Was the fall of France in 1940 preventable if there was a change in leadership?

[darthfanta]

I'm not talking a change in leadership after the Ardennes breakthrough(they tried it in real life),but one at the start of the war,with someone more competent
.I have come to notice that there are a lot of timelines that even if the Ardennes breakthrough was prevented,fall of France would still happen,only slower and bloodier for the Germans.

 

[eliphas8]

I've always been curious what a Leon Blum administration would do in 1940, seeing as he was both really committed to no appeasement, and was viscerally against soviet policy.

 

[Shaby]

What you need is for people to recognize that Verdun was a lesson for the last war and that the enemy will not repeat it play-by-play. Verdun veterans practically dominated the French military at strategic level. So unless you have people like De Gaulle in France and Fuller and Lidell Hart take a dominating influence, the French campaign will unfold in pretty much the same way as IOTL, with timing being different. The French army prior to Fall Gelb was a disaster waiting to happen.

 

[cracou]

The problem is not administration but some generals

Replace Gamelin and Hutzinger and you'll get a MUCH better result.

For example: a car accident kills Gamelin and he is replaced by Georges and Billote replaced Georges.

Georges was against the Dyle-Breda manoever and Billote is a very competent leader with experience in combined operations.

By the way his son (Pierre Billote) was a more than successful officer. Have a look:

- officer in 1937
- 16 May 40: leaded the most effective French attack of the whole campain at Stonne. A Copy paste:

Billotte is known for his extraordinary actions on 16 May 1940 during the battle at the French village of Stonne. Billotte served in the 1st Compagnie of the 41st Tank Battalion, equipped with the Char B1 heavy tank. Then-Captain Billotte was instrumental in capturing the village of Stonne, defended by elements of the German 8th Panzer Regiment. The village had already been the scene of fierce fighting before Billotte's action, having changed hands numerous times and lying on a strategic location on the road to Sedan. On 16 May, while under heavy fire from German tanks, Billotte and his B1 Bis managed to break through the German defences and to destroy alone two German PzKpfw IV tanks, eleven PzKpfw III tanks and two enemy guns. Billotte's Char B1-Bis tank received 140 hits from enemy tanks and guns, but none were able to penetrate the tank's heavy armour.

- Critically wounded later during the battle
- imprisoned by the German military.
- escaped the next year through Poland and reached Russia
- managed to gather all French espcapee and joined the Free French
- From 1942 to 1943, he served as chief of staff to Charles de Gaulle. After - was attached to the 2nd Armored Division (leaded a CC)
- Assistant Chief of Staff of the French Army.

 

[fhaessig]

Yes, but only if the leadership is willing to make a clear swipe of most general and staff officers. That's not a very plausible decision in the middle of a war and without hindsight.

 

[TheBrunswickian]

Well the French would need to fight back if they didn't want the Germans to win. If Petain hadn't taken control I don't think that France would have surrendered until the Germans had actually marched all the way to the Atlantic.

Not that the French were determined to stop them.

 

[Karelian]

Yes. The Germans were operationally superior, but strategically they got extremely lucky, and a more cautious Franco-British defense plan with suitable reserves at hand would have been too much for 1940-vintage Heer.

It is however really unlikely to see the necessary changes happening in time. Gamelin was not chosen to his post by accident - he was one of the few high-ranking French generals with suitable credentials as a firm supporter of the Third Republic. The leading politicians lacked trust towards the Army, and the example of Vichy collaborators shows that their fears were far from delusional.

 

[kung Zog]

The leading politicians lacked trust towards the Army, and the example of Vichy collaborators shows that their fears were far from delusional.

This is very important and often forgotten. The Vichy France was the result of lasting distrust between high command and government. Mental Maginot Lines is an ok dissertation that deals with some of the politics of the third republic.

 

[Magnum]

snip

oh, come on.

Billotte was an idiot and the best thing he did the entire campaign was die at the opportune moment, as that precipitated Lord Gort's decision to not follow orders and instead withdraw to Dunkirk. Had Billotte died earlier, later, or not at all, it is my belief that a majority of the BEF would have been trapped somewhere west of Liege without ever reaching the sea.


wiki:

Like all the Allied commanders, Billotte failed to discern the German plan.[1]

On 12 May Billotte was given the task of co-ordination the operations of the French, Belgian and British armies in Belgium. He lacked the staff and the experience for this task, and is reported to have burst into tears when informed of it.[2] He failed to co-operate effectively with the British commander, General Lord Gort, and the Belgian commander, King Leopold. By 15 May Billotte's morale was "at rock bottom."[3] After a meeting with Gort on 18 May, he remarked to a British officer: "I'm shattered and I can't do anything against these Panzers."[4]

On 20 May the British government, alarmed at the situation, sent the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Edmund Ironside, to confer with Gort and Billotte. Ironside later wrote: "I found Billotte and Blanchard all in a state of complete depression. No plan, no thought of a plan. Ready to be slaughtered. Defeated at the head without casualties... I lost my temper and shook Billotte by the button of his tunic. The man is completely beaten."[5] Ironside effectively took over the co-ordinating role from Billotte and organised an unsuccessful attack southwards towards Arras in the hope of checking the German advance.

Finally realising the threat posed by the rapid German advance from the Ardennes towards the sea, the French commander-in-chief, General Maxime Weygand, ordered Billotte to withdraw his forces southwards. At a meeting in Ypres on 21 May, Weygand found Billotte depressed and pessimistic, "heavily marked by the fatigues and anxieties of the past two weeks." [6] After leaving this conference, Billotte was severely injured when his staff car was involved in an accident, and died after two days in a coma. The British general Henry Pownall (Gort's Chief of Staff) said: "With all respect, he's no loss to us in this emergency."[7]

 

[fhaessig]

Well the French would need to fight back if they didn't want the Germans to win. If Petain hadn't taken control I don't think that France would have surrendered until the Germans had actually marched all the way to the Atlantic.

Not that the French were determined to stop them.

I suggest you read some history.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I suggest you read some history.

What? The History Channel is not the best

 

[pdf27]

I'm not talking a change in leadership after the Ardennes breakthrough(they tried it in real life),but one at the start of the war,with someone more competent
.I have come to notice that there are a lot of timelines that even if the Ardennes breakthrough was prevented,fall of France would still happen,only slower and bloodier for the Germans.

<gratuitous plug>I've been doing exactly that (Gamelin listening to Georges rather than adopting Dyle-Breda wholesale) - see my sig</gratuitous plug>

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Yes. The Germans were operationally superior, but strategically they got extremely lucky, and a more cautious Franco-British defense plan with suitable reserves at hand would have been too much for 1940-vintage Heer.

Heer maybe, but remember how vital the LW was in 1940; it crushed the French army's reserves trying to move against the German army and eliminated the RAF, ALA, and Dutch and Belgian air forces.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France#Central_front

On 19 May, after receiving reinforcements, De Gaulle made another effort, and was repulsed with the loss of 80 of 155 vehicles.[161] Wolfram von Richthofen's VIII Fliegerkorps had done most of the work; by targeting French units moving into position to attack the vulnerable German flanks it was able to stop most counterattacks from starting. The defeat of de Gaulle's unit and the disintegration of the French 9th Army was caused mainly by Richthofen's air units.[162]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France#Fall_Rot

In a series of examples at Amiens, the Germans were repeatedly driven back by powerful French artillery concentrations, and came to recognise improved French tactics. Once again, the German Army relied on the Luftwaffe to help decisively, by silencing French guns and enabling the German infantry to inch forward.[225]

The German spearheads were overextended and vulnerable to counter strokes, but the concentration of the Luftwaffe denied the French the ability to concentrate, and the fear of air attack negated their mass and mobile use by Weygand.[227]

On top of this added danger, the situation in the air had also grown critical. The Luftwaffe established air supremacy (as opposed to air superiority) as the French air arm was on the verge of collapse.[232] The French Air Force (Armée de l'Air) had only just begun to make the majority of bomber sorties; between 5 and 9 June (during Operation Paula), over 1,815 missions, of which 518 were by bombers, were flown. The number of sorties flown declined as losses were now becoming impossible to replace. The RAF attempted to divert the attention of the Luftwaffe with 660 sorties flown against targets over the Dunkirk area but losses were heavy; on 21 June alone, 37 Bristol Blenheims were destroyed. After 9 June, French aerial resistance virtually ceased; some surviving aircraft withdrew to French North Africa. The Luftwaffe now "ran riot". Its attacks were focused on the direct and indirect support of the German Army. The Luftwaffe subjected lines of resistance to ferocious assault, which then quickly collapsed under armoured attack.[233]

So the success of 1940 wasn't simply German luck at the strategic level, it was the excellence of the Luftwaffe preventing the French and British from moving around reserves, breaking fortified positions, and breaking up concentrations of reserves massing for counter attacks. Really the Wehrmacht (all arms of the German military) was going to win a major victory, though perhaps not the entire war, in 1940 that would leave the Allied militaries shattered.

 

[usertron2020]

I recommend everyone consider taking a read of William Shirer's legendary "The Rise and Fall of the Third Republic". It can pretty much answer anyone's questions by the OP.

Warning: It's a monster book, as big as his better known "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich".

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Shirer is a good pick. He has been dismissed as a mere "journalist", but I notice the professional historians dont stray far from Shirers narrative or conclusions.

Ernest May is another that should at the top of the list. His 'Strange Victory' examines the question from the German PoV. Specifically the evolution of the "Sickle Cut" plan. The German leaders from top down had a very pessimistic view of their chances of sucess. the plan they finally went with was considered a long shot, and very risky. Post battle most considered it a miracle it had worked.

It is easy to look at the French and second guess them from the arm chair. Conversely critical examinations of the German side, like Mays book shows just how close Guderian, Rommel, Kleist & the others were to their own version of disaster.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Shirer is a good pick. He has been dismissed as a mere "journalist", but I notice the professional historians dont stray far from Shirers narrative or conclusions.

Ernest May is another that should at the top of the list. His 'Strange Victory' examines the question from the German PoV. Specifically the evolution of the "Sickle Cut" plan. The German leaders from top down had a very pessimistic view of their chances of sucess. the plan they finally went with was considered a long shot, and very risky. Post battle most considered it a miracle it had worked.

It is easy to look at the French and second guess them from the arm chair. Conversely critical examinations of the German side, like Mays book shows just how close Guderian, Rommel, Kleist & the others were to their own version of disaster.

The French army though had an inflated reputation from WW1 on all sides. Post war examination showed the huge flaws in their doctrine, leadership, morale, political situation, etc. However, as I tried to say above, their air force was in shambles especially at the start of the campaign so was not up to the task of confronting the LW. That's not to say the French weren't solid in some areas, like their artillery doctrine, which was top notch; their army equipment was quite good overall, they had very well trained units, and had good tanks for the period.

The Germans too got an inflated reputation after the battle, but really given how the situation developed the close calls that Rommel, Guderian, and others had was ultimately not as serious as portrayed because of the German army's system of improvisation and the quality of the LW in dealing with those threats. The Germans weren't perfect and could have suffered more defeats than they did, but it would be very hard if not impossible for the French to stop the Germans from winning a major victory in 1940 given the issues that existed in May. A leadership change was only going to help if it was pre-war as there were just too many issues to change to fix things once it started. Also you have to factor in the funding issues that really hurt the French, but that was also a function of their economic model (relying on the gold standard way too long) and the Great Depression, while of course the political situation and fear of the military.

 

[Redbeard]

The short answer is: Yes indeed, if we could rerun 1940 a number of times, the French would do much better in most cases.

IMHO the French primarily lost because their overall operational plan was too offensive. Yes, I did say “offensive”. The problem wasn’t the Maginot Line, which was a fine way to channel the enemy to attack somewhere else – i.e. somewhere from the Maginot Line to the Channel. The problem was that Gamelin’s plan not only preconditioned the Germans taking the old WWI route, but also sent the entire BEF and the best parts of the French Army right into the German trap.

A plan not so hooked on advancing into Belgium but more on being able to cope with any possible German advance, incl. that through the Ardennes (the 1871 route) would have put the German plan in jeopardy as they were extremely vulnerable in the days when advancing “single file” through the Ardennes forests and across the Meuse. But Gamelin didn’t even put up some recon to watch the Ardennes, he just went whistling around in his HQ as his armies advanced into the trap.

There is no doubt that the German army operationally and strategically was much superior to the allied armies, but the German leadership didn’t really realize this until the campaign was practically over (and after they overestimated what it could). The Germans repeatedly shortcut the French CCC system and French units moving to take up a position would usually find it already occupied by Germans and themselves in a vulnerable marching order. This had many French units dissolve as would have any units from any army in the same situation. With the French reserve wasted/trapped in Belgium the Germans could repeat this often enough to break cohesive French resistance, but only could do that because some frontline German commanders disobeyed orders to halt.

The French army of 1940 wasn’t as inept as is usually imaged, and had it been given just a little more time to establish defensive lines, either by the Germans hesitating a little more, and/or by the French reserve being intact, the Germans most likely would have bogged down in front of very firepower heavy French doctrines. That would not necessarily have ended the war but in the planned allied offensive of 1941 the Germans probably would have crumbled under massive French fire and systematic advance. The French Army of early WWII wasn’t limited to defensive operations, their offensive doctrines were quite refined and not that far from what the Anglo-Saxons and Russians later practiced.

On top of these PoDs we can put all the butterflies, like a different commander of the French 55th Division. This unit was the French unit at the first serious contact between the German advance and the French line. 55th Division was well supported by artillery but everything went wrong. A simple rumor of “loose” Panzer had most of the artillery panic and the Divisional commander spent the first 17 hours of the battle to drive around in his staff car to find his superior to get new orders! A 55th Division actually being lead would have changed world history.

Quite telling of the capacity of the early WWII French army is the combat after Weygrand took over. The French here had adopted hedgehog positions in checkerboard formation that could survive being penetrated by panzers and German losses accelerated to a level of Barbarossa. It is quite remarkable that the French in a few weeks were capable of transforming from WWI continuous lines to the hedgehog doctrines that later were re-invented on the eastern front and became standard practice later in NATO.

By June too much of the French army had been lost for the new doctrines to make a difference, but again, imagine the French reserve being available and not trapped.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The short answer is: Yes indeed, if we could rerun 1940 a number of times, the French would do much better in most cases. ...


The French army of 1940 wasn’t as inept as is usually imaged, and had it been given just a little more time to establish defensive lines, either by the Germans hesitating a little more, and/or by the French reserve being intact, the Germans most likely would have bogged down in front of very firepower heavy French doctrines.

Find a copy of Gunsbergs 'Battle of the Belgian Plain:

http://www.megaessays.com/viewpaper/27580.html

Gunsberg describes how a French infantry division without air support, and on favorable tank terrain stopped a German armored corps. In that battle is the illustration of how the other French formations could have defeated the attack, and why Guderian & Co. thought the whole thing very risky. When you dissect each battle in 1940 there is a underlying theme of the senior French commanders making the wrong decision at a critical moment and negating their advantage in fire power.

...
On top of these PoDs we can put all the butterflies, like a different commander of the French 55th Division. This unit was the French unit at the first serious contact between the German advance and the French line. 55th Division was well supported by artillery but everything went wrong. A simple rumor of “loose” Panzer had most of the artillery panic and the Divisional commander spent the first 17 hours of the battle to drive around in his staff car to find his superior to get new orders! A 55th Division actually being lead would have changed world history.

What never enters into the Pop narrative is one of the three assaults at Sedan was repulsed. The lead battalion of the 2 Pz Div failed to reach the river, being pinned in the approaches by long range MG & mortar fires. They were unable to cross until the French bank was cleared the next morning by the 1st Pz Div rifle battalions. Not all the French soldiers fled. Those who remained, mostly from the local fortress regiment, gave the leading German companies a lot of trouble. Had the tactical battles gone slightly differently the local regimental commanders might have been able to stall the German assault on their own.

 

[cracou]

Billotte was an idiot and the best thing he did the entire campaign was die at the opportune moment, as that precipitated Lord Gort's decision to not follow orders and instead withdraw to Dunkirk. Had Billotte died earlier, later, or not at all, it is my belief that a majority of the BEF would have been trapped somewhere west of Liege without ever reaching the sea.

ok, Bilotte is an idiot as he is defending his country and tries to convince his ally not to escape and leave him alone... And you call him an idiot?

The german plan worked because it was completely insane and suicidal: sending your best troops in hills with a limited logistic train....

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
The german plan worked because it was completely insane and suicidal: sending your best troops in hills with a limited logistic train....

I've often wondered how it would have gone had the Belgians either used their Corps de Ardennes as a blocking force vs the delaying mission they did attempt. That is sacrificing the corps in order to gain 24 to 48 hours for their own backstop forces and the French mechanized cavalry force sent to assist.

48, or even just 24, hours makes a difference in the numbers of French defending their main zone on the Meuse River & their degree of preparation.