Was the "starve them out" strategy ever really feasible?

Sure, Jellicoe would take a sure-fire win - and day 2 of Jutland was that had it happened - but, he wasn't taking any risk or going out of his way for battle, which is presumably why he declined night combat by going to bed on the bridge of the Iron Duke instead.



So, if it works, USW might be avoided, the US might stay neutral, and Germany might win the war. But if it doesn't work then convoys get 30 more escorts in 1917? One of those payoffs is much, much higher in value than the other....

Also, I said that if the HSF detached its screening forces to independent operations due to the surviving dreadnoughts switching to a coastal mission, these TB's and CL's could be used much more aggressively.

The thing is that the Entente are going to look a hell of a lot stronger, the HSF has been trashed which is hard to quantify but not going to be a positive for German or even wider CP morale. The Entente now have more resources for use on land while the Germans do not. Yes the US could well stay neutral but the Ludendorff clique are going to have an even harder time selling the rest of the regime on eventual victory. Also it does not follow the loss of the HSF as an effective fighting force prevents USW in fact an even more desperate Germany is even more likely to pursue such a move which is going to come across even more as a piratical act by the side that is losing the war and thus an offence to American sensibilities.
 
However the Merchant Navy were considered unfavorably by many in society at the time. It wouldn't take much to make thoughts worse.

If the Black Ops Campaign actually depressed Merchant Navy morale too much FDR talks to the various bigwigs in Hollywood that they most put out a pro-Merchant Navy picture or two for the war effort. Within six months or so you have such a picture with John Wayne as a Merchant Navy captain. Within a month or two you have a number of Bugs Bunny Cartoons with Bugs as a Merchant Navy captain .
 
@RodentRevolution I could give you answers to a lot of the points you raise, but that might give the impression that I think ocean raiding by capital ships is a reasonable tactic in the 'starve them out' strategy.

To the extent that 'starve them out' is an effective strategy, and I think it is effective enough to try, the best results would be obtained close to British waters making use of the forces at hand from Ostend and Zeebrugge. Better results could be obtained by using unemployed light cruisers and destroyers from these ports, deploying and withdrawing them as needed and as effectiveness changes. For big changes geography rather than more or better ships is the best bet, and given the course of the fighting in 1914 better naval geography is well within the realms of possibility.
 
@RodentRevolution I could give you answers to a lot of the points you raise, but that might give the impression that I think ocean raiding by capital ships is a reasonable tactic in the 'starve them out' strategy.

To the extent that 'starve them out' is an effective strategy, and I think it is effective enough to try, the best results would be obtained close to British waters making use of the forces at hand from Ostend and Zeebrugge. Better results could be obtained by using unemployed light cruisers and destroyers from these ports, deploying and withdrawing them as needed and as effectiveness changes. For big changes geography rather than more or better ships is the best bet, and given the course of the fighting in 1914 better naval geography is well within the realms of possibility.

I do not actually think raiding by surface ships as a tactic available to the Germans in World War 1 is unreasonable but what I am trying to communicate is that the RN has a lot of responses and it is a strategy fraught with risk. Tirpitz's misconception was that the Royal Navy was adverse to risk whereas if anything its flaw tended to be the opposite, the deliberate cultivation and promotion of risk junkies because it unnerved the enemy. It is partly the reason someone like Jellicoe was so important to the Navy, he understood his personal pride came second to preserving the fleet for the next war while still being aggressive enough to take out the HSF if it gave him the opportunity.

Now I think you have to be careful about assuming that moving German ships around more is the answer. The British too could move ships and ships can move fast. This means that the British once they know where German ships are can switch them to respond to the German attacks. If they know the Germans are going for coastal traffic they can cover the East coast with patrol groups and yes they might lose a fair few ships from these but they are equally likely to get German ships too and the balance of force correlation is heavily in their favour (this is even if we ignore the OTL experience of British light forces dominating German ones).

Of course you do try and argue for better results rather than outright victory and maybe better results could stretch to outright victory but it needs to be recognised that it is a long stretch.
 
Of course you do try and argue for better results rather than outright victory and maybe better results could stretch to outright victory but it needs to be recognised that it is a long stretch.

I don't think a commerce raiding strategy is a war winner by itself, however it does add value to the German war effort using assets that were not otherwise well utilised, so it should be pursued with some vigour and as much skill as can be mustered.

I do not actually think raiding by surface ships as a tactic available to the Germans in World War 1 is unreasonable but what I am trying to communicate is that the RN has a lot of responses and it is a strategy fraught with risk. Tirpitz's misconception was that the Royal Navy was adverse to risk whereas if anything its flaw tended to be the opposite, the deliberate cultivation and promotion of risk junkies because it unnerved the enemy. It is partly the reason someone like Jellicoe was so important to the Navy, he understood his personal pride came second to preserving the fleet for the next war while still being aggressive enough to take out the HSF if it gave him the opportunity.

They were very brave in surface engagements but risk averse when it came to strategems like being lured into uboat traps or fresh minefields. That's how we see destroyers HMS Broke and Swift taking on 6 large German TBs (and winning!) while the Grand Fleet was not able to operate west and south of a certain coordinate (54 south?, I don't have the book) in the central North Sea.

Now I think you have to be careful about assuming that moving German ships around more is the answer. The British too could move ships and ships can move fast. This means that the British once they know where German ships are can switch them to respond to the German attacks. If they know the Germans are going for coastal traffic they can cover the East coast with patrol groups and yes they might lose a fair few ships from these but they are equally likely to get German ships too and the balance of force correlation is heavily in their favour (this is even if we ignore the OTL experience of British light forces dominating German ones).

The Germans should be prudent with their assets, if they move ships from the Baltic or North Sea to Flanders they should only keep them there until things get too hot then recall them, much like they did in 1916-17. They shouldn't hammer away pointlessly, losing ships on fools errands.

However, not moving ships because they might be lost is caution bordering on defeatism. At the very least the RN should have their control of the seas contested, especially given as the attacker the KM has the initiative and can husband their resources until they're ready to strike rather than provide ships available 24/7 to guard against such a strike like the RN has to. For example the Dover Patrol could only keep 4-5 Tribals at sea at any one time, which is fine for the 3 V class but when II flotilla of 10 destroyers arrived the Dover Patrol was outnumbers and the Harwich Force had to pay more attention to the south.
 
Yes, 1000 times yes! The magic ship strategy doesn't work. IOTL the HSF was be outnumbered something like 5:3 by Jutland, with less but more powerful capital ships that will be worse. A 14" kaiser is great but not as great as to defeat 2 12" BBs. Nor would the 14" kaiser be immune to the mines, shore defences and naval forces at the southern end of the North Sea.

You don't build 23kt dreadnoughts vs. 21kt enemy dreadnoughts to fight a Jutland. You build them faster so that they don't have to fight a Jutland if they don't want to. Fighting Jutlands was a useless activity for the HSF, in much the same way that fighting a pack of lions is a useless activity for a gazelle. Gazelles aren't built to run fast in order to slug it out with lions.

Whereas holding Le Harve (while not ASB is highly unlikely and would be indicative of much more massive problems for the Entente. Holding the coast down to Boulogne is more realistic and almost as effective.) would close or drastically restrict through channel shipping day after day for years, to vastly greater effect that a couple of 14" kaiser death rides into the Atlantic.

Actually, the Germans could have had both. Both a fast wing of dreadnoughts capable of operating with Hipper's scouting group, or independently, and to capture Le Havre had Moltke's right wing swung to the coast in August 1914 instead of pursuing the French south of Paris.
 
The thing is that the Entente are going to look a hell of a lot stronger, the HSF has been trashed which is hard to quantify but not going to be a positive for German or even wider CP morale.

Absolutely correct, in much the same way that if you say on Friday that the New England Patriots will win the Superbowl on Sunday 42-6 over the Broncos, that the imaginary US NFL fans reacting to this imaginary outcome will be imaginarily in the camp of the Patriots. OTOH, let's say just for shits and giggles that the HSF goes out and serves it to the Royal Navy, in a series of thrashing battles, all over the North Atlantic. How now for neutral opinion and CP morale, with 6 of Beatty's 10 BC's sunk along with 12 pre-dreadnoughts in half a dozen actions, all for just one German battleship that interned due to battle damage? See how I did that? You're not the only one that can make up imaginary outcomes to imaginary battles!

The Entente now have more resources for use on land while the Germans do not. Yes the US could well stay neutral but the Ludendorff clique are going to have an even harder time selling the rest of the regime on eventual victory. Also it does not follow the loss of the HSF as an effective fighting force prevents USW in fact an even more desperate Germany is even more likely to pursue such a move which is going to come across even more as a piratical act by the side that is losing the war and thus an offence to American sensibilities.

The loss of 12 German dreadnoughts would not change the location of the Western Front by 1 mile.
 
@RodentRevolution I could give you answers to a lot of the points you raise, but that might give the impression that I think ocean raiding by capital ships is a reasonable tactic in the 'starve them out' strategy.

To the extent that 'starve them out' is an effective strategy, and I think it is effective enough to try, the best results would be obtained close to British waters making use of the forces at hand from Ostend and Zeebrugge. Better results could be obtained by using unemployed light cruisers and destroyers from these ports, deploying and withdrawing them as needed and as effectiveness changes. For big changes geography rather than more or better ships is the best bet, and given the course of the fighting in 1914 better naval geography is well within the realms of possibility.

On the subject of light cruisers, once the war began all work on all capital ships should have been stopped for review. Some, such as Lutzow, would be far enough to have been completed. But generally speaking, all resources for surface ships should have gone over to CL's and DD's, not capital ships. Trying to complete, for example, the Mackensen, was a waste of resources.
 
I do not actually think raiding by surface ships as a tactic available to the Germans in World War 1 is unreasonable but what I am trying to communicate is that the RN has a lot of responses and it is a strategy fraught with risk.

Oh, you want the strategy where the fleet outnumbered 3:1 by a globe-spanning coalition of enemies can win a world war without taking any risks! Gee, why didn't you just say so? :^)

Seriously, the major advantages to a raiding strategy is that the Atlantic is very huge and airpower and radar - the things that shut down raiding in 1941 - are not factors in WW1. So it is very difficult for the RN to defend against raiding with its 21kt dreadnoughts and poor-range BC's, especially if the raiding ships have a speed advantage that allows them to avoid combat with enemy battleships. The major disadvantage to a raiding strategy was lack of range in the German capital ships to do so without restocking coal somewhere in the North Atlantic basin. But that was a design choice by the HSF before the ships were even built, which did so by following the wrong doctrine, one of Mahan's decisive battle. As if Tirpitz just read a book and decided to build a navy on the basis of some American naval officer's conclusions. Yet Germany was a land power. If on the day its armies were in Brest, Rome and Moscow the German navy didn't have a single battleship left afloat, Germany still has won the war.

Tirpitz's misconception was that the Royal Navy was adverse to risk whereas if anything its flaw tended to be the opposite, the deliberate cultivation and promotion of risk junkies because it unnerved the enemy. It is partly the reason someone like Jellicoe was so important to the Navy, he understood his personal pride came second to preserving the fleet for the next war while still being aggressive enough to take out the HSF if it gave him the opportunity.

Tirpitz was the wrong man for the High Seas Fleet expansion because he didn't seem to understand naval strategy enough to do his job properly. He built a fleet that better suited Britain's needs than Germany's. That's why I said the HSF would have been better off with him cashiered - at least then it could have built a smaller, but much more flexible and useful, fleet. Take torpedo boats for example. In Tirpitz's thinking raw numbers = combat power. So, he built TB's as small and numerous as possible. But for Germany, raw numbers of TB's were not as important as range, speed, and firepower. Germany's geographical situation demanded more CL's and DD's.

Now I think you have to be careful about assuming that moving German ships around more is the answer. The British too could move ships and ships can move fast. This means that the British once they know where German ships are can switch them to respond to the German attacks. If they know the Germans are going for coastal traffic they can cover the East coast with patrol groups and yes they might lose a fair few ships from these but they are equally likely to get German ships too and the balance of force correlation is heavily in their favour (this is even if we ignore the OTL experience of British light forces dominating German ones).

The way raiding worked is that the British couldn't just react in response to attacks because by the time they got to the scene of the attack the raider was attacking elsewhere. So, for example, if Hipper shows up off New York and sinks 100,000 tons of RN AMC's and merchant ships, and Beatty is currently sitting in Ireland with his BC's and QE's, then Hipper might be off the coast of South America by the time Beatty gets to New York. Beatty has to be at New York before Hipper attacks. But, Beatty can't be in Ireland protecting the Western Approaches, in New York protecting that port, and off the coast of South America all at the same time. Beatty needs three squadrons, all superior to Hipper, in the three different locations to do that. But, if Beatty had 15 ships in three groups of 5 to defend against Hipper's 4, then 15 British ships are missing from the North Sea while only 4 German ones are missing from the North Sea. Bit of a problem there.
 
You don't build 23kt dreadnoughts vs. 21kt enemy dreadnoughts to fight a Jutland. You build them faster so that they don't have to fight a Jutland if they don't want to. Fighting Jutlands was a useless activity for the HSF, in much the same way that fighting a pack of lions is a useless activity for a gazelle. Gazelles aren't built to run fast in order to slug it out with lions.

Gazelles don't get to choose who they have to run from, they're on the plains with lions, leopards, cheetahs, hyenas, hunting dogs and jackals. Just like Graf Spee in 1939, built to outrun anything she couldn't outfight and outfight anything she couldn't outrun, ended up facing 3 ships she could outfight and got beaten. The 23kt Kaisers will either eventually have nowhere to go and be bought to battle by superior numbers and defeated like Graf Spee, the Graf Spee and Bismark or like the Goben and Tirpitz pushed into some corner of the world unable to escape.

The way raiding worked is that the British couldn't just react in response to attacks because by the time they got to the scene of the attack the raider was attacking elsewhere. So, for example, if Hipper shows up off New York and sinks 100,000 tons of RN AMC's and merchant ships, and Beatty is currently sitting in Ireland with his BC's and QE's, then Hipper might be off the coast of South America by the time Beatty gets to New York. Beatty has to be at New York before Hipper attacks. But, Beatty can't be in Ireland protecting the Western Approaches, in New York protecting that port, and off the coast of South America all at the same time. Beatty needs three squadrons, all superior to Hipper, in the three different locations to do that. But, if Beatty had 15 ships in three groups of 5 to defend against Hipper's 4, then 15 British ships are missing from the North Sea while only 4 German ones are missing from the North Sea. Bit of a problem there.

From August 1914 the RN had a number of pre-dreads and cruisers stationed throughout the Atlantic covering shipping concentrations;

NAWI
1 battleship
5 cruisers
1 AMC

West Africa
2 cruisers

South-East America
1 battleship
7 cruisers
5 AMC's

Cape
1 battleship
2 cruisers
2 AMC's

14" Kaisers would likely drill any of these forces, however much like the RN at the Falklands, Spee at Coronel and Langsdorff at River Platte, they would likely expend much or most of their ammo and possibly take damage from heavy shells in the process. So the task of the RN is considerably less than stated, as these forces will limit the options of the 14" Kaisers to something more manageable for detachments from the GF or Med or whatever.
 
Gazelles don't get to choose who they have to run from, they're on the plains with lions, leopards, cheetahs, hyenas, hunting dogs and jackals. Just like Graf Spee in 1939, built to outrun anything she couldn't outfight and outfight anything she couldn't outrun, ended up facing 3 ships she could outfight and got beaten. The 23kt Kaisers will either eventually have nowhere to go and be bought to battle by superior numbers and defeated like Graf Spee, the Graf Spee and Bismark or like the Goben and Tirpitz pushed into some corner of the world unable to escape.

The list of things that can both outrun and outfight a quartet of 23kt Kaisers backing five battlecruisers in 1914 is....nothing. In fact, until the QE's commission in 1915 the situation would be entirely to Hipper's favor because the Grand Fleet simply does not play. Gazelles don't have to play if they don't want to.

From August 1914 the RN had a number of pre-dreads and cruisers stationed throughout the Atlantic covering shipping concentrations;

These forces would best make themselves scarce against BC's or dreadnoughts. That's where dreadnought raiders are different than what you might be thinking of in CL's or armed merchants. They were Alpha Dogs. No skulking, they could sail right up to an overseas port in daylight.

14" Kaisers would likely drill any of these forces, however much like the RN at the Falklands, Spee at Coronel and Langsdorff at River Platte, they would likely expend much or most of their ammo and possibly take damage from heavy shells in the process. So the task of the RN is considerably less than stated, as these forces will limit the options of the 14" Kaisers to something more manageable for detachments from the GF or Med or whatever.

So after sinking a dozen old Entente warships in a series of victories that shocks the neutrals, the Germans might need ammo? True. One solution would be to bring extra ammunition with the squadron on a fast supply ship. Another would be to return to Germany when ammunition is depleted. Now, before we get too excited about interceptions off Scotland, remember that a dreadnought that can cruise 16,000nm can also sail deep into the Greenland Sea and hang out in snow squalls for a couple weeks. (I believe you'll find S&G were cut off in 1939 by the Home Fleet and did exactly that). Either way, these are the types of problems for a navy that is actually doing something.
 
The list of things that can both outrun and outfight a quartet of 23kt Kaisers backing five battlecruisers in 1914 is....nothing. In fact, until the QE's commission in 1915 the situation would be entirely to Hipper's favor because the Grand Fleet simply does not play. Gazelles don't have to play if they don't want to.

Thats a huge force to sink single merchant ships under prize rules. How long before merchant ship flee to port and these 9 capital ships, half of the German fleet, are wandering around the empty sea, whose edges are ringed by various forces that limit its freedom of action? What happens when the QEs enter service?

These forces would best make themselves scarce against BC's or dreadnoughts. That's where dreadnought raiders are different than what you might be thinking of in CL's or armed merchants. They were Alpha Dogs. No skulking, they could sail right up to an overseas port in daylight.

RN Admirals who flee get shot for cowardice. The commanders of these forces, which are of course stationed close to concentrations of shipping, will at least try to damage these German ships and slow them down for more powerful forces to deal with.

So after sinking a dozen old Entente warships in a series of victories that shocks the neutrals, the Germans might need ammo? True. One solution would be to bring extra ammunition with the squadron on a fast supply ship. Another would be to return to Germany when ammunition is depleted. Now, before we get too excited about interceptions off Scotland, remember that a dreadnought that can cruise 16,000nm can also sail deep into the Greenland Sea and hang out in snow squalls for a couple weeks. (I believe you'll find S&G were cut off in 1939 by the Home Fleet and did exactly that). Either way, these are the types of problems for a navy that is actually doing something.

It all sound so easy if you forget that you're pitting 9 ships against 100. Thats a recipe for defeat in detail, which is why no country tried it.
 
The list of things that can both outrun and outfight a quartet of 23kt Kaisers backing five battlecruisers in 1914 is....nothing. In fact, until the QE's commission in 1915 the situation would be entirely to Hipper's favor because the Grand Fleet simply does not play. Gazelles don't have to play if they don't want to.

Well actually it will be quite a long list because the RN will lay something down to do exactly that as soon as the Germans commence these Wunderkaisers. The thing is that British building being faster due to the more developed infrastructure and deeper pockets of the British state the British answer would likely also have been working up for longer.



These forces would best make themselves scarce against BC's or dreadnoughts. That's where dreadnought raiders are different than what you might be thinking of in CL's or armed merchants. They were Alpha Dogs. No skulking, they could sail right up to an overseas port in daylight.

The thing is in real life all that needs happen is that one smaller ship gets a shot below the waterline outside or even under the belt and whilst in battle the damage control team will fix the flooding issue no problem until you get back to port you no longer have a 23 knot ship.



So after sinking a dozen old Entente warships in a series of victories that shocks the neutrals, the Germans might need ammo? True. One solution would be to bring extra ammunition with the squadron on a fast supply ship. Another would be to return to Germany when ammunition is depleted. Now, before we get too excited about interceptions off Scotland, remember that a dreadnought that can cruise 16,000nm can also sail deep into the Greenland Sea and hang out in snow squalls for a couple weeks. (I believe you'll find S&G were cut off in 1939 by the Home Fleet and did exactly that). Either way, these are the types of problems for a navy that is actually doing something.

It all sound so easy if you forget that you're pitting 9 ships against 100. Thats a recipe for defeat in detail, which is why no country tried it.

More importantly the ocean is a big place and having all 9 ships together is just not that effective a way to find stuff. It is also funny how Glenn confuses the abilities of oil fuelled world war two ships with coal fired vessels laid down in 1909. So he either has the nine scattered and doing good anti-commerce work but getting picked off in detail or concentrated and burning fuel while hoping none of them has a mechanical failure nor draws down a more powerful RN Squadron.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Younger officers in a shit command structure will still produce shit outcomes.
The aforementioned 'shit command structure' would have effectively prevailed against the vastly superior resources of the British and French navies had the US not intervened. But apparently I cannot suggest the British performed poorly, without various members taking a fence...
 
Well actually it will be quite a long list because the RN will lay something down to do exactly that as soon as the Germans commence these Wunderkaisers. The thing is that British building being faster due to the more developed infrastructure and deeper pockets of the British state the British answer would likely also have been working up for longer.





The thing is in real life all that needs happen is that one smaller ship gets a shot below the waterline outside or even under the belt and whilst in battle the damage control team will fix the flooding issue no problem until you get back to port you no longer have a 23 knot ship.







More importantly the ocean is a big place and having all 9 ships together is just not that effective a way to find stuff. It is also funny how Glenn confuses the abilities of oil fuelled world war two ships with coal fired vessels laid down in 1909. So he either has the nine scattered and doing good anti-commerce work but getting picked off in detail or concentrated and burning fuel while hoping none of them has a mechanical failure nor draws down a more powerful RN Squadron.

Sadly in my old age I've become a real killjoy when it comes to cool shit. As much as I love big fast ships and wish they'd succeed the inescapable logic of a big fleet gets me every time these days.
 
The aforementioned 'shit command structure' would have effectively prevailed against the vastly superior resources of the British and French navies had the US not intervened. But apparently I cannot suggest the British performed poorly, without various members taking a fence...

How so? The command failed to use the weapons at their disposal as effectively as they could have.
 
Oil is more important than food.
It worked against Japan.

Britain in WW1 had ample supplies of black coal, the economy basically ran in it, much of the RN used coal to a large extent as well. Reducing oil supplies will hurt but won't bring Britain to the negotiating table.
 
Britain in WW1 had ample supplies of black coal, the economy basically ran in it, much of the RN used coal to a large extent as well. Reducing oil supplies will hurt but won't bring Britain to the negotiating table.
Aircraft can't fly on coal, reducing the frequency of reconnaissance fights over the Western Front and handing the Germans air superiority would have serious consequences.
 
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