You said that battleships were compact for the crews and not optimalized for long range missions. Ok, what would be needed to do to make them capable of long range missions? Three things that come to mind would be (1) to carry more coal, even at the expense of armament or armor; (2) have about 2-3 boilers per ship capable of burning oil or diesel so that as much of the cruising consumption as possible could be absorbed by liquid fuels; (3) a more robust system of supply, using as much as possible enemy captured ships. (In terms of how packed the crews were, the U-boats were even more cramped but still functioned fine at sea for weeks or months on end.)
I don't recall saying the
emboldened comments on this thread, but sounds reasonable. If a significant portion of the HSF dreadnaughts spend most the war in a chop shop, then the RN have less to worry about.
1916 saw 2.3 million tons sunk, primarily by U-boats. Assuming no USW for 1917, I think you might be right. Perhaps the U-boats could have sank 3 million tons under the normal rules as the numbers of U-boats increased. That's only half of the USW numbers, but more importantly, also no war with the USA in 1917. Could the German surface navy had made up the other half of sinkings, such that in 1917 the German navy scores the historical 6 million tons of enemy shipping sunk, but not using USW and therefore without war with the USA?
From my understanding, the USW only substantially increased shipping losses for approximately six months, only four of those doubling pre-USW shipping losses.
If we look at shipping in isolation, the wider implementation of convoys appears to have been the turning point, based on the statistics available. Avoiding USW may avoid or delay the British wider implementation of the convoy system, because a neutral US will not advocate and resource the convoy implementation and the British may lack the impetus to leap from an increasingly hot pot without the step up in shipping losses. Alternatively, the US might join regardless and/or the British implement the wider convoy system regardless.
About 4 or 5 convoy battles betweeen '1-2' surplus pre-dreadnoughts vs. 4 German dreadnoughts and the RN will have no more 'surplus' pre-dreadnoughts. Isn't this tactic just setting up any number of Battle of the Coronels, for which each will serve as a propaganda victory for the Central Powers domestically and in the US?
Also, in terms of hunting down a squadron, to do that the pursuing squadron would have to move at high speed - 20kt+, for days on end. Too much fuel burned!
In the first instance, breaking into the Atlantic is no small feat and any losses or damage incurred cannot be recovered or repaired. Further, once in the Atlantic such a German force would be at a distinct disadvantage in terms of reconnaissance, repairs and refueling. Such a significant German surface force could be trailed by a handful of faster British units, which could be refueled and rotated with greater ease than the Germans.
If it turns into a metaphorical game of cat and mouse, the German mouse would be blindfolded.