Was the fall of France in 1940 preventable if there was a change in leadership?

[Matteo]

No.

The german diplomacy was crazy. Not its military strategy because Germany enjoyed absolutely decisive advantages :
- numerical superiority,
- operative speed and coordination between separate armed groups,
- concentration of force and ability to break through,
- third dimension with dive bombers.

As the book said, the french fought like lions. But they would have needed an incredible amount of luck not to be defeated.

The german staff just had not realized the advantages its strategy gave it and underestimated the operative capacity of the french army.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

it crushed the French army's reserves trying to move against the German army

Crushed is a bit of an exaggeration. As with artillery, the actual physical damage inflicted by tactical air strikes are really quite modest, the main effect is psychological. The vaunted German Stuka bombardment at Sedan actually did little physical damage, but it terrified the inexperienced French troops, distracted them from stopping the German river crossing, and then left their morale in a fragile state in the following battle, leading to a quick collapse. But had the Stuka attack not immediately been followed up by the ground assault, the French would have rallied their troops, patched up the damage to their equipment, and the bombardment would be remembered as largely ineffective. Similar story with Amiens. It was this kind of close co-ordination between air and ground that was required for CAS to really shine, and the French were still years away from that in 1940.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Crushed is a bit of an exaggeration. As with artillery, the actual physical damage inflicted by tactical air strikes are really quite modest, the main effect is psychological. The vaunted German Stuka bombardment at Sedan actually did little physical damage, but it terrified the inexperienced French troops, distracted them from stopping the German river crossing, and then left their morale in a fragile state in the following battle, leading to a quick collapse. But had the Stuka attack not immediately been followed up by the ground assault, the French would have rallied their troops, patched up the damage to their equipment, and the bombardment would be remembered as largely ineffective. Similar story with Amiens. It was this kind of close co-ordination between air and ground that was required for CAS to really shine, and the French were still years away from that in 1940.

Sure, but the way the attack was organized it was meant to be mostly psychological rather than physical because there was going to be a follow on assault right behind it. So they kept it up continuously with a handful of aircraft at a time for hours. Of course Sedan and the fight over the Weygand line were different things, as was the aerial attack on the French 9th army that I quoted above.

However you are sort of supporting my point here that the situation in 1940 was such that the LW was years ahead of the French and was thus able to dominate the situation even if French leadership was different. What was needed was different funding in the 1930s, but French politics and economics prevented funding for the military. It wasn't until after the Germans had gained a major lead in preparations that the French even started modernization, but they were still beset by political issues that hampered things. You'd need to have a different France for them to be ready to confront the LW. The moral of the story here is that the LW was the key element of German success and regardless of better French reactions to the Ardennes move the LW advantage was still going to carry the Heer forward, even if better Allies reaction prevents OTL total victory. It was virtually impossible for the Allies to win the 1940 campaign, even if you are able to cite tactical victories.

 

[cracou]

- numerical superiority,

not really

- operative speed and coordination between separate armed groups,
- concentration of force and ability to break through,
- third dimension with dive bombers.

You forget that the whole point is that a strong French line on the Meuse would negate most of the German advantage. People often forget that the crossing was really a close thing and that Rommel failed first. Just a single effective artillery battery and Germans are doomed there.

As long as French can hold the river, even 100.000 tanks are not going to go anywhere.

 

[Karelian]

Heer maybe, but remember how vital the LW was in 1940; it crushed the French army's reserves trying to move against the German army and eliminated the RAF, ALA, and Dutch and Belgian air forces.

And bled so badly in doing so that had they failed to deliver a quick knockout blow, German aircraft production and pilot training programs would have had a hard time to catch up. Peter Cornwell lists the total Luftwaffe casualties between 1st September 1939-24th of June 1940 to 1814 aircrafts of all types and 3278 air crews killed or missing. Meanwhile the Armée de l’Air and RAF were in the process of evacuating to Algeria and Britain, so they still had uncommitted forces to send in. They were worse than their German adversaries, but in the French side a lot of that had to do with bad leadership, which brings us to the OP.

So the success of 1940 wasn't simply German luck at the strategic level, it was the excellence of the Luftwaffe preventing the French and British from moving around reserves, breaking fortified positions, and breaking up concentrations of reserves massing for counter attacks. Really the Wehrmacht (all arms of the German military) was going to win a major victory, though perhaps not the entire war, in 1940 that would leave the Allied militaries shattered.

And yet Kesselring estimated that Luftwaffe had c. 30% of the effective pre-invasion fighting strength left by the time of the French armistice. The German success was a really close-run thing, even though it was executed with great skill and the operational methods utilized were in critical cases superior to the Entente countermeasures.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

What was needed was different funding in the 1930s, but French politics and economics prevented funding for the military. It wasn't until after the Germans had gained a major lead in preparations that the French even started modernization, but they were still beset by political issues that hampered things.

This is not entirely true. Blaming the politicians is a very simplistic explanation of France's problems in 1940. Politics towards the end of the Third Republic were deeply divided between right and left, and this certainly contributed to the division and malaise, but the military was also fully complicit in its own downfall. For one thing, politics in France in the 1930's did not stop at the politicians, and the military was itself deeply political. Certainly some decisions, such as the reduction of conscript terms, were out of the military's hands, yet there was much it had control over that it also screwed up all on its own. Chief among its mistakes being where it assigned what resources it was given.

It was the military after all which first proposed the Maginot Line, and spent a great deal of its political, financial, and intellectual capital ensuring it was built. Steven Eden in "Military Blunders II," estimates that had the French instead spent those resources on tanks or planes they could have bought an additional 24 tank divisions, or 10,000 fighter planes. Obviously the Maginot Line was built over the course of a decade, so that by no means would have allowed France to actually enter WWII with an additional 10,000 modern fighters - but had the French military been spending those resources developing its inter-war maneuver forces it would have had a much stronger foundation beneath it in 1940. The RAF is a good example of this. The poor state of the French air force in 1940 is directly related to a failure to properly prioritize resources for its development in the inter-war years.

 

[Strategos' Risk]

What if France had prepared to do a campaign of partisan fighting immediately as the German army rolled in?

 

[Bad@logic]

What if France had prepared to do a campaign of partisan fighting immediately as the German army rolled in?

Partisans, irregulars, guerrillas, tend to get overemphasized in modern opinion. It is partly because democracies are very bad at fighting them. But also because their success looks so impressive when they succeed - Vietnam, Afghanistan with the Soviets, Indochina, Algeria, all have entered popular opinion as decisive victories by irregular forces. However most of these had good reasons why the "partisan" side won. Vietnam was fighting against both irregulars, and a conventional army; the conventional army was the one that entered Saigon in 1975, not the Viet Cong. Afghanistan with the Soviets had massive supplies that could be tendered to the rebels from Pakistan and limited Soviet deployments. Indochina with the French was a weakened colonial power fighting against an enemy who ultimately managed to evolve upwards to a full fledged army - Bien Dien Phu wasn't French troop patrols getting ambushed in the jungle, it was French soldiers fighting a set-piece conventional battle against an enemy who had an artillery advantage. Algeria was actually militarily won by the French, but the political cost involved in that was too high and there was no wish by the local people to stay part of France by the end.

Unless if a partisan force is from a population that outnumbers what their opponent can politically tender to the region or their effective strength, then their impact will be limited. Germany had ~80m people, while France had 40m. Germany would have had the political will to deploy large numbers of troops to the region and crush resistance. Trying to fight that with partisan action will cause additional German casualties, but it won't be decisive - and it'll kill vastly more French and ruin France even more than otherwise happened. The other way partisans can make a difference is in support of the regular army - Russian partisans on the Eastern front, partisans in the Western European campaigns, the Peninsula war, all of these spring to mind. But the French after their defeats in the northern parts of their country do not have sufficient armies for their partisans to support, nor allies with such armies. Fighting as irregular troops against front line German spearheads is going to be a massacre, and ultimately German supply lines aren't vulnerable enough until France has already lost the battle.

French leadership won't advocate for a partisan campaign, because they'll be aware of this - that regardless of who wins, they'll be the number one loser at the end of hostilities. Active resistance was best to happen when it could make a difference on the battlefield, as it ultimately happened during the Liberation of France in 1944. In 1940 it will just get a lot of people killed for very little.

There also aren't any men to support a Partisan campaign, France had drafted into their army a massive percentage of the population. Of course men aren't the only one who can resist, but the social factors of that must be accounted for too.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...

It was the military after all which first proposed the Maginot Line, and spent a great deal of its political, financial, and intellectual capital ensuring it was built. Steven Eden in "Military Blunders II," estimates that had the French instead spent those resources on tanks or planes they could have bought an additional 24 tank divisions, or 10,000 fighter planes. ...

I wonder how he calculates this. Randal Reed in a magazine article from the late 1960s provides this:

Cost of Units Vs Cost of Maginot Line

Units..................Cost of Unit in............No. of Units Available
.........................F 1,000,000.............for expense of Maginot Line

..................................................per mile.............for whole

Motorize One
Division (cost of vehicles)

100% trucks.........78.75....................1.02.................86.74

80% trucks..........115.5.....................0.70.................60.9
20% tracked

Divisions

Infantry...............175.......................0.46................40.02

Armor.................280.......................0.29................25.23

Aircraft

Fighters................0.7....................115.1..............10,013.1

Bombers Med......2.187.....................36.8...............3,201.1

Bombers Hvy......3.937.....................20.5...............1,783.5

Reed goes on to point out French industry did not have the capacity to produce this many trucks, tanks, or aircraft; and it had limits on expansion. This was not simply factory floor space, machine tools, but clear limits on skilled labor. He goes on to refine his numbers to:

Motorized Infantry Divisions............+45...total 60

Armored Divisions.........................+10...total 17

Fighter Planes..........................+1,000...total 1,700 (modern types)

Bombers...................................+500...total 1,225 (modern types)

As part of his refinement he allows for cost of training, and support costs. that is the cost of adding a fighter pane is not just the cost of a air frame and a couple spare engines & other parts, but also the mechanics, riggers, fuel handlers, clerks, ect...

This cost of support crew then touches on limits of people. There only so many able bodied men, or women to allocate & France like most other nations could only increase one group by decreasing another. There was not a huge surplus labor force as there was in North America.

Anyway, that is Reeds estimate. One thing that some folks might catch is only sexy items like tanks or aircraft are calculated. Reed did not do estimates of items like extra corps artillery, AT guns, artillery ammunition.

 

[Strategos' Risk]

Germany had ~80m people, while France had 40m.

Not only is that a really extensive and well-written explanation, I had no idea of this simple numerical fact. Kudos.

 

[TRH]

Not only is that a really extensive and well-written explanation, I had no idea of this simple numerical fact. Kudos.

Actually, I think counting Czechoslovakia and Austria in it, the German population was closer to 100 million. Really, really bad odds. Puts all these expectations we've got of France vs. Germany into perspective.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I wonder how he calculates this. Randal Reed in a magazine article from the late 1960s provides this:

Interesting. Seems that the sketch numbers estimating pure cost do match up but the numbers once the practicalities are factored in are lower. That makes sense, but the difference is still quite significant.. I do obliquely acknowledge this would be the case in my post with this line:

so that by no means would have allowed France to actually enter WWII with an additional 10,000 modern fighters

So it does not really change my final conclusion that had the French military been spending the resources for the Maginot Line developing its inter-war maneuver forces instead it would have had a much stronger foundation beneath it by 1940. Given the relatively thin margins the Germans were operating under, it could easily be enough.

And really, Maginot Line or no, the main German thrust - as in WWI - was going to come through Belgium. The Germans were never going to throw their main thrust through the south due to the closed terrain, pre-existing fortress cities (like Metz), and most importantly because south of the Ardennes means they have to cover several hundred more km of ground to reach the Channel. The Maginot Line defended an axis that even before its construction in WWI, the Germans had shown a disinclination to use. The Line was also a cushy post, but also a technically demanding one, and all the best technical troops went there rather than the tank divisions. The French armoured divisions would later suffer badly for their lack of trained mechanics. The Maginot Line fortress also could not be deployed elsewhere, and so when war broke out France was left with 15% of her troops - and some of her best troops as that - twiddling their thumbs while the fate of France was decided elsewhere.

Another thing different French leadership could do is actually verify their assumptions. For all we talk about how the Sickel's Cut was a German gamble, the really big gamble was actually on the side of the French, who wrote off the Ardennes as "impassible" and then failed to verify. This is particularly shocking, since in 1938 General Pretelat,* then commanding the French Second Army, ran a staff exercise where he was hit by seven German divisions, including two tank brigades, emerging suddenly from the Ardennes to crash into his defensive line on the Meuse. This exercise exactly paralleled the actual German attack in 1940. The result was a disaster, and the French line was broken without hope of recovery. The French response was to cover the whole thing up so as not to "upset the troops." Studying the disaster in Versailles, Gamelin made no changes to his plan, merely the bland statement that adequate reinforcements would have to be sent in future. [Horne, "To Lose a Battle," p. 231] Yet Gamelin made no actual plans for HOW those "adequate reinforcements" would be alerted in time to respond, and then moved in time to act, and then positioned in the proper places to have effect.

*To add insult to injury, General Pretelat wasn't even in command of 2nd Army when the German offensive broke. He was promoted to the Second Army Group on the Maginot Line, where he effectively sat out the war. Pretelat was replaced by General Huntzinger, who apparently never studied his predecessor's exercise.

Needless to say, the Germans did not just make assumptions and fail to verify them. They had reconnaissance and used it to do what the French did not: verify their assumptions. They knew the Ardennes was crisscrossed with trails, and in the high plateau leading down from the German border was actually ideal tank country. They also performed extensive planning exercises and road moves to verify the concept, and prepare the troops for the actual move. They had performed extensive reconnaissance overflights through the area and knew that the natural choke points, such as the Semois gorge, were not defended. Difficult terrain with no defenses is just a matter of marching.

That the French had left themselves exposed was not a gamble on the part of the Germans either. They knew French dispositions, due to extensive reconnaissance, and could infer their opponent's assumptions. They also had an assessment of General Gamelin's skill, which was not complementary, and knew that the French army would be slow to react to the unexpected. In short, they knew that the ground in the Ardennes could be passed, and they also knew that the French hadn't planned for that eventuality, and lacked the ability to improvise a fast response to change that. The Germans also didn't just gamble that the French would misread them. They seriously hedged against the French identifying the Ardennes as their main effort by conducting an aggressive assault into the Low Countries; an assault that was in fact one big, bloody deception. Which worked.

Really, when we look at the Ardennes attack it was not actually a gamble. It was a risky decision, but that is not exactly the same thing.

 

[darthfanta]

Would the French at least be able to drag the war till more Commonwealth/Imperial forces come to offset the odds?Not to mention,France can always draw on more of it's colonial population(just that I honk it would be a mess after the war to have that many colonials to be trained soldiers).

 

[Bad@logic]

Actually, I think counting Czechoslovakia and Austria in it, the German population was closer to 100 million. Really, really bad odds. Puts all these expectations we've got of France vs. Germany into perspective.

I was using Populstat, the wikipedia article on the Census in Germany (which appears to have a 1939 census for the Germans with 79m people) and Tacitus which had it at 87m. It is important to note though that in effect it gets even worse for the French since their demographic growth was even poorer, and Great War casualties were even worse. France was the oldest society in the world in 1940 if I recall correctly, so as a percentage of its population it could raise fewer troops. A smaller percentage of raisable troops from a population under half as large is a pretty major handicap. They did have their colonial empire, but colonies are not nearly as good at raising large, effective armies as home regions.

That said that the 1940s campaign with the forces they had was theirs to lose, which they did, but the demographic and social composition of French society in the Interwar was a huge burden for the French. We all know that the French generals were often old dinosaurs, but in a lot of ways given how aged their society was that actually reflects their general situation.

 

[fhaessig]

That said that the 1940s campaign with the forces they had was theirs to lose, which they did, but the demographic and social composition of French society in the Interwar was a huge burden for the French. We all know that the French generals were often old dinosaurs, but in a lot of ways given how aged their society was that actually reflects their general situation.

IIRC, ' Les classes creuses', i.e. the years where the number of young men reaching military service was abyssimally low as an effect of WWI (for some reasons, most of the adult male population being on the front rather than at home tended to reduce the number of baby being born, even without taking the effects of WWI death/mutilation toll), were supposed to end in 1940.

 

[Bad@logic]

IIRC, ' Les classes creuses', i.e. the years where the number of young men reaching military service was abyssimally low as an effect of WWI (for some reasons, most of the adult male population being on the front rather than at home tended to reduce the number of baby being born, even without taking the effects of WWI death/mutilation toll), were supposed to end in 1940.

Yes, that was another concern, and a major reason behind the French pro-natalist consensus in the 1930s. If "Pronatalism in Interwar France" from Jstor is correct the French organization pressing for pro-natalism distributed a bunch of the following posters on said theme;

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

... The Line was also a cushy post, but also a technically demanding one, and all the best technical troops went there rather than the tank divisions. The French armoured divisions would later suffer badly for their lack of trained mechanics.

Hm.. the fortresses were not stood up until the Cezch Crisis in October 1938. Kemps 'The Maginot Line' describes the main portion of the project unready until then & some parts o the CORF project incomplete until the spring of 1939. IIRC the first large class of reservists trained for the new fortresses started in 1937 & the bulk of the training of new conscripts was in 1938. Tat would total three years draw on the intake out of approx fifteen years intake representing the bulk of the reservists. It is not as if units were striped of their assigned reservists to retrain for the fortification regiments.

The Maginot Line fortress also could not be deployed elsewhere, and so when war broke out France was left with 15% of her troops - and some of her best troops as that - twiddling their thumbs while the fate of France was decided elsewhere.

A quick check of the map shows approx 40% of the French field armies would be required to hold that length of ground. A 30% emergency allocation would still be over 20 infantry divisions & corps units. Since the German army did make widespread holding attacks on the fortress zone it is not as if the French could leave the area undefended. (The fortress garrisons were not exactly twiddling their thumbs.) 15% of the army sounds fairly efficient, plus the fortress regiments did not require motor transport on the same scale as the field armies.

Another thing different French leadership could do is actually verify their assumptions. For all we talk about how the Sickel's Cut was a German gamble, the really big gamble was actually on the side of the French, who wrote off the Ardennes as "impassible" and then failed to verify. This is particularly shocking, since in 1938 General Pretelat,* then commanding the French Second Army, ran a staff exercise where he was hit by seven German divisions, including two tank brigades, emerging suddenly from the Ardennes to crash into his defensive line on the Meuse. This exercise exactly paralleled the actual German attack in 1940. The result was a disaster, and the French line was broken without hope of recovery. The French response was to cover the whole thing up so as not to "upset the troops." Studying the disaster in Versailles, Gamelin made no changes to his plan, merely the bland statement that adequate reinforcements would have to be sent in future. [Horne, "To Lose a Battle," p. 231] Yet Gamelin made no actual plans for HOW those "adequate reinforcements" would be alerted in time to respond, and then moved in time to act, and then positioned in the proper places to have effect.

Take another look at Horne & count the size of the group sent into the Ardennes on 10 may. Five of the Mechanized cavalry divisions, reinforced with motorized units from the divisions and corps troops of the 2d, 3rd & 9th Armies. Since the French sent a mechanized/motorized force into the area it sort of contradicts the idea they thought it impassable to such a force. They were also aware the Belgian army had assigned a large portion of its motorized formations to the same area. They had sent two armies into the area in 1914 & that experience appears in the French army literature of the interwar years.

Between the four Belgian divisions assigned & the French mechanized force the Ardennes should have been well defended. Why these units failed is not because the region was misjudged but lays in other directions.

... Difficult terrain with no defenses is just a matter of marching.

There idea of the Ardennes as undefended has been a persistant cannard. The area was fought over & the Franco Belgian force lost badly due to timing, tactical decisions, & lack of coordination.

Really, when we look at the Ardennes attack it was not actually a gamble. It was a risky decision, but that is not exactly the same thing.

Kliests entire Panzer Group arrived at the Meuse River ahead of schedule which quite suprised him & the other leaders. The armored corps also arrived without infantry, heavy artillery, ammunition trains, reserve bridging equipment. They gambled that a half dozen mobile divisions could seize & exploit multiple bridgeheads from two enemy armies with three times as many divisions, five time the artillery strength, and mostly defending from prepared positions. The only support that could be counted on was a air force that did not want to fight the same battle & was balking at using the tactics Kleists corps commanders wanted.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Actually, I think counting Czechoslovakia and Austria in it, the German population was closer to 100 million. Really, really bad odds. Puts all these expectations we've got of France vs. Germany into perspective.

No, with those it was 80 million. 1937 Germany only had 66-68 million people.

 

[Matteo]

Germany before the anschluss had a population of 72/73 million people. It still enjoyed a very dynamic demographic. After the Anschluss It was close to 80 million.

France's population was only 40/41 million. And its demography made it the oldest Country in the world.

 

[darthfanta]

Germany before the anschluss had a population of 72/73 million people. It still enjoyed a very dynamic demographic. After the Anschluss It was close to 80 million.

France's population was only 40/41 million. And its demography made it the oldest Country in the world.

It can always levy it's colonials.There's also Commonwealth forces coming to the rescue.