Was the Gallipoli Campaign really that unwinnable?

Yes, if the UK maintains a substantial standing army, WW1 has the real potential to be a short war.
To expand upon my earlier reply, my British Army of WWI wank, with no financial controls is on the lines of the following:
  • Still have 20 infantry divisions in the UK in August 1914, but they would all be equipped with modern weapons and there would be a 100% material reserve to allow for rapid expansion to 40 divisions in an emergency. AFAIK Lord Haldane, who created the Territorial Army in 1908 from the Volunteers and Yeomanry wanted the TF to have 28 infantry divisions, but was thwarted by the Cabinet because the Liberal Government he was part of wanted to cut military expenditure, A) because they disliked high defence spending and B) they wanted to spend more on their welfare reforms like the Old Age Pension. IOTL he was only able to obtain enough money for 14 infantry divisions equipped with Boer War vintage weapons. In my "Army Wank" he fails to get the 28 divisions authorised, but he does succeed in getting the 14 divisions he was allowed equipped with modern weapons with a 100% material reserve.
  • IOTL the British military arms industry had the capacity to support 6 infantry divisions with modern equipment. ITTL the 100% material reserve meant it had to effectively support 40 so that it was 6-7 times the size of OTL in August 1914.
  • All the infantry battalions had 40 machine guns in August 1914 instead of 2, increasing the number of MGs per division in August 1914 from 24 to 480. IOTL the 2 guns were Vickers weapons. In the wank there were 12 Vickers MGs and 28 Lewis Guns per battalion.
  • There were only 8 heavy artillery pieces per regular army division consisting of 4 60-pdrs and 4 Boer War vintage howitzers as the 9.2-inch had only just been approved for service. ITTL there were 16 consisting of eight 60-pdr and eight 9.2-inch. These were organised into brigades manned by the Royal Garrison Artillery held at Corps level or under GHQ BEF. IRRC there were only 3 heavy batteries with 4 guns each in the whole TF. ITTL TF was provided with modern heavy artillery on the same scale as the Regular Army. All the Regular and TF heavy artillery was towed by Holt tractors instead of horses.
  • The Royal Field Artillery was equipped with a gun/howitzer that combined the performance of the OTL 18-pdr gun and 4.5-inch howitzer. This facilitated the organisation of the RFA into brigades of 24 guns instead of 18 guns. Thus an infantry division had 3 brigades = 12 batteries = 72 gun/howitzers or one brigade of 24 guns per infantry brigade and one battery of 6 guns per infantry battalion. IOTL they had 54 18-pdr in 3 brigades and 18 4.5-inch in one brigade.
  • The 42 RFA brigades of the Territorial Force had 24 of these gun howitzers each. IOTL there were 42 with 12 Boer War guns each and 14 with 12 Boer War vintage howitzers each, because IOTL their RFA batteries had 4 guns each, when regular batteries had 6 guns each.
  • IOTL the Regular and TF divisions had 2 field companies of Royal Engineers each, but ITTL they had 3 field companies and a field park company.
  • The Royal Flying Corps was 4 times the size of OTL. It was able to send 16 Aeroplane Squadrons to France with 192 aircraft with another 60 in its Aircraft Park. Left behind were 12 Reserve Aeroplane Squadrons and a quadrupled Central Flying School, which became the core of the training organisation. Furthermore there were 40 kite balloon sections (12 regular and 28 TF) in the UK, plus a mounted establishment for the cavalry and a handful of kite sections in Egypt and the colonies. The Indian Flying Corps provided the kite balloons for the 9 infantry divisions and 9 cavalry brigades in India.
 
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You pull out the better formations for training and build landing craft, the Germans are going to take the Channel ports.

Firstly this was what Hamilton wanted and OTL was refused for the reason you state. However the German army concentrated on the East in 1915 and was therefore largely on the defensive on the western front. Further would these plans to concentrate on the east (due to issues with the Austrian Army's performance against the Russians in 1914 and the eastern fronts still being open to manouver warfare unlike the trenches in the west) really be changed by the Germans if 4-6 quality Bristish divisions where replaced by 4-6 lower quality divisions? Remembering that throughout 1915 the bulk of the allied forces on the western front where French. As such even if a German major offensive against the British sector was launched it would be contested by the French as the campaign developed. I just can't see the Germans taking the channel ports in 1915 when they failed to so with much better tactics, artillery and a greater attacker to defender ratio in 1918!

Secondly one of the great lessons of Gallipoli was the need for specialist landing craft being able to transport soldiers and supplies under their own power. Indeed OTL some specialist craft where made ready for the secondary landings at Suva Bay so Fisher getting his way would and could have got more suitable ships for a delayed attack.
 
That is where the bulk of the defenses were stationed. It was where the attack was expected. So instead of landing from whaling boats with only a regiment or two in the area and time to organize, you are going to be landing under much heavier fire from multi-division size formations. Think Normandy. While it might work, you may also have a failed landing such as was at Kerch. Take OTL attack but add 3 times the opposing fire power. Also, it is much quicker to reinforce with the additional divisions held in reserve due to distance. And the tip can be supplied by boat from the Asian side, so you have not made a naval forcing of the straights easier.

I have recently read Eugene Roger's excellent book The fall of the Ottomans and I would recommend it to anyone interested in the war in the middle east. He states that although the bulk of the forts to defend the straights where at the toe of the peninsular the main concentration of defenders was based at Maidos s o forces could be reinforced along the coast between Krithia and Suva Bay due to the Ottoman/German belief that a landing would be aimed at reaching the narrows by the shortest route. The landings failed at Cape Helles due to the tenacity of the Ottoman defenders and the poor planning and training of the stacking forces.
 
You missed the point. The unit had the effective fighting power of about a Division due to lesser training, not used to climate, lower quality officers, etc.

I have heard about the issues experienced by the Indian Corps in the winter weather of 1914. However I have spent the last couple of hours looking for any mention of poor quality Indian troups in 1915. This included skimming through Lyn Macdonalds (still IMO the best account of the fighting in 1915) 1915 The death of innocence. She gives detailed accounts of the poor quality of Territorial and New Army units but praises the Indian army units in France. Indeed Field Marchel French had doubts about these British formations yet had none about the Indian forces. Throughout their time on the western front Indian forces manned the same distance of line as British troups in active sectors and where involved especially in the British planned battle of Neuve Chapelle. Surly if their quality and equipment was so poor they would have been relegated to secondary roles and sectors?
 
A point unadressed so far is the fact that the British (Entente) faced a severe lack in shells (and this from autumn 1914 on).

So EVEN if the MANPOWER is found to raise 4-16 (Make that 6+) divisions, they might be without enough ammo (for the guns) to fight as good as fully equipped (and supplied) units.

I won't go into the discussion of the quality of indian troops (you get good reads for yourself from various sources), but ...


the Indian Army was a purely VOLUNTEER army - the Brits did NEVER consider conscription for India - fearing that this might have negative effects later on (like indians demanding dominion status).

The usual annual volunteer number was around 15.000 - considering that during the war 800.000 volunteered for the amry (and 400k more for non combat duty) thats quite good.


BUT in late 14 and early 15 those volunteers have to be trained and equipped - and officers have to be found.

Given that I assume there were NOT many "free" divisions in india to be sent to Gallipoli - most "free" units were already used in other theaters (East Africa, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Western Front)

BTW the 850 Mutinners were actually only 400 or so as not the whole 5th Light Infantry muntineered - IIRC
 

hipper

Banned
I am saying that when the combat effectiveness of the Indian Corp is compared to the combat effectiveness of other corp on the Western Front, the Indian corp under performed. While a rough approximation, the Indian Corp probably had about the combat effectiveness of a division size unit. Additional Indian Troops available on May 1, 1915 are unlikely to better and likely to do worse. We can spill a lot of ink on the why, but it clear there is not 4-16 divisions of high quality sitting around India on January 1, 1915 that can be deployed to the Med Basin.

Or another way to put this, no major power was holding back large land units ready for combat in 1915. Each side went all out trying to win.


I disagree,
if you look at the battle of Nuevo chapelle in march in 1915 there was no discernible difference between the performance of the two corps involved one British and one Indian. I can't see how you come to that conclusion.
 
I assume what Blondies thoughts about the Indian army (in Europe) are is best summarized by this:

On the outbreak of war the Indian Army had 150,000 trained men and the Indian Government offered the services of two cavalry and two infantry divisions for service overseas.The force known as Indian Expeditionary Force A was under the command of General Sir James Willcocks. Force A was attached to the British Expeditionary Force and the four divisions were formed into two army corps: an infantry Indian Corps and the Indian Cavalry Corps.

Upon arrival in Marseilles on 30 September 1914, only six weeks after the declaration of war, they were moved to the Ypres Salient and took part in the Battle of La Bassée in October 1914. In March 1915, the 7th (Meerut) Division was chosen to lead the assault in the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. The Expeditionary Force was hampered by a lack of familiarity with new equipment, only being issued Lee–Enfield rifles on their arrival in France and they had almost no artillery, relying on support from their neighbouring corps when in the front line. They were not accustomed to the continental weather and were poorly equipped to resist the cold, leading to low morale which was further compounded by the reserve system, whereby reinforcements were drafted in from any regiment and had no affiliation to their new units. Officer casualties were even more of a handicap, as replacements were unfamiliar with the Indian Army and could not speak the language. With morale low, many soldiers fled the scene of the battle and the infantry divisions were finally withdrawn to Egypt in October 1915, when they were replaced by the new British divisions of Kitchener's Army.

With the withdrawal of the infantry divisions, the only Indian Army units on the Western Front were the two cavalry divisions. In November 1916, the two Indian cavalry divisions were renumbered from 1st and 2nd to the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions. Serving alongside British cavalry divisions they were held behind the front line awaiting the hoped for breakthrough. At times during the war they served in the trenches as infantry, each cavalry brigade when dismounted formed a dismounted regiment. This meant that when the divisions went into the front line, they could only cover a brigade area. Before being themselves withdrawn to Egypt in March 1918, they took part in the Battle of the Somme, the Battle of Bazentin, the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, the advance to the Hindenburg Line and finally the Battle of Cambrai.
 
Given that I assume there were NOT many "free" divisions in india to be sent to Gallipoli - most "free" units were already used in other theaters (East Africa, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Western Front)
My best guess is that there were 12 Indian divisions on 30th April 1915 as follows:
  • 2 (3rd and 7th) in the Indian Corps with the BEF on the Western Front;
  • 2 (10th and 11th) in Egypt;
  • 2 (6th and 7th) in Mesopotamia;
  • 6 (1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th. 8th and 9th) in India defending India from the Indians;
  • There was also the Burma Division in Burma, which as their names suggest were in Burma and Aden respectively.
9 Indian divisions (1st to 9th) existed on 4th August 1914. I don't know the formation dates for the 10th and 11th Indian Divisions, but they were part of the Garrison of Egypt by November 1914. The 12th Indian Division was formed in Mesopotamia in March 1915.

No new Indian divisions were formed until the first half of 1916. The 13th Indian Division was formed in Mesopotamia in March and followed by the 14th and 15th Divisions, which were formed in Mesopotamia in May 1915. The 16th Indian Division was formed in India in December 1916 and remained there for the duration of the war. The 17th and 18th Indian Divisions were formed in Mesopotamia in August 1917 and December 1917 respectively.

Bear in mind that about one third of the fighting troops in an Indian division were actually British. That is 4 of the 12 infantry battalions were British and all the artillery was British.
 
Before World War I, the Indian Army was deployed maintaining internal security and defending the North West Frontier against incursions from Afghanistan. These tasks did not end with the declaration of war. The divisions deployed along the frontier were the existing 1st (Peshawar) Division, the 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, the 4th (Quetta) Division. The only war-formed division to serve in India was the 16th Indian Division formed in 1916, it was also stationed on the North West Frontier. All these divisions were still in place and took part in the Third Afghan War at the end of World War I.

In supporting the war effort, India was left vulnerable to hostile action from Afghanistan. A Turco-German mission arrived in Kabul in October 1915, with obvious strategic purpose. Habibullah Khan abided by his treaty obligations and maintained Afghanistan's neutrality, in the face of internal opposition from factions keen to side with the Ottoman Sultan. Despite this, localised actions along the frontier still took place and included Operations in the Tochi (1914–15), Operations against the Mohmands, Bunerwals and Swatis (1915), Kalat Operations (1915–16), Mohmand Blockade (1916–17), Operations against the Mahsuds (1917) and Operations against the Marri and Khetran tribes (1918).

On the North East Frontier between India and Burma punitive actions were carried out against the Kachins tribes between December 1914 – February 1915, by the Burma Military Police supported by the 1/7th Gurkha Rifles and the 64th Pioneers. Between November 1917 – March 1919, operations were carried out against the Kuki tribes by auxiliary units of the Assam Rifles and the Burma Military Police.

The other divisions remaining in India at first on internal security and then as training divisions were the 5th (Mhow) Division, the 8th (Lucknow) Division and the 9th (Secunderabad) Division. Over the course of the war these divisions lost brigades to other formations on active service; The 5th (Mhow) Division lost the 5th (Mhow) Cavalry Brigade to the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division. The 8th (Lucknow) Division lost the 8th (Lucknow) Cavalry Brigade to the 1st Indian Cavalry Division and the 22nd (Lucknow) Brigade to the 11th Indian Division. The 9th (Secunderabad) Division lost the 9th (Secunderabad) Cavalry Brigade to the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division and the 27th (Bangalore) Brigade which was sent to British East Africa. The other pre war units the Burma Division, remained in Burma throughout the war on internal security duties, likewise the Aden brigade remained in Aden.
 
Given that I assume there were NOT many "free" divisions in india to be sent to Gallipoli - most "free" units were already used in other theaters (East Africa, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Western Front).

BTW the 850 Mutinners were actually only 400 or so as not the whole 5th Light Infantry muntineered - IIRC
Although I had written in Post 88 that there were 6 divisions in India defending India from the Indians the internal security situation in India was much better than expected. That allowed the garrison of British troops in India to be reduced by more than was expected and a greater number of Indian troops to be sent abroad than was expected also.

Therefore the only divisions that might be "free" in the first half of 1915 were the 3 Territorial Divisions (43rd, 44th and 45th) which were sent to India between October 1914 and January 1915 to relieve regular British troops which had been withdrawn to form the 27th-29th Infantry Divisions. As India was quieter than expected the British Government might take a calculated risk and send these 3 divisions to Gallipoli instead of India.

IOTL a fourth Territorial Division (the 42nd) was sent to Egypt in 1914 to relieve the regular garrison there and it was later one of the original 6 divisions in the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force that landed in Gallipoli. The 29th Division formed from regulars withdrawn from India was also part of the original MEF.
 
I had a thought that perhaps using some of these "new" units in other theatres like Iraq and the Egiptian frontier might force the Ottomans to divert some of their reserves thus making the Gallipoli camapaign easier on the troups involved. certainly if enough forces where deployed to Iraq then the forced retreat to Kut followed by the long and in the end futile siege could have been avoided. this in turn would have probably hastened the Arab revolt as OTL Sharif Husayn of Mecca was waiting for a British victory (or at least a favourable time) to start his rebellion. In OTL he had no,choice but to rebel in the end due to the Ottoman Authorities demanding his arrest.

In this scenario; the British are fighting at Gallipoli where there is no garentee of Ottoman victory and they are slowly advancing towards Baghdad (as where the Russians) and they have strong forces in Egipt being readied for an advance into Palestine. Then there would also be the considerable internal troubles of the Arabs in full revolt, the Christians becoming increasing untrusted and the Arminians already being subject to slaughter by the Ottoman government. In OTL the Ottomans where buoyed by the siege and latter victory over the British at Kut and then at Gallipoli. I think it's not unreasonable to assume that without these victories there is the possibility of peace feelers being sent out or of regime change as the war looks unwinable.

This has the advantage as it doesn't require the finding and transportation of more men to Gallipoli for the campaign to be judged a success. In fact the whole campaign could be fought as OT and be heralded as a decisive victorious campaign.
 
The "disaster" at Kut was probably the result of a too agressive advance with not enough ressources and supply. adding troops to the theater makes the situation actually worse for the British. The main challenge in this theater is not the enemy but the logistics war.
 
While these bureaucratic decisions happen with armies all the time, it was a screw-up to send a couple of divisions from India all the way to Flanders, which has a very un-India like climate, and where they had the wrong equipment, to fight the Germans when there were many locations closer to India where they could have been used. It also would have been easier to recall them to India from needed from these locations, and to reinforce them with Indian units, from India.

Use Indian units exclusively to fight the Turks, in a part of the world more similar to India than northwestern Europe, and you should be able to free up at least one regluar British division to use in Flanders. There may have been some symbolic reason to send the divisions to northwestern Europe, that seemed important at the time.

There was also an attempt to use Indian units to overrun German East Africa/ Taganikya, which resulted in a disaster.
 
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