Was the Roman Republic Doomed by the 1st Century BC?

Was the Collapse of the Roman Republic inevitable by 100 BC?

  • Yes, its collapse was inevitable by then

    Votes: 26 44.1%
  • No, events could have unfolded differently and the Republic could have survived

    Votes: 33 55.9%

  • Total voters
    59

Anaxagoras

Banned
The historiography of ancient Rome is divided on the question of whether the Roman Republic was doomed by the 1st Century BC. Some maintain that the governmental structure that had initially evolved to govern a city-state was simply too cumbersome and inappropriate to the needs of what had become an empire spanning the Mediterranean. This point of view was well-stated by the historian Ronald Syme in his work The Roman Revolution. On the other side, though, some historians maintain that the opposite was true and that Rome's institutions in fact were still strong and adaptive and that the collapse of the Republic was due to the actions of individuals rather than what we might call a systems failure. This point of view was articulated by the historian Erich Gruen in his work The Last Generation of the Roman Republic.

What does the board think? By 100 BC, was the Roman Republic destined to collapse or might it have continued to thrive?
 
Had the Roman Republic been confined to more manageable borders with a less rapid expansion, i think the oligarchal system could have survived in one way or another. Maybe through Caesar dying by Vercingetorix's sword and never conquering Gaul?
Albeit i do think that the Republic would end up heavily unstable, and that a more authoritarian system would be implemented, even if without a "first citizen".
 
The historiography of ancient Rome is divided on the question of whether the Roman Republic was doomed by the 1st Century BC. Some maintain that the governmental structure that had initially evolved to govern a city-state was simply too cumbersome and inappropriate to the needs of what had become an empire spanning the Mediterranean. This point of view was well-stated by the historian Ronald Syme in his work The Roman Revolution. On the other side, though, some historians maintain that the opposite was true and that Rome's institutions in fact were still strong and adaptive and that the collapse of the Republic was due to the actions of individuals rather than what we might call a systems failure. This point of view was articulated by the historian Erich Gruen in his work The Last Generation of the Roman Republic.

What does the board think? By 100 BC, was the Roman Republic destined to collapse or might it have continued to thrive?

This is where the argument falls apart. The actions that historians like Gruen may specify (Crossing the Rubicon for instance), weren't performed in a vacuum of personal ambition, but rather were reactionary responses to incentives placed within the system. For instance, the decentralized command-reward structure fostered by the Roman state directly lead to massively successful wars of conquest in Asia Minor and Gaul, but as we know fostered dangerous loyalty-feedback-loops between generals and their soldiers. It's no wonder that it inevitably lead to the catastrophe of ancient bonapartism, especially when you combine it with the intrigue laden milieu of the patronage system.
Without fixing these and a variaety of other issues, (with a written and codified constitution perhaps?) the Republic was doomed to collapse.
 
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I'd say that the reforms and turmoil of the Gracchus brothers was probably the last chance to save the Republic. After that it was in soldiers' economic interest to support the strong man who could bring them wealth and a living rather than support the political system that would leave them landless, voiceless, and desperate.

I think Sulla had the right idea but his attempt to strip all power from the people and give it to the Senate only exasperated the long term problem and the very way he was able to acquire the power to implement his reforms undermined them.
 
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One book I highly recommend on the subject is "Roman Republics" by Harriet Flower, which will change people's thinking on the subject.

She makes a strong argument against the notion that the "Roman Republic" "fell" in either 49 BC or 27 BC. These dates are more artificial than the 476 AD date for the fall of the Western Roman Empire.

The "Roman Republic" was a system of ad-hoc arrangements between the elites which, even though it conquered the Mediterranean, barely functioned as a government. There was no standing army, police force, or much in the way of a bureaucracy. This was not going to do for running a Mediterranean style empire, and after marching on Rome and overthrowing the legitimate government, Sulla imposed a constitution for the first time in history.

The Sullan system, which was actually a sharper break with what had happened before than Octavian's arrangements would be, started breaking down not long after Sulla's death, and by the 50s the elites were becoming unable even to hold the routine elections to the magistrates. When Caesar crossed the Rubicon, again this was not unprecedented because Sulla had anticipated him, he was launching into a power background. Octavian's claim to have "restored" the Republic actually had a good deal of truth to it.

Constitutionally, Rome remained a republic until well into the Byzantine period so the Republic never so much fell as faded away, much like the Empire. And the Principate was less of a turning point than the reforms of either Sulla or Diocletian at either end.
 
Personally, I think the likely way to 'Save the Republic' is to kill it. For a little bit.

Which means Caesar lives. This is a guy who knew how to work the Republics institutions to tear it down. Now, I might be mistaken, but if we work under the guise that Caesar did value the Republic, then it could be interesting to see if he'd rebuild it entirely under his Dictatorship.

If you know how the institutions fell apart, you can redesign them. The advantage is that it prevents anyone rising to oppose him in the same way he did, and as long as he leaves himself as an exception, or in an office that would be dissolved upon his death, so be it.

If we work from Caesar as a popular power figure, using that and empowering that is how he could reform the Republic, and in such a way that realistically it couldn't create another him. So essentially early federalisation could be a strategy (I'm a fan of the two-tier system tbh, with a stratocracy as a seperate structure with the Dictator at the head of both, until abolished).

But yeah, that is how I'd save it. Burn it down to just its spirit, and rebuild it anew. :D I'd love to see the Senate of Italia and Gaul squabbling at each other whilst the Generals go "Eurgh" and do the real work.
 
The Marian Reforms paved the way for strongmen like Sulla, Pompey, Caesar, Antony and ultimately Octavian to rule by force of legions, so once those were in place, bringing the Republic back from the brink after that would be very difficult.

marius did nothing wrong
 
The Marian Reforms paved the way for strongmen like Sulla, Pompey, Caesar, Antony and ultimately Octavian to rule by force of legions, so once those were in place, bringing the Republic back from the brink after that would be very difficult.

marius did nothing wrong

Although ... the Marian reforms barely ever came close to being more than a half-pregnancy, since it was like squeezing water from rocks to get the Senate to accept that they had to 'freely' deliver land plots to veterans, which in turn forced the generals to fight for their soldiers, which in turn led the soldiers being more loyal to the generals that went out of their way to fight for their rights, than they were towards the senate which dragged their feet so slowly that they would have preferred to push it in reverse
 
you would probably need to get rid of slavery to save the republic
I see this a lot, but it's my understanding that the "small landholder" Roman ideal was about as real as the American middle-class of the 50s; perhaps it existed for a time, but never like it was described, and only ever very fleeting. Rome was run by the wealthy, and non-wealthy citizens never had much of a stake in it.
 
Although ... the Marian reforms barely ever came close to being more than a half-pregnancy, since it was like squeezing water from rocks to get the Senate to accept that they had to 'freely' deliver land plots to veterans, which in turn forced the generals to fight for their soldiers, which in turn led the soldiers being more loyal to the generals that went out of their way to fight for their rights, than they were towards the senate which dragged their feet so slowly that they would have preferred to push it in reverse
Well, I don't think Marius's intent per se was to provide a convenient mechanism for military strongmen to gain power, one way or the other his changes wound up leading to that.
 
In fact, while it didn't have anything directly to do with it, I'm of the belief that the watershed (well, in and so far that the republic would be considered likely to fail outside of wank) probably was somewhere between the Battle of Vercellae (mid 101bc) and the end of Marius' 6th consulship (which, conveniently for this discussion was in 100bc), where Marius increasingly soured his reputation among the senate, by pushing in all his 'chips' on populist radicals and short-term gains by forcing through the Land grants in exactly the way he wanted them, and indirectly fostered a latent counter-movement among the elites that would stonewall any and all attempts at reforming (outside of Sullan reforms, which for the most part was reversed as soon as people believed they could get away with it) for the next couple of generations, up until Caesar
 
Realistically the combination of the Introduction of violence, with the Brothers Gracchus, and the Marian Reforms, which created the situation for strongmen, meant that it was at the least semi-acceptable to rule through political violence, and as a reaction to this violence, for dictators-for-life to rise. And the line between a dictator-for-life and a king is exceedingly fleeting. As a result, while the collapse wasn't inevitable, it was more than likely, and hard to prevent.
 
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