Was Stalin really planning to deport Soviet Jews?

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Was Stalin in the last months of his life planning to have Soviet Jews exiled to remote areas of the USSR? There were many rumors about it at the time and many writers have accepted such a plan as probable or even a proven fact. A reading of Joshua Rubenstein's recent *The Last Days of Stalin* (all my references here are to this book unless otherwise indicated) doesn't answer the question (Rubenstein himself says we may never know) but leaves me more skeptical than I had previously been. Let me discuss this in three parts: (1) What were the rumors and what evidence is there to support them? (2) What about the stories of Stalin proposing the idea to the Presidium and being rebuked there? (That's the easiest one--the stories were pure invention.) And finally, (3) what was the collective letter to *Pravda* that prominent Soviet Jews were being pressured to sign?

(1) The rumors and the evidence (or lack thereof):

Rubenstein describes the ominous atmosphere for Soviet Jews in early 1953. There had been signs of it for years, but things got steadily worse with first the Slansky trial in Prague and than the "doctors' plot" allegations which linked Soviet Jews to Zionism and American imperialism, often employing standard antisemitic stereotypes--see the *Krokodil* cartoon "Traces of a Crime" which I have attached. (The apparently kindly doctors are revealed to be hook-nosed archcriminals taking gold from American imperialists.)

"It was in this poisonous atmosphere that rumors began to spread that Stalin intended to deport Soviet Jews to far-off places of exile: to Kazakhstan, to Siberia, perhaps to Birobidjan, the 'autonomous Jewish region' near the border with China. Ever since Stalin's death, the truth behind these rumors has remained among the most difficult to explore or confirm. The arguments that such a plan never existed are compelling, and are often and most persuasively based on the fact that not a single document has been located that can confirm that such a plan was ever considered. When Mikhail Gorbachev opened hitherto closed, sensitive, official archives in the late 1980s and allowed both Soviet and foreign scholars to unearth once inaccessible material about myriad crimes-—a process that Boris Yeltsin and even to some extent Vladimir Putin have continued--documents relating to Stalin's alleged plan to deport the Jews were among the most highly sought. But nothing has been found. That there should be no explicit directive from Stalin's office is not surprising. But neither are there records from within the Gulag bureaucracy calling for the construction of extensive new camps or settlements; nor orders within the railway administration to assign rolling stock; nor written plans to deploy soldiers, security officers, or ordinary police to round up Jews.

"In their book, *Stalin's Last Crime,* Jonathan Brent and Vladimir Naumov point to orders for the construction of new special camps for German, Austrian, and other foreign criminals, but these documents refer to a few thousand prisoners and do not mention the Jews. They also cite protocols of interrogations and face-to-face interrogations involving two senior officials of the secret police, Mikhail Ryumin and Isidor Maklyarsky, as evidence that such a plan was being considered. Maklyarsky had been arrested in November 1951. Under questioning by Ryumin several months later, he was ordered to denounce other people for engaging in Jewish nationalism. He was also told by Ryumin that he had "intended to put the question to the government about the expulsion of the Jews from Moscow . Brent and Naumov, who like all students of this period were frustrated by the lack of explicit documentation about such a plan, concluded that 'the testimony of Maklyarsky concerning Ryumin's threats gives ample reason to believe that, as in so many other cases, a policy was being developed without explicit written directives, that it had emanated from the Central Committee and had penetrated the investigative units of the security services.' This interpretation implies that officials like Ryumin were responding to some kind of signal 'from above,' that the drumbeat of propaganda against 'Zionists' and now Jewish doctors created a situation reminiscent of how Nazi officers sought to 'work toward the Fuhrer.' They engaged in atrocities of their own without an explicit order, based on their understanding of what Hitler expected from them when it came to Jews, subversives, or the disabled. Officials like Ryumin, who were always anxious to demonstrate their ideological reliability, could well have been 'working toward Stalin' and initiating rumors or even preliminary plans for a general assault against the Jews before Stalin or the Presidium actually reviewed or sanctioned such a plan." (pp. 80-82)

Rubenstein notes that to round up all Soviet Jews (there were about 2.5 million at the time, with a significant presence in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and other major cities) and dispatch them to camps would have been more complicated than had been the deportation of several smaller ethnic minorities in 1944 (Crimean Tatars, Ingush, Kalymyks, etc.) who had been living for the most part in well-defined regions of the country. Although the deportation of these groups had been state secrets, enough people knew about them to know what the regime was capable of. In the wake of the "Doctors' Plot" and the crescendo of denunciations of Zionists and alleged Jewish criminals, it is not surprising that rumors began to circulate of the deportation of the Jews. The usual substance of these rumors was: The accused doctors would confess in a public trial and be hanged in Red Square. Thereupon notable Soviet Jews would appeal to Stalin to save the Jews from "the people's wrath" by exiling them. Trains would then carry the Jews to special camps prepared for this eventuality. Numerous Soviet dissidents, including Roy Medvedev, Anton Antonov-Ovseenko, Mikhail Heller, Aleksandr Nekirch and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, have expressed the belief that such a deportation plan existed. Several of them claim that Dmitry Chesnokov, Stalin's chief ideologist of the period, had prepared a book justifying the planned deportations. Similar allegations are made by some western historians, e.g., Robert Levy in his *Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist*: "In early 1953 the MVD publishing house printed and readied for distribution one million copies of 'Why Jews Must Be Resettled from the Industrial Regions of the Country,' a pamphlet by Dmitry Chesnokov...Ready as well in the eastern regions by the end of 1952 or the beginning of 1953 were thousands of shabby, temporary barracks for the deported Jews..." https://books.google.com/books?id=TDqemCGtAuYC&pg=PA218

(Antonov-Oveseenko has a peculiar variant: some Jews would be allowed to stay in Moscow but they would have yellow stars sewn in their sleeves! I rather doubt that Stalin would imitate Hitler *that* crudely...)

But as Rubenstein notes, none of these writers offered any documentary evidence for their claims. The alleged book by Chesnokov, for example, has never been found. "Other allegations--that a great many barracks were under construction in Siberia or central Asia, that lists of Jews by their addresses were being compiled--have also been advanced but without any documentary evidence." (p. 84) (In a footnote, Rubenstein does note that Alya Savich, a close friend of Ilya Ehrenburg, told Rubenstein when he talked to her in Moscow in the 1980's that a policeman once told her that he and several colleagues had been asked to compile a list of Jews in their Moscow district.) Rubenstein concludes: "Without some measure of documentary evidence, it is impossible to reach a definitive conclusion about Stalin's ultimate plans. What can be said is that the antisemitic campaign was gathering such momentum in the press and in the mood of the population that it could well have been intended to reach some kind of monstrous denouement. Only Stalin knew the answer to this question, and with his death the answer could well be lost to history."

(2) Stalin's successors, after the denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, contributed to the belief in a Stalin deportation plan by spreading stories that he proposed it to the Presidium--and that they bravely resisted it. One especially unlikely version of these stories is the one that Voroshilov violently objected to the idea, saying that it resembled the crimes of Hitler, and then dramatically threw his Party membership card on the table, saying he no longer wanted to be a member of the Party if such a a plan was adopted. (To which Stalin supposedly replied: Comrade Voroshilov, it will be I, not you, who determines when you are no longer able to carry a Party card.) In other versions it is Malenkov or Molotov or Kaganovich or Khrushchev or all of them who objected--and Stalin got his stroke because he was so angry at the objections! Anyway, these stories are such obvious lies that they do not in any way strengthen the case that a deportation plan existed. Khrushchev, who seems to have circulated some of these stories, makes no mention of any such Presidium confrontation with Stalin in his memoirs.

(3) Finally, what had once persuaded me that such a plan existed was that there had been a collective letter going around to be published in *Pravda*, which prominent Soviet Jews were being pressured to sign. (The Kremlin had delegated two well-known Moscow figures, both Jewish--the historian and academician Isaac Mints and Tass editor Yakov Khavinson--to gather the signatures.) Ilya Ehrenburg clearly, though cautiously, referred to this open letter in his memoirs:

"I will omit the story of how I tried to prevent the appearance in print of a certain collective letter. Happily, the project, which was absolutely insane, did not come about. I thought at the time that I dissuaded Stalin with my letter; now it seems to me the whole business was delayed and Stalin did not succeed in doing what he wanted to do. This is history, of course, a chapter of my biography, but I believe the time has not yet come for me to say more."

I had always assumed that this "collective letter" must have urged the deportation of the Jews for their protection from "the wrath of the people." However, it is not clear that it did so even in its initial draft. This draft has not survived, though we know that those who were called on to sign it were frightened by it. Ehrenburg refused to sign it, offering some suggestions to soften the letter's language and make it clear it was not directed against all Jews. Mints and Khavinson took Ehrenburg's suggested changes to Malenkov, who shared them with Stalin. Stalin approved of the changes.

Even the (evidently softened) second version, in Rubenstein's words "remains an ugly and disturbing piece of antisemitic demagoguery. It acknowledged the guilt of the arrested doctors and called for 'the most severe punishment' for their crimes, meaning their execution. In its most extreme paragraph, the letter declared: 'To increase vigilance, to utterly rout and uproot bourgeois nationalism—-these are the obligations of working Jews, Soviet patriots, and defenders of freedom for all people.'" Rubenstein continues:

"In this draft, there are no references to a broad plot involving the country's Jews, no accusation of 'fifth column' subversion, just as there is no call for collective responsibility for the crimes of the accused doctors or a call for deportations or mass repressions of any kind. At the end of the letter, the final paragraphs acknowledge that 'the vast majority of the Jewish population is a friend of the Russian people. No tricks by our enemies will succeed in undermining the trust of Soviet Jews in the Russian people or cause a falling out between them.'

"While the idea that 'this collective Jewish letter' was part of a broader plan to deport the country's Jews cannot be dismissed altogether, it is far more likely that Mints and Khavinson were told to mobilize prestigious Jewish figures to denounce the doctors and other alleged Jewish nationalists, and that this was the 'insane' idea that so unsettled Ehrenburg and others. It meant the creation of internecine struggle—-an internal witch hunt—that would pit one group of Jews against another, compelling people to either target 'Jewish bourgeois nationalists' or stand vulnerable to a similar charge themselves..." (pp. 90-91.)

Anyway, Ehrenburg objected even to the second version of the collective letter and insisted on writing to Stalin personally. A translation of his letter to Stalin is provided in Rubenstein's earlier book, *Tangled Loyalties: The Life and Times of Ilya Ehrenburg*, pp. 274-5, where Ehrenburg shrewdly argued that the collective Jewish letter would actually strengthen Jewish nationalism and anti-Soviet forces in general:

"Dear Joseph Visarionovich!...

"It seems to me that the only radical solution to the Jewish Question in our Socialist State is full assimilation and the merging of individuals of Jewish origin with the peoples among whom they live. I am afraid that a collective statement by a number of people active in Soviet cultural life, united only by their origin, could strengthen nationalistic tendencies. The text of the letter speaks of a 'Jewish people'; this could encourage nationalists and others who have not yet understood that there is no such thing as a Jewish nation.

"I am particularly worried about the influence of such a 'letter to the editor' on the broadening and strengthening of the world movement for peace. Whenever, in various commissions and press conferences, the question has been raised as to why there are no Jewish schools or newspapers in the Soviet Union, I have replied that after the war there no longer remained any breeding-grounds for the former 'Pale of Settlement' and that new generations of Soviet citizens of Jewish descent do not wish to set themselves apart from the peoples among whom they live. The publication of this letter, signed by scientists, writers and composers, who speak of a so-called Soviet Jewish community, could fan repellent anti-Soviet propaganda which is at present being spread by Zionists, Bundists, and other enemies of our Motherland..."

Ehrenburg added that if nevertheless Stalin decided that signing the open letter would be helpful to the cause of the Peace Movement and the Motherland, he would sign it. This sort of self-humiliation (and the posing of ideological [1] and practical objections to the open letter, not moral objections which would obviously have no impact on Stalin) was necessary if the letter was to have any effect. Anyway, Stalin replied that it was necessary for Ehrenburg to sign the collective letter to *Pravda*--but he also ordered that Shepilov (the editor of *Pravda*) draft a new "softer" version of the letter, dated February 20, 1953, which Ehrenburg signed and expected to see in *Pravda* within a few days. But the letter never appeared.

The text of this final version of the Jewish collective letter has been preserved. According to Rubenstein, "If in fact Stalin had been planning to round up the country's Jews and to use a 'collective letter to *Pravda*' as part of his plan, this final version bears no hint of such an intention. (p. 92) It was almost entirely about enemies outside the USSR, especially the US and Israel. It repeats the accusations about the doctors being guilty of monstrous crimes, but does not call for their execution, makes no mention of Jewish nationalists in the USSR as a "fifth column," repeats the second draft's declaration of the friendship of Soviet Jews with "the great Russian people," calls antisemitism a "frightful holdover from the past," and makes only one concrete recommendation---the establishment of Jewish newspapers! (so that "the true situation of Jewish workers in various countries will be known" among Jews throughout the USSR and abroad.) Given that the original draft horrified Ehrenburg and others so much, does the softer language of the final version mean that Stalin had altered his original plans--whatever they were--about the Jews? Rubenstein thinks that's possible but I would argue that it's also possible that the softening was just a maneuver on Stalin's part--he sometimes liked to give his enemies a temporary respite. (E.g., the announcement in September 1936 that the investigation into charges against Rykov and Bukharin was being dropped for lack of evidence...)

In any event, the final draft was not published. But what is even more striking is this: after February 20, neither *Pravda* nor *Izvestia* published any more accusations about the doctors. This was more than a week before Stalin's final stroke. Obviously, this cessation of the public campaign could only have been a result of orders from Stalin, but again it is impossible to say whether this meant he had some second thoughts about the whole "Plot" or, again, whether this was just one of Stalin's devious maneuvers.

So basically we are just left with Rubenstein's "Only Stalin knew the answer to this question, and with his death the answer could well be lost to history."


[1] Note Ehrenburg's emphasis that there is no such thing as a Jewish nation--a point which Stalin had long ago argued in *Marxism and the National Question*: "Bauer speaks of the Jews as a nation, although they 'have no common language'; but what 'common destiny' and national cohesion is there, for instance, between the Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian and American Jews, who are completely separated from one another, inhabit different territories and speak different languages?" https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03a.htm
 
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Stalin might have been trying to earn points in the Middle East and grab the oil. There were a lot of new nations in the area with not to popular governments and no love for Israel or Jews, with active Communist movements.
 

CaliGuy

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In any event, the final draft was not published. But what is even more striking is this: after February 20, neither *Pravda* nor *Izvestia* published any more accusations about the doctors. This was more than a week before Stalin's final stroke. Obviously, this cessation of the public campaign could only have been a result of orders from Stalin, but again it is impossible to say whether this meant he had some second thoughts about the whole "Plot" or, again, whether this was just one of Stalin's devious maneuvers.

So basically we are just left with Rubenstein's "Only Stalin knew the answer to this question, and with his death the answer could well be lost to history."

[1] Note Ehrenburg's emphasis that there is no such thing as a Jewish nation--a point which Stalin had long ago argued in *Marxism and the National Question*: "Bauer speaks of the Jews as a nation, although they 'have no common language'; but what 'common destiny' and national cohesion is there, for instance, between the Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian and American Jews, who are completely separated from one another, inhabit different territories and speak different languages?" https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03a.htm
Excellent post, David!

However, I have a question--if Stalin was genuinely planning to deport Soviet Jews, where exactly do you think that he would have deported them to? Kazakhstan? Siberia? Another part of Central Asia? Somewhere else?
 
Stalin might have been trying to earn points in the Middle East and grab the oil. There were a lot of new nations in the area with not to popular governments and no love for Israel or Jews, with active Communist movements.


But how would this benefit arabs or muslims outside the USSR? And what evidence is there that the USSR under Stalin was already tilting toward the arabs by '53?
 
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