Was the German Schlieffen Plan actually a good plan?

BlondieBC

Banned
I dont agree with you in regards of the USW howeve thats really beside the point in this thread. German submarines were going to sink american mercant ships and ships with american passengers and this would piss off the USA and turn popular opinion there against Germany - which was the point I was making.

Don't agree on basic facts does not cut it. What you is saying is like "I don't agree the USA flattened Japanese cities in WW2". As soon as one ignores clearly established historical facts, one is not debating OTL but some ATL.

I have repeatedly posting sources and explanation of how German sank ships both with and without warning. The source is a book that compiles the date from the Official Royal Navy archives. I have personally read the NY Times articles for this matter. All of them. I have looked at the ship sunk on a month to month basis, and at times, a week to week basis. USA outrage was only inflamed when it made a good story. These good stories basically involved either a loss of American civilian life in numbers and/or the Germans on one of their PR campaigns to scare people. And the big one is the Lusitania where the Germans were printing ads warning of the attack just in case the American press did not cover the issue enough in the news section. Germany was quite simply trying to get these stories in the news, and for logic that is understandable but ultimately tragic for German imperial designs.

Germans sank US merchant ships and the US did nothing. Germany sank ships within sight of the USA shore and Americans watching from shore. The USA did nothing. The USA only reacted to a few major events. Now to be clear, I am not saying there were no diplomatic notes. No articles in the paper, but on these type of issues the USA did no more or less than it did when i periodically protest the British preventing unlimited USA shipping to Amsterdam.
 
Don't agree on basic facts does not cut it. What you is saying is like "I don't agree the USA flattened Japanese cities in WW2". As soon as one ignores clearly established historical facts, one is not debating OTL but some ATL.

I have repeatedly posting sources and explanation of how German sank ships both with and without warning. The source is a book that compiles the date from the Official Royal Navy archives. I have personally read the NY Times articles for this matter. All of them. I have looked at the ship sunk on a month to month basis, and at times, a week to week basis. USA outrage was only inflamed when it made a good story. These good stories basically involved either a loss of American civilian life in numbers and/or the Germans on one of their PR campaigns to scare people. And the big one is the Lusitania where the Germans were printing ads warning of the attack just in case the American press did not cover the issue enough in the news section. Germany was quite simply trying to get these stories in the news, and for logic that is understandable but ultimately tragic for German imperial designs.

Germans sank US merchant ships and the US did nothing. Germany sank ships within sight of the USA shore and Americans watching from shore. The USA did nothing. The USA only reacted to a few major events. Now to be clear, I am not saying there were no diplomatic notes. No articles in the paper, but on these type of issues the USA did no more or less than it did when i periodically protest the British preventing unlimited USA shipping to Amsterdam.

No, its not. I simply dont care to debate facts that dont have any bearing on the actual question. You do acknowledge that american public was outraged at least in the cases of the loss of civilian life and when it made a good story. As british submarines were not sinking either american merchant or passenger ships this outrages could be only directed at Germany. This keeps happening and the public will turn decidedly against Germany.

In regards the nuances of this (like the german press champaigns) you provided interesting information and I thank you for that but that information didnt really change anything: my point still stands.

I dont think that Germany conducting unrestricted submarine warfare continually througout the war is a basic fact - though i willingly acknowledge that im not the most well informed on the question. My opinion is based on Arthur J. Marder The Royal Navy on the Fisher Era 1904-1919 which though is not focused on it but details the periods of German submarine warfare. Also on Alexander Watsons Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary at War, 1914-1918. The latter details german push for unrestricted submarine warfare on the later phase of the war after it was discontinued because of diplomatic pressure.
 
Germany could have afforded a 50% larger budget, so their is plenty of funds for more nitrates. Or probably even a better use of the funds, more ammunition.

Weather the German economy could easily handle a 50% increase to the military budget isen't the issue to getting the money. It's getting the Reichstag to pass a budget bill that gives it to you, and then you having little overt to show for it to jusify the additional spending to the voters.
 

BooNZ

Banned
I too would like to see evidence of serious discussion amongst key people about a war going for a couple of years.
Equally, I would be curious of any discussions between key people who expected their plans to result in a quick victory.

From my readings, the key military figures appeared to be working on the assumption the next war would continue until the enemy's will to fight was broken, so the war would be decided by whole societies. While not many military figures were expecting a short war, most would have underestimated the OTL resilience of modern societies.

I can give you examples of how long it took to realize it would be a long war. The UK largely did not start adjusting its finances for a long war until around February 1915.
Britain may not be the best example, since in late July 1914 during the absence of Germans in Belgium, Churchill was trying to sell the war to Lloyd George on the basis British contribution would be limited to naval matters. This was to limit the expected burden on British finances and the fact British boots on the continent was not acceptable to the British doves who represented the majority of the British Cabinet. In my opinion Britain's inadequate preparation for a continental war was more of an example of mission creep, than an expectation of a short war.

The second part is obvious to me. Say you are someone in power from Kaiser Willie to Prince Henry or just the admiral in charge of the North Sea. You correctly understand the general situation and there is enough evidence for you to be sure. Then you are stuck with the whole need to change the entire diplomatic structure and military structure. In Germany's case, a 50% larger army. And Germany needs a less aggressive foreign policy. So the human mind finds a way to rationalize.
Care to elaborate?

The SP was not a 'war' plan, it wasn't even a national campaign plan in that it didn't include the navy. It was an Army campaign plan which accurately reflected the direction of the government as well as any other country's campaign plan in 1914.
It is clear the SP was the Army's war plan, developed independently from both the Navy and the German civilian government - difficult to argue it reflected the direction of Government. From the information available, both incorrectly assumed British belligerence, but the unprovoked violation of neutral territory was scarcely representative of the German government in the previous decades.
Germany had a 500,000 ton stockpile of nitrates, which is as much as they could reasonably afford. The inability to realistically get much more nitrates than that in the face of a blockade (under the German assumptions of British intervention) is one of the main reasons why a long war was correctly viewed as impossible at the time.
Germany made no effort to strategically stockpile nitrates, the significant quantities of nitrates in Germany was by virtue of being one of the largest importers of nitrates for agricultural purposes. Further, I have never found any reference to nitrates being identified as a limiting factor to war before July 1914, despite nitrates being an recurring theme on the boards. Your conclusion is logical, but not supported by any evidence that I am aware of.
Germany could have afforded a 50% larger budget, so their is plenty of funds for more nitrates. Or probably even a better use of the funds, more ammunition.
There appears to have been a disconnect between the German military and civilian administration that controlled the purse strings. I would suggest after the Naval race was abandoned, the German army's use of funds appeared rather prudent.
 

BooNZ

Banned
I would love to see these quote in source before July 31, 1914, not post war CYA. I have looked extensively at pre-WW1 preparations and I see no indication anyone in power took a long war as a serious possibility.
Secondly, idle musings aren't serious discussions. A conference where appropriate people discuss the matter and develop some scenarios and ideas for dealing with them is a serious discussion. For example, did the Germans have a plan to raise dozens more divisions?

I too would like to see evidence of serious discussion amongst key people about a war going for a couple of years.
"...between 1906 and 1914, Moltke, the General Staff, the War Ministry, and numerous other government agencies (not to mention Marshal Joseph Joffre, then chief of the French General Staff) openly and repeatedly stated that the next general conflict would be a long one. Therefore, the argument that German military thinkers were laboring under the illusion that the next war would be a short one is untenable..." After Clausewitz, Antulio J. Echevarria II

"In the case of a serious defeat, the 3rd Department was of the opinion that the French did not have the manpower to raise new armies on the scale of 1870/71. On the other hand, the initial German victories would not be in the order of Metz and Sedan in 1870. Even if the Germans won significant victories at the beginning of the next war, strong elements of the 2 million man French field army would be able to withdraw to the middle Loire and subsequent German operations would not be easy. Significant forces would have to be detailed to watch the French border fortifications. The German advance on middle Loire would be flanked by Paris and Lyon. Fortress Paris was enormous and would be difficult to deal with." Zuber pg 130

"...If the Germans allowed the French to fall back in the direction of the Marne and Seine, Schlieffen concluded that the war "will be endless." Antulio J Echevarria II, After Clausewitz - German military thinkers before the great war, pg 197

"...Moltke believed that the next war in Europe would be a "national war" (Volkskrieg). Although the term Volkskrieg was generally used to refer to a people's (or guerrilla) war, the context of Moltke's letters indicates that he meant a more extensive national conflict in which a people's war was merely a component. This national war would not be a short war fought merely with conventional armies and decided in one or two major battles, but a "long and protracted struggle" against an entire "nation in arms." Victory would require breaking the whole might of the French nation (Volkskraft), which would necessitate mobilising all political, economic, military and psychological power the Reich could muster. And even if the Germans triumphed in such a war, Moltke believed that the struggle would probably leave them totally exhausted..." Antulio J Echevarria II, pg 203
 
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