Was the "starve them out" strategy ever really feasible?

Yeah it is almost as if there were reasons the HSF did not do that?

First off of course finding ships even in the Irish Sea or the Channel pre-radar is a little complicated. Secondly The Germans were not entirely sure where the defensive minefields were. Third a convoy escort does not need to match a raider, it merely needs to provide sufficient threat so that it can delay any attack while the convoy disperses meanwhile the Wireless operators arte signalling their position and the nature of the force that is attacking them. A force that is far from home and with the hunters between them and safety...

Firstly the German naval command setup was atrocious, they wouldn't try good ideas that were blindingly obvious. However thats just lines on an org chart which can be easily changed.

Secondly, sure if looked at in isolation the specifics of merchant raiding off Cornwall aren't awesome. However in the context of an overall naval strategy putting a single BC at the German held port if Le Harve (all this talk rests on such shaky foundations ) is a pretty cheap way of reducing British imports by 1/3 due to the institution of ocean convoys. Furthermore if this BC sortied and fired a few shots it is a pretty cheap way to strip the GF of 3 BCs, the best but being that the KM BC could race back to Germany in a single night and be at sea with the HSF before the RN could redeploy their 3 BCs, reducing the German inferior numbers in a North Sea battle.
 
Firstly the German naval command setup was atrocious, they wouldn't try good ideas that were blindingly obvious. However thats just lines on an org chart which can be easily changed.

Secondly, sure if looked at in isolation the specifics of merchant raiding off Cornwall aren't awesome. However in the context of an overall naval strategy putting a single BC at the German held port if Le Harve (all this talk rests on such shaky foundations ) is a pretty cheap way of reducing British imports by 1/3 due to the institution of ocean convoys. Furthermore if this BC sortied and fired a few shots it is a pretty cheap way to strip the GF of 3 BCs, the best but being that the KM BC could race back to Germany in a single night and be at sea with the HSF before the RN could redeploy their 3 BCs, reducing the German inferior numbers in a North Sea battle.

Before I start pondering how embarrassing it would be for the captain of a German battlecruiser to be sunk in harbour by pre-dreadnoughts are we still talking about World War 1 or you confusing Le Havre, Department Seine-Maritime with another port?
 
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Yeah it is almost as if there were reasons the HSF did not do that?

Yes there is. It had a doctrine that its battleships were inherently prestigious and, being intact, served as a pawn for peace negotiations. This thinking was quite wrong; all the ships of the HSF were already obsolescent due to the pace of technological change, and an intact fleet held no advantage in negotiations should the German army collapse. There was no military advantage beyond self-preservation in the passive stance the HSF took.

Third a convoy escort does not need to match a raider, it merely needs to provide sufficient threat so that it can delay any attack while the convoy disperses

A convoy that is attacked by a superior squadron could be destroyed, (as happened any number of times to Italian convoys in WW2, and to several convoys off Norway in 1917). Or, if it disperses, it provides independently sailing targets for the U-boats. German USW efforts simply required more participation from the surface navy in the naval war, because the submarines could not do it all on their own. It didn't get it, the fleet brass was simply unwilling to lose a dozen dreadnoughts.
 
A convoy that is attacked by a superior squadron could be destroyed, (as happened any number of times to Italian convoys in WW2, and to several convoys off Norway in 1917). Or, if it disperses, it provides independently sailing targets for the U-boats. German USW efforts simply required more participation from the surface navy in the naval war, because the submarines could not do it all on their own. It didn't get it, the fleet brass was simply unwilling to lose a dozen dreadnoughts.

Well yes because once they have lost a dozen dreadnoughts the Grand Fleet can disperse save for a single squadron of super dreadnoughts and then there are plenty of convoy escorts and forget being at square one you are back to square zero. It is amazing how brilliant a strategy sounds as long as you ignore the obvious.
 
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Seriously though the German naval officers were professionals who applied themselves with vigour and often personal physical courage to their jobs but there were very real geographical and operational impediments in the way of their neatly cutting the British sea lanes and bringing perfidious Albion (not the board member) to its knees.

Normally, navies that face geographical impediments to their mission either build the ships and equipment they need to overcome it, or they alter their tactics to achieve their mission within these constraints. The German surface navy in WW1 did neither. What it did was use the problems it faced to justify remaining inactive. I think Ludendorff might have been better serving Germany to cashier the entire naval high command, and rebuilt it from the ranks with a much younger leadership set.
 
I think Ludendorff might have been better serving Germany to cashier the entire naval high command, and rebuilt it from the ranks with a much younger leadership set.

Yeah because it is not like we have ever on this board discussed how well that sort of thinking worked out for the navy of revolutionary France...
 
Well yes because once they have lost a dozen dreadnoughts the Grand Fleet can disperse save for a single squadron of super dreadnoughts and then there are plenty of convoy escorts and forget being at square one you are back to square zero. It is amazing how brilliant a strategy sounds as long as you ignore the obvious.

First, an HSF that tried and failed at a more active commerce raiding strategy would be no further behind than an HSF that sat in port and did nothing, on the basis of the fact that a dreadnought which does nothing contributes nothing. Second, the dreadnoughts of the Royal Navy themselves had no actual useful function beyond fighting the dreadnoughts of the HSF. That is to say, the loss of the HSF's dreadnoughts in a series of battles would give the RN no actual advantage. This is similar in concept to how the elimination of the US Pacific Fleet battleships in 1941 eliminated the mission for the IJN battleships, which then proceeded to do nothing for the first phase of the war. Third, the number of convoys, sea lanes, and ships to protect considerably exceeded the number of RN dreadnoughts available. Such that had the HSF just one dreadnought in commission in WW1, it still could have preformed a commerce mission with some chances of material success before meeting its end in some running battle somewhere.
 
First, an HSF that tried and failed at a more active commerce raiding strategy would be no further behind than an HSF that sat in port and did nothing, on the basis of the fact that a dreadnought which does nothing contributes nothing. Second, the dreadnoughts of the Royal Navy themselves had no actual useful function beyond fighting the dreadnoughts of the HSF. That is to say, the loss of the HSF's dreadnoughts in a series of battles would give the RN no actual advantage. This is similar in concept to how the elimination of the US Pacific Fleet battleships in 1941 eliminated the mission for the IJN battleships, which then proceeded to do nothing for the first phase of the war. Third, the number of convoys, sea lanes, and ships to protect considerably exceeded the number of RN dreadnoughts available. Such that had the HSF just one dreadnought in commission in WW1, it still could have preformed a commerce mission with some chances of material success before meeting its end in some running battle somewhere.

First the HSF did try raiding British convoys to and from Norway and with some success I might add but the risks outweighed the gains. Here the losses would definitely outweigh the gains but further battleships do have a useful function that you yourself have argued for, they pawn all other ships below their rate in surface engagements. That means RN battleships will dominate cruisers, they will dominate destroyers, they will laughingly sink auxiliary cruisers, they will force submarines to submerge and likely lose their engagement window and they can also stop merchant ships, shell land positions and so on and so forth. In fact it turns out the battleship could do rather a lot which it did until aircraft came of age and could do a lot of the same further, faster and for given numbers cheaper.

Beyond that but the Grand Fleet required a number of light cruisers and destroyers to screen the big ships from embarrassing slip ups against smaller vessels with torpedoes. However once the Grand Fleet need no longer worry about the German dreadnoughts then its screen can reduce its margin of superiority over that of the HSF (even assuming the HSF sent off its battleships alone) and that will free up escorts which are again quite capable of suppressing submarine surface operations while battleships can transfer between multiple sequential convoys in the capital ship threat zone around the British Isles.
 
Yeah because it is not like we have ever on this board discussed how well that sort of thinking worked out for the navy of revolutionary France...

The French Navy in the Napoleonic period lacked the combat skills to challenge the RN even when having a numerical advantage, and suffered from a defeatist morale. The HSF surface forces had combat skills and elan equal to the RN at the basic level - they could defeat the RN 1 on 1. So, the HSF was in much better shape to fight in 1914 than was the French navy in 1804. What it lacked was an actual war fighting strategy, which is why it literally invented one with a new weapon - submarines - as the war progressed. Any purge of the HSF's leadership would need to remove the high-end deadweight - the Kaiser, Tirpitz, etc., to allow more energetic lower-level commanders of the Mueller mold, more freedom to take risks.
 
The French Navy in the Napoleonic period lacked the combat skills to challenge the RN even when having a numerical advantage, and suffered from a defeatist morale. The HSF surface forces had combat skills and elan equal to the RN at the basic level - they could defeat the RN 1 on 1. So, the HSF was in much better shape to fight in 1914 than was the French navy in 1804. What it lacked was an actual war fighting strategy, which is why it literally invented one with a new weapon - submarines - as the war progressed. Any purge of the HSF's leadership would need to remove the high-end deadweight - the Kaiser, Tirpitz, etc., to allow more energetic lower-level commanders of the Mueller mold, more freedom to take risks.

Since neither of the two persons you have named had operational command and since removing one of them is going to be considered a coup if not a revolution then I am going suggest you do not actually have a clue about whom you are talking.
 
Since neither of the two persons you have named had operational command and since removing one of them is going to be considered a coup if not a revolution then I am going suggest you do not actually have a clue about whom you are talking.

Given that the army removed the Kaiser from any say in its decisions without needing to overthrow the government, where did you get the idea the navy would be any different? In terms of Tirpitz, he wasn't a combat commander, but he was very much deadweight and had to go. He was good at securing funding for the navy, but had no constructive insight into the navy's actual strategic purpose in a war with Great Britain.
 
Given that the army removed the Kaiser from any say in its decisions without needing to overthrow the government, where did you get the idea the navy would be any different? In terms of Tirpitz, he wasn't a combat commander, but he was very much deadweight and had to go. He was good at securing funding for the navy, but had no constructive insight into the navy's actual strategic purpose in a war with Great Britain.

Erm but the important question is who do you want at the Naval Staff? In command of the HSF, in command of the Scouting Group, I Battle Squadron, II Battle Squadron and so forth, who commands Torpedo Boats (aka destroyers), who commands U-boats?

Without any notion of this you do not have an argument.
 

BooNZ

Banned
You said that battleships were compact for the crews and not optimalized for long range missions. Ok, what would be needed to do to make them capable of long range missions? Three things that come to mind would be (1) to carry more coal, even at the expense of armament or armor; (2) have about 2-3 boilers per ship capable of burning oil or diesel so that as much of the cruising consumption as possible could be absorbed by liquid fuels; (3) a more robust system of supply, using as much as possible enemy captured ships. (In terms of how packed the crews were, the U-boats were even more cramped but still functioned fine at sea for weeks or months on end.)
I don't recall saying the emboldened comments on this thread, but sounds reasonable. If a significant portion of the HSF dreadnaughts spend most the war in a chop shop, then the RN have less to worry about.

1916 saw 2.3 million tons sunk, primarily by U-boats. Assuming no USW for 1917, I think you might be right. Perhaps the U-boats could have sank 3 million tons under the normal rules as the numbers of U-boats increased. That's only half of the USW numbers, but more importantly, also no war with the USA in 1917. Could the German surface navy had made up the other half of sinkings, such that in 1917 the German navy scores the historical 6 million tons of enemy shipping sunk, but not using USW and therefore without war with the USA?
From my understanding, the USW only substantially increased shipping losses for approximately six months, only four of those doubling pre-USW shipping losses.

If we look at shipping in isolation, the wider implementation of convoys appears to have been the turning point, based on the statistics available. Avoiding USW may avoid or delay the British wider implementation of the convoy system, because a neutral US will not advocate and resource the convoy implementation and the British may lack the impetus to leap from an increasingly hot pot without the step up in shipping losses. Alternatively, the US might join regardless and/or the British implement the wider convoy system regardless.

About 4 or 5 convoy battles betweeen '1-2' surplus pre-dreadnoughts vs. 4 German dreadnoughts and the RN will have no more 'surplus' pre-dreadnoughts. Isn't this tactic just setting up any number of Battle of the Coronels, for which each will serve as a propaganda victory for the Central Powers domestically and in the US?

Also, in terms of hunting down a squadron, to do that the pursuing squadron would have to move at high speed - 20kt+, for days on end. Too much fuel burned!
In the first instance, breaking into the Atlantic is no small feat and any losses or damage incurred cannot be recovered or repaired. Further, once in the Atlantic such a German force would be at a distinct disadvantage in terms of reconnaissance, repairs and refueling. Such a significant German surface force could be trailed by a handful of faster British units, which could be refueled and rotated with greater ease than the Germans.

If it turns into a metaphorical game of cat and mouse, the German mouse would be blindfolded.


 
Before I start pondering how embarrassing it would be for the captain of a German battlecruiser to be sunk in harbour by pre-dreadnoughts are we still talking about World War 1 or you confusing Le Havre, Department Seine-Maritime with another port?

Yes, no ship larger than a light cruiser can enter Ostend and Zebrugge and then is still behind the Dover mine barrage. Therefore before any talk about german capital ships doing Atlantic cruises can occur a base must be found that is big enough to handle a capital ship, beyond the Dover mine barrage and whose capture is not ASB. That leaves Le Harve, although I'm not going to do a TL about how it gets captured in WW1.
 
First, an HSF that tried and failed at a more active commerce raiding strategy would be no further behind than an HSF that sat in port and did nothing, on the basis of the fact that a dreadnought which does nothing contributes nothing.
A dreadnought on the bottom of the sea is a lot less threatening than one sitting in the harbor. The last one at least has to be contained by your navy, which takes up resources.
 
Normally, navies that face geographical impediments to their mission either build the ships and equipment they need to overcome it, or they alter their tactics to achieve their mission within these constraints. The German surface navy in WW1 did neither. What it did was use the problems it faced to justify remaining inactive. I think Ludendorff might have been better serving Germany to cashier the entire naval high command, and rebuilt it from the ranks with a much younger leadership set.

Younger officers in a shit command structure will still produce shit outcomes.

What is needed is a professional naval officer in overall command of the Baltic naval station, Baltic fleet, High Seas Fleet, North Sea naval station and MarineKorps Flanders. Such an officer could decide that in winter ice will reduce the activity of the Baltic fleet so the its destroyers can be sent to Flanders. Or the HSF isn't planning a major sorties in the next few weeks so a destroyer flotilla can be sent to Flanders and another to the Baltic. Or that the HSF is going to sortie in 2 weeks so send these destroyer flotilla back to the North Sea at the last minute to boost numbers. But each of these commanders were more or less equal to each other, chief of naval staff and naval secretary so didn't have to do anything the Kaiser didnt order.
 
Yes, no ship larger than a light cruiser can enter Ostend and Zebrugge and then is still behind the Dover mine barrage. Therefore before any talk about german capital ships doing Atlantic cruises can occur a base must be found that is big enough to handle a capital ship, beyond the Dover mine barrage and whose capture is not ASB. That leaves Le Harve, although I'm not going to do a TL about how it gets captured in WW1.

The issue with Le Havre, quite apart from if the Germans have the land strength to get that far the Entente are looking at real issues, is that it is horrible to defend by the time of the Battle of Tsushima. Your modern and expensive CC is going to be vulnerable to attack by pre-dreadnoughts or even some of the more heavily armed monitors like Erebus until the Germans can lay extensive mine belts a good 10 and more likely 12 kilometres into the Channel. It would be highly embarrassing if this modern battlecruiser was merely crippled by bombardment in port or torpedo attack while traversing the Western approaches or did a Gneiseanau on a dash back to Germany.

If the British did send three battlecruisers after it and why bother when they can send three battleships to do the same they would simply peg it in port a la Mers-El-Kebir and have done with it.
 
In October 1914 Korvettekapitan Bartenbach made the following appraisal of Le Harve. Bartenbach commanded the Flanders uboat flotilla when it stood up in early 1915.

Le Havre: navigation hazards so bad as to require French pilots, excellent defensive works with artillery, exceptional repair facilities, canal access from port to inland, Seine navigable deep inland for shelter against naval gunfire: very promising.
 
In October 1914 Korvettekapitan Bartenbach made the following appraisal of Le Harve. Bartenbach commanded the Flanders uboat flotilla when it stood up in early 1915.

Le Havre: navigation hazards so bad as to require French pilots, excellent defensive works with artillery, exceptional repair facilities, canal access from port to inland, Seine navigable deep inland for shelter against naval gunfire: very promising.

Well the canal is out, yes it could handle an unladen U-boat but not anything close to a battlecruiser. The repair facilities are tricky for the reason I mentioned above but the blockading squadron could probably be made of pre-dreadnoughts but otherwise three dreadnoughts with two on station at any time would cork your battlecruiser like a bottle while it would be sorely missed from the Scouting Group.
 
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