Was the German reunification inevitable after November 9th, 1989?

I recently re-saw the news from November 9th, 1989 (the day the Berlin Wall fell), and I was wondering if the German reunification was inevitable past that point, or if there is any possibility by which the DDR could have lasted on?

I for one am inclined to think that there is no real possibility for the DDR to survive, but depending on the circumstances, the reunification might have been delayed.
 
Yes there is a way the hardliner take over in USSR and send warsaw pact troups to restore oder it end up in a bloodbath but the DDR is preseved.
 
Yes there is a way the hardliner take over in USSR and send warsaw pact troups to restore oder it end up in a bloodbath but the DDR is preseved.

Frankly, I don't know how likely that one is, given how the USSR basically had already given up power over the other Warsaw Pact countries by then and the precedent for end of communist rule had already happened in Poland and Hungary, earlier in 1989, and continued to occur during the following months. It also depends on when the coup happens, but I don't think that a coup by hardliners would have saved communist rule anywhere in the Eastern Bloc, save for for the Soviet Union itself - even that one is shaky in my opinion.
 
Yes there is a way the hardliner take over in USSR and send warsaw pact troups to restore oder it end up in a bloodbath but the DDR is preseved.

I believe that this statement exposes the author's gross misunderstanding of exactly what was going on in the Communist sphere at this time. Is it possible that there could have been a hardliner attempt to restore order and maintain control? Sure. Is it at all possible that it would have lasted? Absolutely not. The writing was on the wall and the only option other than giving up and allowing Communism to dissolve would have been bitter violence which would have ended with roughly the same result, anyway.
 
I believe that this statement exposes the author's gross misunderstanding of exactly what was going on in the Communist sphere at this time. Is it possible that there could have been a hardliner attempt to restore order and maintain control? Sure. Is it at all possible that it would have lasted? Absolutely not. The writing was on the wall and the only option other than giving up and allowing Communism to dissolve would have been bitter violence which would have ended with roughly the same result, anyway.

Well, the main problem I see is that I don't think that the Soviet Union - even if a hardliner coup would have occured at that point - would have utterly lacked the ability to bring the entire Warsaw Pact countries back into line. The only possibility would have been basically a massacre on most if not all other Warsaw Pact members which would have been impractical at best - an utter disaster at worst. Consider that the revolutions continued in the other Warsaw Pact countries, think of the events in Romania a month later, would... even could the Soviet Union have invaded Romania, too?

What I've been contemplating on is that the pace of German reunification could have undergone a lot slower if certain things had happened differently, and it could have happened quite a bit differently:

- There was initially the idea of a confederation of both German states, and a slow integration, the creation of a new constitution, the creation of a common overarching government body, and referenda in both states about an eventual unification. If this plan had been realized, it's entirely possible that if this plan had been carried out, the reunification would have only happened in the mid-to-late-1990s.

- Western Allies insisted on a continued NATO membership of Germany and an continued integration of Germany into the European community, whereas the Soviet Union would have prefered a neutral Germany. The DDR also envisioned West Germany to leave NATO first before any talks on reunification would begin.

- One main reason for the fast pace of the reunification was Kohl's initiative, since he - one by one - won the Allies for his cause of a swift reunification.

- Finally, there was Britain... well, specifically Thatcher, who was most adamantly anti-reunification (and who, unlike her western allies, also opposed a further integration of Germany into the West), and who basically isolated herself with her views as events proceeded.
 
Yes, I believe that no matter what will happened to Soviet Union, whether the hardliner coup will succeed or not, reunification was inevitable as long as Soviet Union continues to decline economically and politically. One way can can see to preserve GDR is to have Soviet Union reforms economically in 1960s and adopt capitalism while maintaining the communism in the government. That will strengthen the Warsaw Pact and possible to create an EU-type economic union.
 
Me and my classmates discussed on November 10 that we would see a unified Germany but no earlier than around 1995. What we didnt see however was the rapid collapse of the Soviet union
 
Yes, I believe that no matter what will happened to Soviet Union, whether the hardliner coup will succeed or not, reunification was inevitable as long as Soviet Union continues to decline economically and politically.

Well, the curious part is that a coup attempt actually occured in OTL (in August 1991), but not only it failed after a mere two days, but it also was too late to change anything - on the very contrary I believe that the coup basically just sped up the demise and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Had the coup occured earlier (say, in early 1990), things might have looked different. However, I don't really think that a coup then could have been successful, either.

One way can can see to preserve GDR is to have Soviet Union reforms economically in 1960s and adopt capitalism while maintaining the communism in the government. That will strengthen the Warsaw Pact and possible to create an EU-type economic union.

Well, I specifically asked about after the Berlin Wall fell because of that reason - it's relatively easily conceivable to have the GDR last with an earlier POD.

Me and my classmates discussed on November 10 that we would see a unified Germany but no earlier than around 1995. What we didnt see however was the rapid collapse of the Soviet union

I don't think the collapse of the Soviet Union was entirely foreseeable out of the perspective of November 1989, however, the trend of the following months (fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Baltic SSRs seeking to leave the Soviet Union, etc.) basically cleared the way.
 
Me and my classmates discussed on November 10 that we would see a unified Germany but no earlier than around 1995. What we didnt see however was the rapid collapse of the Soviet union

NO ONE expected East Germany to collapse until it did. The Left wing Politics professors at my university hadn't a clue about what was happening in front of them.
 
mattep74 said:
Me and my classmates discussed on November 10 that we would see a unified Germany but no earlier than around 1995.

My assumptions ranged between 10 and 25 years for a reasonable and economically feasible reunification but I hadn't factored in that Kohl wanted to win the next elections ;) (and Kohl in turn seemed to have put less importance about the economics :rolleyes:)

Although lucky you, mattep74, as my classmates were that much disinterested that there were no discussions at all in school :( (granted, we were aged 16 to 17 back then, but still to show not the slightest interest, meh...)
But the teachers were no better either, apart from one physics teacher (yep, not the ones teaching history and/or politics :p) there was absolutely nothing in school going on around those days.

As for the OPs question: some kind of delay surely, but complete prevention of the unification would have been, while not ASB per se, rather far fetched requiring some prerequisites to make it work.
 
My assumptions ranged between 10 and 25 years for a reasonable and economically feasible reunification but I hadn't factored in that Kohl wanted to win the next elections ;) (and Kohl in turn seemed to have put less importance about the economics :rolleyes:)

Nobody claimed that the OTL reunification was reasonable and economically feasible. :p

Although lucky you, mattep74, as my classmates were that much disinterested that there were no discussions at all in school :( (granted, we were aged 16 to 17 back then, but still to show not the slightest interest, meh...)
But the teachers were no better either, apart from one physics teacher (yep, not the ones teaching history and/or politics :p) there was absolutely nothing in school going on around those days.

I know that they regularly accused and accuse teenagers of Politikverdrossenheit, but teachers? Oh my... :eek:

As for the OPs question: some kind of delay surely, but complete prevention of the unification would have been, while not ASB per se, rather far fetched requiring some prerequisites to make it work.

It's actually very interesting to see how quickly the views changed there, primarily because the context that was given in November 1989 was no longer existent a few months later. For example:

- In late November, Kohl suggested a "10 point plan" that would aim towards a confederation of the two German states.

- By November the SED, although having given in with the border, was still in reasonably firm control in East Germany and still bragged about how they would not give in to any "demands" from the West.

- A few days after the Berlin Wall fell, the Soviet Union commented on events that they would welcome the opening of the border, but they claimed that the Germans should not expect a reunification. The "current post-WWII reality that includes two German states is irreversible". The problem was that the very same "post-WWII reality" was about to cease to exist just a few months later, thereby making the claim that the existence two German states would exist in solid seem obsolete. OTOH, what the Soviets were genuinely worried about (and, to a bigger degree, the Poles) was that the occupation treaties of 1945 were legal within the 1937 borders and that theoretically speaking at least there could be renewed claims of a revision of the border. Now, the DDR already had accepted the Oder-Neisse line by 1950, and West Germany signed a treaty with Poland in the 1970s, but said treaty had a loop hole in so far that it only stated that West Germany would accept the Oder-Neisse line, and that a future unified German state would still have a claim to the 1937 borders until a new border treaty between the unified German state and Poland was worked out. Therefore, the Soviets probably more feared the (legally even correct!) potential claim by a unified Germany on the areas east of the Oder-Neisse line. Now, Kohl was initially totally silent on the border issue (at least, in his "10 points confederation plan" forwarded on November 28th), which obviously invoked initial resistence against it by the Soviets. Even after he added to it that a united Germany would "of course" accept the Oder-Neisse line, the Soviets at first remained hesitant. However, I think the events that followed (especially the bloody revolution in Romania in december, and the demands for independence amongst the Baltic countries during the first half of 1990) made the Soviets rethink the position. Also, I suppose that the promise of good ol' financial support by West Germany for the Soviet Union was an incentive that made Gorbachov rethink his position.
 
To add a grain of salt into all that:

WI there would be a domestic political crisis in West Germany between 1987 and 1989 that led to premature Bundestag elections, leading to an SPD-lead government under Oskar Lafontaine at said 11/9/89? Lafontaine was fiercly reluctant to a quick reunification and demanded to exempt East Germans from the West German welfare state to keep it from breaking down.

I think this would be a reasonable enough POD to serve the purpose.
 
Well, even if the governments were for it, there would be the question of the people. East and West Germans do have somewhat different cultures, some of which even predated the division of Germany. Even today, there is "Ostalgie" and talk of "Die Wall im Mauer".
 
To add a grain of salt into all that:

WI there would be a domestic political crisis in West Germany between 1987 and 1989 that led to premature Bundestag elections, leading to an SPD-lead government under Oskar Lafontaine at said 11/9/89? Lafontaine was fiercly reluctant to a quick reunification and demanded to exempt East Germans from the West German welfare state to keep it from breaking down.

I think this would be a reasonable enough POD to serve the purpose.

Yes, exactly, if you want to delay unification--conceivably, defer it indefinitely--in the immediate context of 1991, you need to look at reasons why West Germans would delay it. OTL there was a lot of grumbling at the time and after amid all the euphoria.

The Soviets were withdrawing and collapsing, they can't restore their old regime if they try, and trying would be a sure way to kill it. The East German Communist establishment had no legs to stand on without the Russians. Later East Germans would realize the West-dominated Greater Germany was not the earthly paradise they dreamed of, certainly not for them, but at the time the thing was to get away from the DDR, by leaving it or definitively abolishing it.

If the East Germans had no where to go, I am sure they'd have repudiated their old regime anyway and would probably have lobbied the Western states shamelessly for some kind of acceptance into Western Europe on some basis--the Common Market; NATO--anything.

Also they'd want aid--loans if not grants. Can they get it from anyone but West Germany?

In those circumstances, could West German politics, parliamentary shifts or not, still keep from reabsorbing the East immediately?

If they could--then I can see the Easterners changing their minds about their rush to get absorbed and carrying on as a separate state, even if later West Germany changes its tune.

What if the GHW Bush administration sees propping up East Germany as an even surer bastion against future Russian ambitions than the West, and is forthcoming with aid and reform advice seriously meant to put the former DDR (what would it be called now? Simply Ostdeutchsland?) on its feet among Western nations? Would West Germans resent that or would they welcome being spared the headaches? And how big a bill for the US taxpayer are we talking about--bearing in mind the USA and whole capitalist world was spinning into yet another of our recessions that come every damn decade like clockwork?
 
Shevek23 said:
And how big a bill for the US taxpayer are we talking about--bearing in mind the USA and whole capitalist world was spinning into yet another of our recessions that come every damn decade like clockwork?

Oh, it will be quite substantial. We still have the Solidaritätszuschlag nipping small amounts off our paychecks.
And they'd have to keep the GDR's welfare level at least comparable to the FRG, or the population will get ideas about reunification.
Although they have the small advantage that propping up the GDR with Dollars has better chances of not botching things up like the Währungsunion did. While an exchange rate of 1:1 surely pleased the average citizen (and thus the voter :rolleyes:) is spelled certain doom for most of GDR's industries.

What if the GHW Bush administration sees propping up East Germany as an even surer bastion against future Russian ambitions than the West
And possibly alienating West Germany by doing so? And East Germany did have (and still does) a substantial communist voter base.
Would be a strange decision.
Then again, governments do occasionally make strange decisions ;)
 
Well, my suggestion is quite ASB. The most so, to my cynical mind, in that even if they sincerely wanted to, I doubt the American ruling establishment is capable of recognizing what a country really needs to get onto a sound economic hence social/political footing. Add to that that I think our leadership, especially the Bush crew, is quite piratical and self-serving, it would be hopeless even if the US taxpayer funded it all without a murmur of complaint.

The former DDR Communists remain even today, but I gather they have never come close to reclaiming the allegiance of anything close to a majority of their former citizens. Tolerating them--probably having to work with them, as they were the former officials who would need to transition over to the new regime--is another ASB thing for the Bushies at any rate, but if they could do it I think they'd still have a country bound and determined not to fall back under Russian hegemony, though they might conceivably insist on a lot more socialism, at any rate social democracy, than our US establishment would want to countenance.

As I asked before, the question is how would all this go down in West Germany? Would West Germans feel slighted and betrayed, or relieved not to have to take on the economic basket case of the former (ITTL, continuing) East?

My guess, under "the grass is always greener on the other side of the fence" paradigm, is that they'd be upset, underestimating the costs they know OTL, favoring union on patriotic grounds all the more if the desire remains frustrated....

If so, the whole scenario is ASB--reunification was inevitable if that's how West Germans were going to react. No American administration would want to actively anger West Germany; the way things went OTL is a "no-brainer" for us.

Exactly the sort of intellectual challenge the powers that were then were up to then.
 
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