Was the "starve them out" strategy ever really feasible?

Erm but the important question is who do you want at the Naval Staff? In command of the HSF, in command of the Scouting Group, I Battle Squadron, II Battle Squadron and so forth, who commands Torpedo Boats (aka destroyers), who commands U-boats?

Those are important questions, but the German navy had a solid officers corps to pick from so plenty of good candidates for all these roles. The vital questions at the grand operational level were whether the Kaiser should be able to veto riskier fleet operations in favor of doing nothing when Germany itself was engaged in a war in which it could face a defeat of catastrophic proportions, or whether he should be sidelined altogether? Why did Tirpitz build a fleet whose strategic utility in a war against Great Britain did not exist as conceived? Was the navy's core doctrine of decisive battle in a war in which it would lose the big battle a fundamentally useless way to think? Those are larger questions than whether Hans or Franz commands the second division of the Second Battle Squadron.

Without any notion of this you do not have an argument.

For a specific example of the defects in HSF doctrine, the armored cruiser Blucher was attached to Hipper's squadron on the basis of 5 ships is better than 4. But the Blucher's contribution to the strength of Hipper's squadron was negative - Hipper was actually weaker with Blucher attached because he was slower and more tempted to engage in rescue operations once she got in trouble after tussling with the British. Her 8.2" guns contributed nothing to a BC duel. OTOH, Blucher was a magnificent armored cruiser, better than anything the British had and would have made an excellent commerce raider, made even better by the fact that the GF might be forced to detach one or two battlecruisers to hunt for her far from the North Sea. This could positively contribute to Hipper's strength by removing British BC's from the North Sea. Yet, in 1914, the HSF had no such plan as to send the Blucher out during a peacetime crisis such as Sarajevo - that's defective doctrine missing even an obvious move.
 
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A dreadnought on the bottom of the sea is a lot less threatening than one sitting in the harbor. The last one at least has to be contained by your navy, which takes up resources.

The British liked nothing better than the concept of the German navy being contained doing nothing at no cost to the Royal Navy beyond the inactivity of its own Grand Fleet. Because if they did that, the British get all the spoils of sea control at no cost. As such, I'm not following how the Germans are to benefiet by exercising the one strategy option the British most desired from them.
 
The British liked nothing better than the concept of the German navy being contained doing nothing at no cost to the Royal Navy beyond the inactivity of its own Grand Fleet. Because if they did that, the British get all the spoils of sea control at no cost. As such, I'm not following how the Germans are to benefiet by exercising the one strategy option the British most desired from them.

No they really did like the idea of the Germans coming out for a stand-up fight because with that done they could then stand down a lot of the battleships and release their supporting warships to other roles.
 

Vuu

Banned
Interesting fact.

Surely though, Britain is not a small place and prior to the 20th century, had fed itself for centuries. The Saxons and Normans for example probably weren't importing food, they were growing it locally.

I think it would be possible to grow enough food for everyone, using the land available?

Such things tend to happen when your population swells above autarky levels
 
Yes, no ship larger than a light cruiser can enter Ostend and Zebrugge and then is still behind the Dover mine barrage. Therefore before any talk about german capital ships doing Atlantic cruises can occur a base must be found that is big enough to handle a capital ship, beyond the Dover mine barrage and whose capture is not ASB. That leaves Le Harve, although I'm not going to do a TL about how it gets captured in WW1.

So between building a Kaiser with 8 x 12" guns, (or 6 x 14"), 30,000 tons and 23kt for 16,000nm cruise range with duel oil/coal fired propulsion, versus needing to take Le Havre, you picked Le Havre?
 
No they really did like the idea of the Germans coming out for a stand-up fight because with that done they could then stand down a lot of the battleships and release their supporting warships to other roles.

The British were perfectly content with no battles should the HSF remain in port. That was the fundamental element to the doctrine of the distant blockade - the status quo was acceptable for it gave the British sea control for free. How does following the preferred British strategy help Germany win the war?
 
The issue with Le Havre, quite apart from if the Germans have the land strength to get that far the Entente are looking at real issues, is that it is horrible to defend by the time of the Battle of Tsushima. Your modern and expensive CC is going to be vulnerable to attack by pre-dreadnoughts or even some of the more heavily armed monitors like Erebus until the Germans can lay extensive mine belts a good 10 and more likely 12 kilometres into the Channel. It would be highly embarrassing if this modern battlecruiser was merely crippled by bombardment in port or torpedo attack while traversing the Western approaches or did a Gneiseanau on a dash back to Germany.

If the British did send three battlecruisers after it and why bother when they can send three battleships to do the same they would simply peg it in port a la Mers-El-Kebir and have done with it.

The only feasible capital ship forward base was Antwerp, and even here the Germans picked the wrong pre-war option on the legal status for the approaches to it....
 
Well the canal is out, yes it could handle an unladen U-boat but not anything close to a battlecruiser. The repair facilities are tricky for the reason I mentioned above but the blockading squadron could probably be made of pre-dreadnoughts but otherwise three dreadnoughts with two on station at any time would cork your battlecruiser like a bottle while it would be sorely missed from the Scouting Group.

Le Havre would have served as a good forward base for Channel TB operations though.
 
The British were perfectly content with no battles should the HSF remain in port. That was the fundamental element to the doctrine of the distant blockade - the status quo was acceptable for it gave the British sea control for free. How does following the preferred British strategy help Germany win the war?
Because if you lose the HSF, then the Grand Fleet becomes the Kill the Submarine fleet ( Pre dreads can be scrapped, older Dreads go into reserve, escorts released to go hunting etc ). The Naval war goes even more in the Entente way and Germany loses even quicker. Being a fleet in being was the best option it had, all the others are even better for the RN.
 
Because if you lose the HSF, then the Grand Fleet becomes the Kill the Submarine fleet ( Pre dreads can be scrapped, older Dreads go into reserve, escorts released to go hunting etc ). The Naval war goes even more in the Entente way and Germany loses even quicker. Being a fleet in being was the best option it had, all the others are even better for the RN.

The idea that the British fleet could defeat the German army in France is absurd. At best a few dozen destroyers might be freed up for convoy escort and have a minor impact on the USW campaign - these few dozen destroyers might sink maybe 4, maybe 6 more U-boats over the course of the entire war.

Anyways, if the Germans lost a dozen dreadnoughts in a more aggressive campaign, absolutely nothing changes except that the HSF's light forces are freed up from their dreadnought escort duties and can actually undertake useful offensive anti-shipping sweeps in very large numbers around the Thames and such. The surviving 25 German dreadnoughts and pre-dreadnoughts (that is to say, 4 x Nassaus, 4 x Helgolands, the 4 surviving BC's/Kaiser/Konigs, the two Bayerns, the Hindenburg, 10 younger pre-dreadnoughts) could perform a coastal/Baltic defense function and still tie down about 40 British dreadnoughts.
 
The idea that the British fleet could defeat the German army in France is absurd. At best a few dozen destroyers might be freed up for convoy escort and have a minor impact on the USW campaign - these few dozen destroyers might sink maybe 4, maybe 6 more U-boats over the course of the entire war.

Anyways, if the Germans lost a dozen dreadnoughts in a more aggressive campaign, absolutely nothing changes except that the HSF's light forces are freed up from their dreadnought escort duties and can actually undertake useful offensive anti-shipping sweeps in very large numbers around the Thames and such. The surviving 25 German dreadnoughts and pre-dreadnoughts (that is to say, 4 x Nassaus, 4 x Helgolands, the 4 surviving BC's/Kaiser/Konigs, the two Bayerns, the Hindenburg, 10 younger pre-dreadnoughts) could perform a coastal/Baltic defense function and still tie down about 40 British dreadnoughts.

When the German light forces sallied forth they tended to get stomped, its one of the issues they had at Jutland, not enough scouts left to know the whole Grand Fleet was about to arrive.You also seem to have no idea of Naval warfare ( or think the RN just drank lead tea all day). In the days before radar, a Dreadnought needed light forces to scout for it and to stop the RN light forces finding it. The north sea was not empty, it was full of patrolling cruisers and destroyers looking for just such a move, the RN knew all about commerce raiding, it had been doing it itself for centuries. A dreadnought would almost certainly be located, trailed and be brought to battle long before it got near the shipping lanes if it was on its own.
As for needing 40 Dreadnoughts to cover the forces you list, again the RN is not drinking that paint or cowering scared of the mighty Germans. It would at most use half that, pre dreads are not at all scary to a battle line mainly 13.5+", HMS Dreadnought herself was deemed unsuitable for the line of battle, by the RN. The idea they would treat battlecruisers and pre-dreads as needing to be covered if they were dreadnoughts is just plain silly
 
I don't recall saying the emboldened comments on this thread, but sounds reasonable. If a significant portion of the HSF dreadnaughts spend most the war in a chop shop, then the RN have less to worry about.

Given that German dreadnoughts (as opposed to BC's) never even bombarded Britain historically and between all of them sank less tonnage of enemy warships and merchants than even Spee's tiny squadron, it defies imagination that the historical strategy could be replaced by anything wherein the British could possibly become less concerned than in the case of the historical inaction. If altering an existing battleship to a new role, breakout season in the Barents Sea is between about November and March, meaning the battleship would go into dock in the summer for conversion, to be ready 6 months later for breakout. During conversion, the RN would have no idea whether the ship was or was not operational, and would have to assume operational.

From my understanding, the USW only substantially increased shipping losses for approximately six months, only four of those doubling pre-USW shipping losses.

2.3 million tons sunk under cruiser rules in 1916, 6 million under USW in 1917, on pace for 3 million tons sunk under USW vs. convoys in 1918. Had the HSF not undertaken USW in 1917 and kept with cruiser rules, probably 2.3 - 3 million tons sunk in 1917 with cruiser rules. IE, much better than war with the US.

If we look at shipping in isolation, the wider implementation of convoys appears to have been the turning point, based on the statistics available. Avoiding USW may avoid or delay the British wider implementation of the convoy system, because a neutral US will not advocate and resource the convoy implementation and the British may lack the impetus to leap from an increasingly hot pot without the step up in shipping losses. Alternatively, the US might join regardless and/or the British implement the wider convoy system regardless.

With the U-boat war the objective was to keep the U-boats from winning it long enough that the Allies could win in France. In that sense, since the ground war was won in 1918 (or 1919 worse case), the convoys were a decisive turning point, along with US intervention, because these extended the period beyond 1919 in which the U-boats could win the war.

In the first instance, breaking into the Atlantic is no small feat and any losses or damage incurred cannot be recovered or repaired. Further, once in the Atlantic such a German force would be at a distinct disadvantage in terms of reconnaissance, repairs and refueling. Such a significant German surface force could be trailed by a handful of faster British units, which could be refueled and rotated with greater ease than the Germans.

If it turns into a metaphorical game of cat and mouse, the German mouse would be blindfolded.

If breaking into the Atlantic were such the magic trick then the RN presumably would have a longer list of ships they'd sunk trying it.

In terms of operations, the closer to the UK a squadron were operating the more decisive the British advantages you list. The further from the UK, the less advantage the RN has. Refuelling is the big one - that's why 4 x Kaiser with 6x14" guns, 23kt and 16,000nm range with the capacity to cruise at 12kt on oil was a far more useful squadron to Germany that 5 x Kaiser with the identical displacement, (ie 5 ships for the cost of 4). Tirpitz was always skimping on quality to achieve higher numbers for his silly risk-battle in the North Sea. This was entirely the wrong building strategy for Germany.
In terms of intel and supply, the German Entappen system was pretty good historically. Could have been improved too. So many neutral countries to work in.

Generally speaking, a raider ties down far more ships hunting it. So, if the Blucher is on a raiding mission in the Americas, it might be the case that two Invincibles are hunting her in the Americas. If the combat power of Beatty vs. Hipper in 1914 is -

Lion = 10
Invincible/Inflexible = 6
Derfflinger = 12
Seydlitz, Moltke = 10
Von der Tann = 8
Blucher = 2

Then Beatty with 10 BC's (including Australia and Tiger) = 76 and Hipper with 5 BC's and 1 AC (including Derfflinger and Goeben) = 52. A 3:2 combat ratio.

But, if Blucher is detached to the Americas and two BC's must detach to hunt her due to heavy losses in raiding, then its Beatty (64) vs. Hipper (50). A 1.25 to 1 combat ratio. Done simply by detaching Blucher and seeing her succeed in forcing a response.
 
It is actually very simple. The Grand Fleet at full strength sortied with some 105 destroyers and light cruisers in the screen. A lot of the debate above revolved around the estimate that the British were short 30 escorts at the beginning of using Atlantic Convoys, if the Grand Fleet can stand down so much as a third of its strength there are your missing escorts. From there it does not matter how many more U-boats get sunk as the entire force will sink fewer merchantmen freeing up not insignificant resources for other uses.

The Grand Fleet would have loved a battle, at Jutland it wanted to stay and play is was the HSF that ran away. The HSF while generally agreed not to be worth the financial and diplomatic cost had to do something and tying down 100+ destroyers and cruisers was actually doing something. Had it gone out and got destroyed either piecemeal or in set piece battle....likely we would have posters here arguing that it would have been better remaining as a fleet in being and having something of a case.
 
So between building a Kaiser with 8 x 12" guns, (or 6 x 14"), 30,000 tons and 23kt for 16,000nm cruise range with duel oil/coal fired propulsion, versus needing to take Le Havre, you picked Le Havre?

Yes, 1000 times yes! The magic ship strategy doesn't work. IOTL the HSF was be outnumbered something like 5:3 by Jutland, with less but more powerful capital ships that will be worse. A 14" kaiser is great but not as great as to defeat 2 12" BBs. Nor would the 14" kaiser be immune to the mines, shore defences and naval forces at the southern end of the North Sea.

Whereas holding Le Harve (while not ASB is highly unlikely and would be indicative of much more massive problems for the Entente. Holding the coast down to Boulogne is more realistic and almost as effective.) would close or drastically restrict through channel shipping day after day for years, to vastly greater effect that a couple of 14" kaiser death rides into the Atlantic.
 
Well the canal is out, yes it could handle an unladen U-boat but not anything close to a battlecruiser. The repair facilities are tricky for the reason I mentioned above but the blockading squadron could probably be made of pre-dreadnoughts but otherwise three dreadnoughts with two on station at any time would cork your battlecruiser like a bottle while it would be sorely missed from the Scouting Group.

Any blockade of Le Harve (noting its capture is unlikely and I'm using it to make a point about needing a forward base if we're going to talk about them raiding in the Atlantic) would be a distant blockade mounted between Portland Bill and the Cherbourg peninsula, for the same reason as in the North Sea. This would require a permanent RN presence that IOTL was with the GF and went to the Dardanelles by May 1915. Whats more the Germans could inflate or deflate the threat overnight by moving single capital ships to and from the station. If the RN had only pre dreads the KM could send a pair of BCs doing nothing in the North Sea to the channel, maul the pre dreads and be home within a week. If the RN responds by sending GF ships to the channel fleet the KM sends a sortie north to remind them of why they keep the GF up to strength.

All the while the light firces are denying the channel to merchant shipping causing the partial evacuation of London. This is what is meant by the silent application of sea power, rather than sexy big ships having orgasmic battles.
 
It is actually very simple. The Grand Fleet at full strength sortied with some 105 destroyers and light cruisers in the screen. A lot of the debate above revolved around the estimate that the British were short 30 escorts at the beginning of using Atlantic Convoys, if the Grand Fleet can stand down so much as a third of its strength there are your missing escorts. From there it does not matter how many more U-boats get sunk as the entire force will sink fewer merchantmen freeing up not insignificant resources for other uses.

I don't think losing a dozen German dreadnoughts changes the U-boat situation at all. Jellicoe will not want to part with many destroyers from his screen, given that these were there to protect the fleet from TB and submarine attack - two forces that would be intact in the North Sea. On the HSF side if the remaining battleships then play true fleet in being then at least the TB's and CL's can make offensive sweeps in large numbers in the direction of the Thames, which might even produce some useful results against shipping and the Harwich Force. Not sure if more TB's could be sent to Belgium, but that would be another front where the HSF might be served by less attending to its useless dreadnought fleet.

The Grand Fleet would have loved a battle, at Jutland it wanted to stay and play is was the HSF that ran away. The HSF while generally agreed not to be worth the financial and diplomatic cost had to do something and tying down 100+ destroyers and cruisers was actually doing something. Had it gone out and got destroyed either piecemeal or in set piece battle....likely we would have posters here arguing that it would have been better remaining as a fleet in being and having something of a case.

Jellicoe never demonstrated much interest in risk to make a battle happen, because if nothing happened then his mission was accomplished for another day. I asked how Germany could benefiet from following the strategy the British preferred for the HSF. I can see only how Britain gained an advantage from such inaction.
 
Any blockade of Le Harve (noting its capture is unlikely and I'm using it to make a point about needing a forward base if we're going to talk about them raiding in the Atlantic) would be a distant blockade mounted between Portland Bill and the Cherbourg peninsula, for the same reason as in the North Sea. This would require a permanent RN presence that IOTL was with the GF and went to the Dardanelles by May 1915. Whats more the Germans could inflate or deflate the threat overnight by moving single capital ships to and from the station. If the RN had only pre dreads the KM could send a pair of BCs doing nothing in the North Sea to the channel, maul the pre dreads and be home within a week. If the RN responds by sending GF ships to the channel fleet the KM sends a sortie north to remind them of why they keep the GF up to strength.

All the while the light firces are denying the channel to merchant shipping causing the partial evacuation of London. This is what is meant by the silent application of sea power, rather than sexy big ships having orgasmic battles.

I get that you are making a POD for the sake of need but you then ignore the reason for the need. The blockade of La Havre does not need to be a distant blockade because British bases are right on top of it. A ship that strikes a mine or swallows a torpedo off La Havre need only limp back to Portsmouth to survive. This means a riskier forward strategy is effective. The Germans also cannot easily risk singletons because they cannot accept defeat in detail. It is no good a damaged ship hiding up the Seine...and really your POD at this points is rather encompassing the defeat of France through handwave defeating the rest of the object of the discussion entirely. The repair facilities of La Havre are likely to be subject to attack by the British meaning they are effectively useless for the basing of large warships.

The thing is that sending battlecruisers to "maul" the pre-dreadnoughts not merely assumes you have handwaved the mines of the Dover Barrage but also assumes the pre-dreadnoughts who are present in numbers do not fight back, Germany cannot afford to have its warships laid up for repairs which is the all too likely result of combat even with inferior opponents.

Your BCs still have to traverse Entente minefields and Entente submarines but also British intercepting squadrons and yes pre-dreadnoughts in numbers are a threat to battlecruisers not simply because coming out of La Havre the modern ship will need time to work up to full speed meaning the already moving pre-dreadnoughts 18 knot sprint will be ample to catch them for a short range engagement where the pre-dreadnoughts' disadvantage in long range heavy guns is minimised. This of course assumes no dreadnought battleships but it get worse. The more battlecruisers you send the less the British response needs to scale up. 1 battlecruiser might require 3 battleships ( of which 2 on station) but two can be covered with...well tbh you could risk 3 but having 4 would allow you keep 3 on rotating station not counting pre-dreadnoughts, send 3 and the British probably respond with a mix of battleships and battlecruisers as you have halved the capital ship complement or worse at the beginning of the war, of the Scouting Group.

The HSF needed to keep concentrated but we several examples such as the Battle of the Falklands, the hunt for the Goeben and the Gallipoli campaign of the Grand Fleet making detachments

Of course we are assuming the Germans hold a substantial chunk of the hinterland of La Havre as high angle 15 inch howitzer shells would hurt a battlecruiser. Hell 6 inch or 155mm guns firing over reverse slopes would making supply and repair awkward to say the least.

I get you really need a free pass at La Havre to even make the German raiding strategy effective but it swiftly runs into the same sort of problems as the Kriegsmarine faced for its surface ships in World War 2 which is the Royal Navy has a big, big force preponderance. In World War 1 the force imbalance is not as great but the geographical situation even with the free gift of a Channel base in this ATL scenario is much the worse. Further but the force imbalance is still great enough that any detachment from the HSF diminishes its effective combat power more than the required response from Grand Fleet.
 
Le Havre would have served as a good forward base for Channel TB operations though.

Thats exactly what Bartenbach was looking for, uboats and tboats.

Here's a precis of all the ports he looked at.

  • Antwerp: major port and shipbuilding facilities, Scheldt pass through (neutral?) Dutch waters, linked by inland canal to Bruges:

  • Zebrugge: shallow approaches and drifting sand requiring dredging, undefended apart from sea mole requiring major defensive gun emplacement, canal big enough for small cruisers inland to Bruges, minimal repair facilities: in general not considered a desirable base

  • Bruges: linked by canal to Antwerp, Zeebrugge and Ostend, no repair facilities: useful as safe harbour and supply station

  • Ostend: defenceless without guns, linked by small canal to Bruges, some repair facilities including 2 small drydocks

  • Dunkirk: shallow and navigational hazards on approach meant bad for Uboats but easily defended, good repair facilities: Good base for Torpedo boats

  • Calais: Deep approaches mean uboats could dive as soon as leaving port, well equipped with repair facilities, very vulnerable to attack and would need major defensive gun emplacements: useable by uboats but overall worse than Dunkirk.

  • Boulogne: approaches and defensibility similar to Calais but with added disadvantage that the supporting rail line ran along the coast and was vulnerable to naval gunfire leaving the port isolated, limited repair facilities: barely passable for Uboats and Torpedo boats

  • Le Havre: navigation hazards so bad as to require French pilots, excellent defensive works with artillery, exceptional repair facilities, canal access from port to inland, Seine navigable deep inland for shelter against naval gunfire: very promising.

  • Cherbourg: deep approaches, excellent defences, very well equipped repair facilities, very well placed for a commerce war against Britain: First class, more promising that Le Havre.
 
I don't think losing a dozen German dreadnoughts changes the U-boat situation at all. Jellicoe will not want to part with many destroyers from his screen, given that these were there to protect the fleet from TB and submarine attack - two forces that would be intact in the North Sea. On the HSF side if the remaining battleships then play true fleet in being then at least the TB's and CL's can make offensive sweeps in large numbers in the direction of the Thames, which might even produce some useful results against shipping and the Harwich Force. Not sure if more TB's could be sent to Belgium, but that would be another front where the HSF might be served by less attending to its useless dreadnought fleet.



Jellicoe never demonstrated much interest in risk to make a battle happen, because if nothing happened then his mission was accomplished for another day. I asked how Germany could benefiet from following the strategy the British preferred for the HSF. I can see only how Britain gained an advantage from such inaction.

Jellicoe stood his fleet to over night to fight the HSF he wanted battle he took reasonable risks, he did not take insane risks but he still was willing to shed ships where the prospective gain was proportionate.

As for the escort screen a smaller Grand Fleet battle line simply does not need so large a screen as it covers less physical area meaning the a smaller number of cruisers and destroyers can provide the needed cover.
 
Jellicoe stood his fleet to over night to fight the HSF he wanted battle he took reasonable risks, he did not take insane risks but he still was willing to shed ships where the prospective gain was proportionate.

Sure, Jellicoe would take a sure-fire win - and day 2 of Jutland was that had it happened - but, he wasn't taking any risk or going out of his way for battle, which is presumably why he declined night combat by going to bed on the bridge of the Iron Duke instead.

As for the escort screen a smaller Grand Fleet battle line simply does not need so large a screen as it covers less physical area meaning the a smaller number of cruisers and destroyers can provide the needed cover.

So, if it works, USW might be avoided, the US might stay neutral, and Germany might win the war. But if it doesn't work then convoys get 30 more escorts in 1917? One of those payoffs is much, much higher in value than the other....

Also, I said that if the HSF detached its screening forces to independent operations due to the surviving dreadnoughts switching to a coastal mission, these TB's and CL's could be used much more aggressively.
 
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