Was the goal of reaching the Urals ever achievable for Germany?

There were simply not the rail lines available (irrespective of guage modification) to support a larger army.

I'm pretty sure the Red Army would disagree with that statement.

No matter how many extra troops you generate from no-where, they do Germany no good until late 1941/early 1942

But yes, while the Axis effort during Barbarossa was suboptimal, they would have trouble supporting a much bigger force until the railroad network was put in order.
By the summer of '42.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Self evidently you did not make the assessment that the more wary USSR exactly cancelled out the more troops and better decisions - you gave the Axis fewer casualties in 1941 and the USSR the same. That's the more wary USSR being less effectual than the other side of things - it's not cancelling out.


As for preparing for a multi year campaign - how do you do that? The German strateic assessment for a short campaign was based on how they could not win a long one, not the other way around.

Of course they could. And that might be bad for the Axis. But the keyword is could. They also might decide to stay firm. That would be good news for the Axis.

Incidentally, the same argument applies for OTL - the Soviets could have withdrawn. But didn't.
Either is bad for the Axis! OTL the Axis achieved near complete strategic surprise and shattered the Soviet Army - a more prepared USSR can only provide benefits, probably massive ones.
This is basic stuff. If you hit the enemy by surprise you do better.

Do you have an archival source stating that the Red Army was planning to withdraw if they felt an Axis invasion was imminent?
It's only been Russian strategic doctrine since, what, the 1700s? It shouldn't need a specific archival source.

I make a quick, dirty and simple assumption that if we were to rate the Axis and Soviet military decisions in the first year on a scale from 1-10, we might end up with a 7-3 score (or something like that - it doesn't really matter). What matters is that I'm assuming a score of 8-2 instead in a "better military decisions"-scenario. That is, a scenario were things go better for the Axis.
Oh, I see. You felt that Op. Barbarossa could have rather easily gone better.

It couldn't, it really couldn't. It basically destroyed everything in the USSR up to the limit of the logistics and getting it to go better is very hard indeed.
 
Self evidently you did not make the assessment that the more wary USSR exactly cancelled out the more troops and better decisions - you gave the Axis fewer casualties in 1941 and the USSR the same. That's the more wary USSR being less effectual than the other side of things - it's not cancelling out.

I did gave the Axis fewer casualties in the first year of the campaign due to the "better military decisions"-scenario.
But I didn't change the number of Soviet casualties as far as I can recall.
Maybe you can help me remember?

My first post about the subject:
For the sake of argument: say you increase the strength of AG Center in July by 50% (from 800k to 1.2M) and double the number of tanks and aircrafts in that sector.
Would the Red Army still be able to hold the line, or would they be pushed backwards in the central sector?

Which part of my original post changes the Soviet casualties?

My second post about the subject:
That is, if say AG Center had been significantly reinforced, and launched a strategic offensive in the central sector just as Fall Blau commenced further south, the Soviets would be in trouble.

Which part of my second post changes the Soviet casualties?

My fifth post about the subject:
Regardless, my main point here is the fact that the Soviets didn't have unlimited resources to counter the Axis summer campaign in '42.
And would be in trouble if the Axis were stronger for some reason (or they themselves were weaker) - regardless if that was due to better military decisions by the Axis in the first year in the east, or due to no war in the west, or both.

It seems as if I mention Soviet casualties in my fifth post on the subject.
Of course, what that post says is that the the Soviets would be in trouble if the force correlation was worse than OTL, regardless of how that happened. The regardless part should be a hint that this is a general statement, and not a specific statement linked to the ATL we have been discussing over the last few posts.

In my sixth post on the subject, I write:
I made a quick and dirty assessment that a more wary Soviet Union coupled with more Axis troops making better military decisions cancel each other out.
Meaning the strength of the Red Army by mid summer '42 remains the same.

Which part of this post changes the Soviet casualties?



As for preparing for a multi year campaign - how do you do that? The German strateic assessment for a short campaign was based on how they could not win a long one, not the other way around.

One thing would be to cancel the order shifting production-priority from the army to the other branches in the second half of '41.

Anyway, generally, the German made two strategic decisions.
(1) they couldn't win a long war against the Soviet Union
(2) they could win a short war against the Soviet Union

Clearly, a lot of people (I'm assuming you are one of them?) believe the Germans were wrong on point (2). One way the Germans might opt for a long war-preparation would be if they realised what you already believe: that point (2) probably wouldn't happen, and so their best chance would be point (1).

Furthermore, part of the reason as to why they didn't believe they could win a long war was the Wallies.
If they are out of the war, the German strategic assessment might change.

Either is bad for the Axis! OTL the Axis achieved near complete strategic surprise and shattered the Soviet Army - a more prepared USSR can only provide benefits, probably massive ones.

Elsewhere, you are arguing that the Red Army should retreat into the depth of the country. Probably in the belief that that would cause severe logistical problems for the Axis before the main battle occurred.

And this makes some sense - after all, most of the fighting after the first month of war happened about 600 km into the depth of the country.

A more prepared USSR might halt the Axis earlier. Maybe after a say 3-400km advance? That would greatly ease the logistical problems for the Axis from mid-July onwards.

And so, one has to weigh the benefit of a more prepared Red Army in the initial period of war against the logistical benefit of the Axis after the initial period of war.

I'm not certain every single such scenario would benefit the USSR (as you believe).
It all depends on the specifics of how much better prepared the Soviets would be.

But sure, I'll modify my statement to say that if the Red Army stays at the front, it might benefit both sides depending on the situation.

It's only been Russian strategic doctrine since, what, the 1700s? It shouldn't need a specific archival source.

Given that the Soviets didn't follow their strategic doctrine (in place since the 1700s?) in OTL, it would be beneficial if you can point to any evidence as to why they would, with absolute certainty?, follow it in an ATL where the prospect of an Axis invasion is greater.

Oh, I see. You felt that Op. Barbarossa could have rather easily gone better.

It couldn't, it really couldn't. It basically destroyed everything in the USSR up to the limit of the logistics and getting it to go better is very hard indeed.

Yes, I do believe their was room for improvement on the Axis side during the first year of the invasion, and room for additional failures on the Soviet side.

Of course, there was also room for the opposite.

Evidently, I don't hold the German High Command in the same high regard as you.
 
Last edited:

Saphroneth

Banned
I did gave the Axis fewer casualties in the first year of the campaign.
But I didn't change the number of Soviet casualties as far as I can recall.
Maybe you can help me remember?
I mean you have the Axis taking fewer casualties and the Soviet casualties unchanged. That is, you have the Axis doing better relative to the Soviets despite better Soviet preparedness - so the effect of Soviet preparedness (EP) is less than the effect of better Axis decisions (EBA).

EP = EBA is the two cancelling out.
EP < EBA is what you have.


Anyway, generally, the German made two strategic decisions.
(1) they couldn't win a long war against the Soviet Union
(2) they could win a short war against the Soviet Union

Clearly, a lot of people (I'm assuming you are one of them?) believe the Germans were wrong on point (2). One way the Germans might opt for a long war-preparation would be if they realised what you already believe: that point (2) probably wouldn't happen, and so their best chance would be point (1).
If they believed that they couldn't win a short war, they wouldn't have launched the war in the first place.


A more prepared USSR might halt the Axis earlier. Maybe after a say 3-400km advance? That would greatly ease the logistical problems for the Axis from mid-July onwards.

And so, one has to weigh the benefit of a more prepared Red Army in the initial period of war against the logistical benefit of the Axis after the initial period of war.
The result? The Soviets rebuilding their army in autumn can do so with cadre, rather than throwing together crap units with little refresher training and throwing them into the line. It makes the Soviets perform better across the board for them to have fewer casualties.

Given that the Soviets didn't follow their strategic doctrine (in place since the 1700s?) in OTL, it would be beneficial if you can point to any evidence as to why they would, with absolute certainty?, follow it in an ATL where the prospect of an Axis invasion is greater.
They didn't follow it because the army on the frontiers was essentially annihalated in the opening battles, largely because it was caught by surprise.


Yes, I do believe their was room for improvement on the Axis side during the first year of the invasion, and room for additional failures on the Soviet side.
Then name some examples of improvements the Axis could make which are logistically feasible. Remember that the Germans inflicted more casualties on the Soviets in the course of Barbarossa than they thought there were Soviet troops in the entire country, and they considered themselves to have greatly exceeded expectations.
The problem was that there were still Soviet troops.

Evidently, I don't hold the German High Command in the same high regard as you.
Really? OTL Barbarossa was an incredible achievement, aided by total strategic surprise, and as I've said even with hindsight it's hard to find feasible ways to have them do much better.
 
In the campaigns against Poland and Low Countries/France the opponents pretty much did what the German General Staff wanted them too. Not so much in Norway, but internal allies made up the fact that the RN did much better than the Germans planned for. Because of these military successes, as well as the prewar political successes, Hitler was able to have a victorious "glow" so that rational professionals on the General Staff, and there were some, had no way to make traction against the Barbarossa assumptions. Hitler expected the Russians, once they had suffered major defeats, to lose will and fold like France did (one kick and the rotten structure will collapse). Nazi actions in the summer/fall 1941 had not yet turned the local population against them like they would in the near future, so it was not the alienation of the local population that was a major factor in the failure. Basing your plans on the enemy doing exactly what you expect them to do is always a bad idea (didn't work well for Japan either vs the USA).

Had the Germans planned on a prolonged campaign, one thing they could have done but did not do was send the Luftwaffe to hit the factories that Stalin was moving east of the Urals. Of course they could not stop the relocation, but every bit of equipment that is destroyed that OTL moved east is a gain for the Germans. Every delay that the bombing causes has a dual effect - it delays the resumption of production, and some of the equipment will end up being overrun by ground forces. They might have decided target one was Leningrad to get a sea supply route, and target 2 was Moscow to disrupt Russian rail traffic. Cutting off access by the Russians to the Baku oil fields would do by denying fuel to the Russians. As has been discussed here, the Germans getting much from these oilfields after taking them from the Russians in a trashed condition won't happen - they will need a lot of effort and time to repair them.

While having at least an armistice with the UK would be great, merely NOT being at war with the USA for as long as possible is absolutely necessary for Germany to succeed in Russia. A neutral USA or one at war with Japan only won't be sending much (if any) LL to Russia.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Had the Germans planned on a prolonged campaign, one thing they could have done but did not do was send the Luftwaffe to hit the factories that Stalin was moving east of the Urals. Of course they could not stop the relocation, but every bit of equipment that is destroyed that OTL moved east is a gain for the Germans. Every delay that the bombing causes has a dual effect - it delays the resumption of production, and some of the equipment will end up being overrun by ground forces.
Um... problems. Firstly, how far ahead of the front line are the Germans bombing; second, how do they conduct their OTL campaigns with much of the Luftwaffe doing strategic bombing? The way the Panzer spearheads operated in Russia was incredibly reliant on airpower as it was often the only thing covering the many kilometres between parallel columns.
 
You'll still have Ju-87s strictly doing tactical missions. Aircraft like the He-111 and Do-17 can be used in both roles. The range of the He-111 was about 1500 miles, so lets say they can be hitting factories and marshaling yards 500 miles in advance of the front lines fairly easily. Combat range of the Do-17 was around 500 miles, so they will bomb closer in. The range of the Me-110 was around 525 miles, so if used for train busting...

Especially if the Luftwaffe is not involved in an air campaign against the UK, and has reduced air defense missions in the west there should be plenty of aircraft to do this.
 
I mean you have the Axis taking fewer casualties and the Soviet casualties unchanged.

Ah, I see now. The disadvantage of writing too quickly making quick and dirty assessments..
I didn't properly articulate my belief in this statement. Or rather, the second line indicates what I meant at the time.

"I made a quick and dirty assessment that a more wary Soviet Union coupled with more Axis troops making better military decisions cancel each other out.
Meaning the strength of the Red Army by mid summer '42 remains the same."

If they believed that they couldn't win a short war, they wouldn't have launched the war in the first place.

And they probably would be better off if that was the case.

Anyway, in answer to your question; they would prepare for a multi-year war if the disadvantages of doing so are small enough that it would appear as a better alternative than gambling on a short war.

No active Wallies-participation reduces the disadvantages of a long war.
A better risk assessment of the situation would increase the risk of failure in a short war.

The result? The Soviets rebuilding their army in autumn can do so with cadre, rather than throwing together crap units with little refresher training and throwing them into the line. It makes the Soviets perform better across the board for them to have fewer casualties.

How many fewer casualties do you believe they would sustain in the initial period of war (maybe we can use Krivosheev's definition as up to July 10 (July 7 for the southern sector) for that?) with various levels of improved alertness?

They didn't follow it because the army on the frontiers was essentially annihalated in the opening battles, largely because it was caught by surprise.

In the case of AG North and Center, the numerical superiority of the Germans also played a part in their initial success.

I was under the impression that the Soviet defensive plan was for the frontier troops to stall the enemy, while the reserve echelons would launch counterattacks from the depth to drive them back.
Are you saying that the OTL Soviet frontier troops was planning on falling back as well? If so, how far?

Then name some examples of improvements the Axis could make which are logistically feasible.

The Smolensk battle could probably be handled better. Going for too many targets at the same time left them short of some of them.
Dropping AG North's attempt to encircle the NW Front in mid-October, and instead focus on sealing of Leningrad would be another.
Giving inadequate support to the Romanians at Odessa might be yet another.
Going for Moscow in mid-November another.

Remember that the Germans inflicted more casualties on the Soviets in the course of Barbarossa than they thought there were Soviet troops in the entire country, and they considered themselves to have greatly exceeded expectations.
The problem was that there were still Soviet troops.

Yes, that was a case of poor intelligence evaluation on the German side.

Really? OTL Barbarossa was an incredible achievement, aided by total strategic surprise, and as I've said even with hindsight it's hard to find feasible ways to have them do much better.

Do remember that we're not only talking about Op Barbarossa (which we might consider ending at the start of December) but also the 7 months afterwards.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
How many fewer casualties do you believe they would sustain in the initial period of war (maybe we can use Krivosheev's definition as up to July 10 (July 7 for the southern sector) for that?) with various levels of improved alertness?

Fewer casualties than OTL, because, you know, they'd actually retain cohesion as an army rather than shattering. Armies are not better off shattered, this seems self-evident.

The Smolensk battle could probably be handled better. Going for too many targets at the same time left them short of some of them.
Hmm... I'm not convinced, especially since Smolensk was pretty close largely due to Soviet resistance!

Dropping AG North's attempt to encircle the NW Front in mid-October, and instead focus on sealing of Leningrad would be another.
Hmm...
Both of these are basically asking that the Germans only make successful operations, and of course we don't know if they'd manage to successfully seal off Leningrad - especially since it would mean cutting the Soviets off from Lake Lagoda completely.

Giving inadequate support to the Romanians at Odessa might be yet another.
The Germans can't be strong everywhere, there have to be some tradeoffs.

Going for Moscow in mid-November another.

Okay, no, that one's just silly. They were.
 
A short recap of how we got this far in thread:
I made an argument that the Red Army would struggle if faced with a stronger Axis force in the summer of '42 - without delving into the details about how they would achieve that.
Upon questioning, we're discussing the start of Barbarossa without a western involvement.

Now, that might be an interesting discussion, but it is wrought with a large amount of uncertainty since it represents such a departure from the OTL.

What precisely would Stalin do in such a scenario with the Axis massing on his border?

The destruction of a substantial part of the Soviet airforce on the ground might be prevented. But then again, the Luftwaffe might be stronger without the BoB.

A larger portion of the Red Army frontier force might survive the opening stage, but the effect of that might be reduced if a larger portion of the Axis force are active on the frontline (shooting at the Soviets) in the opening stage if they don't have to march 600km to get to it.

The Red Army might inflict more casualties on the Axis in the opening stage, but that might be countered by a greater Axis replacement pool, if they have prepared for a longer war (without wallies involvement).

The Red Army might inflict more equipment losses on the Axis in the opening stage, but that might be countered by a greater Axis logistical capacity to bring forward equipment (if the frontline is closer).

The Red Army's third echelon of troops might be of a higher quality if they aren't rushed to the front. But how does one compare that to a potentially better supplied Axis force if the frontline is closer to their supply base?

The Red Army might retain a bigger portion of their defence industry, but that might be countered by no LL or a bigger German industrial focus on army equipment.

The involvement of other nations, both current Axis members like Japan and Italy, and other nations bordering the battlefield (like Turkey) might change for the better or worse for the Axis.
And we don't really know what role the wallies would play in all this. Nor the role of potential trading partners of both sides.

etc etc

The level of uncertainty would go up the further into the campaign one goes. And a year later, the deviation might have become massive.

Which is probably why I prefer to focus on slightly smaller scenarios were the baseline is settled and one only looks a few months into the future. Like I tried to do originally - but obviously failed to :)

Fewer casualties than OTL, because, you know, they'd actually retain cohesion as an army rather than shattering.

But are we talking 100k fewer casualties in the period specified? Or 500k? Or something else?

Hmm... I'm not convinced, especially since Smolensk was pretty close largely due to Soviet resistance!

Going for Nevel, Smolensk, Elnia and Mogilev at the same time was a town to far.
And both Nevel and Elnia were controversial decisions at the time.

Both of these are basically asking that the Germans only make successful operations, and of course we don't know if they'd manage to successfully seal off Leningrad - especially since it would mean cutting the Soviets off from Lake Lagoda completely.

When asking for examples were the Germans might have made improvements, you shouldn't be too surprised if those examples are of the Germans conducting more successful operations.

Both are cases of the Germans overreaching and going for too many targets at once.

The Germans can't be strong everywhere, there have to be some tradeoffs.

Sure enough. And capturing Odessa earlier would probably be good tradeoff compared to a lot of other things as long as their involvement isn't to large.

Okay, no, that one's just silly. They were.

I'm guessing something is missing from this statement.
However, they were unaware of the strength of the Red Army when they decided to make one last lunge at the capital.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
I'm guessing something is missing from this statement.
Well, I said:

Then name some examples of improvements the Axis could make which are logistically feasible
And one of your examples was:

Going for Moscow in mid-November another.
Which is not "an improvement" - it's what they were already doing, they launched the Klin offensive exactly on the 15th of November.



Now, that might be an interesting discussion, but it is wrought with a large amount of uncertainty since it represents such a departure from the OTL.
Honestly I think the biggest question is - what is the "West" doing at all? France is presumably not occupied, and Britain is certainly not, so are there troops in place in case those powers decide to re-enter the war?

Continuing to fight the West is a long term problem but is a short term advantage for the Germans, as it means any intervention by the British would hsve to make an opposed landing and French intervention is impossible. Making peace may earn a dividend of troops, but it also means there's the risk of about a hundred divisions of infantry stabbing Germany in the kidney when they start to stall.

Conversely, if there's been no war with Britain and France then Barbarossa is functionally impossible.
 
Well, I said:
Which is not "an improvement" - it's what they were already doing, they launched the Klin offensive exactly on the 15th of November.

My statement was meant to read:
"Going for Moscow in mid-November another [example of a decision that could be improved]"

That is to say; I believe it was a mistake to launch the mid-November attack. And had they been aware of the true strength of the Red Army, they probably wouldn't.

Honestly I think the biggest question is - what is the "West" doing at all? France is presumably not occupied, and Britain is certainly not, so are there troops in place in case those powers decide to re-enter the war?

In an ATL which involves no war in the west, you can have a host of different involvements and levels of hostility from France, Britain and the rest. Depending on how the war ended.

So yes, that uncertainty is probably one of the bigger ones, and can have a great deal of effect on the conduct of a war in the east.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
In an ATL which involves no war in the west, you can have a host of different involvements and levels of hostility from France, Britain and the rest. Depending on how the war ended.

So yes, that uncertainty is probably one of the bigger ones, and can have a great deal of effect on the conduct of a war in the east.
Sure, but what I can't possibly credit is the idea that Germany can avoid having any troops in the west at all. Either they're needed to hold down an occupied country and defend against a landing, or they're needed to ward off a very much unoccupied - and possibly rather annoyed - France.

Look at the force strength that was left in France during 1941 itself - on the order of 100,000 for the whole country. If France is under occupation, then you can't use them in the USSR... but if France isn't under occupation you're going to need one whole hell of a lot more troops than that to Watch On The Rhine.
 
Look at the force strength that was left in France during 1941 itself

Ok. I'll take a look.

At the start of invasion, I have:
1st Army: 106,423 men
7th Army: 141,318 men
15th Army: 205,779 men

on the order of 100,000 for the whole country.

Adding up the numbers above I get a sum larger than 100,000.


Anyhow, what I did in one of my first posts on the topic was to suggest that they might transfer 200k from France, Norway, Africa and the Balkans by the summer of '42.
The troops fighting an active campaign at the time; namely the troops in North Africa would be prime candidates for such a move.
The remainder might be found among the (I quickly counted) 45 divisions and assorted other units not stationed in the east.

Whether they will make such a drawdown of forces in the west depends on the whether they believe, before the summer campaign of 42, that the the risk that the wallies will re-enter the war and launch an immediate attack is greater than the OTL risk of an attack (which was deemed very likely).
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Whether they will make such a drawdown of forces in the west depends on the whether they believe, before the summer campaign of 42, that the the risk that the wallies will re-enter the war and launch an immediate attack is greater than the OTL risk of an attack (which was deemed very likely).
There is a difference between the risk of an amphibious operation constrained by a single port (and by the way a lot of British troops were in the Desert) and the risk of the French ordering mobilization and suddenly having two million men on the border.
 
Look at the force strength that was left in France during 1941 itself - on the order of 100,000 for the whole country. If France is under occupation, then you can't use them in the USSR... but if France isn't under occupation you're going to need one whole hell of a lot more troops than that to Watch On The Rhine

If France isn't under occupation it's because the French government e.g. Laval/Petain is pro-German. With 'peace in the west' 'occupation' would be a much looser concept, they would not be guarding the channel, it would be more of a case of R & R. The French would be trying - to get their POWs back, to stop Germany looting the country - to do that they have to offer something - show that integration would be better. The SS are allowed to recruit not just from Norway, Denmark and the Low Countries but also from France. France offers more - some French Air Force personnel volunteered for the SS (pushing plausibility here I know) - to keep some control, they offer French squadrons of MB-157s!
 
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