The aspirational goal of the Royal navy in the years prior to the war was the defeat of the German HSF in a battle of annihilation - Churchill for example saw a British Blockade as a means to entice the Germans to come out to play, but has not appeared to have contemplated the ramifications of the HSF remaining anchored. The commitment of British light forces do defend against a HSF excursion contributed to the British conclusion they had insufficient escorts to implement a widespread convoy system.
The USW was a gross miscalculation. The shipping loses the British were incuring in the months before the introduction of USW were not sustainable and the Entente access to new North American credit had already dried up. Without the entry of the US (resources and funding)
and the widespread introduction of a convoy system, the war would have likely ended in 1917.
Preliminary and isolated naval bombardments weeks before the arrival of Entente land forces, coupled with the initial delivery of those land forces to the wrong parts - doomed what was already a deeply flawed plan, championed by the First Sea Lord.
I am genuinely curious as to what the British would be seeking to achieve by forcing the straights, let alone how it would be achieved. On paper the Dardanelles looked there for the taking, but the reality was there were too many unknown, unknowns for the Entente to succeed.
The wartime conditions strained British shipping without the efforts of the Germans. The shortage of shipping (along with escorts) was cited as the principal reason why convoys could not be implemented, since it was believed the formation and servicing of convoys would lead to unacceptable levels of downtime among shipping resources.
The British started the war with inadequate tanker capabilities and this proceeded to get even worse without effective steps being taken to rectify this shortage on a timely manner - sufficient tanker resources would have come on line in 1918 after the point of crisis. This is curious since the RN prewar was planning to utilize British oil resources in the middle east, but due to quality issues and refining problems instead relied on more accessable US sources.
As an aside, a high review of shipping losses during WW1 illustrates a disproportionate loss of British tankers, to the extent I question the data.
I have read a decent amount about the implementation of convoys and most of the above is very fresh material...
More common reasons cited for the convoy system not being more widely implemented sooner include the belief by British admiralty that convoys system would be a logistical nightmare requiring additional shipping and escort resources that were not available. It was later determined the British admiralty were working with flawed assumptions/ calculations.
As previously stated, the British started with the strongest economy, navy and empire. From a naval perspective it also enjoyed overwhelming geographical advantages over the Germans. It's implementation of its 'blockade' was muddled and it mismanaged the protection of British maritime interests against a vastly inferior foe. Despite those overwhelming advantages, the British war effort may not have survived 1917 without US assistance.
I'm not convinced the empire was in decline, but it had probably ceased to expand and likely needed to reform to face new challenges.
The RN performed its perceived core roles really well, except those core roles were less relevant in 1914. As distasteful as it sounds, the RN chestnuts were hauled from the fire by the US, which then proceeded to strip Britain of its baubles of empire.
So back to your
Hapless and Outfought comment which is what I have taken umbrage over - most of the above does not explain, support or defend your comment. I am not arguing any other point in this thread just that comment. I even agree with some of the above - I am not questioning the impact of the USA on the conduct of WW1 for example it was important but that does not explain or support the assertion.
The first role of the RN is to defend Britain its second role in to maintain British control of the international sealanes and in doing so defend Britain's maritime interests - and this it did and it was up to the German fleet (then the 2nd largest in the world) to change this state of affairs. It did not.
Their plan was to wait for the RN to come charging in to the area around the Helgoland Bight in order to conduct the close blokade and for the 'Risk Flotte' strategy to take place were after a heavy battle damaged German ships could retreat behind defensive minefields and light forces - while damaged British ships would have far longer to travel back to British ports and many of them foundering or being 'picked off' by Uboats and 'Torpedo boats' (Destroyers) thus evening up the relative strengths or even tipping the scales totally into the KMs favor.
But the Perfidious Bloody British thought that this was a silly idea and decided instead to conduct a distant blockade much to the KM leaders anguish and disappointment.
Had the KM never sortied from its anchorages in WW1 then the Grand fleet would have succeeded in its primary task without sinking or having to sink a single German ship.
Had the KM sought a fight to the death ie Jutland without the Germans (quite sensibly) running away bit the Royal Navy would also have done its job.
As I have said, before USW began to bite from Feb 1 1917 the most obvious threat to a convoy was from a surface ship or ships. For example one of the reasons that the SMS Goeben escaped the 3 Med based British Battle Cruisers in 1914 was because conventional wisdom would have the Goeben sortie and attack French troop carrying convoys, not have a sniff around and then bugger of to Turkey! Therefore the RN ships despite not 'yet' being at war with Germany or AH sought to cover the German ship from an effort to sortie and attack the French Convoys. Would Goeben have had a crack at the French Troop ships what with the French not having any BCs to match her - well she did have a sniff but changed her mind - It's my read that the presence of 3 British I class BCs changed her captains mind and instead he headed East not West.
I consider the Goeben mission to be the greatest success of the entire war by the German Navy and the subsequent op to force the Straights the RNs greatest failure (more on that later)
With the HSF locked up in the North Sea due to the presence of the Grand fleet there was no threat there and early war no real threat of USW - no need for convoys for any reason (other than troop convoys).
Troop convoys were about the only 'convoy' in the early part of the war and these were almost always escorted by powerful warships lest they be attacked by a powerful enemy warship
As for other ships - there was simply not enough capital ships to escort non troop ships during the war therefore there was nothing to be gained by them sailing in convoy - so they did not.
This had drastically changed by Spring 1917.
The sinkings prior to this while heavy but not critical - might not have been sustainable over the long term but were probably sustainable long enough for Germany to become exhausted and seek terms ie late 1918.
Subsequent to the introduction of USW this rate of sinkings did become critical but also brought the USA and others into the war rather rapidly and resulted in a massive reaction from all of the allies resulting in the introduction of the Convoy systems and later even more draconian measures that basically controlled every tons imported into Europe.
Convoys were seen as an own goal by pretty much everyone upto early 1917 when the British ordered convoys to start (which they did from May 10th) - as for working from flawed assumptions/calculations USW on this scale or pretty much any scale had never happened before - the closest analogy to USW in WW1 was the use of Privateers during the Napoleonic wars - the major difference being that most sailing vessels of the day could pretty much sail at the same speeds plus or minus a few knots and didn't as a rule deliberately hide underwater.
"It's implementation of its 'blockade' was muddled and it mismanaged the protection of British maritime interests against a vastly inferior foe."
Did it? Was not Germany suffering from severe shortages by 1916 onwards? The failure of its own 'inferior fleet' (a fleet 2nd only in size to the British one which had to police the world's oceans and not bob around at anchor looking aggressive) in breaking the blockade resulted in extreme pressure from the more reactionary German leaders in convincing the Kaiser to unleash USW. They knew it would result in the USA joining the war but simply did not care. Great quote on Wiki - Even if the "disorganized and undisciplined" Americans did intervene, Holtzendorff assured the Kaiser, "I give your Majesty my word as an officer, that not one American will land on the Continent."
Now there is a muddled and mismanaged decision.
As for your query around forcing the Dardanelles - well if your inept and outfought comment could be defended anywhere during the war well look no further - its right here!
"I am genuinely curious as to what the British would be seeking to achieve by forcing the straights, let alone how it would be achieved. On paper the Dardanelles looked there for the taking, but the reality was there were too many unknown, unknowns for the Entente to succeed."
Had the British and French fleets forced the Dardanelles then it is highly likely that the Ottoman Government would have collapsed and with it one of the CP allies would have ceased to be a threat to the Allies - certainly that was impression of the US Ambassador to Constantinople Henry Morgenthau at the time - he wrote that the German Ambassador had abandoned his residence and sought refuge at the US Embassy and the Leaders of the Ottoman government had made plans to flee with whatever could be loaded into whatever transport could be found as soon as the British and French entered the Marmara Sea.
Admiral John De Roebeck pure and simply bottled it and after the loss of some obsolete pre-dreadnoughts on the 18th March 1915 - ships that for the most part were going to be scrapped despite a war being on and were not going to be missed - prevaricated, delayed and then called off further attacks despite the civilian crews of the minesweepers (who had been a bit flaky when under fire) being replaced with the crews from the sunken Pre-Dreads and reorganized by Commodore Roger Keyes. The Commodore was convinced as was the Captain of HMS Queen Elizabeth that the attempt should have been made with the reorganised fleet and that it would have succeeded.
A subsequent offer by Greece of 1/4 million Soldiers to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula was effectively vetoed by the Russians - the region was their sphere after all - another mistake as at the time the Turkish were scrambling for troops with all their best units fighting the British in Palestine and what is now Iraq.
Ultimately the failure to force the straights, make use of the Greek offer and then the failure of the subsequent much telegraphed and delayed Gallipoli land campaign resulted in the hundreds of thousands of casualties, the deployment of a million and half troops, the continued activities of the Ottoman Empire as an active member of the CP, a great deal of treasure expended and tellingly the Straights remaining closed to the 90% of Russian imports and exports (this partially responsible for the collapse of the Russian Empire) for pretty much the rest of the war.
And Churchill gets all the blame......
It's a big WW1 potential POD and one that I hope one day to explore.