Was Japan doomed to lose?

Not really what happened at Stalingrad. US entry into Africa coupled with German overextension and Hitler's strategic insanity finally all caught up. Soviet generals did nothing outside of the massing overwhelming force against overextended and strung out forces deep in the USSR heartland. To get to that point something like 7 million Soviet troops died to that point in the war (including the PoWs in German custody starved to death) with millions more still in captivity and who knows how many millions of wounded. Pretty much nothing more than having unlimited willingness to sacrifice life for victory, US and UK allies, US and UK L-L, and an enemy that made fatal strategic mistakes and put their head out to be lopped off.

The real Soviet competency and skill came out in 1944-45.

It was what happened, demonstrably the Soviets proved their mastery over two field marshals, one of whom was the best the Germans had. You do not specify the gap in 1942-43 Soviet operational art/operational design and 1944-45, and how significant it is, for one thing. The 1941 issue of Soviet mechanized corps that were founded on overly optimistic and unrealistic objectives rather than on what would be required or what could practically be mobilized for a war, that was reversed at Stalingrad, tank armies first were seen there. That being said, I would agree that is merely a combat tool whose intrinsic effectiveness depends upon the talent of the user, as you are kind of stipulating. Multi-front operations were seen as early as Moscow and the STAVKA representatives--something that I would critique as imperfect. And the original Operation Saturn did not happen because of Stalin so this is unfair. And the Soviets very nearly trapped the 9th army of the Germans at Kursk. Kursk was a total failure (the OP asks if Germany could win the war of course). The Red Army took advantage of the LUCY spy ring at Kursk, they didn't have it going for them in 1941.

And to answer your question, those 7 million and all the civilians that would be lost were unavoidable OTL (in any of the options available to the Red Army to stabilize the front far closer to the border as far as I am concerned), but the appropriate measures were not taken prewar due to gross negligence on the part of the Stalinist regime, these losses were unnecessary. The mechanized corps issues were due to negligence. The fact that the country was not mobilized beforehand was due to negligence.

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Deleted member 1487

It was what happened, demonstrably the Soviets proved their mastery over two field marshals, one of whom was the best the Germans had. You do not specify the gap in 1942-43 Soviet operational art/operational design and 1944-45, and how significant it is, for one thing. The 1941 issue of Soviet mechanized corps that were founded on overly optimistic and unrealistic objectives rather than on what would be required or what could practically be mobilized for a war, that was reversed at Stalingrad, tank armies first were seen there. That being said, I would agree that is merely a combat tool whose intrinsic effectiveness depends upon the talent of the user, as you are kind of stipulating. Multi-front operations were seen as early as Moscow and the STAVKA representatives--something that I would critique as imperfect. And the original Operation Saturn did not happen because of Stalin so this is unfair. And the Soviets very nearly trapped the 9th army of the Germans at Kursk. Kursk was a total failure (the OP asks if Germany could win the war of course). The Red Army took advantage of the LUCY spy ring at Kursk, they didn't have it going for them in 1941.

Tank armies were seen during the early stages of Case Blue and were annihilated in all but name, while being smashed again while deploying in front of Stalingrad in July-August. Their first success only came after the Germans overextended themselves and stripped out their forces to go all in on the Caucasus and Stalingrad proper, while 3rd Tank Army failed during Operation Mars. So really in 1942 Hitler beat himself at Stalingrad/the Caucasus. BTW the Germans also had to strip out their reserves in the air and their last Panzer Army to deploy to Africa to confront Operation Torch, which made responding to the crisis in the East effectively impossible.

In response to the Soviet 'operational art' bit...prior to late 1943-1944 it was really much like Conrad von Hötzendorff's plans in WW1: nice arrows on a map with limited connection to the capabilities of forces on the ground. Then it required massive numerical superiority to work and forces capable of carrying out even part of what was ordered; by late 1943-1944 that capability matured, allowing the tactical means (plus skills of the planners) to match the operational concepts. Certainly the concepts were extremely advanced, but all the elements that would make them work took time to mature...as well as a massive weakening of the German forces both due to attrition (and a lot of dead Soviets) plus massive intervention by the Wallies.

Where did the Soviets almost trap the 9th army at Kursk? They did no such thing; Kursk was called off because of operation Husky and the transfer of German forces to Italy. Lucy had not special impact on Kursk, it was pretty obvious where the attack was going to be to everyone, which is why the Soviets started fortifying the area before Hitler even set a date for the offensive.

And to answer your question, those 7 million and all the civilians that would be lost were unavoidable OTL (in any of the options available to the Red Army to stabilize the front far closer to the border as far as I am concerned), but the appropriate measures were not taken prewar due to gross negligence on the part of the Stalinist regime, these losses were unnecessary. The mechanized corps issues were due to negligence. The fact that the country was not mobilized beforehand was due to negligence.
That's debatable; the much of the losses later in 1941 and in 1942 were avoidable, but due to gross incompetence and Stalin's meddling they happened. The Mechanized Corps issues in terms of OOB were not due to negligence, but rather faulty understanding of what was needed organizationally due to lack of appropriate combat experience; in terms of practical material deficits...that was a function of the modernization of equipment that was going on and the lack of industrial output prior to the invasion...not sure you can call that negligence per se. It probably would have been a workable organization with some additional years to try out the OOB in war games and once it had proper TOE as well as officers who gained experience in their new positions after the purges.

In terms of Stalin not mobilizing in 1941...that's a huge discussion onto itself and somewhat understandable given the faulty intel picture (they got the invasion date wrong repeatedly, which lulled Stalin into a false sense of security, plus he didn't believe that anyone would try to invade so late in the season) and Stalin being personally suckered by Hitler, who apparently wrote Stalin directly to explain the build up of forces on the border.
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-...es/studies/vol50no1/9_BK_What_Stalin_Knew.htm
 
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The Mechanized Corps issues in terms of OOB were not due to negligence, but rather faulty understanding of what was needed organizationally due to lack of appropriate combat experience; in terms of practical material deficits...that was a function of the modernization of equipment that was going on and the lack of industrial output prior to the invasion...not sure you can call that negligence per se. It probably would have been a workable organization with some additional years to try out the OOB in war games and once it had proper TOE as well as officers who gained experience in their new positions after the purges. ...

Everyone had imperfect organizations in the early years, even Guderian. I was surprised to see the French organization of the DLM was ahead of everyone else in many respects. Most oversized their tank divisions and were slow in reducing them to something manageable with 1940s communications.
 

Deleted member 1487

Everyone had imperfect organizations in the early years, even Guderian. I was surprised to see the French organization of the DLM was ahead of everyone else in many respects. Most oversized their tank divisions and were slow in reducing them to something manageable with 1940s communications.
Ironically the Soviets went backwards with the Mechanized Corps org compared to their 1939 motorized division (effectively a tank division)...though it was workable in combat provided they had rectified the poor ratio of supply trucks to combat units, had sufficient radios, and had commanders skilled enough to handle full mobile corps formations.

Guderian never actually learned the lesson of reducing numbers of tanks per division, in 1943 when he became inspector of the tank forces he pushed for a return to the 400 tank division of 1940!

Its not that surprising that the French were in the lead in terms of organization given their lack of radios and uninterrupted experience with using and developing their armor units from WW1 to 1940; it is more surprising to me that the Brits neglected the lessons of their Experimental Mechanized Force.
 
But we digress.

When Japan invaded china for the third time, Could they win any war on the Major scale?
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It was not Japans place to win a war against a major opponent. The best they can hope for is any enemy will lose it through a lack of will or gross incompetency. That worked for them in their first war with China in the 1890s & gave them a good start against the Russian Empire in 1904. In 1937 it game them a good start as well, but the KMT government managed to hang on & was still fighting in 1940. Not good since Japan lacked the financial and industrial strength for a long war. I see the same problem were Japan to attack the USSR vs China. While they might win some early campaigns, & I don't see that as certain, the Soviet government can play a longer game, even with German interference. Only if the Soviet government completely rolls over for Japan or disintegrates can Japan gain the Northern Resource Area.

Japans best route to 'winning' WWII is to have enough of the maverick army officers shot the central government can regain control. Then negotiate something with China, at least for the short term, and mend fences with Britain. This allows Japan to go to war with the Axis and end up on the winning side as in 1918. At least in this case they can retain their own empire through 1945 & some time beyond.
 
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Guderian never actually learned the lesson of reducing numbers of tanks per division, in 1943 when he became inspector of the tank forces he pushed for a return to the 400 tank division of 1940!

Its not that surprising that the French were in the lead in terms of organization given their lack of radios and uninterrupted experience with using and developing their armor units from WW1 to 1940; it is more surprising to me that the Brits neglected the lessons of their Experimental Mechanized Force.

Guderians idea for a armored division fit his idea of it as a "strategic" weapon. What his ideas in size pointed to was closer to a armored corps with a division HQ.

The French DLM was a organization of the cavalry who were separated somewhat from the mainstream doctrines of the Army. Tho officially organized in the late 1930s the development went back into the 1920s. Some where along the way the officers involved in this grasped the idea of not overloading the formation with tanks and keeping the ratio of tanks to artillery and infantry manageable. They also grasped better extending combined arms down to the lower levels, hence the mixed formations of light tanks and mechanized infantry in the dragoon regiment. Not the perfect solution, but better at the moment than the others. Last they kept the artillery of the division under the centralized control/decentralized execution doctrine, vs piece mealing control of sub groups out to the maneuver commanders. That allowed rapid massing of multi battalion concentrations at critical points in the maneuver battle.
 
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