Self evidently you did not make the assessment that the more wary USSR exactly cancelled out the more troops and better decisions - you gave the Axis fewer casualties in 1941 and the USSR the same. That's the more wary USSR being less effectual than the other side of things - it's not cancelling out.
I did gave the Axis fewer casualties in the first year of the campaign due to the "better military decisions"-scenario.
But I didn't change the number of Soviet casualties as far as I can recall.
Maybe you can help me remember?
My first post about the subject:
For the sake of argument: say you increase the strength of AG Center in July by 50% (from 800k to 1.2M) and double the number of tanks and aircrafts in that sector.
Would the Red Army still be able to hold the line, or would they be pushed backwards in the central sector?
Which part of my original post changes the Soviet casualties?
My second post about the subject:
That is, if say AG Center had been significantly reinforced, and launched a strategic offensive in the central sector just as Fall Blau commenced further south, the Soviets would be in trouble.
Which part of my second post changes the Soviet casualties?
My fifth post about the subject:
Regardless, my main point here is the fact that the Soviets didn't have unlimited resources to counter the Axis summer campaign in '42.
And would be in trouble if the Axis were stronger for some reason (or they themselves were weaker) - regardless if that was due to better military decisions by the Axis in the first year in the east, or due to no war in the west, or both.
It seems as if I mention Soviet casualties in my fifth post on the subject.
Of course, what that post says is that the the Soviets would be in trouble if the force correlation was worse than OTL, regardless of how that happened. The
regardless part should be a hint that this is a
general statement, and not a
specific statement linked to the ATL we have been discussing over the last few posts.
In my sixth post on the subject, I write:
I made a quick and dirty assessment that a more wary Soviet Union coupled with more Axis troops making better military decisions cancel each other out.
Meaning the strength of the Red Army by mid summer '42 remains the same.
Which part of this post changes the Soviet casualties?
As for preparing for a multi year campaign - how do you do that? The German strateic assessment for a short campaign was based on how they could not win a long one, not the other way around.
One thing would be to cancel the order shifting production-priority from the army to the other branches in the second half of '41.
Anyway, generally, the German made two strategic decisions.
(1) they couldn't win a long war against the Soviet Union
(2) they could win a short war against the Soviet Union
Clearly, a lot of people (I'm assuming you are one of them?) believe the Germans were wrong on point (2). One way the Germans might opt for a long war-preparation would be if they realised what you already believe: that point (2) probably wouldn't happen, and so their best chance would be point (1).
Furthermore, part of the reason as to why they didn't believe they could win a long war was the Wallies.
If they are out of the war, the German strategic assessment might change.
Either is bad for the Axis! OTL the Axis achieved near complete strategic surprise and shattered the Soviet Army - a more prepared USSR can only provide benefits, probably massive ones.
Elsewhere, you are arguing that the Red Army should retreat into the depth of the country. Probably in the belief that that would cause severe logistical problems for the Axis before the main battle occurred.
And this makes some sense - after all, most of the fighting after the first month of war happened about 600 km into the depth of the country.
A more prepared USSR might halt the Axis earlier. Maybe after a say 3-400km advance? That would greatly ease the logistical problems for the Axis from mid-July onwards.
And so, one has to weigh the benefit of a more prepared Red Army in the initial period of war against the logistical benefit of the Axis after the initial period of war.
I'm not certain every single such scenario would benefit the USSR (as you believe).
It all depends on the specifics of how much better prepared the Soviets would be.
But sure, I'll modify my statement to say that if the Red Army stays at the front, it might benefit both sides depending on the situation.
It's only been Russian strategic doctrine since, what, the 1700s? It shouldn't need a specific archival source.
Given that the Soviets didn't follow their strategic doctrine (in place since the 1700s?) in OTL, it would be beneficial if you can point to any evidence as to why they would, with absolute certainty?, follow it in an ATL where the prospect of an Axis invasion is greater.
Oh, I see. You felt that Op. Barbarossa could have rather easily gone better.
It couldn't, it really couldn't. It basically destroyed everything in the USSR up to the limit of the logistics and getting it to go better is very hard indeed.
Yes, I do believe their was room for improvement on the Axis side during the
first year of the invasion, and room for additional failures on the Soviet side.
Of course, there was also room for the opposite.
Evidently, I don't hold the German High Command in the same high regard as you.