Was Scipio Africanus greater than Napoleon?

Who was the better commander?

  • Scipio Africanus

    Votes: 9 17.6%
  • Napoleon

    Votes: 42 82.4%

  • Total voters
    51
Was Scipio Africanus greater than Napoleon? Who was the better commander Scipio or Napoleon?

I've been reading about Napoleon lately and it reminded my of the book "Scipio Africanus Greater than Napoleon" by B.H. Liddell Hart. I think its pretty close, they both were terrific.
 
Apples and oranges, being that they presided over armies in very disparate eras, different tactics, technologies, and the very size and number of armies deployed and under their strategic command.

Scipio was one of the finest generals of the classical era. Napoleon of the 19thC.
I'd leave it at that.
 
Apples and oranges, being that they presided over armies in very disparate eras, different tactics, technologies, and the very size and number of armies deployed and under their strategic command.

Scipio was one of the finest generals of the classical era. Napoleon of the 19thC.
I'd leave it at that.
Same. You might as well be trying to compare Charles Martel and Zhukov.
 
Same. You might as well be trying to compare Charles Martel and Zhukov.

That is always the argument when comparing military figures, but these two can be compared on some level. They still both fight set battles. They still both have certain command traits. Battles are still won in a generally similar manner, one are attacks and flanks the other etc. They still both have infantry and cavalry.Napoleon studied the cmapaigns of commander prior in hsitory to formulate his own. Their is still a connection. Am i wrong?

When it gets to the 20th century though i think all comparisons with previous figures have to stop.
 
That is always the argument when comparing military figures, but these two can be compared on some level. They still both fight set battles. They still both have certain command traits. Battles are still won in a generally similar manner, one are attacks and flanks the other etc. They still both have infantry and cavalry.Napoleon studied the cmapaigns of commander prior in hsitory to formulate his own. Their is still a connection. Am i wrong?

Yes. You are only bringing up criteria on the very broadest of terms. No historian worth their salt would evaluate the 2 this way. Hart was best as someone who wrote of modern warfare. To write such a book, he was probably paying the rent. ;)
 
Last edited:
The written history of Scipio Africanus was written by the winners, a long time ago. Any analysis of his history is based on original written history.
 
Personally, I'd chalk up Scipio's victories to as much his enemies weakness and luck as his skill. At both Illipa and Zama, he made two risky decisions that could have (and, frankly, if his enemies had capitalized on it, should have), cost him the battle. At Ilippa he moved his army to the flank of the Carthaginians literally right in front of them, leaving himself open to an attack while his army was vulnerable repositioning that would have been devastating-yet Mago refused to take advantage of it, and so lost a battle he could have very easily won.

Same goes for Zama. With his forces disorganized and out of breath after fighting through the first two lines, Scipio decided on reforming and reorganizing his army right in front of Hannibal's third line. And, like Mago, Hannibal refused to capitalize on this and attack Scipio's army at its most weakest moment. In waiting, he let Scipio's army reform and make the climax of the infantry fight an even match, all the while buying precious time for Massinissa to return with his cavalry and seal Hannibal's fate.
 
Personally, I'd chalk up Scipio's victories to as much his enemies weakness and luck as his skill. At both Illipa and Zama, he made two risky decisions that could have (and, frankly, if his enemies had capitalized on it, should have), cost him the battle. At Ilippa he moved his army to the flank of the Carthaginians literally right in front of them, leaving himself open to an attack while his army was vulnerable repositioning that would have been devastating-yet Mago refused to take advantage of it, and so lost a battle he could have very easily won.

What? Scipio's army was arrayed in a line with Iberians in the center and the Legions on the flanks, the opposite of what was expected. His flanks hit the Carthaginian army before the Center moved in, and Scipio's lighter troops and cavalry moved to extend the wings. He didn't move his whole army to the flanks of the Carthaginians. In addition, none of the Carthaginian forces could be moved because their wings held the weaker troops (who were no match for the Roman infantry) and their stronger troops could not be deployed without giving the Iberians who were right in front of them an opening to attack.

In addition the Carthaginians were tired and hungry (having been woken up by the roman attack and forced to take the field without eating first.

Same goes for Zama. With his forces disorganized and out of breath after fighting through the first two lines, Scipio decided on reforming and reorganizing his army right in front of Hannibal's third line. And, like Mago, Hannibal refused to capitalize on this and attack Scipio's army at its most weakest moment. In waiting, he let Scipio's army reform and make the climax of the infantry fight an even match, all the while buying precious time for Massinissa to return with his cavalry and seal Hannibal's fate.

And Hannibal also reorganized his line during this time, so that the Romans would not overwhelm it in their next attack. In addition, Hannibal likely believed his cavalry would be returning to the field, after all they did turn and battle the Roman cavalry after leaving the field. When the infantry actually fought, from Hannibal's own line the attack was a stalemate until,the Roman cavalry returned.
 
What? Scipio's army was arrayed in a line with Iberians in the center and the Legions on the flanks, the opposite of what was expected. His flanks hit the Carthaginian army before the Center moved in, and Scipio's lighter troops and cavalry moved to extend the wings. He didn't move his whole army to the flanks of the Carthaginians. In addition, none of the Carthaginian forces could be moved because their wings held the weaker troops (who were no match for the Roman infantry) and their stronger troops could not be deployed without giving the Iberians who were right in front of them an opening to attack.

In addition the Carthaginians were tired and hungry (having been woken up by the roman attack and forced to take the field without eating first.
From "The Ghosts of Cannae"

Scipio ordered his whole line to start moving forward until they closed to approximately five hundred paces, at which point he had the Spaniards continue to march forward slowly, thereby pinning the Africans. Meanwhile, he broke each of the wings off to operate separately, taking command of the right and leaving the left under Silanus and Marcius, the commander the troops themselves had earlier elected. There followed a complicated evolution, which Polybius describes in highly technical language open to multiple interpretations. The choreography seems to have consisted of everybody taking a quarter turn to the right or left in order to form two columns (led by the velites and cavalry, and followed by the triplex acies). The commanders then wheeled the columns around and marched toward each Carthaginian flank until, right under the noses of the enemy, they wheeled again, repeated the quarter turn, and reformed the three-tiered battle line. Since a column of men can move much faster than the same number of men in a line, Scipio managed to very quickly put his cavalry and velites on each Punic flank and allow his legionaries to get at Hasdrubal's Spaniards, while leaving his own Spaniards unengaged. The Carthaginians watched it all happen, doing nothing until it was too late.

Modern sources agree that such a move (whatever it exactly constituted) was not only extremely dangerous in such close proximity to the enemy, but testified to extraordinary training and discipline of the legionaries involved.

I seem to have exaggerated when I said he moved the whole army to the flank. Regardless, he made an extremely dangerous maneuver that could have proved costly if Hasdrubal and Mago had taken advantage of it.

And Hannibal also reorganized his line during this time, so that the Romans would not overwhelm it in their next attack. In addition, Hannibal likely believed his cavalry would be returning to the field, after all they did turn and battle the Roman cavalry after leaving the field. When the infantry actually fought, from Hannibal's own line the attack was a stalemate until,the Roman cavalry returned.

I find it likely that Hannibal had intended his cavalry to draw the opposing cavalry off the battlefield, knowing they were inferior to Massinissa's numidians-essentially he wanted to neutralize them and win the infantry battle before they could return. The third line was untouched, so I'm unsure why they are going to need to reform-the first and second lines regrouped on the flanks, yes, but this hardly would impede the as of yet unscathed third line from moving forward. Again, I'll quote from "The Ghosts of Cannae"

A critical moment had arrived. The space between the two forces was now covered with dead and dying men, the ground made slippery by their blood. On the Roman side, the hastati were in complete disorder from the chase, and the maniples and principes were probably somewhat disheveled from their short fight. Only the triarii were fully ready to confront the much more numerous Carthaginian veterans, lined up in perfect battle array. It may well have crossed Scipio's mind that he had been tricked by the master into committing too many units too soon, just another Roman commander led cluelessly into the abattoir. His horns sounded the retreat, and he set about attempting the most difficult of military maneuvers, reconstituting his formations in the field, reconnecting with their centurions, re-forming their maniples, and lining up again, this time along a single front, hastati in the center, and the principes and triarii on either flank.

For as long as it took, they were dangerously vulnerable. Yet Hannibal with his fresh veterans in perfect order simply watched as the Romans scurried about, brought their wounded to the rear, and above all rested. Opportunity beckoned, and the supreme opportunist marked time. Maybe he was worried about keeping good order while attacking across the corpse-strewn battlefield. Perhaps he was wary of one of Scipio's flanking maneuvers. Whatever the reason, he waited and let the Romans come to him. It would be his undoing.

I'm not trying to say Scipio was not a very talented commander-he was. He completely reinvented Roman tactics. Yet at the same time, he was very lucky to achieve his most signature victories. I don't think he's a Hannibal or a Caesar, or an Alexander in command ability.
 
From "The Ghosts of Cannae"I seem to have exaggerated when I said he moved the whole army to the flank. Regardless, he made an extremely dangerous maneuver that could have proved costly if Hasdrubal and Mago had taken advantage of it.

Pyres it was dangerous, but many brilliant military maneuvers are dangerous if they were performed incorrectly. From Scipio's point of view the risk was worth it. He was facing men who were tired and hungry, and had been forced to stand in formation for hours while the skirmishers did their bit. In addition, the troops he had making the maneuvers were his best soldiers, against the weaker forces of the Carthuginians. This maneuver let Scipio put his legionairres up against soldiers who were barely trained, while making it impossible for the best Carthiginian forces to engage the Romans. Against some commanders this maneuver might well have gotten his army slaughtered, but Scipio correctly surmised his opponent's weaknesses and was able to execute the plan.

And I would note that many of the best commanders were facing far less capable people. Hannibal's victory at Trebia and Cannae would have failed miserably against more able leaders. Similar stories can be told of Caesar, Napoleon, Gustavus Adolphus, etc.

I find it likely that Hannibal had intended his cavalry to draw the opposing cavalry off the battlefield, knowing they were inferior to Massinissa's numidians-essentially he wanted to neutralize them and win the infantry battle before they could return. The third line was untouched, so I'm unsure why they are going to need to reform-the first and second lines regrouped on the flanks, yes, but this hardly would impede the as of yet unscathed third line from moving forward. Again, I'll quote from "The Ghosts of Cannae"

I'm not trying to say Scipio was not a very talented commander-he was. He completely reinvented Roman tactics. Yet at the same time, he was very lucky to achieve his most signature victories. I don't think he's a Hannibal or a Caesar, or an Alexander in command ability.

At this point however the last two Roman lines were still largely intact despite the fighting and could likely have gone into the fray in case of a Carthiginian advance while,the Riman forces reorganized. In addition, according to Polybius the battlefield was (naturally) covered in blood and bodies which could have disrupted an advance made by Hannibal's own men (and would have done significantly more to disrupt his own advance than the Romans given the inferior training of the Carthiginian troops. Furthermore, advancing in this manner as the Roman flanks are being strengthened by their better soldiers could well have left Hannibal's forces to be outflanked by said soldiers.hannibal had to incorporate the first two of his lines into his own soldiers to avoid this.

It should be noted that had the cavalry not pursued the Carthiginians the battle would likely have ended faster, and had they not returned as quickly as possible Hannibal may well have won the infantry battle that developed with his superior numbers.

And I would note again that Alexander never faced a particularly talented commander or confident army and he had better soldiers, Caesar did so and had superior soldiers the entire time, but still was not always victorious. Hannibal consistently faced generals who were his inferior, and his first major battle with someone who was close to his equal (ie Zama) was a total defeat. Scipio was at least as good as any of them.
 
Pyres it was dangerous, but many brilliant military maneuvers are dangerous if they were performed incorrectly. From Scipio's point of view the risk was worth it. He was facing men who were tired and hungry, and had been forced to stand in formation for hours while the skirmishers did their bit. In addition, the troops he had making the maneuvers were his best soldiers, against the weaker forces of the Carthuginians. This maneuver let Scipio put his legionairres up against soldiers who were barely trained, while making it impossible for the best Carthiginian forces to engage the Romans. Against some commanders this maneuver might well have gotten his army slaughtered, but Scipio correctly surmised his opponent's weaknesses and was able to execute the plan.
It's not like Scipio had much to go off of to assume that Hasdrubal and Mago would not attack him during this maneuver. If anything, Mago had a history of being aggressive-he launched the ambush at Trebia. And I should also mention Hasdrubal Gisgo and Mago were the leaders of the army that ambushed and crushed the elder Scipios in Spain. If anything, their prior history (and the fact that they were eager to meet Scipio in battle) should have led Scipio to believe that they would not just sit there while he maneuvered around them. the troops were hungry and tired, but then again, so were the Roman troops at Trebia and they dove right into the fight.


And I would note that many of the best commanders were facing far less capable people. Hannibal's victory at Trebia and Cannae would have failed miserably against more able leaders. Similar stories can be told of Caesar, Napoleon, Gustavus Adolphus, etc.
The difference is that Scipio was usually facing inferior armies in quality that were of roughly equal size to his own (with the exception of Zama). Hannibal was facing armies superior to him in number, and at least early on, superior to him in martial ability (as demonstrated by the Romans' ability to break through the center at both Trebia and Trasimene). The same goes for Alexander (well, not necessarily quality wise, but the Persian cavalry was certainly equal in quality to their Makedonian counterparts). Alexander as well showed himself to be a master of sieges.

As for Caesar, I don't rank him up close to Alexander anyway, but again, he made the best of bad situations on many occasions, whereas Scipio seemed to have good situations to start with. The siege of Alesia, and his victory in the civil war are testament to this (on numerous occasions he was in a tight spot that seemed insurmountable).


At this point however the last two Roman lines were still largely intact despite the fighting and could likely have gone into the fray in case of a Carthiginian advance while,the Riman forces reorganized. In addition, according to Polybius the battlefield was (naturally) covered in blood and bodies which could have disrupted an advance made by Hannibal's own men (and would have done significantly more to disrupt his own advance than the Romans given the inferior training of the Carthiginian troops. Furthermore, advancing in this manner as the Roman flanks are being strengthened by their better soldiers could well have left Hannibal's forces to be outflanked by said soldiers.hannibal had to incorporate the first two of his lines into his own soldiers to avoid this.
Since the retreating soldiers had regrouped to the flanks mostly by this point anyway, I don't think outflanking was much of a worry for Hannibal at this point-at least not a serious one that should have prevented him from moving forward. First and foremost time was limited-he needed to win the infantry battle before Massinissa's cavalry returned. Second, the benefits of hitting the Roman army while they reformed may have outweighed the costs of possibly losing formation and being outflanked-he might have been able to sow enough chaos in the Roman ranks to get the upper hand in the infantry engagement early on. It wasn't a lot to go on, but Hannibal needed to do something to win before the cavalry returned. An infantry stalemate just wasn't going to cut it.



It should be noted that had the cavalry not pursued the Carthiginians the battle would likely have ended faster, and had they not returned as quickly as possible Hannibal may well have won the infantry battle that developed with his superior numbers.
Yes, but the thing was, the cavalry was going to return-Hannibal knew this, and Scipio knew this. Hannibal had to do what he could to win before the cavalry returned.


Either way, Zama was not a victory due to Scipio's genius, but due to Masinissa arriving in the knick of time.
 
I rather agree with you.

Hannibal was certainly greater than Scipio on the battlefield. The point is that Scipio was, however, a greater strategist than Hannibal because Scipio was the one who first understood the real strategic situation and the real balance of power (which was very much in Rome's favour). And he was the one able to design and enforce the decisive plan for victory. Saying this, I do not ignore that his uncle and father already started campaigning in Spain, but they achieved no decisive result in many years while he did in a few years.
 
I rather agree with you.

Hannibal was certainly greater than Scipio on the battlefield. The point is that Scipio was, however, a greater strategist than Hannibal because Scipio was the one who first understood the real strategic situation and the real balance of power (which was very much in Rome's favour). And he was the one able to design and enforce the decisive plan for victory. Saying this, I do not ignore that his uncle and father already started campaigning in Spain, but they achieved no decisive result in many years while he did in a few years.

I'm not sure if I follow here. Scipio was a great strategist, yes, but as was Hannibal. Hannibal's strategy was, quite frankly, the only realistic way Carthage had a chance at beating Rome in the Punic Wars. Invade Italy, crush the Roman armies, and have the allies defect to him if Rome doesn't immediately sue for peace. Hannibal couldn't have known the extremely close ties between Rome and her allies-he was in the mindset of Carthage's relationship to their Libyan allies (who were fond of rebellion when enemies landed in N. Africa) or at the very least the fickle alliances of the Greek world. He wasn't completely wrong in his assessment either-many of the allies did defect, including the three key cities, Syracuse, Tarentum, and Capua. It wasn't Hannibal's lack of strategic foresight that doomed Carthage, it was the sheer determination (and a little bit of luck) of the Romans to continue fighting on after defeat after defeat (and they suffered multiple crushing defeats following Cannae as well I might add).
 
I would rather notice similarities between Hannibal and Napoleon.

Both were the greatest general of their time. But they eventually were not, to my point of view, the greatest strategists. More than strategists, they were gamblers : that was their doom.

Hannibal took excessive risk because Rome was in fact much stronger than Carthage and could in fact not be defeated. Carthaginian victory was possible only if Rome endlessly made the same mistakes and if Rome was endlessly led by unable military commanders.

That was just totally irrealistic.

By the end of 216, Hannibal it was clear that Hannibal could not win the war, however genious he was on the battlefield. The core of roman power was central Italy, not southern or borthern Italy. And central Italy was at that time to closely integrated with Rome to secede the way Hannibal had wrongly supposed.
It's like if the japanese had thought in 1941 that the war would cause a split in the US.

For Napoleon, things were different because he won more than Hannibal before he made the fatal mistakes that led to his fall. But like Hannibal, Napoleon miscalculated and over-extended.
 
I would rather notice similarities between Hannibal and Napoleon.

Both were the greatest general of their time. But they eventually were not, to my point of view, the greatest strategists. More than strategists, they were gamblers : that was their doom.

Hannibal took excessive risk because Rome was in fact much stronger than Carthage and could in fact not be defeated. Carthaginian victory was possible only if Rome endlessly made the same mistakes and if Rome was endlessly led by unable military commanders.

That was just totally irrealistic.
I am going to disagree heavily here. Defeat of Rome was not impossible. In the years prior to Hasdrubal's invasion (the year, not of the invasion but of the anecdote, escapes me), many of the Latin allies simply had no troops to send-Rome's manpower WAS being exhausted. Had Hasdubal avoided, or better yet, won, the Metaurus, the Romans were done for at that point. A consular army and a half would be dead on the field, and another half consular army would soon be crushed by Hannibal (outnumbered severely and without their commander since Nero would be dead on the fields of Metaurus). That would be it for Rome-they'd sue for peace at that point, especially if Hannibal chose to march to the city (he could not take it though). monopolist has a good timeline on this.

Alternatively, there is the slight chance that following a victory at Cannae, if Hannibal had marched towards Rome, the Roman senate might have capitulated (there was actually a fierce debate on whether to concede following Cannae OTL).


Now was a Hannibalic victory unlikely? Yes? Impossible-I think you are giving Rome far too much credit here. It was a much closer thing than you would like us to believe.
 
Top