I don't recall saying the emboldened comments on this thread, but sounds reasonable. If a significant portion of the HSF dreadnaughts spend most the war in a chop shop, then the RN have less to worry about.
Given that German dreadnoughts (as opposed to BC's) never even bombarded Britain historically and between all of them sank less tonnage of enemy warships and merchants than even Spee's tiny squadron, it defies imagination that the historical strategy could be replaced by anything wherein the British could possibly become
less concerned than in the case of the historical inaction. If altering an existing battleship to a new role, breakout season in the Barents Sea is between about November and March, meaning the battleship would go into dock in the summer for conversion, to be ready 6 months later for breakout. During conversion, the RN would have no idea whether the ship was or was not operational, and would have to assume operational.
From my understanding, the USW only substantially increased shipping losses for approximately six months, only four of those doubling pre-USW shipping losses.
2.3 million tons sunk under cruiser rules in 1916, 6 million under USW in 1917, on pace for 3 million tons sunk under USW vs. convoys in 1918. Had the HSF not undertaken USW in 1917 and kept with cruiser rules, probably 2.3 - 3 million tons sunk in 1917 with cruiser rules. IE, much better than war with the US.
If we look at shipping in isolation, the wider implementation of convoys appears to have been the turning point, based on the statistics available. Avoiding USW may avoid or delay the British wider implementation of the convoy system, because a neutral US will not advocate and resource the convoy implementation and the British may lack the impetus to leap from an increasingly hot pot without the step up in shipping losses. Alternatively, the US might join regardless and/or the British implement the wider convoy system regardless.
With the U-boat war the objective was to keep the U-boats from winning it long enough that the Allies could win in France. In that sense, since the ground war was won in 1918 (or 1919 worse case), the convoys were a decisive turning point, along with US intervention, because these extended the period beyond 1919 in which the U-boats could win the war.
In the first instance, breaking into the Atlantic is no small feat and any losses or damage incurred cannot be recovered or repaired. Further, once in the Atlantic such a German force would be at a distinct disadvantage in terms of reconnaissance, repairs and refueling. Such a significant German surface force could be trailed by a handful of faster British units, which could be refueled and rotated with greater ease than the Germans.
If it turns into a metaphorical game of cat and mouse, the German mouse would be blindfolded.
If breaking into the Atlantic were such the magic trick then the RN presumably would have a longer list of ships they'd sunk trying it.
In terms of operations, the closer to the UK a squadron were operating the more decisive the British advantages you list. The further from the UK, the less advantage the RN has. Refuelling is the big one - that's why 4 x Kaiser with 6x14" guns, 23kt and 16,000nm range with the capacity to cruise at 12kt on oil was a far more useful squadron to Germany that 5 x Kaiser with the identical displacement, (ie 5 ships for the cost of 4). Tirpitz was always skimping on quality to achieve higher numbers for his silly risk-battle in the North Sea. This was entirely the wrong building strategy for Germany.
In terms of intel and supply, the German Entappen system was pretty good historically. Could have been improved too. So many neutral countries to work in.
Generally speaking, a raider ties down far more ships hunting it. So, if the Blucher is on a raiding mission in the Americas, it might be the case that two Invincibles are hunting her in the Americas. If the combat power of Beatty vs. Hipper in 1914 is -
Lion = 10
Invincible/Inflexible = 6
Derfflinger = 12
Seydlitz, Moltke = 10
Von der Tann = 8
Blucher = 2
Then Beatty with 10 BC's (including Australia and Tiger) = 76 and Hipper with 5 BC's and 1 AC (including Derfflinger and Goeben) = 52. A 3:2 combat ratio.
But, if Blucher is detached to the Americas and two BC's must detach to hunt her due to heavy losses in raiding, then its Beatty (64) vs. Hipper (50). A 1.25 to 1 combat ratio. Done simply by detaching Blucher and seeing her succeed in forcing a response.