought concept as well. However to say the Germans were behind technologically isn't really accurate; their smaller guns had similar ship-killing power as the larger British guns but were much lighter in construction, their rangefinders were 20' compared to 8' British ones giving the Germans the edge in getting early hits in battle and while they were behind in turbine engines their small-tube boilers were more efficient, not to mention that their ships were build really tough and not prone to explosive sinking.

Hum tell that to the Pommern, also Seydlitz had a near miss at Dogger Bank. I would also like to point out the German guns did give up significant ship killing power but there was something of balance due to their lighter construction. Also it is worth noting the apparent toughness came at the cost of active onboard repair efforts as damage control teams could not transit through the ship by alternate routes.

The above said I would agree with you that Tirptiz did have more technical vision than he is being credited for, he kept the Kaiserliche Marine focused on facing a numerically superior opponent in the North Sea rather than trying to out match British ships one for one would likely have been even more of a losing battle.
 
Hum tell that to the Pommern, also Seydlitz had a near miss at Dogger Bank. I would also like to point out the German guns did give up significant ship killing power but there was something of balance due to their lighter construction. Also it is worth noting the apparent toughness came at the cost of active onboard repair efforts as damage control teams could not transit through the ship by alternate routes.

The above said I would agree with you that Tirptiz did have more technical vision than he is being credited for, he kept the Kaiserliche Marine focused on facing a numerically superior opponent in the North Sea rather than trying to out match British ships one for one would likely have been even more of a losing battle.

If Pommern has a fault it is that it was a pre-dread when the Dreadnought entered service before her. As for the other stuff, sure, but things are relative and RN ships also had design problems; I believe the Dreadnoughts armour wasn't laid out the best and those early dreads were very wet and not awesome seaboats.
 
No, Germany relations were generally friendly, at least up until 1895, when things changed - not a long game at all.
Relations were still largely friendly until 1901. The Kruger Telegram was partly repaired by the German support of British troops being sent to the Sudan.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Given Tirpitz and co were only going for 60% of the RN strength and to fight between Heligoland and the Thames the line between a defensive strategy and what the Germans did is a fine line. Further a defensive strategy is a weak position from which to conduct international diplomacy, and out of step with Germany's influence in other spheres.
The Germans spent an awful lot of treasure for the opportunity to fight hypothetical losing naval battle a few hundred miles offshore, when far cheaper sea denial weapons would make it difficult for the Royal Navy to even approach the German coast, which itself was the ultimate limitation on the scope of the Royal Navy's operations (lack of wheels and all that).

As far as diplomacy, the British had ruled the world for centuries with an army comparable in size to Belgium and the US had appeared on the world stage with scarcely a military at all. Germany had also done rather well in recent decades under British 'hegemony'.

In addition, if the German Army is limited by the 'requirement' to keep the Officer Corps full of aristocrats, what purpose is served by the German Navy being kept as a defensive force? It won't increase the size of the budget, nor will it prevent the Anglo-Japanese Treaty or the entente with France and therefore Britain's 'splendid isolation'.
The German Army's budget was relatively static during the naval race, while French and Russian army budgets were expanding, so I'm not convinced the HSF no impact on army budgets. The Heer might be more inclined to push for more funding without the incessantly squeaky German navy wheel. The limitation on size of the German army is somewhat overstated, given even a couple of extra German corps in August 1914 could have been decisive. Aside from the pretentious proclivities of its army leadership, the German education system and growing population provided more scope for the growth of a conscription army than France or even Russia.

Germany does not need an alliance with Britain to secure its neutrality in WW1, although up until 1901 this appeared more likely than an Anglo-French or Anglo Russian alliance - neither of which eventuated OTL. If Anglo-German relations remain amicable, there would be fewer Anglo-German miscommunications and the Germans would be less likely to develop a paranoid siege mentality.

Its a chicken and egg thing; shitty early subs were seen as defensive in the early days because they were slow and short ranged, which they were because they were early subs. The maturation of subs occured very late in the game.
My point is if Germany prioritized the naval defense of its coast and maintained only sufficient conventional naval elements to deter the Russians/French and maybe assist the British, the potential value of those early shitty submarines for localized sea denial weapons would have been recognized and their development prioritized (at least more than OTL). As previously stated, OTL German submarine tech trailed France, despite the German naval focus and vast scientific resources.
 
The Germans spent an awful lot of treasure for the opportunity to fight hypothetical losing naval battle a few hundred miles offshore, when far cheaper sea denial weapons would make it difficult for the Royal Navy to even approach the German coast, which itself was the ultimate limitation on the scope of the Royal Navy's operations (lack of wheels and all that).

Why losing? The realities of the situation are that Germany needs less ships than the British to fight any particular battle because the Germans have the operational initiative and can choose when to go to sea, in particular they can choose to do so when their ships are at the highest levels of availability. In contrast the British need to be ready 24/7/365 so need 30-40% more ships than the Germans to ensure superiority in numbers on that day to get the best chance of a good victory, and the British need such a victory in a way that the Germans do not. People who don't understand such tactical and operational issues tend to dismiss Riskflotte theory as stupid, but Tirpitz isn't the idiot such people make him out to be.

The German Army's budget was relatively static during the naval race, while French and Russian army budgets were expanding, so I'm not convinced the HSF no impact on army budgets. The Heer might be more inclined to push for more funding without the incessantly squeaky German navy wheel. The limitation on size of the German army is somewhat overstated, given even a couple of extra German corps in August 1914 could have been decisive. Aside from the pretentious proclivities of its army leadership, the German education system and growing population provided more scope for the growth of a conscription army than France or even Russia.

I can't think of an area where the Heer was short of equipment or training compared to its rivals; maybe communications equipment? On the other hand it had the best siege train, more heavy artillery and mortars than its rivals and apparently the best training facilities on the continent. It was only when in December 1912 that it was decided to expand the Army by 135,000 men that the Navy began to be impinged, it appears they could keep the Heer at the top level while expanding the Navy until that point.

My point is if Germany prioritized the naval defense of its coast and maintained only sufficient conventional naval elements to deter the Russians/French and maybe assist the British, the potential value of those early shitty submarines for localized sea denial weapons would have been recognized and their development prioritized (at least more than OTL). As previously stated, OTL German submarine tech trailed France, despite the German naval focus and vast scientific resources.

However Germany decided, with sufficient political support, that they were done with a defensive naval strategy and the capacity to push back at Britain in the future would be useful as a way to deal with Britain on German terms rather than relying on the goodwill of the British for diplomatic relationships.

As for the high-tech French subs, what did they achieve in WW1? People bang on about tech but its a part, and often a small and misused part, of the 'effectiveness' picture. People think French tanks of WW2 were good because they look at the engine power, gun size and armour thickness, but fail to realise that in fact they were complete pieces of shit because of their 1 man turrets. Furthermore these shit tanks were not organised into effective fighting units, which further devalued them. Were French subs of WW1 like this, shiny on paper but actually shit in detail and placed in ineffective command structures?
 
Why losing? The realities of the situation are that Germany needs less ships than the British to fight any particular battle because the Germans have the operational initiative and can choose when to go to sea, in particular they can choose to do so when their ships are at the highest levels of availability. In contrast the British need to be ready 24/7/365 so need 30-40% more ships than the Germans to ensure superiority in numbers on that day to get the best chance of a good victory, and the British need such a victory in a way that the Germans do not. People who don't understand such tactical and operational issues tend to dismiss Riskflotte theory as stupid, but Tirpitz isn't the idiot such people make him out to be.

The underlined applied only in Tirpitz's head. The British did not need to win big on any one occasion, Trafalgar was nice but it was in fact the exception to the Royal Navy tradition of grinding out repeated small wins. In fact against Germany the British only needed to suffer sufficient narrow defeats to utterly destroy the ability of the HSF to contest the North Sea as they could make good losses more easily and were starting any conflict in any period of the Riskflotte era from a higher starting base and then in addition they had the advantage of geographical position.

Looking at the aftermath of Jutland is informative the British replace two of the lost battlecruisers and recall one bringing them back to full strength in that rating and in battleships they add three and one, Vanguard, blows up, the German manage to make good their lost battlecruiser and after the battle they lose one battleship to a mine and add two. In other words the Germans being generous they are just as far behind if not further back relative to their opponent even with inflicting significantly more capital ship casualties and this ignores the issues with losses among the light ships while the British lose fewer and again add more.

One of the most interesting things about the pre-war Anglo-German 'Arms Race' is that it can be argued the British were not even racing as they simply carried on building at their typical pace in their typical proportions of battleships/battlecruisers, light cruisers and destroyers during the period 1905-1912.
 
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