Realpolitik
Banned
What a lot of people seem to forget is that the Saudi regime has sustained itself by making concessions to the puritans in their midst. It was, at one point in the recent past, a fairly standard, albeit despotic, Gulf monarchy, along the lines of Qatar or Jordan. Rather than antagonizing religious hardliners, as the Shah did, the Sauds instead began to increasingly accommodate them from the 1970s onwards (banning women from driving, an enhanced crackdown on 'immoral' media, etc.). I blame this conciliatory shift in attitudes for a lot of the radicalism festering in the Middle East today.
As far as I can see, there are two problems with replicating this scenario in Iran. The first is that the Shah anchored a lot of his legitimacy, however dishonestly, in his track record as a Western-oriented reformer. The liberal middle class was, and continues to be, a far more influential component within Iranian society than virtually anywhere else in the Islamic world (Turkey being the probable exception). Any swing in a religious direction, as the ayatollahs will inevitably demand, risks incurring the ire of a vital pillar for the Pahlavi dynasty. More importantly, the Iranian opposition was never clearly dominated by a single political element until after the Shah's overthrow; in fact, the U.S. State Department, based on intelligence assessments, had expected a takeover by progressives and leftists in the aftermath of the Revolution. For Saudi-style concessions, not only would the Shah have to be ready to compromise in the first place, Khomeini's lot would have to be a lot more dominant from the outset.
Exactly. Also, the problem with the White Revolution was that it not only alienated a lot of the ulema and feudal landlords, but it also promised too much and let a lot of the revunue be sucked up by the army and the Shah's cronies via corruption, leading to predictable anger. It also had certain unintended consequences-literacy and high school graduation boomed during the Shah's rule, but similarly to modern Egypt, that created problems when the Iranian economy couldn't handle all these graduates, who then were ripe for Ayatollah Khomeini to influence. Great idea, poor implementation.
This didn't cause the revolution by itself, but when the Shah began to get more and more outlandish throughout the 70s, it set the stage for it. The Ayatollah's image was a 180 degree difference from the Shah, in all of the right ways, for many of the young men who supported the movement.