Was Malta worth hanging on to?

so, was Malta worth hanging on to?


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It seems when you consider the extra planes used in the Demaynsk airlift operating from decent Baltic state fields, that the Germans would be able to use JU88s at least not used bombing Malta in the November to January 41 time frame at least for their typical train busting roles and such. I think it was Wilking that brought up in his 3 little fish thread that after the withdrawal of air to the med in November 41 there were only 8!!! operational aircraft left to support typhoon in its final phases and this is before the weather got really bad.

So I am thinking that the Germans could gainfully use extra aircraft at least in certain situations and times in the winter of 41-42 (how about the siege of Sevastopol where the airfields would be considerably behind the front.

If the Germans only manage as an improvement over OTL to keep a land line open to Demanysk in Winter 41 the Luftwaffe becomes much more effective in 1942 without having to supply the place by air.

Also it seems if the supply link from Naples to Tripoli was pretty much secure now, that the Italians instead of working on craft and plans to invade Malta would be working on craft and plans to have coastal shipping move stuff from Tripoli to little ports or just to right on the beach near the front lines. Sboat and submarines busy OTL patrolling and mining Malta could escort the coastal shipping. Just getting the stuff across the med intact, its a whole lot easier to protect if moving off the coast, even if you have to use bigger ships to move it to Benghazi or Tobruk
 
Depends, if the Wallied invasion is delayed then more of what ended up fighting them will end up in the East instead

Which is totally inadequate to substantially slow down the Soviets in 1943-1944, even if we don't assume a greater Soviet victory at Kursk (which actually accelerates the Soviet victory by a few months) discussed above. A delay for the WAllies of a few months (which is what losing Malta would entail) puts practically no additional delay on the Soviet advance. You need to delay the WAllies by a year to impose a delay of even a few months on the Soviets.
 

Deleted member 1487

Which is totally inadequate to substantially slow down the Soviets in 1943-1944, even if we don't assume a greater Soviet victory at Kursk (which actually accelerates the Soviet victory by a few months) discussed above. A delay for the WAllies of a few months (which is what losing Malta would entail) puts practically no additional delay on the Soviet advance. You need to delay the WAllies by a year to impose a delay of even a few months on the Soviets.
The 2200 AFVs used and lost in Normandy were a huge part of German AFVs in July 1944, about double what was on hand for Bagration with AG-Center.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Overlord
2,200[9] – ~2,300 tanks and assault guns[10]
 
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The 2200 AFVs used and lost in Normandy were a huge part of German AFVs in July 1944, about double what was on hand for Bagration with AG-Center.

To begin with, 2,200 AFVs represents less then half of what the Germans had on the Eastern Front at the start of the Soviet summer strategic offensive in 1944. Furthermore, Bagration was was merely one of several operations which happened in the June-August period so you are deliberately ignoring massive German losses for stuff like L'vov-Sandomierz and other operations that made up the Soviet strategic summer offensive. Finally, pretty much all of those AFVs would still be in the West as the Germans would still be expecting a WAllied invasion in the summer of 1944. This would also mean the Germans would only send a small portion of those AFVs eastward after the Soviet offensive begins and, given the sheer rapidity with which the Soviet attack unfolded and German defenses collapsed, they would arrive too late to have any meaningful impact and then would have to be sent right back westward when the WAllies do land in August or September. So the Soviets would end the summer with the Ostheer smashed, their front north of the Caucasus on the Vistula, and their front south of the carpathians poised to launch a massive drive through the Balkans. Or in other words: the same situation at the end of summer 1944 IOTL.
 
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I think wiking meant twice the number of AFVs with AGC specifically.

That would be addressed by the "only paying attention to Bagration and ignoring the entire rest of the Eastern Front" point.

It's like only paying attention to what Patton's 3rd Army did in a analysis of the entire Battle of Normandy.


Can't comment on the details, but a basic debunking of a pretty key part of his central thesis (that is "land power did not win WW2, air and sea power did") is pretty easy, at least for the European theatre. Basically, if winning the air and naval wars were that important, then Germany should have surrendered before Normandy even happened, as that the air and naval wars in Europe had been won before that. It did not. The air and naval wars were certainly a necessary perquisite for the WAllies to stave off defeat and get their foot in the door to the land war, but it was still necessary for the ground war to be won. And IOTL it was the Soviet Union that was the main engine in winning the ground war in Europe. That is not to say it would have had to have been the case in some ATL: had the Soviets somehow been defeated or (rather more plausibly) stayed neutral, then the burden of winning the ground war could have been fulfilled just as well by the Americans. The blood price would just have been a few million American lives.

This same hole in the theory can also be displayed by positing another counter-factual: had Germany managed, through whatever ASB-induced luck, to stalemate the WAllies in the air and naval war but gone on to lose the ground war against the Soviet Union* then what difference would it have made that the WAllies failed to achieve victory in the air and naval war? It would be like the Cold War joke: a Soviet general at a victory parade in Paris turns to another and goes "So tell me Sergei, who won the air war?" This is actually illustrated to a degree IOTL: the turning of the tide in the ground war (Stalingrad, Winter 1942/43) came before final victory in the naval and air wars had been achieved (those came in 1943 and 1944, respectively).

The Pacific is another matter because Japan was primarily an island power (like Britain) and thus her defeat was something of an inversion: air and naval forces playing the primary role, while ground forces acting in the auxiliary one. So in the case of WW2 in the Pacific, his thesis is correct.

The basic difference here, as you might be able to tell, are geographic. A continental power like mid-war Germany or Russia/the Soviet Union primarily draws it's resources from the bulk of a continent while an island power like Britain or Japan is dependent on imports from overseas (both colonial empires and trade partners) to the homeland. Thus victory or defeat in a naval-air war for a island power is a life or death matter while for a continental power it is at best an annoyance and at worst an extreme deficiency. The US is unique (and exceptionally advantaged) in that it is a continental power with the positioning of an island power.

Of course, the above mainly applies to conventional war. Nuclear war is a whole 'nother ballgame.

*I know you might dispute the plausibility and/or possibility of that Wiking, so if you do then just please humor me on this and inject whatever ASB reasoning you need into it. The how is secondary to my point here and god knows I've dealt with enough of your handwaving on similar issues so you can deal with one on mine
 
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That would be addressed by the "only paying attention to Bagration and ignoring the entire rest of the Eastern Front" point.

It's like only paying attention to what Patton's 3rd Army did in a analysis of the entire Battle of Normandy.



Can't comment on the details, but a basic debunking of a pretty key part of his central thesis (that is "land power did not win WW2, air and sea power did") is pretty easy, at least for the European theatre. Basically, if winning the air and naval wars were that important, then Germany should have surrendered before Normandy even happened, as that the air and naval wars in Europe had been won before that. It did not. The air and naval wars were certainly a necessary perquisite for the WAllies to stave off defeat and get their foot in the door to the land war, but it was still necessary for the ground war to be won. And IOTL it was the Soviet Union that was the main engine in winning the ground war in Europe. That is not to say it would have had to have been the case in some ATL: had the Soviets somehow been defeated or (rather more plausibly) stayed neutral, then the burden of winning the ground war could have been fulfilled just as well by the Americans. The blood price would just have been a few million American lives.

This same hole in the theory can also be displayed by positing another counter-factual: had Germany managed, through whatever ASB-induced luck, to stalemate the WAllies in the air and naval war but gone on to lose the ground war against the Soviet Union* then what difference would it have made that the WAllies failed to achieve victory in the air and naval war? It would be like the Cold War joke: a Soviet general at a victory parade in Paris turns to another and goes "So tell me Sergei, who won the air war?" This is actually illustrated to a degree IOTL: the turning of the tide in the ground war (Stalingrad, Winter 1942/43) came before final victory in the naval and air wars had been achieved (those came in 1943 and 1944, respectively).

The Pacific is another matter because Japan was primarily an island power (like Britain) and thus her defeat was something of an inversion: air and naval forces playing the primary role, while ground forces acting in the auxiliary one. So in the case of WW2 in the Pacific, his thesis is correct.

The basic difference here, as you might be able to tell, are geographic. A continental power like mid-war Germany or Russia/the Soviet Union primarily draws it's resources from the bulk of a continent while an island power like Britain or Japan is dependent on imports from overseas (both colonial empires and trade partners) to the homeland. Thus victory or defeat in a naval-air war for a island power is a life or death matter while for a continental power it is at best an annoyance and at worst an extreme deficiency. The US is unique (and exceptionally advantaged) in that it is a continental power with the positioning of an island power.

Of course, the above mainly applies to conventional war. Nuclear war is a whole 'nother ballgame.

*I know you might dispute the plausibility and/or possibility of that Wiking, so if you do then just please humor me on this and inject whatever ASB reasoning you need into it. The how is secondary to my point here and god knows I've dealt with enough of your handwaving on similar issues so you can deal with one on mine

I know that this reply was not primarily directed at me, but I think the point that the air and seapower advocates would make is not that the Eastern Front wasn't decisive but that it was the air and sea war that allowed it to be. From Mark Harrison, The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison, page 10, the combined economies of Germany (not counting France and other occupied countries), Austria, and Italy in 1942 (in billions of 1990 dollars) were 417, 27, and 145 respectively. The USSR was 318, in other words, outmatched by nearly 2-1. The reason why those Axis powers were unable to bring all those resources to bear on the Soviet Union was a combination of the blockade, strategic bombing, and the resources that had to be directed towards the air force and navy that would otherwise have gone to the ground forces. Without these there would have been no Stalingrad, and even if there was it would not have been a tide-turning victory because the Axis would have had a far, far easier time replacing its losses.
 

Deleted member 1487

Can't comment on the details, but a basic debunking of a pretty key part of his central thesis (that is "land power did not win WW2, air and sea power did") is pretty easy, at least for the European theatre. Basically, if winning the air and naval wars were that important, then Germany should have surrendered before Normandy even happened, as that the air and naval wars in Europe had been won before that. It did not. The air and naval wars were certainly a necessary perquisite for the WAllies to stave off defeat and get their foot in the door to the land war, but it was still necessary for the ground war to be won. And IOTL it was the Soviet Union that was the main engine in winning the ground war in Europe. That is not to say it would have had to have been the case in some ATL: had the Soviets somehow been defeated or (rather more plausibly) stayed neutral, then the burden of winning the ground war could have been fulfilled just as well by the Americans. The blood price would just have been a few million American lives.

This same hole in the theory can also be displayed by positing another counter-factual: had Germany managed, through whatever ASB-induced luck, to stalemate the WAllies in the air and naval war but gone on to lose the ground war against the Soviet Union* then what difference would it have made that the WAllies failed to achieve victory in the air and naval war? It would be like the Cold War joke: a Soviet general at a victory parade in Paris turns to another and goes "So tell me Sergei, who won the air war?" This is actually illustrated to a degree IOTL: the turning of the tide in the ground war (Stalingrad, Winter 1942/43) came before final victory in the naval and air wars had been achieved (those came in 1943 and 1944, respectively).

The Pacific is another matter because Japan was primarily an island power (like Britain) and thus her defeat was something of an inversion: air and naval forces playing the primary role, while ground forces acting in the auxiliary one. So in the case of WW2 in the Pacific, his thesis is correct.

The basic difference here, as you might be able to tell, are geographic. A continental power like mid-war Germany or Russia/the Soviet Union primarily draws it's resources from the bulk of a continent while an island power like Britain or Japan is dependent on imports from overseas (both colonial empires and trade partners) to the homeland. Thus victory or defeat in a naval-air war for a island power is a life or death matter while for a continental power it is at best an annoyance and at worst an extreme deficiency. The US is unique (and exceptionally advantaged) in that it is a continental power with the positioning of an island power.

Of course, the above mainly applies to conventional war. Nuclear war is a whole 'nother ballgame.

*I know you might dispute the plausibility and/or possibility of that Wiking, so if you do then just please humor me on this and inject whatever ASB reasoning you need into it. The how is secondary to my point here and god knows I've dealt with enough of your handwaving on similar issues so you can deal with one on mine

I'd recommend you check out his thesis, the sea war part was mainly about the Japanese, though there was a considerable part of the German war effort put into the naval war; as he says until 1943 there was more steel invested in uboat construction than Panzers per year. By 1943 over 2/3rds of spending was directed to naval and the non-East Front air war and the German army was only getting some 35% of the military spending budget by 1942.

As CrimsonKing points out the issue isn't that the ground war was unnecessary to final victory, it was that the air war and to a lesser degree in Europe the naval war enabled the ground victory. Much more was spent on fighting the air war than the ground war in the end and the bombing ended up costing more AFVs than the Eastern Front in 1943-45 due to production destruction/disruption and actual units lost to bombing at depots, at rail yards, in factories, on the way to the front, and while actually at the front.

As already noted Ellis in Brute Force points out that for the yearly average less than half of Germany's AFVs were on the Eastern Front by 1942 through 1945; it would seem they were used to guard coasts, on other fronts, refitting units, raising new units, in reserve, etc.

Removing the strategic air war then frees up so many resources that were invested in defending against it and in production savings (much of the loss was not just bomb damage or disruption, but dispersal of production and lost manhours from absenteeism due to dehousing, sickness, lost sleep, etc.) that makes the ground war much more costly, perhaps too costly.
 
timing matters

It depends on when Malta falls....

if it falls just after the Italians enter the war, then political damage is minimized as it is just part of the general chain of disaster caused by the Fall of France. The Fleet is already elsewhere, and air losses are minimal, and ground forces lost aren't unbearable.

Losing Malta in 1941 as part of the Fall of Greece might also be politically less painful. For the same reasons as above, although at that point enough military resources have been put into Malta to make it very painful.

Any time after that the Fall of Malta becomes a very significant political disaster for Churchill. He did face a no confidence vote after Tobruk fell, which he survived easily enough. Losing Malta would surely cause a no confidence vote and depending on when it occurred, potentially disastrous consequences for the British government.

As to its military effects. It was untenable from 1940-42 as a fleet base for anything beyond submarines and aircraft (sometimes) because of heavy Axis bombing. The submarines gained (depending on fuel availability on Malta) some extra patrol time, which usually translated into loiter time on station (and thus more tonnage sunk). Strike and recce aircraft benefited as well, when they could operate at all depending on Axis pressure. It was submarines that did most of the sinkings though, and they can operate just as well from Alexandria and Gibraltar albeit at a loss of loiter time. Although keep in mind running out of torpedoes is a far bigger problem than fuel for submarines usually in World War II. They can only carry so many, and after a few attacks are pretty much out of ammo except for self defense. It would add in travel time for them to return to base to rearm though, and that would make them less efficient and reduce Axis losses somewhat.

But ultimately I think the RN would have still waged an extremely effective campaign against Italian shipping. The submariners of the RN had their Finest Hour in the Med and inflicted staggering losses. Without Malta it would have been more difficult but not decisively so.

Creveld in "Supplying War' overwhelmingly and I think conclusively proves that there is simply no way, without a massive expansion of port facilities at Benghazi and Tobruk, that Rommel will ever have enough trucks to move supply tonnages necessary to support a ground force much larger than he had. As it was, his force, about the size of an army group (including the Italians) at its largest had 1/4 of the logistics truck transportation units of the entire Wehrmacht, while the rest were in the Eastern Front. There were no more to send him, and not enough rubber or spare parts to support any more if they were built anyway.

Malta is not why Rommel lacks the logistics to conquer Egypt. Lack of resources was. There were some important sinkings of Italian convoys with critical cargos, but with Ultra, the British would still have been able to get their submarines into position, and if critical enough, a surface force would be sent, in spite of the risks of heavy losses.

The Pedestal convoys and similar relief attempts were extremely costly in warship losses and merchant shipping tonnage lost to the British. Not to mention cargoes lost as well, and obviously the heavy casualties.

I tend to believe ultimately Malta was worth keeping, but only barely in terms of cost effectiveness, and after mid 1941 its primary importance was morale instead of military. By the time Malta was a useful base again the Campaign in North Africa was all but won. Its usefulness for invading Sicily was there, but really the value of Sicily has been argued by a number of historians.
 
I'd recommend you check out his thesis, the sea war part was mainly about the Japanese, though there was a considerable part of the German war effort put into the naval war; as he says until 1943 there was more steel invested in uboat construction than Panzers per year. By 1943 over 2/3rds of spending was directed to naval and the non-East Front air war and the German army was only getting some 35% of the military spending budget by 1942.

As CrimsonKing points out the issue isn't that the ground war was unnecessary to final victory, it was that the air war and to a lesser degree in Europe the naval war enabled the ground victory. Much more was spent on fighting the air war than the ground war in the end and the bombing ended up costing more AFVs than the Eastern Front in 1943-45 due to production destruction/disruption and actual units lost to bombing at depots, at rail yards, in factories, on the way to the front, and while actually at the front.

As already noted Ellis in Brute Force points out that for the yearly average less than half of Germany's AFVs were on the Eastern Front by 1942 through 1945; it would seem they were used to guard coasts, on other fronts, refitting units, raising new units, in reserve, etc.

Removing the strategic air war then frees up so many resources that were invested in defending against it and in production savings (much of the loss was not just bomb damage or disruption, but dispersal of production and lost manhours from absenteeism due to dehousing, sickness, lost sleep, etc.) that makes the ground war much more costly, perhaps too costly.

a number of historians have pointed out (including Hastings in "Armeggedon") that the Air War was a Second Front all by itself. Flak and other defenses soaked up 2 million personnel, and anywhere from 1/4 to 1/2 of the entire artillery production of the Third Reich, not to mention forcing the deployment of the majority of fighter units to home defense by 1943 with serious consequences to the battle field.

It didn't win the war, but Strategic Bombing was a vital part of it, and probably worth the staggering losses suffered by the RAF and USAAF.
 

Deleted member 1487

a number of historians have pointed out (including Hastings in "Armeggedon") that the Air War was a Second Front all by itself. Flak and other defenses soaked up 2 million personnel, and anywhere from 1/4 to 1/2 of the entire artillery production of the Third Reich, not to mention forcing the deployment of the majority of fighter units to home defense by 1943 with serious consequences to the battle field.

It didn't win the war, but Strategic Bombing was a vital part of it, and probably worth the staggering losses suffered by the RAF and USAAF.
The losses of the RAF/USAAF probably saved several times more lives than were lost in their bombing effort. A couple hundred thousand lives lost in the bomber campaign on the Wallied side easily saved 1 million Soviet lives and who knows how many Wallied ones.
 

Deleted member 1487

The Pedestal convoys and similar relief attempts were extremely costly in warship losses and merchant shipping tonnage lost to the British. Not to mention cargoes lost as well, and obviously the heavy casualties.

I tend to believe ultimately Malta was worth keeping, but only barely in terms of cost effectiveness, and after mid 1941 its primary importance was morale instead of military. By the time Malta was a useful base again the Campaign in North Africa was all but won. Its usefulness for invading Sicily was there, but really the value of Sicily has been argued by a number of historians.
So what if Pedestal fails and Malta falls? IIRC there was a cancelled Italian cruiser sortie against the effort that was called off, but had it been launched would have likely destroyed the supply ships and maybe would have been the coup de grace of the naval force entirely.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pedestal#Aftermath
The arrival of the four merchant ships, and the survival of the tanker Ohio ensured the arrival of enough materials to maintain the island, but it did not mean its siege was at an end. The ultimate result of Operation Pedestal was that it ensured that Malta stayed in the war. For the high price of nine merchantmen sunk, one aircraft carrier (Eagle), two cruisers (Manchester and Cairo), and a destroyer (Foresight) sunk, the Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy had saved Malta, as roughly 32,000 short tons (29,000 t) of general cargo had reached the Grand Harbour, together with petrol, oil fuel, kerosene and diesel fuel, enough to give the island about ten weeks more life beyond the existing stocks of only a few weeks. Royal Navy gunners and Fleet Air Arm fighters shot down 42 of the approximately 330 attacking Axis aircraft.[34]

So if Malta then falls due to the lack of supplies by the end of August 1942 due to the failure of Pedestal and the sinking of most of the ships used, what are the political consequences in Britain? I'm assuming that the fall of Malta means no real change for Rommel in Egypt, but maybe in late 1942 as he falls back on Benghazi (IOTL 3/4s of the shipping sent to him by December were lost to Malta based attacks, severely reducing his ability to resist the 8th army). What happens in the meantime?
 
So what if Pedestal fails and Malta falls? IIRC there was a cancelled Italian cruiser sortie against the effort that was called off, but had it been launched would have likely destroyed the supply ships and maybe would have been the coup de grace of the naval force entirely.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pedestal#Aftermath


So if Malta then falls due to the lack of supplies by the end of August 1942 due to the failure of Pedestal and the sinking of most of the ships used, what are the political consequences in Britain? I'm assuming that the fall of Malta means no real change for Rommel in Egypt, but maybe in late 1942 as he falls back on Benghazi (IOTL 3/4s of the shipping sent to him by December were lost to Malta based attacks, severely reducing his ability to resist the 8th army). What happens in the meantime?

the short answer is bad for Churchill. I am still not convinced it would topple him (after all it wasn't as bad as losing Singapore) but it would be viewed as a major disaster far worse than losing Tobruk. I would expect a vote of no confidence and a much closer result than the historical one.

He would probably have to sack some people too, and Pound would be the most likely candidate

As for Benghazi, the problem with that port is that it simply could not handle the same kind of tonnage that Tripoli can in terms of harbor space, wharf capacity, warehouse space etc. It also was a lot closer to Allied bombers which routinely hammered it.
 
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What about the lorries that went down with the ships? If they had got through they would have been available to transport the extra supplies to the front.

Unless the lorries are tankers, they are not going to be much use when the bulk oil tanker docks. Even if you drain every last tanker truck from Europe, then there is the issue of the road, it only has so much capacity.

OK send it all in drums in standard cargo ships but then you need the resources to make those drums and are still going to need to drain Europe of every last truck to carry those drums.
 
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